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FOREWORD
Sports Law, there is no such thing. Sports Law is simply law as it
applies to sports. Therefore, Sports Law encompasses contract law, tort
law, intellectual property law, corporate law, etc.... What has been the
cause of the current explosion in this relatively new area of law? The
primary reason is sports today is big business. Professional player contracts exceeding six figures, multimillion dollar television contracts, and
individual product endorsements are just a few examples of the big
bucks involved in the industry. Moreover, as college sports gain popularity, the pressure to win often has more to do with additional revenues
than student-athletes' educational experience.
For better or for worse the lawyer's role in sports is increasingly
important. This point is clear when considering that the four largest
professional team sport leagues in North America all have lawyers as
their respective commissioner or president. Furthermore, professional
teams and university athletic departments have or soon will be required
to hire in-house attorneys to efficiently meet the burgeoning legal issues
evolving in sports. As business and other aspects of our society demand
good lawyers to positively contribute to the system, the future of sports
also needs such contributions. However, the most important thing that
needs to be preserved is the Game itself.
Lawyers and businessmen alike should not lose sight of the fact that
sports were created to provide fun and challenge to those who play, and
entertainment to those who watch. The lawyer's role in the sports industry should be proactive. Lawyers must deal with vital issues such as
players' rights without jeopardizing the quality of each sport. Intercollegiate athletics must step back and reevaluate current demands on the
student-athlete, and focus more on educating rather than winning. Nevertheless, the reality is that law can play an important role in the sports
industry, but to do so there should be more thought and dialogue addressing the legal aspects of sports.
The purpose of this Sports Law Symposium Issue is to provide a
scholarly forum for current and emerging legal topics that relate to
sports. The articles included provide positive and meaningful analysis
of their respective subjects. The Editor wishes to thank Leslie Speed
Greene and Jon J. Franklin for their assistance and support, and all of
the individuals that contributed to the issue.
Kurt F. Overhardt
Symposium Editor

LARRY FLEISHER,

1930-1989

DEDICATION IN MEMORY OF
LARRY FLEISHER
MARK

H.

McCORMACK

I first met Larry Fleisher back in the early '60's. I remember the
location: The Brasserie Restaurant in the Seagram Building in New
York City. The specifics of our discussion back then are long forgotten.
But I remember being very impressed with Larry and his vision about
the rights of professional athletes. At that point in time, the business of
representing professional athletes, which I was doing, was very new and
the business of running a labor union for athletes, which Larry was doing, was also very new.
Larry and I were to forge a strong tie together many years later, but
we didn't know that then. In the meantime, Larry was to make valuable
and lasting contributions to the sport of basketball in his capacity as
leader of the union and my company, International Management Group,
I like to think, became the leader in the business of representing
athletes.
After graduating from Harvard Law School and practicing law for
10 years, Larry was asked by Tommy Heinsohn, then a player for the
Boston Celtics, to help form a players organization within the National
Basketball Association. The immediate goal was to obtain a pension for
NBA players. This led to the formation of the National Basketball Players Association, the first real players' union in professional sports. Larry
organized the players into electing a group of officers and player representatives-one from each team. For more than 25 years, Larry served,
without salary, as General Counsel of the NBA Players Association.
Throughout the 1960's, Larry, along with union president Oscar
Robertson and others, fought for and obtained an NBA pension as well
as other player benefits, including minimum salaries. These were firsts
for professional athletes. In the late 1960's, Larry began representing
professional basketball players. His first client was Princeton graduate
and Rhodes scholar, Bill Bradley, a member of the New York Knicks.
Larry went on to represent hundreds of other players in the NBA, including John Havlicek, Bob Lanier, Paul Silas, Junior Bridgeman, Willis
Reed,Jerry West, Lenny Wilkens and Dave DeBusschere, to name just a
few.
With the advent of the American Basketball Association in the late
1960's, Larry helped the ABA survive and later flourish by signing players such as Zelmo Beatty, Billy Cunningham and Joe Caldwell with ABA
teams and encouraging other established players to join the new league.
In the 1970's, Fleisher began his long fight to obtain some form of
free agency for NBA players that would permit players to move more
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easily to a different team at the end of their contracts and to be paid
fairly based on a competitive marketplace for their skills. Again, together with Oscar Robertson and other players, Larry launched a six
year struggle to win some economic freedom for professional basketball
players. At Fleisher's insistence, the NBA players filed the first free
agency lawsuit. A controversial battle ensued between NBA players and
NBA owners in the courts, in Congress and before the National Labor
Relations Board. The resolution of that controversy in 1976 became
known as the Oscar Robertson Settlement and was hailed at the time as an
innovative solution. The settlement constituted a 10 year experiment in
new forms of free agency and permitted the long sought NBA-ABA
merger to be completed.
Later in the 1970's, Fleisher began to see the potential for professional basketball's popularity worldwide. As a player agent, he sent a
number of his clients to play in Italy and other European countries
thereby not only expanding the market for their skills, but also extending the longevity of their careers. In addition, he organized summer tours around the world for members of the Players' Association
including games in Brazil, Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, Israel and the People's Republic of China.
As the 1980's began, Larry Fleisher was once again at the forefront
of developments in professional basketball. He and the NBA players
entered into the first anti-drug agreement in professional sports which
provided both for counseling and penalties for players involved with the
use of hard drugs. Larry also sensed that it was time for the players to
tie themselves more closely to the overall fortunes of the NBA and its
members. He was confident of the future of pro basketball because of
the potential growth from new sources of revenue, such as cable television. He once again negotiated an innovative agreement with the NBA.
This time the agreement provided for players to be guaranteed a percentage of NBA league revenues and a team salary cap which was to be
flexible and which would keep pace with the growth of league revenue.
Once again his solution was hailed as innovative and, as in the past, is
serving as a blueprint for other professional team sports.
Larry Fleisher was not only a skilled attorney but, by all accounts, a
master negotiator. He was tough, but fair. He learned how to push a
good idea into a great one. And he knew the cardinal rule of negotiating: No matter how tense the circumstances, never leave the table. The
proof? In his 26 years as head of a very successful union, Larry never
had to call a single strike.
Meanwhile, our company, International Management Group, had
become pre-eminent in its business of representing athletes throughout
the world. IMG's traditional strengths were in the non-team sports areas, such as golf and tennis. In the mid-1980's, we decided that we
wanted IMG to be the major force in team sports, as well. Although we
had represented team sport athletes for many years, we had never devoted the necessary personnel resources to be a dominant factor.
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In 1987, IMG acquired the firm of Reich, Landman & Berry, headed
by Tom Reich, which was the leader in the representation of baseball
players. The following year, we hired Ralph Cindrich, a Pittsburghbased lawyer, who was one of the leading football agents.
Shortly thereafter, we learned that Larry Fleisher was planning to
retire as General Counsel of the NBPA once he had completed the new
collective bargaining agreement. We perceived that as a result of
Larry's vision and leadership, the National Basketball Association was
approaching an unprecedented era of labor peace and growth in which
all of the players would participate. We also felt that the sport of basketball was set to explode on an international level and that Larry was,
without question, the most knowledgeable player agent in basketball.
In October 1988, Larry and his two sons joined IMG to head up
IMG's Basketball Division. Larry desired to join IMG because he knew
basketball players had a need for the financial services and marketing
services which are IMG's hallmark. The idea was that Larry and his two
sons would continue to advise basketball players on contract negotiations with the NBA and throughout the world, and IMG's staff would
provide the players with financial and marketing services. This was to be
the perfect match: basketball's best contract negotiator with sport's best
provider of financial and marketing services to athletes. Alas, it was not
to be. Larry died suddenly of a heart attack in May of 1989. Yet, the
match remains strong and healthy, as Larry's sons, Marc and Eric, continue to lead IMG's Basketball Division guided by the principles and philosophies of their father.
During Larry Fleisher's nearly three decades in pro basketball the
game went from dingy arenas and back-page media coverage to spectacular new basketball palaces and prime time exposure. Larry had been
the first to recognize the need for a player organization and the first to
urge free agency on behalf of team sport players. Larry was in the forefront of the fight against drugs in sports and the first player leader to
form a partnership with a sports league. He was one of the first to grasp
the great international potential for basketball. It is appropriate that
this issue be dedicated to the memory of Larry Fleisher, a true sports
visionary.
Mark H. McCormack

PREFACE
The following three articles published in the Sports Law Symposium Issue address the merits of Powell v. National Football League and the
ongoing dispute between the National Football League ("NFL" or
"League") and the National Football League Players Association
("NFLPA").
While preparing to publish the Sports Law Symposium Issue, the
Denver University Law Review contacted legal representatives from
both the NFL and the NFLPA to obtain the views of each organization.
As a result of this effort, the NFL designated one of its attorneys in the
Powell litigation, Neil K. Roman, to present a summary of the League's
position; Mr. Roman's article appears first. The second article, written
by Ethan Lock, is Mr. Lock's personal understanding of the dispute as
perceived by the players.
In addition to the aforementioned position papers, Professor Burton F. Brody of the University of Denver College of Law submitted a
proposal discussing a possible resolution to the conflict between the
NFL and the NFLPA. The Denver University Law Review felt Professor
Brody's proposal would provide relevant content to the issue. Professor
Brody's proposal is the third article in the issue and represents the sole
view of the author and not that of the NFL or the NFLPA.

ILLEGAL PROCEDURE:

THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL

LEAGUE PLAYERS UNION'S IMPROPER USE OF
ANTITRUST LITIGATION FOR PURPOSES OF
.COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
NEIL

K.

ROMAN*

On October 15, 1987, the National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA" or "Union") ended its twenty-four day strike against
the National Football League ("NFL" or "League") and simultaneously
filed in federal district court in Minnesota an antitrust complaint against
the NFL and its twenty-eight member clubs.' Joined by nine-present or
former NFLPA officials on behalf of all NFL players, the Union's suit
challenges the League's system governing inter-team movement of veteran "free agent" players, 2 the annual college draft, the NFL player contract, and other employment terms. Each of these terms had been set
forth in at least two collective bargaining agreements, the most recent of
3
which had expired, with some notable exceptions, six weeks earlier.
From the beginning, the Powell litigation has constituted an improper attempt to involve the courts in a labor dispute and has been a
significant impediment to collective bargaining. When the Union
brought suit after only limited and sporadic efforts at bargaining, the
district court observed that the NFLPA was seeking "to gain through the
courts what they could not win at the bargaining table."' 4 When the district court ruled that the antitrust laws did not apply to the challenged
employment terms until such time as the parties reached an impasse in
negotiations, 5 the NFLPA declaredfor thefirst time that impasse had been
reached and thereafter refused to take any action - i.e., bargaining inconsistent with this position. And when the Eighth Circuit ruled that
the nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws "protects agreements conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship from
* Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. A.B. 1980, Bowdoin College;
J.D. 1985, Harvard University. I am grateful for the substantial assistance of Covington &
Burling colleagues John H. Schafer, Herbert Dym, Jeffrey Pash, and Richard Wm.
Buchanan.
1. Powell v. NFL, Civ. No. 4-87-917 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 1987).
2. Veteran free agents are players whose contracts have expired.
3. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football League
Management Council and the National Football League Players Association, art. XXXVIII,
§ 2 (Dec. I1,1982) [hereinafter 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement]. The most significant exception to the Agreement's general 1987 expiration date is for the provisions governing the college draft which continue "through at least 1992." 1982 Collective
Bargaining Agreement, art. XIII, § 1.
4. See Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 781 n.9 (D. Minn. 1988).
5. Id. at 788.
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[Sherman Act] challenges," 6 the NFLPA declined the court's invitation
to resume bargaining and instead announced plans to decertify and
abandon its bargaining rights. Indeed, at every turn, the Union has rejected bargaining or reliance on the labor laws in favor of its treble damage case.
At the heart of the dispute are the so-called "free agency" provisions. These provisions have their genesis in two collective bargaining
agreements - the 1977 and 1982 Agreements between the NFLPA and
the NFL Management Council, the collective bargaining representative
of the twenty-eight member clubs. Both agreements included versions
of a system governing the movement among NFL clubs of veteran players known as the "right of first refusal/compensation system."' 7 Under
this system, a club wishing to maintain contract rights with respect to
one of its veteran free agents is required to make a contract offer at a
specified salary level depending on the player's seniority. 8 If another
club then offers the player a contract, the former club has the option of
matching the offer and retaining rights to the player or receiving compensation from the signing club in the form of future draft choices, the
number and quality of which are to be determined by the player's salary
and seniority. 9 A substantially liberalized system implemented at the
start of the 1989 season permits each club to retain first refusal/compensation rights with respect to 37 of its approximately 55 players; the
rest are free to sign with any club without any first refusal or compensation rights. ' 0
Although the NFLPA has stated that its primary collective bargaining/litigation goal is "complete free agency" for every player, I I every
court that has addressed the issue has held that the NFL must have some
player reservation system to preserve and promote its "strong and
unique interest in maintaining competitive balance among its teams."' 12
"[C]omplete freedom of movement," the Eighth Circuit has held,
"would result in the best franchises acquiring most of the top players,"
would have a potentially "devastating effect" on NFL clubs, would be
"irresponsible," and would "endanger the continued employment prospects of" the players. 1 3 In Powell, the district court on two occasions
denied motions to enjoin implementation of player reservation systems
in part because of "[tihe danger that destruction of the competitive balance could ultimately lead to diminished spectator interest and franchise
6. See Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 568 (8th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-

1421 (Mar. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library,'Courts file).
7. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, at art. XV.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
11. Garvey, Foreword to The Scope of the Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports: A Perspective
on Collective Bargainingin the NFL, 1989 DUKE L.J. 328, 329. The author of the foreword, Ed

Garvey, was the Executive Director of the NFLPA from 1970-83.
12.

See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.

801 (1977).
13.

See Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 282, 287 (8th Cir. 1978).

1990]

ILLEGAL PROCEDURE

failures." 14
The NFL's system governing veteran player movement is an important element of an elaborate framework of rules and policies whose purpose is to maintain this competitive balance.1 5 Of those not involving
the allocation of players among teams, the most important is the clubs'
pooling of League revenues, including those from the League's national
television contracts.1 6 Because the NFL has clubs in cities of widely varying sizes and resources, the equal division of the majority of League
revenues allows clubs located in the smaller markets to compete effectively on the playing field with teams based in media centers. Nevertheless, in an earlier article published in the Duke Law Journal, Ethan Lock,
who is presenting his understanding of the NFLPA's position in this law
review, calls not only for the removal of restraints on veteran players,
but also for the elimination of the NFL's antitrust exemption for the
pooling of revenues and the League's internal rules restricting the
movement of franchises from one city to another. 1 7 Even Mr. Lock,
however, concedes that "the result might be a league with three
franchises in Los Angeles, New York and Chicago, and none in Kansas
18
City, Cincinnati, or Green Bay."'
Notwithstanding the restraints on movement,' 9 NFL players are
prospering. Their average salary has risen from $78,000 in 1980 to
more than $300,000 in 198920 with an additional $50-55,000 in collectively-bargained benefits. 2 ' At the top, contracts paying players in excess of $500,000 per year are common. 2 2 Although the best players
might be able to command still higher salaries if more teams were com14. See, e.g., Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812, 818 (D. Minn. 1988).
15. The annual college draft is another significant mechanism for ensuring that teams
have equal access to the best players while at the same time providing weaker teams an
opportunity to improve themselves. Through the draft, clubs secure rights to the top college players in inverse order of finish. The waiver system for players released by their
clubs operates in a similar fashion by giving clubs with the worst records the first opportunity to contract with players released by other clubs.
16. Other such policies include limits on roster size and a scheduling system that favors the weaker teams.
17. See Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339.
18. Id. at 407.
19. Although the NFLPA has attempted to characterize the issue as one of "freedom"
and "dignity," it is clear that the Union's demand for open bidding is motivated largely, if
not entirely, by monetary concerns. See, e.g., LeGere, Donlan, Upshaw Hope to Avoid Repeat of
'82, Pro Football Weekly, Nov. 7, 1986, at 5, col. 4 (quoting NFLPA Executive Director
Eugene Upshaw as follows: "When we're involved in something that generates as much
money as pro football does . . . and we don't take care of the players that built the game,
that's a mistake.").
20. See McDonough, NFL: They All Cashed In, Boston Globe, Dec. 24, 1989, at 46
(based on figures supplied by the NFLPA).
21. See Jones, Management Council Presents Its Side of the Story, Pro Football Weekly, Dec.
17, 1989 (letter to the editor by NFL Management Council's director of public relations).
22. In 1988, the average salary of each NFL team's top 12 players was $536,000, exceeding the NBA average for that League's 12-man rosters of $524,000. The 1988 NFL
average for each club's top 24 players was $408,000, which is only slightly less than Major
League Baseball's $431,000 average for its 24-man rosters. See NFL Management Council,
Top NFL Pay Comparable to NBA, Baseball Averages (Mar. 22, 1989) (unpublished news
release).
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peting for their services, their current compensation levels indicate that
they have significant leverage vis-a-vis their own club.
In fact, the growing disparity in compensation levels between the
"superstars" - generally "skill" position players such as quarterbacks
and wide receivers - and the so-called "journeymen" players who dominate NFL rosters2 3 raises the question as to the division among players
of the large but finite pool of funds available to each club for player
costs. Indeed, Mr. Garvey, who preceded Eugene Upshaw as Executive
Director of the NFLPA, has been openly critical of the NFLPA's recent
pursuit of greater opportunities for movement for the top players at the
expense of improved benefits for all players: "My view is that the union
should deemphasize free agency and refocus on agreement over a fixed
percentage of gross revenues."124 Mr. Garvey's view is apparently
shared by many active players; a recent independent poll revealed that
only nineteen percent of the players surveyed listed free agency as their
compared to sevfirst priority in a new collective bargaining agreement
25
enty-two percent favoring improved benefits.
Accordingly, not only does this position paper argue from a legal
standpoint that the Eighth Circuit's opinion represents a proper accommodation of labor and antitrust principles, but it also contends that the
players have been disserved by the NFLPA's decision to resort to the
courts. Indeed, after nearly three years of divisive and costly litigation
in both the district court and the Eighth Circuit, the players are still
without an agreement and have missed opportunities for increases in
compensation and benefits. The history of this dispute therefore confirms that courts are ill-suited to resolve labor disputes and that a bargained resolution is in the best interests of all concerned - the players,
the clubs, and the fans.
I.

SUMMARY

At the outset, it is important to understand what is not at issue in
Powell. Indeed, the Powell plaintiffs have never so much as alleged that
the challenged player restraints affect business competition in any product market, that these restraints have been imposed outside the collective
bargaining process, or that the NFL defendants have at any time failed
23.

Mr. Garvey, in his foreword to Mr. Lock's Duke Law Journalarticle, estimates that

"non-star players . . .make up about 96% of the Union." Garvey, supra note 11, at 338.
24. Id. at 336. More recently, Mr. Garvey stated his opposition to the NFLPA's announced plans to decertify in light of the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Powell. See infra notes
87-88 and accompanying text. According to Mr. Garvey, if the NFLPA goes "through with
decertification, all that will happen is that they will make some quarterbacks and superstars
a lot richer. There should be more concern for a Darryl Stingley" (a former player who is

paralyzed for life). McDonough, Idea Put Garvey Ahead of His Time, Boston Globe, Dec. 31,
1989, at 50. Mr. Garvey added that, "[tihis free agency the players are looking for is mythical. All players do not benefit from free agency." Id.
25. See King, Inside the NFL, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 30, 1989, at 66, cols. 2-3. An

additional five percent urged increased roster sizes and improved working conditions and
four percent expressed no opinion. Indeed, one possible explanation for the failure of the
NFLPA's strike in 1987 is the Union's inability to identify a strike issue of common interest
to the majority of its members.
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to bargain in good faith. To the contrary, the challenged restraints concern mandatory subjects of bargaining which relate only to a labor market involving the parties to a collective bargaining relationship and are
the product of a negotiation process in which management has at all
times abided by its labor law obligations.
In circumstances closely analogous to these, every appellate court
to have addressed the issue has concluded that the labor, not the antitrust, laws are exclusively to govern the dispute. 2 6 Those courts have
uniformly recognized that the labor laws are uniquely suited for the resolution of employment-related disputes having no external effects on
business competition. As Professor Cox put it, -[n]o one seriously suggests that antitrust policy should be concerned with the labor market per
27
se."
Of these governing labor law principles, perhaps the most fundamental is freedom of contract. Under the labor laws, courts are expressly forbidden from dictating or even influencing the
substantive terms of labor-management agreements. 28 Instead, they are
to monitor the use by the parties of approved economic weapons as a
means to persuade the other side to reach a compromise. Among the
primary weapons in union arsenals is the right to engage in concerted
activity such as striking 2 9 and picketing.3 0 Employers may, in turn, lock
out their employees 3 ' or, in certain circumstances, hire permanent
replacements. 3 2 At least one court has recognized that this freedom of
contract principle applies with unique force in the professional sports
context because "[s]uch bargaining relationships raise numerous
33
problems with little or no precedent in standard industrial relations."
In view of the delicately balanced framework established by the labor laws for the resolution of labor disputes, no judge - not even the
Powell dissenter - has ever suggested that the labor exemption does not
"survive" formal expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.3 4
26. See, e.g., Mid-America Regional Bargaining Ass'n v. Will County Carpenters Dist.
Council, 675 F.2d 881, 890 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters Local Union No. 576 v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979);
Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 431 F.2d 1004
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R. Co., 319
F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
27. See Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws -A

Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 252,

254 (1955).
28. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103-09 (1970) ("[I]t is the job of
Congress, not the [National Labor Relations] Board or the courts, to decide when and if it
is necessary to allow governmental review of proposals for collective-bargaining agreements and compulsory submission to one side's demands."); NLRB v. Insurance Agents'
Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 483-87 (1960) ("Congress was generally not concerned with the
substantive terms on which the parties contracted.").
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982); see also NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S.
9 (1962).
30. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
31. See, e.g., American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
32. See, e.g., NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
33. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987).
34. See Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 568 (8th Cir. 1989) (majority); id. at 569 n.4
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Nevertheless, Mr. Lock in his Duke Law Journal article had encouraged
the Eighth Circuit to adopt this contrary rule withdrawing immunity
upon contract expiration. 3 5 Every court to have addressed the issue,
however, has recognized that such a rule would completely upset the
balance outlined in the labor laws and would drastically alter the bargaining positions of the parties.
Therefore, the true issue presented in Powell is not whether the labor exemption "survives" contract expiration, but rather for how long.
The district court concluded that impasse marks the proper endpoint
because at impasse the employer is free to implement new employment
terms consistent with past offers. 36 The Eighth Circuit, however, observed that the Supreme Court has defined "impasse" as merely "a temporary deadlock or hiatus in negotiations ' 3 7 which "may be 'brought
about intentionally by one or both parties as a device to further, rather
than destroy, the bargaining process.' "38 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the impasse standard "treats a lawful stage of the
collective bargaining process as misconduct by defendants, and in this
way conflicts with federal labor laws that establish the collective bargain39
ing process."1
The Eighth Circuit held that a proper accommodation of labor and
antitrust doctrine requires that the labor exemption protect all agreements "conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship. "40
Under this standard, terms of employment remain exempt from antitrust challenge where the employer satisfies its obligations under the labor laws, including the duty to bargain in good faith. Indeed, the court
made clear that it was not holding that "management is forever exempt
from the antitrust laws, [or] . . . that restraints on player services can

41
never offend the Sherman Act."
At the end of its opinion, the Eighth Circuit outlined the parties'
options: "They may bargain further, which we would strongly urge that
they do. They may resort to economic force. And finally, if appropriate
issues arise, they may present claims to the National Labor Relations
Board."'42 Although these are the same options available to every other
union in every other industry in the country, the NFLPA chose another
course. On November 6, 1989, less than one week after the Eighth Circuit issued its ruling, Mr. Upshaw sent a letter to John M. Donlan, Executive Director of the NFL Management Council, stating that the Union's
Executive Committee had voted to "abandon bargaining rights and be-

(dissent); Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 785 (D. Minn. 1988); Bridgeman v. NBA, 675
F. Supp. 960, 965 (D.N.J. 1987).
35. See Lock, supra note 17, at 374.
36. See Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 788.
37. See Powell, 888 F.2d at 564 (quoting Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v.
NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 566.
40. Id. at 568.
4 1.1d.
42. Id.
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gin the decertification process."'43 The letter indicates that this decision
had been prompted by the Eighth Circuit ruling and that its only intended purpose was to terminate the labor exemption and thereby revive the Union's antitrust suit.
This announced intention to decertify is therefore entirely consistent with the position of the NFLPA - and Mr. Lock4 4 - that a satisfactory agreement cannot be reached with the NFL member clubs unless
the Union has the threat of a treble damages action in its bargaining
arsenal. Ironically, however, throughout proceedings in the district
court in Powell, the NFLPA cited the system governing player movement
in Major League Baseball as an example of a less restrictive alternative
that should be adopted by the NFL. Major League Baseball, however,
has from the beginning enjoyed a complete antitrust immunity, 45 and the
baseball union therefore does not have access to the "antitrust lever.' '46
The lesson to be learned is that the labor laws provide associations of
professional athletes with all the weapons necessary to negotiate a set47
tlement fair to all parties.
II.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING -

AND ANTITRUST LITIGATION -

IN THE

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE

A.

Background

Prior to 1977, the system governing movement of veteran players
from one NFL club to another - known at the time as the "Rozelle
Rule" after former Commissioner Pete Rozelle - required any club that
48
If
signed a veteran free agent to compensate the player's former team.
the two clubs were unable to come to terms as to appropriate compensation, the Commissioner in his discretion was to award players, draft
49
choices, or both.
In 1975, a group of players challenged the Rozelle Rule under the
antitrust laws in Mackey v. National Football League. 50 Following a fiftyfive day trial, the district court ruled that the Rozelle Rule constituted a
concerted refusal to deal and was therefore a per se violation of the Sherman Act; the court also held that it was invalid under the rule of reason.
43. Letter from Mr. Upshaw to Mr. Donlan (Nov. 6, 1989).
44. See Lock, supra note 17, at 399 ("[Albsent the risk of antitrust liability, the owners
will have no incentive to bargain with the union over the restrictions on free agency.").
45. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346
U.S. 356 (1953); Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
46. See Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 571 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
47. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 609 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Although this spring's lockout in Major League Baseball was marked by acrimonious and sometimes petty disputes, it was ended in one month in time to play an entire 162game schedule, and the Major League Baseball Players Association is generally considered
to have acquitted itself quite well. SeeJustice, Labor Process Wasn't Pretty, but It Worked Pretty
Well, Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 1990, at B5, col. i.
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit set forth a three-part test for application
of the labor exemption: the restraint (1) primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship; (2) concerns a mandatory
subject of bargaining; and (3) is the product of bona fide arm's-length
bargaining.5" Although the appellate court found that the first two requirements had been satisfied, it held that the Rozelle Rule had not
been the subject of arm's-length bargaining and therefore did not qualify for the exemption. 52 Next, the court of appeals reversed the district
court finding of a per se violation of the antitrust laws in light of "the
unique nature of the business of professional football," i.e., the economic interdependence of the NFL clubs. 53 Finally, the court affirmed
the district court's rule of reason finding insofar as it concluded that the
Rozelle Rule was too restrictive, but it expressly recognized that the
NFL has a "strong and unique interest in maintaining competitive balance among its teams" and that collective bargaining is the best means
for achieving a proper balance between competing interests of players
54
and clubs.
Following the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Mackey, the NFL Management Council and the NFLPA resumed negotiations. By early 1977, the
parties had both settled the Mackey and Alexander 5 5 cases and executed a
five-year collective bargaining agreement 5 6 that included a new "right of
first refusal/compensation" system governing veteran player movement.
This system represented a significant change from the Rozelle Rule,
eliminating the role of the Commissioner and establishing non-discretionary guidelines under which a player's old club had the option of
either matching a competing offer from another club or receiving compensation in the form of draft choices from the new club. The 1977
upon court approval
Collective Bargaining Agreement was contingent
57
of the Alexander class action settlement.
The Alexander settlement was in fact challenged by sixteen NFL players whose principal objection was to the inclusion of any restrictions on
player movement. The objectors' claims were rejected by the district
court which, after detailed review of the 1977 Collective Bargaining
Agreement, concluded that it "fundamentally modifies the traditional
51.

See id. at 614.

52.

The Eighth Circuit expressly reserved the question of the "survival" of the labor

exemption. Id. at 616 n.18.
53. Id. at 619.
54. Id. at 620-23.
55. Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,730 (D. Minn. 1977), aff'd sub.
nor. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978). After the district court's decision in
Mackey, a class of all NFL players brought a parallel action challenging the same League
practices that had been at issue in Mackey.
56. 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football League
Players Association and the National Football League Management Council (Mar. 1, 1977)
[hereinafter 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement].
57. See Id. at art. XXXVI, § 3. That settlement provided for payments to class members totalling $13,675,000 over a 10-year period. Appendix D to 1977 Agreement. In
addition, the parties agreed to the dismissal of Mackey, including the withdrawal of the
pending petition for certiorari, in consideration of settlement payments totalling
$2,200,000. Alexander, 1977-2 Trade Cas. at 72,992.
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form of [the] Rozelle Rule . . .[,J the college player draft, the option
clause in the NFL player contract, and related practices."15 8 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed, observing that "the subject of player movement restrictions is a proper one for resolution in the collective bargaining
59
context."
B.

The 1982 Collective BargainingAgreement

The 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement, with some exceptions,
expired before the start of the 1982 season. 60 After playing the first two
weeks of the 1982 season without a new collective bargaining agreement, the players went on strike over their demand for a fixed percentage of the NFL's gross revenues. 6 1 The strike resulted in the
cancellation of nearly half of that year's games and placed the entire
season in jeopardy. When a new collective bargaining agreement was
reached fifty-seven days later, it marked the end of the longest and cost62
liest work stoppage in the history of any professional sports league.
For the players, the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement promised a swift and dramatic increase in compensation. The total package
of benefits won by the NFLPA was substantial, with financial commitments by the NFL clubs in excess of $1.2 billion over the five seasons
covered by the Agreement. 63 Indeed, average player salaries, including
bonuses but excluding collectively-bargained benefits, rose during the
4
term of the agreement from $137,000 in 1983 to $241,000 in 1987.6
The principal concession made by the NFLPA in exchange for these financial commitments was the retention of a modified right of first refusal/compensation system, and it is clear that the Union did so with the
58. Alexander, 1977-2 Trade Cas. at 72,997-98. The district court further observed
that "[t]he NFLPA believes that the [liberalized compensation rule] will benefit the overwhelming majority of the players in the NFL and will raise salaries throughout the
League." Id. at 72,999.
59. See Reynolds, 584 F.2d at 289.
60. See 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 56, at art. XXVI, § 2.
61. In 1982, the NFLPA sought a minimum guarantee of 55% of annual league gross
income for player salaries (including bonuses, incentives, and post-season pay) and severance. Salary costs attributable to individually negotiated salaries above the 55% minimum, and the value of pension, insurance, and other aspects of the player benefit package,
were excluded from the Union's 55% demand. See generally, Wallace, N.F.L. and Players
Begin to Negotiate Contract Tomorrow, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1982, at C5, col. i. As Mr. Garvey
observes, the NFL estimates that players are currently receiving 65% of the gross and the
NFLPA acknowledges that players are "getting at least 55%." Garvey, supra note 11, at
336 & n.34.
62. Barnes, Agreement Reached in NFL Strike, Wash. Post, Nov. 17, 1982, at AI, col. 6.
63. Included among the benefits was a lump sum payment to be made under a
"Money Now" provision to all players on NFL rosters at the start of the strike. 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, at art. XXIII.
64. See Affidavit of John M. Donlan (June 7, 1988) at 10-11. Undoubtedly, these
figures were influenced by the presence of a rival league, the United States Football
League ("USFL"), during the 1983-85 seasons. During this period, player salaries were
artificially raised by a bidding war that simply could not be sustained on a long-term basis,
as evidenced by the USFL's decision to cease operations. See, e.g., USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d
1335, 1351-52 (2d Cir. 1988). In any event, NFL player salaries have not retreated from
the levels reached during the USFL years and, in fact, have continued to increase steadily.
See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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knowledge that inter-club movement of players under this system 6 5
would be limited as it had been under the 1977 Collective Bargaining
66
Agreement.
Despite the agreement to maintain the first refusal/compensation
system, the NFLPA in its first report to its members after the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement had been reached proclaimed that it had
"won" the strike: "The NFLPA has clearly established itself as a strong
union, one that staged a long and difficult strike, achieved major gains,
and survived intact." ' 6 7 The report further noted that subsequent negotiations would be conducted in an atmosphere in which the NFL Management Council will "know that the players are fully capable of shutting
down the regular season and inflicting enormous economic losses on the
68
owners."
C.

The 1987 Negotiations

Not surprisingly, the NFLPA's bargaining strategy heading into the
1987 negotiations was shaped largely by the 1982 experience. Outwardly confident that the NFL feared a repeat of the crippling 1982
strike, the NFLPA waited until early September 1987 - after the general expiration date of the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement before assigning a monetary value to its demands. 6 9 One week later,
when the NFL Management Council refused to agree to the NFLPA's
demand for unrestricted free agency, the NFLPA initiated its strike - as
in 1982 - after the second weekend of regular season games.
This time, however, the clubs attempted to avoid being shut down
in mid-season again. Alerted earlier to the possibility of a strike, the
League suspended play just one week before resuming the regular sea65. Although there has been limited movement under the first refusal/compensation
system, a significant number of players change teams during the course of their careers
primarily through trades and the waiver system. Indeed, some players, such as running
back Eric Dickerson and quarterback John Elway, have sufficient leverage to demand
trades to certain clubs after threatening to withhold their services. Dickerson successfully
demanded to be traded from the Los Angeles Rams after that club refused to renegotiate
his contract, to the Indianapolis Colts, which agreed to increase his salary. Eskenazi, Dickerson Traded to Colts, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1987, § 5, at 1, col. 6. Similarly, John Elway in
1983 refused to join the Baltimore Colts, which had acquired rights to him through the
college draft, and forced a trade to the Denver Broncos. Janofsky, Elway Traded to Broncos
by Colts, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1983, at B5, col. 3.
66. Even though little movement had been contemplated by either party at the time of
the 1977 or 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreements, Mr. Lock now cites the lack of movement as evidence of a group boycott. Lock, supra note 17, at 346-47. The NFLPA, however, agreed in 1982 to maintenance of a system that had produced limited movement
over the previous five years and was unlikely to produce significant movement in the future. In addition, because player salaries increased so dramatically during the term of the
1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, compensation levels made nearly all free agent
acquisitions a poor "trade." As an example, a club in 1987 acquiring a fifth year player
making $300,000 (today's average) would be required to forfeit its first round draft choices
for the next two years. 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, at Exhibit D.
67. See NFLPA, Update '82, at I (Dec. 3, 1982) (unpublished newsletter).
68. Id.
69. See Affidavit ofJohn M. Donlan (Dec. 18, 1987) at 4.
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son schedule with teams comprised largely of so-called "replacement"
players. In all, three weekends of replacement games were played..
On October 8, 1987, the Thursday following the first weekend of
replacement games, the NFLPA in a newsletter to its members acknowledged that, "[f]or the first time, real bargaining is going on." 70 Two
days later, the NFLPA agreed to accept continuation of the right of first
refusal/compensation system (with two modifications) in exchange for
improved compensation and benefits. 7 1 Discussion of this and other
proposals, however, was quickly overtaken by the collapse of the strike
and negotiation over the Union's terms for returning to work. On October 15, just one week after the NFLPA had announced that "real bargaining" had commenced, the NFLPA ended its strike and filed suit.
Although a few negotiation sessions followed, the NFLPA's collective
bargaining positions have at all times thereafter been governed by and
subordinated to its litigation posture.
D. Announcement of the "Impasse" Standard and the Union's FailedAttempt
to Enjoin Continuation of the Right of First Refusal/Compensation
System
Shortly after filing their complaint, the Powell plaintiffs moved for an
injunction against continuation of the right of first refusal/compensation system. The NFL defendants countered with a motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the labor exemption insulated the challenged player restraints from antitrust scrutiny.
In resolving these motions, the district court announced its impasse
standard: "[T]he Court concludes that proper accommodation of labor
and antitrust interests requires that a labor exemption relating to a
mandatory bargaining subject survive expiration of the collective bargaining agreement until the parties reach impasse as to that issue.'"72 At
the time (January 29, 1988), the district court observed that "[t]here is
abundant evidence in the record to indicate that the parties are not so
73
far apart in negotiations as this lawsuit would suggest."
Nevertheless, on the next business day, the NFLPA's antitrust counsel sent a letter to counsel for the NFL defendants declaring for the first
time that an impasse had been reached on the free agency issue and that
70.

See NFLPA, Game Plan '87, Vol. 12, No. 13, at 1 (Oct. 18, 1987) (unpublished

newsletter).
71.

SeeJanofsky, New Free-Agency Dispute, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1987, § 5, at 10, col. 1.

The NFLPA at the time described the two proposed modifications as follows:
1. That the old club's "qualifying offer" to the veteran free agent be a one-year,
guaranteed contract at a 120% increase in salary, rather than a one-year, unguaranteed contract offer as in the past; and
2. That the draft choice compensation payable to the old club for a player who
moves to a new club be based on his salary level at the time he becomes a free
agent. In the past the draft choice compensation was based on the salary
level offered by the new club.
NFLPA Press Advisory (Oct. 10, 1987) (emphasis in original).
72. See Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 788 (D. Minn. 1988) (emphasis in original).
73. Id. at 789 n.22.
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defendants were therefore subject to treble damages. 74 From that date
forward, the NFLPA carefully avoided taking any steps inconsistent with
maintaining the purported impasse, and negotiations for all intents and
purposes ceased. On June 17, 1988, the district court found that the
parties were at an impasse on the free agency issue as of that date. 75
Still, one month later, the district court denied the NFLPA's motion
for injunctive relief after concluding that the parties were engaged in a
"labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 76
thereby depriving it of jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent
injunction. 77. In addition, the district court held that an injunction was
inappropriate under traditional equitable principles, 7 8 particularly in
light of the likely harm to the NFL were it to issue an injunction: "[T]he
potential migration of many key players from less attractive clubs to
more desirable ones could have a devastating, long-term impact on the
'79
competitive balance within the league."
E.

Announcement of a New Veteran Player Movement System and the Union's
Failed Attempt to Enjoin Its Implementation

As the 1988 season came to a close, the NFL Management Council
attempted to break the stalemate in negotiations by making two alternative bargaining proposals. 80 The first proposal, called "Plan A," contemplated significantly improved benefits and a modified right of first
refusal/compensation system with substantially revised criteria that
would foster player movement among clubs. 8 1 The second, "Plan B,"
did not offer as attractive a benefits package but incorporated an entirely
new approach to the free agency issue that would make an unprecedented number of players unconditional free agents each year. 82 The
NFLPA declined to discuss either proposal and instead submitted a
"counterproposal" so regressive that its only conceivable purpose was
83
to continue the "impasse" for litigation purposes.
No agreement having been reached as of February 1, 1989, the
Management Council exercised its undisputed labor law right at impasse
to implement new terms and conditions of employment consistent with
74. See letter from Carol Rieger, counsel for the Powell plaintiffs, to John H. Schafer,
counsel for the NFL defendants (Feb. I, 1988).
75. See Powell v. NFL, Civ. No. 4-87-917 Hearing Tr. at 3 (D. Minn. June 17, 1988).

76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
77. See Powell v. NFL,690 F. Supp. 812, 814-17 (D.Minn. 1988).
78. Id. at 818 (citing Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113
(8th Cir. 1981)(en banc)(identifying four factors)).
79. Id.
80. Letter from Mr. Donlan to Mr. Upshaw (Nov. 16, 1988).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See NFLPA Collective Bargaining Proposal (Dec. 12, 1988) (unpublished). Under
the proposal, all veteran free agents with three or more years of service in the NFL would
become "unrestricted" free agents by 1992. In addition, the NFLPA proposed the institution of salary arbitration (at the sole discretion of the player), elimination of the option
clause from the NFL player contract, mandatory skill and injury guarantees, and significant
compensation and benefits increases. Id.
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past good faith bargaining proposals, 8 4 and implemented a modified
and even further liberalized version of Plan B. Under the revised Plan
B, each club retains rights to 37 of the approximately 55 players it has
under contract; the remainder are free to negotiate with any other club
regardless of their contractual status, the old club retaining no first refusal or compensation rights. Veteran free agents who are "protected"
by their clubs may negotiate with any other club subject to a first refusal/compensation system.
Plan B was designed to allow a large percentage of players - particularly players who had limited playing time with their present clubs an opportunity to sign with an NFL team of their own choosing while at
the same time permitting clubs to retain the players that form the nucleus of their team. In its first year of operation, Plan B was responsible
for the greatest amount of "free agent" movement in the history of professional sports; at the same time, it permitted clubs to fill gaps and add
depth to their rosters. Indeed, of the 619 players left unprotected on
February 1, 1989, 229 signed with new clubs and 149 of these players
were under contract with an NFL team as of the start of the 1989
85
season.
The NFLPA again sought injunctive relief to bar the clubs' implementation of Plan B, which was denied by the district court. Once again,
the district court found the controversy to be a "labor dispute" under
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and expressed deep concern that an injunc86
tion would irreparably harm competitive balance in the NFL.
F.

The Eighth Circuit Ruling and the NFLPA's Announcement of Plans To
Decertify

In early 1989, the Eighth Circuit granted the NFL defendants' petition for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) of the district court's ruling that the labor exemption "survives" until impasse but
not beyond. On November 1, 1989, the Eighth Circuit issued its ruling
reversing the district court.
As noted, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the challenged provisions governing veteran player movement are not subject to antitrust
challenge so long as they are the product of an ongoing collective bargaining relationship. This ruling effectively removes the first refusal/
compensation system, Plan B, and the college draft from antitrust chal84. See, e.g., Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 543 n.5 (1988) (citing American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380
U.S 300, 381 (1965); Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 NLRB 475, 478 (1967), aff'd sub nom.
American Federation of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir.

1968)).
85. See Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 569 n.3 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J. dissenting).

The 229 NFL free agents who changed teams exceeded the combined total of free agent
movement in Major League Baseball and the NBA from 1982-88.

During this time, 117

baseball free agents and 93 basketball free agents changed teams. NFL Management
Council,

fore NFL Free Agents Move Than NBA, MLB Combined Total Since 1982 (Apr. 10,

1989) (unpublished news release).
86. Powell v. NFL, Civ. No. 4-87-917, slip op. at 7-8 (D. Minn. Mar. 24, 1989).
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lenge at the present time. Although the Eighth Circuit identified several
options available to the parties, including the resumption of bargaining
coupled, if necessary, with the use of economic force, the NFLPA immediately announced plans to decertify and to abandon its bargaining
rights.8 7 This latest development, however, is nothing more than a negotiating ploy and another attempt to use the antitrust laws as a club at
88
the bargaining table.
Finally, on January 17, 1990, the Eighth Circuit, 7-2, denied the
NFLPA's petition for rehearing en banc. 89 The NFLPA subsequently
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court on March
12, 1990.90
III.

THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE NON-STATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION TO
THE ANTITRUST LAWS

Prior to the Eighth Circuit ruling in Powell, two courts - the district
courts in Bridgeman and Powell - had addressed the issue of the proper
scope of the labor exemption within the context of professional sports
leagues. Although both courts recognized that the antitrust laws at
points during such disputes must give way to the labor laws, neither developed a standard which adequately accommodates labor law interests.
In Bridgeman, the district court held that "the exemption for a particular practice survives only as long as the employer continues to impose that restriction unchanged, and reasonably believes that the
practice or a close variant of it will be incorporated in the next collective
bargaining agreement." 9 1 Although the NFLPA urged the adoption of
this standard in Powell, the district court declined to do so on the ground
87. See Letter from Mr. Upshaw to Mr. Donlan (Nov. 6, 1989) ("The NFLPA Executive
Committee has voted to abandon bargaining rights and begin the decertification
process.").

88. The NFLPA apparently believes that, if its disclaimer of bargaining authority is
effective despite evidence to the contrary, the labor exemption ceases to protect Plan B.
This theory, however, is based on a misreading of the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Powell.
There, the court observed that Plan B had been implemented "only after [it] had been
forwarded in negotiations and subsequently rejected by Players" and that "[tihe Players
do not contend that these proposals were put forward by the League in bad faith." Powell,
888 F.2d at 569. The court then concluded that "the present lawsuit cannot be maintained
under the Sherman Act." Id. Since the Eighth Circuit issued its ruling last November,
Plan B has remained unaltered. Because Plan B was indisputably "'conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship," it should be regarded as exempt from the antitrust
laws.
89. Powell v. NFL, Civ. No. 89-5091, slip op. (8th Cir. Jan. 17, 1990).
90. On March 30, 1990, the NFL, the 28 member clubs, and the NFL Management
Council brought a declaratory judgment action against the NFLPA in federal district court
in Minnesota seeking a declaration, inter alia, that the NFLPA's purported decertification
and abandonment of bargaining rights is ineffective to terminate the labor exemption recognized by the Eighth Circuit. See Five Smiths, Inc. v. NFLPA, Civ. No. 3-90-177 (D. Minn.
Mar. 30, 1990).
On April 10, 1990, eight players who were protected under Plan B in 1990 brought an
antitrust action in federal district court in NewJersey alleging that the labor exemption no
longer applied and that the free agency rules as applied to them are unreasonable. See
McNeil v. NFL, Civ. No. 90-14-02-JWB (D.N.J. Apr. 10, 1990).
91. Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 967 (D.N.J. 1987).
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that the Bridgeman standard fails to "give proper regard to the strong
labor law policy promoting the collective bargaining process." '9 2 The
court observed that employees, knowing that their manifestations of assent are critical to the employer's "reasonable" belief, "would have
every incentive to furnish the requisite indicia of disaffection and unwillingness to bargain."'9 3 Indeed, on the same day the Bridgeman court issued its ruling, the NBA Players Association informed NBA officials that
the players would not return to the bargaining table "until the N.B.A.
advises that it is agreeable to eliminating the right of first refusal, the
draft and the salary cap."' 94 Nevertheless, four months later, the basketball union agreed to a new collective bargaining agreement that included modified versions of all the essential features of the expired
agreement - the right of first refusal, the draft, and the salary cap despite its repeated representations to the court in Bridgeman that it
would "never" agree to the three provisions it was challenging in that
95
case.
Although the district court in Powell had correctly identified the
flaws in the Bridgeman standard, its alternate standard proved no more
successful at promoting collective bargaining. As with the basketball
union, attorneys for the NFLPA on the first business day after the "impasse" standard was announced opined that the parties had been at an
impasse on the free agency issue for some time even though no such
claim had ever previously been made. 9 6 Following counsel's advice, the
NFLPA sought to maintain this contrived impasse by breaking off negotiations and refusing to make or consider realistic offers for settlement.
This section outlines why the Eighth Circuit was correct in rejecting
the standards outlined by the district courts in Bridgeman and Powell and
in formulating its own test. Section A is an analysis of prior cases involving the labor-antitrust accommodation in analogous circumstances. Section B is a discussion of the strong labor law policy of judicial nonintervention with respect to the terms of management-labor agreements. And Section C is a critique of the Powell dissent's assertions that
unions in professional sports should be accorded benefits not enjoyed
by labor organizations in any other industry.
A.

The Primacy of the Labor Laws Relative to Pure Labor Market Restraints

Although no appellate court had previously been presented with
the precise issue in Powell, the Eighth Circuit was by no means writing on
a clean slate. Prior Supreme Court and other appellate rulings had concluded that disputes over employment terms and conditions are the cen92. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 787 (D. Minn. 1988).
93. Id.
94. NB.A. Talks Rejected, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1987, at A14, col. 3. The NBA's first
refusal and player draft provisions are similar to those in the NFL. Unlike the NBA, however, the NFL has never had a salary cap limiting the amount individual clubs may spend
on player salaries.
95. Thomas, NB.A. and Union inAccord, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1988, at D23, col. 3.
96. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2

tral focus of the labor, not the antitrust, laws. These cases establish that,
whereas the antitrust laws concern themselves primarily with anticompetitive behavior in product markets and the effects of such behavior on
consumers, the labor laws govern disputes whose only effects are on labor markets. As the Supreme Court has stated, the antitrust laws are
limited to "the prevention of restraints to free competition in business
and commercial transactions which tend[] to restrict production, raise
prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or
consumers of goods and services;" ' 97 labor market restraints that restrict
competition in the setting of wages or other employment terms are not a
98
central concern of the Sherman Act.
In Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters,9 the Supreme Court confirmed that the Sherman
Act has little relevance to disputes over such terms and conditions of
employment. There, the Court held that a union did not have standing
to assert antitrust claims against a multi-employer bargaining association with which it had a collective bargaining relationship. Noting that
Congress has developed "a separate body of labor laws specifically
designed to protect and encourage the organizational and representational activities of labor unions[,]" the Court concluded that a union
"will frequently not be part of the class the Sherman Act was designed
to protect, especially in disputes with employers with whom it
bargains."' 0 0
This theme permeates the opinions of the four courts of appeal,
including the Eighth Circuit, that had previously addressed this precise
issue in analogous circumstances.' 0 ' Each of these opinions concluded
that the critical factor in determining whether the antitrust or labor laws
are to govern is the presence or absence of an effect on a product, as
opposed to a labor, market.
Most recently, in Mid-America Regional BargainingAss 'n v. Will County
CarpentersDist. Council,10 2 several members of a multi-employer bargaining association challenged a wage scale agreement between a union and
two employers that was reached after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. Although the plaintiff-employers claimed that this
subsequent agreement undercut their bargaining position, the Seventh
Circuit ruled that they had failed to state an antitrust claim because the
challenged agreement resulted only in " 'the elimination of wage competition' " and was therefore covered by the labor exemption. 10 3 Observing that the purpose of the nonstatutory exemption is to protect
"the collective bargaining process," the court of appeals concluded that
"a complaint must allege conduct operating as a direct restraint upon
97. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
98. Id. at 512-13.

99. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
100. Id. at 539-40.
101. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
102. 675 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1982).
103. Id. at 889 (citing district court opinion).

ILLEGAL PROCEDURE

1990]

the business market in order to avoid application of the nonstatutory
exemption ...

."104

Similarly, in Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local Union No. 576 v. Wetterau
Foods, Inc.,105 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an antitrust
action brought by a union challenging a strike-induced agreement
among employers for the loan of employees. The appellate court found
dispositive the fact that, even though the parties had bargained to an
impasse, "[tihe agreement had no anticompetitive effect unrelated to
the collective bargaining negotiations."' 10 6 In Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 10 7 the Fifth Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of a suit alleging that joint employer conduct to resist union demands violated the Sherman Act: "There is no indication, however
remote, of a conspiracy or combination on the part of [the employers] to
restrain competition in the marketing of [employer] goods."' 0 8 Finally,
in Kennedy v. Long Island R.R. Co.,109 the Second Circuit held that concerted employer conduct designed to increase employer bargaining
power and having no effect on "pricing, supply, or distribution of goods
or services" is not subject to antitrust scrutiny.'1 0
The significance of the labor laws to the labor-antitrust accommodation is also made clear in a recent decision, Wood v. National Basketball
Ass'n,''' that rejected an antitrust challenge to collectively-bargained
player restraints in professional basketball.' 12 Like the Seventh Circuit
in Will County Carpenters, the Second Circuit in Wood sharply distinguished the basketball labor market issue from the issue presented in
cases involving restraints that directly limit business competition in
product markets, such as Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local Union No. 189 v.
Jewel Tea Co. 1 13 The Second Circuit regardedJewel Tea and similar cases
104. Id. at 886 n.14, 893 (emphasis in original).
105. 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979).
106. Id. at 136.
107. 431 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1970).
108. Id. at 1007.
109. 319 F.2d 366 (2nd Cir. 1963).
110. Id. at 373; see also California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated General
Contractors of California, Inc., 648 F.2d 527, 544 (9th Cir. 1980) ("an employer agreement falls within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act only if it has an anticompetitive
purpose or effect on some aspect of competition other than competition over wages or
working conditions"), rev'd on other grounds, 459 U.S. 519 (1983); Consolidated Express,
Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 514 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[rlestraints operating
on that primary [i.e., labor] market are presumptively outside the scope of the Sherman
Act"), vacated on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980); Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine
Workers, 505 F.2d 1129, 1134 (4th Cir. 1974) (no evidence that illegal strike "operated to
restrain commercial competition in some substantial way"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877
(1975); Plumbers & Steamfitters v. Morris. 511 F. Supp. 1298, 1306-07, 1311-12 (E.D.
Wash. 1981) (dismissing union challenge to concerted employer action as not having effects that "Congress prohibited by enacting the Sherman Act"); Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v.J.P. Stevens, 475 F. Supp. 482, 488-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (restraint upon commercial competition "an essential element of an antitrust claim"), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d
7 (2d Cir. 1980).
111. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
112. Id. at 962-63.
113. 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (agreement restricting operating hours of grocery store meat
counters); see also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616
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as essentially irrelevant when a practice affects only the labor market:
"[T]hese cases are so clearly distinguishable that they need not detain
us. Each of the decisions involved injuries to employers who asserted that
' 1 14
they were being excluded from competition in the product market.'
In addition, while Wood involved an operative bargaining agreement, the Second Circuit's analysis accorded controlling significance to
other labor law and collective bargaining considerations: the "collective
bargaining relationship" between the NBA employers and the union;
the statutory function of the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the bargaining unit; and the federal labor policy promoting freedom of contract in collective bargaining."l 5 As
discussed below, these considerations are decisive because the collective
bargaining process as mandated by the labor laws will necessarily be
subverted if employment terms established through the lawful observance of that process and affecting only the bargaining parties can be
challenged under the antitrust laws.
B.

The Labor Law Policy FavoringJudicialNon-Intervention In Labor
Disputes

The federal labor laws establish the collective bargaining process as
the exclusive mechanism for the resolution of labor disputes. Most fundamentally, the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") obligates both
parties to a collective bargaining relationship to bargain in good faith
with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," the so-called "mandatory subjects of collective bargaining."11 6 This duty to bargain in good faith, however, "does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession., 117 Instead, the parties are entitled to resort to certain economic
pressures, including strikes and lock-outs, in support of their position
on a mandatory subject."18
The corollary of these principles is that the government may not,
through either the NLRB or the courts, dictate or influence the substantive terms of labor-management agreements. In the leading case of H.
K. Porter v. NLRB,"19 the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he object of
[the NLRA] was not to allow governmental regulation of the terms and
(1975) (contractor agreement to deal only with subcontractors which were parties to multiemployer collective bargaining agreement); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381

U.S. 657 (1965) (effect of agreement between miner's union and large coal mine operators
on small mine operators).
114. See Wood, 809 F.2d at 963 (emphasis in original).
115. Id. at 959-61. As noted in lWood, 809 F.2d at 958 n. 1, the author of the Second
Circuit's opinion, Judge Winter, had earlier published an oft-cited article analyzing the
application of labor-antitrust principles to employment practices in professional sports.
See Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective BargainingBy Athletes: Of Superstars In
Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971).

116. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(d), 159(a) (1982); see also NLRB v. Wooster Div. of
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958).

117. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
118. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
119. 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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conditions of employment, but rather to ensure that employers and their
employees could work together to establish mutually satisfactory conditions."' 20 The theory behind this freedom of contract concept is that
the parties themselves are best able to reach an agreement on12a1 wide
range of issues that will reflect their relative bargaining power.
As the Second Circuit in Wood recognized, freedom of contract is
"particularly important" in professional sports:
Such bargaining relationships raise numerous problems with
little or no precedent in standard industrial relations. As a result, leagues and player unions may reach seemingly unfamiliar
or strange agreements. If courts were to intrude and to outlaw
such solutions, leagues and their player unions would have to
arrange their affairs in a less efficient way. It would also inreducing the number and qualcrease the chances of strikes by
12 2
ity of possible compromises.
The importance of this principle is demonstrated by the implications of a court accepting jurisdiction of antitrust claims such as those
asserted by the Powell plaintiffs. Because an antitrust court is expressly
forbidden from imposing specific terms on parties to a collective bargaining relationship, the only possible motivation for bringing such a
suit is to gain leverage in negotiations. In these circumstances, any
court judgment would necessarily have a significant effect on any ultimate agreement in a manner not contemplated or authorized by the labor laws.
Accordingly, in another case involving a professional sports league,
McCourt v. California Sports, Inc. ,123 the Sixth Circuit held that the district
court had improperly asserted itself in a collective bargaining dispute in
the National Hockey League ("NHL"). There, the district court had
found dispositive the NHL's successful insistence on the inclusion of a
player reservation system described by the district court as a " 'modified
Rozelle Rule.' ",124 The court of appeals, however, held that the labor
exemption applied because "nothing in the labor laws compels either
party negotiating over mandatory subjects of collective bargaining to
12 5
yield on its initial bargaining position."'
Indeed, judicial scrutiny under the rule of reason of collectively-bargained terms, or proposed substitute terms, could produce anomalous
results wholly unintended by the framers of either the labor or antitrust
laws. As a preliminary matter, were a court to find that a disputed term
120. Id. at 103. See also Local 24, Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295
(1959).
121. See, e.g. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 150 n. 11 (1976) (citing NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960)); see also Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954,
961 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[c]ourts cannot hope to fashion contract terms more efficient than
those arrived at by the parties who are to be governed by them").
122. Wood, 809 F.2d at 961.
123. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
124. Id. at 1194 (quoting district court).
125. Id. at 1200.
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constituted a violation of the antitrust laws, the forbidden term would
continue to be a mandatory subject of bargaining capable of being proposed by the employer as part of an overall agreement and accepted by
the union. That is precisely the situation in the NFL where the union
has in the past accepted labor market "restraints" in collective bargaining because management guaranteed a total financial benefits package
for a period of years. The question then arises whether union acceptance bears on the "reasonableness" of the challenged restraint if it is
thereafter maintained as the status quo during a continuing labor dispute.
If so, the antitrust inquiry will cover an unusual range of subjects; if not,
the inappropriateness of applying the antitrust laws to collective bargaining matters is made plain. Similarly, it is not clear by what standard
finders of fact will measure the "reasonableness" of an employment restraint when the matters presented for resolution as antitrust issues
cover only limited aspects of the overall employer-employee relationship. 126 In short, if every solution proposed in collective bargaining to
resolve a disputed employment issue must also periodically satisfy the
antitrust rule of reason, freedom of contract in collective bargaining in
professional sports will effectively be destroyed.
C.

The Options Available to Associations of ProfessionalAthletes Under The
Labor Laws

The predominant theme of the dissent in Powell is that, absent the
"antitrust lever," 127 the only realistic option for the NFLPA is "decertification" and "abandonment of bargaining rights."' 2 8 The dissent complains that the majority opinion provides the League with a labor
exemption of "indefinite" duration and therefore leaves the NFL mem129
ber clubs with no incentive to negotiate a new agreement.
In support of its position, the dissent relies heavily on Mr. Lock's
Duke Law Journalarticle. In that article, Mr. Lock concludes that special
rules are needed to protect professional athletes, or at least NFL players, because of an alleged "significant mismatch" in bargaining
power. 13 0 To "reduce the imbalance in bargaining leverage in the
NFL," 1 Mr. Lock proposes that the labor exemption expire with the
collective bargaining agreement - a position specifically rejected by
126.

Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801

(1977).
127. See Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 571 (8th Cir. 1989) (HeaneyJ. dissenting); see
Lock, supra note 17, at 341. As the majority observed, however, in discussing the
dissent's argument "that the court's action deprives the Union of the threat of antitrust
laws, 'the antitrust lever' and removes this issue from the bargaining table," such removal
"is precisely the thrust of nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws." See Powell,

also

888 F.2d at 568 n.l1.
128.

Id. at 570 (Heaney, J. dissenting).

129. Id. Dismissing the majority's suggestion that the NFLPA can use economic force
to attempt to eliminate or modify the challenged player restraints, the dissent responds,
"should players be forced to strike to alter owner conduct which violates the antitrust
laws? I think not." Id.
130. See Lock, supra note 17, at 397-419.
131. Id. at 404.
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3 2
every judge to have considered it, including the Powell dissenter.'
Mr. Lock, however, does not stop there. Not content merely with a
rule which would expose professional sports leagues, or at least the
NFL, to treble damage suits with respect to collectively bargained employment terms at the moment of contract expiration, Mr. Lock suggests
repeal of decades-old antitrust exemptions that permit the NFL member
clubs to pool their revenues from national television contracts' 3 3 and
that allowed the NFL to merge 13 4 with the American Football League
("AFL"). 135 Finally, Mr. Lock proposes amendments to the NLRA that
would apply only to the professional sports industry, including expanded use of injunctive relief and expedited unfair labor practice
36
proceedings. 1
As an initial matter, Mr. Lock's thesis proceeds from the erroneous
factual premise that the NFLPA has always been and always will be bargaining from a position of weakness in negotiations with the NFL member clubs. Mr. Lock even asserts that the NFLPA had been "dominated"
in 1982; 137 as noted, however, the Union in 1982 had successfully
staged a fifty-seven day strike seeking a fixed percentage of gross revenues after which it had unequivocally proclaimed victory citing a guaranteed compensation package of $1.2 billion over five years. 13 8 Even
today, Mr. Garvey, who led the NFLPA during those negotiations, notes
the strength of a union that in 1982 "was one week from [forcing the]
cancellation" of the entire season. 139 Moreover, Mr. Lock concedes that
"management suffered significant losses during past players' strikes."1 40
Therefore, even if one makes the unwarranted assumption that one purpose of the labor laws should be to strengthen weak unions, 141 it is clear
that the NFLPA - despite the annual turnover in its membership and
the differing priorities of superstar and journeyman players 14 2 - is per-

132. See supra note 34.

133. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
134. Id.
135. See Lock, supra note 17, at 403-08. Mr. Lock's proposed wholesale revisions to the
antitrust laws have been raised in other cases involving the NFL and rejected. In the USFL
litigation, for example, the district court expressly "decline[d] to undo the congressionally
authorized merger of the NFL and the AFL." See USFL v. NFL, 84 Civ. 7484 (PKL), slip
op. at 21 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986). Moreover, Mr. Lock has ignored the circumstances
surrounding the merger, most notably the strong concern voiced by legislators that the
merger would lead to franchise stability and expansion. See, e.g., ProfessionalFootball League
Merger: Hearings on S. 3817 Before The Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Similarly, as noted, the pooling of television and other revenues is essential if clubs in smaller markets are to compete on the playing field with those
based in media centers. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
136. Lock, supra note 17, at 409-15.
137. Id. at 359.
138. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
139. See Garvey, supra note 11, at 336.
140. See Lock, supra note 17, at 403.
141. Such a purpose is clearly not contemplated by the labor laws. As the Supreme
Court has observed, the NLRA "does not contemplate that unions will always be secure
and able to achieve agreement even when their economic position is weak, or that strike
and lockouts will never result from a bargaining impasse." H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S.
99, 109 (1970).
142. Lock, supra note 17, at 354-59.
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fectly capable of uniting its players behind an issue of concern to the
majority of its membership.
More fundamentally, however, Mr. Lock operates from an assumption completely at odds with long-settled labor law principles, most notably freedom of contract. In one telling passage, Mr. Lock complains
that "[n]one of the [NFLPA's] strikes forced management to capitulate
to the union."1 4 3 In another, he concedes that "[clertainly, judicial condemnation of the challenged restraints may benefit the union at the bargaining table; it has the potential to shape the terms of the
agreement." 144 Consistent with this theme, Mr. Lock recommends a solution that would stand the principle of freedom of contract on its head:
"The Minnesota district court should outline the type of system regulat14 5
ing free agency that might satisfy the rule of reason."
From these statements and others, it seems that Mr. Lock believes
that the NFL member clubs are compelled to reach agreement with the
NFLPA on the Union's terms. Apparently recognizing that this view
conflicts with labor law prohibitions against governmental intrusion into
the contract formation process, Mr. Lock attempts to overcome this
roadblock by asserting that the freedom of contract principle should be
suspended in this case because the NFL member clubs have "been inconsistent with [their] obligation [to act in good faith]." 146 The NFLPA,
however, has never made, much less proven, such an allegation.
In any event, Mr. Lock, having concluded that freedom of contract
principles are no barrier, states that the antitrust laws are an appropriate
means ofjudicial intervention in the NFL's labor dispute. Mr. Lock then
seeks to avoid application of the labor exemption by stating that its purpose is to protect unions and that an employer's protection is merely
"derivative." 147 No case, however, has ever held that the labor exemption exists only to serve union/employee interests and that union agreement is essential to the exemption. To the contrary, courts have
expressly acknowledged that employers are entitled to assert the exemption.1 48 Indeed, the clear purpose of the labor exemption is not to protect one party or the other, but rather to "preserve the integrity of the
negotiating process." 149
Now that the integrity of the process has in fact been preserved by
the Eighth Circuit ruling, the parties have the option of returning to the
143. Id. at 396.
144. Id. at 386.
145. Id. at 415.
146. Id. at 384. Mr. Garvey makes the same allegation in his foreword to Mr. Lock's
article. Garvey, supra note 11, at 337.
147. Lock, supra note 17, at 353.
148. See, e.g., Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847 n. 14 (3d Cir.
1974) (unavailability of labor exemption to employers "would undermine the vitality of
the exemption by discouraging bargaining on the part of management") (citing Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 499
(E.D. Pa. 1972)); see
also Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 612 n.10 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing
Scooper Dooper).

149. Scooper Dooper, 494 F.2d at 847 n.14 (emphasis added).
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bargaining table to negotiate free of the distractions spawned by the
Powell litigation. If collective bargaining is not initially successful, either
party may employ the powerful economic weapons sanctioned by the
labor laws. If these rules are not followed, remedies enforcing compliance are available at the NLRB.
The labor laws have provided the framework for successful resolutions to disputes in virtually every other industry 150 - as well as in major league baseball. Not that agreements always result or that success is
always immediate. Agreements have on occasion come only after
15
months and sometimes years of negotiation and sometimes not at all. '
In all instances, however, federal labor policy dictates that the ultimate
resolution be left to the parties. There being no authority or reason for
a special rule for professional athletes, the NFLPA should return to the
bargaining table to resume a process that was abruptly halted in midstream more than two and a half years ago.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The NFL's current labor dispute has serious implications for the
League's future. At the moment, the NFL is enjoying great popularity
- attendance is high; television ratings are strong; international interest
is increasing; and expansion is on the horizon. The NFL's success, however, has not left the players behind' 52 - expansion over the years has
created additional job opportunities and salaries have reached levels
never before contemplated.
The NFL's success is no accident. It is the product of years of sacrifice and compromise. Typical of the League's philosophy was the agreement made in the beginning by clubs from the larger markets to share
their revenues with teams from smaller cities. Later, the clubs agreed to
allocate the best players among themselves on an even basis and not
simply to the highest bidder. These policies reflect the recognition of
the member clubs that the interests of all connected with the NFL are in
staging close, exciting games and tight races for the championship.
While the League's current system does not guarantee that each club
will enjoy the same level of success, it does provide roughly equal
opportunities.
The NFL's commitment to these principles is as strong as ever, but
150. Indeed, in most labor disputes, the disagreement is between a union and a single
employer. It is only because of the fortuity of the League's organizational scheme in which
the NFL's 28 member clubs employ their players directly, as opposed to through the
League, that an action alleging violations of section one of the Sherman Act may even be
brought.
151. As the Supreme Court stated in H.K. Porter, "[Congress] recognized from the beginning that agreement might in some cases be impossible, and it was never intended that
the Government would in such cases step in, become a party to the negotiations and impose its own views of a desirable settlement." 397 U.S. at 103-04.
152. If anything, the opposite is true as increasing costs are rapidly outpacing revenue
growth. See, e.g., Hayes, The NFL's Painful Profit Crunch, N.Y. Tiies, Oct. 29, 1989, § 3, at
I, col. 4; Robichaux, Dallas Cowboys Face Financial Predicament Spreading in the NFL, Wall St.
J., Oct. 23, 1989, at AI, col. 1.
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the League has over the years attempted to accommodate the players'
legitimate interests as expressed in collective bargaining. The result has
been higher salaries, improved benefits, and, with Plan B, greater opportunity for movement. Nevertheless, the NFLPA now insists on a
condition - complete free agency for all players at some point in their
career - that the member clubs believe threatens both the interests of
the majority of players and the long-term integrity of the League.
The ultimate question raised by the Powell litigation, therefore, is
whether the participants or the courts should resolve this dispute. The
Eighth Circuit's response is plainly correct; courts are ill-equipped to
deal with the complexity of issues presented by collective bargaining
agreements in professional sports. More fundamentally, the labor laws
strictly forbid them from doing so.

The Eighth
Circuit Sacks the National Football League
Players Association

POWELL V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE:

ETHAN LoCK*

I.

INTRODUCTION:

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN

NFL

Imagine the following scenario: the United States Bar Association
("USBA") has driven the American Bar Association out of existence and
assumed sole and absolute control over entry into the legal profession.
The USBA has divided the country into specific regions and has adopted
rules regulating the competition for and the availability of legal services
in each region.
You have just graduated first in your class from Harvard Law
School. The USBA has rewarded you for your extraordinary academic
performance by assigning you to a legal aid clinic in North Dakota, a
state located in a region which suffers from a scarcity of quality legal
services for the indigent. You are offered a yearly salary of $50,000 and
must, according to USBA regulations, either accept the offer or engage
in an occupation unrelated to the practice of law during the coming
year. In the event that you choose to engage in a different occupation,
the USBA will re-assign you next year to practice law in another region
that needs and desires your services. If, on the other hand, you choose
to accept the offer, that region will, regardless of the term of your contractual arrangement, retain perpetual rights to your services as well as
the right to fire you at any time if in its sole discretion it judges your skill
to be unsatisfactory as compared to other lawyers.
If the above scenario sounds unimaginable, un-American, and unlawful, be thankful that you practice law or some other occupation rather
than "play" professional football because this scenario is in fact an occupational reality for those who make a living from professional football.'
My experience with the employment relationship in the National Football League ("NFL") is more than academic. The harshness of the
NFL's system became apparent to me between 1984 and 1986 during
my negotiations with the Chicago Bears on behalf of a player named Al
Harris.
Harris had been the ninth player selected in the first round of the
*

B.A. 1973, University of California at Berkeley; J.D. 1977, University of North

Carolina. Consultant, G.B.A. Sportsworld.
1. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football League
Players Association and the National Football League Management Council art. XV (Dec.
I1, 1982) (hereinafter 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement]. On February 1, 1989, the
NFL unilaterally implemented the Plan B modification of art. XV. See infra notes 98-103
and accompanying text.
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1979 NFL draft and had signed a series of five one-year contracts with
the Bears. The contract for the fifth year contained an option clause
which, in effect, bound Harris to the Bears for a sixth year. The option
clause, if exercised in 1984, would pay Harris 120% of his base salary
for the 1983 NFL season, the fifth year of his contractual commitment
2
with the Bears.
By 1982 it became apparent that the contractual arrangement between Harris and the Bears was particularly advantageous to the team.
Unfortunately for Harris, the team's good fortune became his misfortune. The length of his contractual commitment eclipsed the escalation
of salaries which occurred between 1982 and 1984 as a result of both the
1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement 3 and the random bidding war for
players between the NFL and the United States Football League
("USFL"). The former was significant because the 1982 agreement
raised minimum salaries to levels that created upward pressure on all
subsequently negotiated contracts. 4 The latter was particularly significant to Harris because it took the USFL two years to figure out that
defensive players, even stars, would increase neither gate receipts nor
television ratings. By 1985 much of the bidding for players between the
two leagues had ceased as the new league realized that large contracts
for stars were for the most part financially unsound. The net result for
Harris, a player who failed to benefit from either of these inflationary
pressures, was that his salary in the final year of his contractual commitment with the Bears (1984) was grossly below the market for a six year
veteran who started every game during the 1984 season.
Harris' contractual situation in 1984 was particularly noteworthy
because of the well-publicized contract of Wilbur Marshall, a rookie linebacker selected by the Bears earlier that year in the first round of the
NFL amateur draft. Unlike Harris, Marshall did benefit from the USFL's
existence. A phantom offer from the USFL Tampa Bay Bandits 5 triggered an immediate reaction from the Bears who, fearful of losing Marshall, signed him within days after the 1984 draft to a series of four oneyear contracts with a reported gross value of approximately $2.8 million.
Marshall and Harris played the same position, and during the 1984 season, Marshall's first and Harris' sixth in the NFL, Marshall sat on the
bench while Harris played virtually every defensive play and enjoyed the
best year of his career.
2. Harris was represented by his father and another individual in the negotiations
with the Bears for this series of contracts.
3. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 1, art. XXII. This article
raised minimum salaries significantly above the levels established in the 1977 agreement
between the parties. 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football League Players Association and the National Football League Management Council
art. XXII (Mar. 1, 1977).
4. The average salary in the NFL in 1982 was approximately $90,000. By 1985 the
average salary had reached almost $200,000. This information is available at the National
Football League Players Association.
5. Telephone interview with Bruce Allen, General Manager 6f the USFL Arizona
Wranglers at the time Marshall was drafted. (Dec. 15, 1989).
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Although Harris' contractual commitment with the Bears ended on
February 1, 1985, he was not free to decide where and for how much he
would play in 1985. Instead, Harris' future in the NFL was controlled by
the right of first refusal/compensation system contained in article XV of
the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement. 6 Under that system, Harris
was permitted to accept offers from other teams between February 1,
and April 15, 1985. The Bears, however, had the opportunity either to
match the offer and retain Harris or to receive draft choice compensation from the other team. The compensation, which was based on the
new team's offer and the number of years Harris had been in the NFL,
raised the price of obtaining Harris' services to a level that completely
deterred new teams from making offers to Harris. In fact, this result was
predictable. Between 1977, the year that the NFL's right of first refusal/
compensation system was first implemented, and 1984, the final year of
Harris' contractual commitment with the Bears, only one player changed
teams under article XV of the 1977 and 1982 Collective Bargaining
Agreements. 7 Not surprisingly, Harris received no offers and his right
to talk to other teams ended on April 15, 1985.
Subsequent negotiations between Harris and the Bears were unproductive. The Bears rejected Harris' demands, literally offering him a
small fraction of Marshall's contract. In June 1985, the Bears granted
Harris written permission to speak to other teams concerning the possibility of working out a trade with the Bears. Several teams expressed
interest in Harris, but no trade materialized; and, in August 1985, the
Bears revoked their permission for Harris to speak with other teams.
As the 1985 season approached, Harris was faced with a choice: he
could either relinquish his demands and accept the Bears' offer or he
could forego playing football in 1985. He rejected the Bears' offer; and,
unable to negotiate a contract with any other NFL team without the
Bears' permission, he was unemployed while the Bears compiled a 15-1
record en route to Super Bowl XX. Moreover, the Bears not only won
the Super Bowl without Harris, but Marshall, Harris' replacement, was
commended by the Bears' management for his stellar performance during the 1985 season.
Unfortunately for Harris, his willingness to sacrifice a year's employment and income had no impact on his ability to seek employment
with other NFL teams. The Bears' rights to Harris under the NFL's
right of first refusal/compensation system were perpetual. In other
words, Harris was subject to the same system in 1986 that restricted his
freedom in 1985. After sitting out an entire year, he was in no better
position to seek employment with another team that might value his
services more highly than the Bears. In fact, his bargaining position appeared to be even more tenuous in 1986. He was now faced with the
6. 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 1.
7. See Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE L. J. 339,
n. 57. (citing Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 780 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 888 F.2d 559
(8th Cir. 1989)).
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decision either to sit out another season, an alternative that almost certainly would have ended his career, or accept an offer from the Bears, a
team that won the Super Bowl without him and who now valued his services as a back-up rather than as a starter. He would now feel both edges
of the NFL's restrictions on free agency. He not only was unable to have
his salary determined in a competitive market, but he also was unable to
seek employment with a team for which he could play on a regular basis.
Harris' situation was unique only because he chose an alternative
that few players choose - he sat out an entire season. Every year, hundreds of players whose contractual commitments with their teams have
expired are subjected to the NFL's right of first refusal/compensation
system. 8 Virtually all players, recognizing that sitting out will diminish a
significant portion of their career earnings without increasing their bargaining leverage or ability to negotiate with other teams, ultimately accept their team's offer.
II.

CURRENT DIsPUTE BETWEEN

NFLPA

AND

NFL.

The collective bargaining agreement containing the right of first refusal/compensation system that restricted Harris' ability to negotiate
and contract with teams other than the Bears expired on August 31,
1987. 9 Negotiations between the National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA") and the National Football League Management
Council ("NFLMC") for a new agreement were unproductive; and, in
October 1987, the NFLPA filed an antitrust action challenging the continued imposition by the NFL of its restrictions on veteran free agents. 10
In response to motions by both parties, a federal district court in Minnesota held that the non-statutory labor exemption immunized the restrictions in the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement from antitrust attack
until these restrictions became an issue over which the parties bargained
to impasse. I I A subsequent ruling by the Minnesota federal district
court that the parties had in fact reached impasse exposed the NFL's
right of first refusal/compensation system to antitrust scrutiny. 12 The
Eighth Circuit, however, granted the NFLMC's petition for interlocutory
appeal of the district court's ruling regarding the expiration of the labor
exemption. 13 On November 1, 1989, the Eighth Circuit reversed the
district court, ruling that the non-statutory labor exemption extended
beyond impasse and that the antitrust laws were inapplicable to the circumstances of the NFLPA-NFL dispute. 14 On January 17, 1990, the
Eighth Circuit issued an order denying the NFLPA's petition for rehear8. Id. at n. 44 (citing Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 779-81).
9. 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 1, art. XXXVIII § 2.
10. Powell, 678 F. Supp. 777.
It. Id. at 788-89.
12. Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Minn. 1988).
13. Petition for Permission to Appeal and Memorandum in Support of Petition, Powell v. NFL, No. 89-5091, (8th Cir., granted Feb. 24, 1989).
14. Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-1421
(Mar. 12, 1990).
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ing and suggestion for rehearing en banc. 1 5
The Eighth Circuit's decision, which I have been asked to critique,
does not address the merits of the players' claim that the NFL's right of
first refusal/compensation system described above and the modified
version of that system unilaterally implemented by the NFL on February
1, 1989, violate federal antitrust laws. The court considered only the
threshold issue of the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption. More
specifically, the court addressed only the question of whether and to
what extent the non-statutory labor exemption, an exemption that immunizes terms in a collective bargaining agreement from antitrust at16
tack, survives the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement.
III.

BACKGROUND

The purpose of federal antitrust law is to promote competition. 17
To this end, the Sherman Act,' 8 enacted in 1890, was designed to regulate commercial activity. 19 In the years immediately following the enactment of the Sherman Act, however, courts interpreted the Act's general
language to apply not only to commercial activity, but also to combinations among employees, or unions, as well as to various types of concerted union activity that interrupted the free flow of commercial
20
activity.
Application of the Sherman Act to labor combinations impeded the
development of unions, a result not intended by Congress. Thus, Congress included two provisions in the 1914 Clayton Act to reduce the
impact of the antitrust laws on the labor movement. 2 1 Section 6 of the
Clayton Act provides that labor unions are not combinations in restraint
of trade. 2 2 Section 20 restricts the injunctive power of courts in labor
disputes to certain enumerated types of union organizational
23
activities.
The Supreme Court interpreted section 20 narrowly and many
union activities were, after 1914, still subject to antitrust attack and the
15. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,
Powell v. NFL, No. 89-5091, (8th Cir. Jan. 17, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
16. Powell, 888 F.2d 559.
17. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635
(1985) (" 'The Sherman Act is designed to promote national interest in a competitive
economy ..
") (quoting American Safety Equip. Corp. v.J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d
821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968)); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d. 520, 536 (7th Cir. 1986)
("[The] Court . . . has instead stressed that the antitrust laws seek to protect
competition.").
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 2 (1988).
19. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797,
803-06 (1945).

20. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 3 (1976).
21. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988);
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2

injunctive power of the courts. 24 The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 2 5 enacted
in 1932, expanded the protection given to union activity by further restricting the use of injunctions in labor disputes. 2 6 Together, the relevant Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act provisions constitute the
statutory labor exemption. This exemption protects unions and certain
27
types of union activity from antitrust liability.
The statutory labor exemption does not immunize from antitrust
attack agreements between labor and management. 28 The courts, however, have recognized that the application of antitrust laws to labor-management agreements would undermine the collective bargaining process
mandated by Congress in the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"). 29 Thus, courts have created a common law non-statutory
30
exemption to immunize labor-management agreements.
The scope of this non-statutory labor exemption is not precisely defined. 3 1 The Supreme Court has not articulated a general standard for
applying the labor exemption to union-employer agreements. More
specifically, the Court has not addressed the issue of whether the labor
exemption immunizes provisions in an expired agreement.
Furthermore, the Court's prior decisions addressing the labor exemption do not provide any clear guidelines with which to resolve this
question within the context of professional sports. In rendering its earlier decisions, the Court faced and responded to the question of whether
the labor exemption would immunize certain union-proposed restraints.
In those cases, the union asserted the labor exemption to escape antitrust liability. The plaintiff was either the employer or a third party challenging a union-proposed restraint embodied in an unexpired
agreement. 3 2 In the current NFL dispute, as well as in each of the other
player restraint cases in which the application of the labor exemption
was at issue, the union is the plaintiff, and the NFL has raised the ex24. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 471-74 (1921) (secondary boycott not immunized from antitrust attack because defendant employees lacked
direct employment relationship with company which was ultimate object of boycott).

25. Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70, 71-73 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, and 113
(1982)).
26. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616,
621-22 (1975) (statutory enactments exempt specific union activities from operation of
antitrust laws).

27. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 501-03 (1940) (federal labor
policy codified in statutory exemption immunizes inherently anticompetitive collective ac-

tivities by employee).
28. See Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.NJ. 1987) (citing United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941)).
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
30. See, e.g., Connell, 421 U.S. at 621 (The nonstatutory exemption has as its source the
strong labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over
wages and working conditions.); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965) ("[The] [e]xemption for union-employer agreements is
very much a matter of accommodating the coverage of the Sherman Act to the policy of
the labor laws.").
31. SeeJ. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 525 (1979).
32. See Id. at 526 (citing Connell, 421 U.S. 616); United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657 (1965);Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676.
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33
emption to immunize its own proposed restraints.
This distinction is significant in light of the original purpose of the
labor exemption. Congress created the statutory labor exemption to
protect unions and their legitimate organizing activities from antitrust
attack.3 4 The purpose of the non-statutory labor exemption, which is
derived from the statutory exemption, is to effectuate Congress' limited
objective as expressed in the statutory exemption. 35 To protect the
union's role in collective bargaining, both parties to the agreement must
be protected from antitrust liability. As a result, the non-statutory exemption affords employers derivative protection from the antitrust
laws. 36 Nevertheless, the exemption is aptly denominated the "labor"
rather than "management" exemption.3 7 The original purpose of the
exemption - to benefit labor - endures and has undoubtedly influenced the Supreme Court's decisions.
The prior player restraint cases within the context of professional
sports are also of limited precedential value in the current dispute. In
each of the earlier cases the challenged restraints were unilaterally implemented prior to the formation of the players association. The restraints were initially incorporated in a collective bargaining agreement
while the union was in its infancy and too weak to resist management's
demands. The willingness of courts to recognize the union's infancy as
a factor in determining the scope of the labor exemption factually distinguishes the current dispute from the earliest player restraint cases.
More important, no previous court has addressed the legal effect of an
expired agreement. 3 8 In each of the earlier player restraint cases, of
course, the court addressed the same general policy choice raised in the
current dispute: whether federal labor policy encouraging collective
bargaining overrides the federal antitrust policy prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade. The focus of the current dispute, however, is
more specific: whether the federal labor policy encouraging collective
bargaining compels courts to exempt restraints contained in an expired
agreement. This specific policy choice was not addressed in the prior
39
cases.
33. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801
(1977); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 884-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (challenge by
NBPA), aff'd in part and revd in part sub nom. California State Council of Carpenters v.
Associated General Contractors 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980), revd 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
34. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 700-13; Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 801-08 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229-37
(1941).
35. Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
36. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 29, at 527.
37. Garvey, Foreword to The Scope of the Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports: A Perspective
on Collective Bargaining in the NFL, 1989 DUKE L.J. 328, 337-38.
38. In Mackey, the only challenge to restraints in an expired agreement, the court
withheld the exemption because of the absence of bona fide, arm's-length negotiations.
543 F.2d at 615-16. The court specifically noted that its decision did not reach the question whether the exemption survived the expiration of the agreement. Id. at 616 n. 18.
39. Mackey, however, does offer some guidance. The Mackey court held that the labor
exemption immunizes player restraints provided those restraints are the product of bona
fide, arm's-length negotiations. See supra note 38. In other words, union approval seems

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
IV.

[Vol. 67:2

IMPASSE TEST

In the current dispute between the NFLPA and NFL, the district
court held that the non-statutory labor exemption expired upon impasse. 4° The lower court reasoned that impasse "respects the labor law
obligation to bargain in good faith over mandatory bargaining subjects
following expiration of a collective bargaining agreement" and "promotes the collective bargaining relationship and enhances prospects
that the parties will reach a compromise on the issue." 4 ' At the same
time, the court reasoned that its impasse standard properly accommodated competing antitrust policies: "[b]y allowing a labor exemption to
survive only until impasse, the law will not insulate a practice from antitrust scrutiny, but will only delay enforcement of the substantive law until continued negotiations over the challenged provision become
pointless.

"42

The appellate court prefaces its rejection of the district court's impasse standard with a discussion of various issues that the court deems
germane to the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption. Among
those issues are the extent to which the framework of the NLRA precludes judicial intervention and application of the antitrust laws in labor
disputes, and the offsetting obligations, remedies, and weapons available under federal labor law to parties involved in a dispute over terms
and conditions of employment. 43 These issues, along with the underlying purpose of the labor exemption to accommodate competing labor
and antitrust policies, are discussed below.
A. JudicialIntervention in Labor Disputes
The Eighth Circuit correctly recognizes that "[tihe labor arena is
one with well established rules which are intended to foster negotiated
settlements rather than intervention by the courts."'44 Similarly, the
court correctly recognizes "that disputes over employment terms and
conditions are not the central focus of the Sherman Act." '4 5 Yet, the
court's recognition of these principles does not warrant its ultimate decision. These principles simply do not control the outcome of the current
dispute between the NFLPA and NFL.
When it enacted the federal labor statutes, Congress clearly intended to limit judicial involvement in labor disputes. The relevant provisions of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act preclude courts
46
from enjoining various types of concerted activity in labor disputes.
to be a prerequisite to the application of the exemption; the mere potential for bargaining
is not enough to immunize the restraints, and the exemption will not immunize restraints
unilaterally implemented by management.
40. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 788-89.
41. Id. at 789.
42. Id.
43. Powell, 888 F.2d 559.

44. Id. at 567.
45. Id. at 566.
46. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.

1990]

POWELL v. NFL

The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to promote industrial peace through collective bargaining 4 7 and its procedural framework
compels parties involved in a collective bargaining relationship to make
an honest effort to resolve their differences at the bargaining table and
to seek redress for unfair labor practices from the National Labor Rela48
tions Board ("NLRB") rather than the courts.
Asking a court to enjoin protected concerted activity, redress an unfair labor practice or invalidate a collectively bargained term of employment contained in an unexpired agreement, however, is certainly
distinguishable from seeking a declaration of the parties' respective
rights under the antitrust laws regarding provisions in an expired collective bargaining agreement. The above legislation notwithstanding, no
authority exists to support an argument that a determination of the parties' rights under federal antitrust law is precluded in the current dispute. Judicial resolution of the underlying antitrust claim in the NFLPANFL dispute simply will not result in the type of judicial involvement in
the bargaining process with which Congress was concerned.
The purpose of limiting judicial intervention in labor disputes is to
preserve the parties' right to arrive at their own agreement. 49 Certainly,
judicial condemnation of the challenged restraints may benefit the union
at the bargaining table - it has the potential to shape the terms of the
agreement in the same manner that a declaration of the parties' respective rights under the labor laws or any other federal statute will shape
the agreement. As the court admits, however, the challenged restraints
involve mandatory subjects of bargaining. Thus, the parties have an obligation to bargain over the restraints, regardless of the outcome of the
current litigation. 50 Whether the court condemns the challenged restraints or instead concludes that they are immunized from antitrust attack, the parties will ultimately determine in what form, if any, the
restraints will continue to exist.
Much of the language cited by the Eighth Circuit to support the
proposition that the collective bargaining framework mandated by the
NLRA automatically precludes antitrust review suggests that the court
confuses the distinction between the statutory and non-statutory labor
exemption. The court cites Associated General Contractors of California v.
CaliforniaState Council of Carpenters,5 1 in which the Supreme Court noted
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982 and Supp. V 1987). Section 151 reads in pertinent
part: "It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining ......
48. See, e.g., Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 962 n.5 (2d. Cir. 1987) ("Any claim of unreasonable bargaining behavior must be pursued in an unfair labor practice proceeding
charging a refusal to bargain in good faith. . . . not in an action under the Sherman Act.")
(citation omitted).

49. See, e.g., Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 150 n.ll (1976); NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960).
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1982).
51. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
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that Congress developed " 'a separate body of labor law specifically
designed to protect and encourage the organizational and representational activities of labor unions.' "52 The Powell court also cites Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local Union No. 576 v. Wellerau Foods, Inc., 5 3 a case in
which "employer agreements adopted in response to a strike caused
plaintiffs to be denied employment." ' 54 In that case, the Eighth Circuit
determined that the challenged employer conduct, the replacement of
striking workers, was lawful conduct under federal labor law and thus
could not constitute a violation of antitrust law: " 'the magnitude and
nature of any restraint of trade or commerce in this case directly follows
from the sanctioned conduct [and] [t]he agreement had no anticompetiFitive effect unrelated to the collective bargaining negotiations.'
nally, the Powell court cites Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, 5 6 where the Fifth Circuit held that an employer's refusal to deal with a-union with respect to terms of employment was governed by the NLRA and not the Sherman Act.
In each of the above cited cases, reference is made to employer or
employee conduct. The types of conduct shielded from antitrust scrutiny in the above cases, however, have very little to do with the nonstatutory labor exemption. It is self-evident that union organizational
and representational activities, the replacement by an employer of striking workers, or an employer's refusal to deal with a union concerning
terms of employment are not vulnerable to antitrust attack. A union's
organizational activities fall within the scope of both the statutory labor
exemption and the NLRA. 5 7 Similarly, the replacement of striking
workers or an employer's refusal to bargain with a union is conduct gov"-55

58
erned by the NLRA and not the Sherman Act.

In essence, the court, by relying on the above types of conduct and
activities to conclude that the challenged restraints are immune from
antitrust attack, equates the right to form a union and engage in various
60
59
concerted activities, protected under the Clayton, Norris-LaGuardia
and National Labor Relations 6 1 Acts, with the mere potential to bargain
over mandatory subjects. This analysis suggests that the exemption
would apply by virtue of the union's existence from the moment of
union certification. Such an interpretation completely eliminates the
distinction that courts consistently have recognized between the statutory and non-statutory labor exemptions. It completely ignores the fact
52. Powell, 888 F.2d at 566 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 539-40).

53. 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979).
54. Powell, 888 F.2d at 566 (citing Wetterau Foods, 597 F.2d 133).
55. Id. (quoting Wetterau Foods, 597 F.2d at 136).
56. Id. (citing Prepmore Apparel, 431 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 801 (1971)).
57, See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 62122 (1975) (statutory enactments exempt specific union activities from operation of anti-

trust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 104, 105, 113, and 159 (1982).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).

59. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, and 113 (1982).
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982 and Supp. V 1987).
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that the non-statutory labor exemption evolved after Congress enacted
the federal labor statutes because the courts recognized that those statutes authorized collective bargaining without immunizing restraints in
collective bargaining agreements. 6 2 In fact, absolute judicial refusal to
determine the parties' antitrust rights is inconsistent with the existence
of the labor exemption. Ifjudicial reluctance to shape the terms of an
agreement precludes courts from resolving antitrust disputes, the labor
exemption would be unnecessary. Courts would not have created the
non-statutory labor exemption to immunize provisions from antitrust attack if the policy of judicial non-intervention already accomplished the
same purpose.
B.

Remedies and Weapons Available under NLRA

In rejecting the district court's impasse test, the Eighth Circuit essentially concludes that the NFLPA-NFL dispute is a labor rather than
an antitrust dispute and, as such, should be resolved exclusively within
the framework of the National Labor Relations Act. 6 3 The court, in
reaching this conclusion, attaches great significance to the offsetting
legal and economic weapons available before and after impasse under
federal labor law through which the parties may seek resolution of their
dispute. 64 To allow an action under the Sherman Act would, according
the careful balance established
to the Eighth Circuit, "improperly upset
65
by Congress through the labor laws."
The court notes the comprehensive array of obligations, weapons,
and remedies which, upon expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, govern employer and employee conduct. 66 Both parties are obligated to bargain in good faith; 67 and, prior to impasse, management is
obligated to maintain the status quo concerning terms contained in an
expired agreement. 68 Upon impasse, management is permitted to make
unilateral changes reasonably comprehended within its pre-impasse
proposals. 6 9 At the same time, the union has a right to strike, 70 management has a right to lockout its employees, 71 and both parties have a
continuing right to petition the NLRB to seek a cease and desist order
prohibiting conduct constituting an unfair labor practice. 72 Thus, if
management exceeds its labor law rights in implementing employment
62. See Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.N.J. 1987) (citing United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941)).
63. Powell, 888 F.2d at 566-68:

64. Id. at 566-67.
65. Id. at 567.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 565 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (1982)).
68. Id. (citing Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v.Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 654 F.2d 625, 627 (9th Cir. 1981)).
69. Id. at 566-67 (ciiing Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 543 n.5 (1988)).
70. Id. (citing NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962)).
71. Id. at 567 (citing American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965)).
72. Id. (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938)).
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terms at impasse, the union must utilize NLRB procedures rather than
institute an action under the Sherman Act.
The court suggests that the weapons, remedies and procedures
sanctioned under the NLRA preclude antitrust scrutiny in the current
dispute. According to the court, application of the antitrust laws is a
weapon inconsistent with those weapons available under the NLRA as
well as the federal labor policy fostering collective bargaining. 73 Thus,
the court incorrectly implies that the weapons under the NLRA and the
antitrust laws are mutually exclusive. This analysis blurs the distinction
between federal labor policy and the policy underlying the labor
exemption.
The NLRA was designed to eliminate "obstructions to the free flow
of commerce . . .by encouraging the practice and procedure of collec-

tive bargaining."' 74 Accordingly, the general policy underlying the
weapons and remedies sanctioned by the NLRA and, in fact, all principles of federal labor law, is to promote collective bargaining. Two
widely accepted labor law principles cited by the Eighth Circuit in Powell
illustrate this point. For example, the prohibition against unilateral employer action fosters collective bargaining both by preserving mandatory
items for the bargaining table and by protecting the union's status as
exclusive bargaining representative. 75 Similarly, the specific purpose of
the status quo doctrine, which requires employers to continue in effect
provisions in an expired agreement, is to prevent management from undermining the union's bargaining authority. 76 The status quo doctrine
is thus a logical extension of the prohibition against unilateral action
regarding mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. Both principles
are designed to protect and preserve the bargaining process.
To the extent that the labor exemption immunizes restraints contained in a bona fide arm's-length agreement, the labor exemption also
fosters collective bargaining. Obviously, neither party would want to
bargain away any benefit in exchange for a provision that could subsequently be challenged on antitrust grounds. To suggest, however, that
this common purpose requires that the labor exemption continue beyond impasse for an indefinite period obscures the policy distinction between the exemption and other principles of federal labor law such as
the status quo doctrine and the prohibition against unilateral employer
action.
The foundational policy of the labor exemption, to reconcile antitrust and labor policies, 77 is clearly distinguishable from a policy
73. Id. at 566-68.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
75. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962).
76. See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960) (employer's unilateral change "tends to subvert the union's position as the representative of
the employees"); Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 391 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1968) (emplover's unilateral action "would undermine the union's authority by disregarding its status as the representative of the employees").
denied, 434 U.S.
77. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.

801 (1977).
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designed to protect the status of the exclusive bargaining representative
or to preserve the bargaining process. Moreover, limiting the scope of
the labor exemption is simply not inconsistent with the status quo doctrine or any other labor law doctrine designed to foster collective
bargaining.
Enabling the union to enjoin unreasonable restraints after the
agreement expires and at a point when immunizing the restraint no
longer fosters collective bargaining does not interfere with federal labor
policy. The labor exemption logically immunizes restraints of trade only
as long as doing so fosters the bargaining process. An employer should
not be permitted to use policy arguments to shield illegal provisions that
the union no longer desires after a point in the negotiations when the
labor exemption no longer furthers these policies. At that point, an employer should be exposed to antitrust liability. If the union has indicated unambiguously that it no longer is interested in continuing the
challenged restraints, neither maintaining the status quo nor continuing
the labor exemption will foster collective bargaining or protect the
union's bargaining status.
The fact that the restraint was previously subject to good faith negotiations is relevant to an employer's obligation to maintain the status
quo; previous good-faith negotiations are not relevant to the application
or non-application of the labor exemption once the agreement has expired. At some point after the expiration of the agreement, an employer
should be forced either to comply with the antitrust laws or to negotiate
away benefits in return for the unreasonable restraint. The owners' argument that such a result creates an unjustifiable shift in bargaining leverage is difficult to accept. The union should have leverage to modify or
eliminate an illegal restraint it determines is no longer in its best
interest.

The court's conclusion that the exemption should continue beyond
impasse is particularly remarkable in light of the limits of one of the
doctrines the court relies on to justify its position. An employer's obligation to maintain the status quo does not continue indefinitely. The
status quo doctrine requires an employer only to continue prior conditions of employment until the parties reach impasse. 78 After bargaining
in good faith to impasse, an employer is free to implement unilateral
changes as long as those changes are consistent with the latest proposals
offered to the union prior to impasse. 79 Under the court's interpretation of the labor exemption, a union that has agreed to a restraint may
not challenge that restraint on antitrust grounds even after the parties
reach impasse and the employer is free to make unilateral change in employment conditions. Thus, an agreement to a particular unreasonablerestraint for a finite period operates to waive, indefinitely according to the
Eighth Circuit's decision, a party's rights under the antitrust laws. In
78. Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 59, 64-65 (1964).
79. Id. at 65.
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short, the players' rights under the antitrust laws lie, after the agreement
has expired, in the hands of the owners.
The Eighth Circuit's inability to distinguish the policy consideration
underlying the labor exemption from those policies underlying the
weapons of remedies available under the Act also led the court to confuse the labor exemption with impasse. Significantly, the court recognized impasse as a part of the bargaining process sanctioned by the
NLRA. The court, citing the Supreme Court in Charles D. Bonanno Linen
Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 8 0 characterized impasse as a "'temporary deadlock' " in negotiations broken in almost all cases through a change of
mind or the application of economic force. Moreover, the court viewed
impasse as a weapon " 'brought about intentionally by one or both parties as a device to further rather than destroy the bargaining
process.' "81

On the basis of this language, as well as the Supreme Court's conclusion that impasse was a recurring feature in the bargaining process
not sufficiently destructive of group bargaining to justify unilateral withdrawal, 8 2 the court somehow concludes that the district court's impasse
test treats impasse, a lawful stage of the collective bargaining process, as
misconduct and, as a result, conflicts with federal labor law. 8 3 In other
words, the court suggests that since impasse is a lawful stage of the bargaining process, exposure to antitrust liability upon impasse is inconsistent with the federal labor policy fostering collective bargaining. In
essence, the court perceives exposure to antitrust liability as a penalty
for impasse.
Impasse is a labor concept, rather than a concept intended to ac84
commodate the intersection of conflicting antitrust and labor policies.
Impasse means that the bargaining process, intended to be protected by
the exemption, has stopped. The significance of that occurrence is that
the employer is then permitted to unilaterally implement pre-impasse
proposals.8 5 At that point, it is impossible to conclude that the restraint
is the product of collective bargaining or that the restraint emerged
from the bargaining process. It is simply a unilateral rule imposed by
86
management.
To continue to immunize a restraint unilaterally imposed by management after impasse raises a serious question concerning not only the
purpose and scope of the labor exemption but also the objectives of
80. Powell, 888 F.2d at 564 (quoting Bonanno Linen Service, 454 U.S. 404 (1982)).
81. Id. (quoting Bonanno Linen Service, 454 U.S. at 412).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 566-68.
84. Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 965-67 (D.N.J. 1987).
85. See Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete
Co., 484 U.S. 539, 544 n.5 (1988) (citing Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478
(1967), aff'd sub nom. American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d

622 (1968)).
86. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,
Powell v. NFL, No. 89-5091, at 7 (8th Cir. Jan. 17, 1990), (Lay, C.J., dissenting) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Courts file).
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federal labor law. Was the labor exemption intended to protect the process or the results of collective bargaining? 8 7 Significantly, the federal
labor laws do not require the parties to reach an agreement.8 8 The Act
mandates the collective bargaining process; it does not mandate an
agreement between the parties. The labor exemption was intended to
protect this process.
Continuing the exemption beyond the point in time when the process is likely to produce an agreement over a particular restraint and
when permitting management to unilaterally implement the restraint is
to protect the substance or results of the bargaining process rather than
the process itself. This result redefines the labor exemption. The labor
exemption protects the process only if its application is contingent upon
consent or, in other words, if the restraint immunized emerges from the
process of collective bargaining. The results of that process are protected only to the extent necessary to protect the process itself. How
can the exemption be said to protect the process when its application
immunizes restraints rejected by the other party after the process has
stopped?
Ironically, the court itself cites Professor Weistart for the proposi-

tion that the NFLPA-NFL dispute ought to be resolved free of judicial
intervention " 'where the union has had sufficient impact in shaping the
content of the employer's offers' " and where the challenged restraint is
"'clothed with union approval.' "89 Yet, according to this language,
Weistart would appear to support a different conclusion than the Eighth
Circuit reached in Powell. If the bargaining process comes to a standstill,
can it be assumed that the union has had an impact shaping the content
of the restraint? Moreover, how can a restraint over which the parties
bargain to impasse and which is then unilaterally implemented by management be said to be clothed with union approval?
C.

Accommodation of Competing Labor and Antitrust Policies

Application of the labor exemption is not appropriate just because
its application is consistent with federal labor policy. The purpose of
the labor exemption is to accommodate conflicting policies under federal antitrust and labor laws. 90 To foster collective bargaining, the
courts have willingly subordinated antitrust policies and immunized
otherwise unlawful restraints which are the product of bona fide arm'slength negotiations. Thus, the parties are free to resolve their differ87. This question was raised by Professor Roger Noll. Stanford University, in a telephone interview with the author (Dec., 1989).
88. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (Bargaining collectively creates an obligation to
meet and confer in good faith but "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession.").
89. Powell, 888 F.2d at 567 (quotingJ. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS
590 (1979)).
90. See, e.g.,
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 613-14 (8th Circuit 1976), cert.
denied, 434
U.S. 801 (1977) (availability of exemption "turns upon whether the relevant federal policy
is deserving of pre-eminence over Federal antitrust policy").
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ences over mandatory subjects through the bargaining process. Either
party may determine that agreeing to a restraint or bargaining away
rights under the antitrust laws, in return for certain benefits, is in its best
interest. As long as the restraint primarily affects the parties to the
agreement, their consent justifies immunization from the antitrust
9
laws. '

In situations where the parties agree to a particular restraint in the
course of good faith negotiations, the exemption is based on the parties'
consent and is intended to preserve the integrity of the bargaining process. A union clearly should not be permitted to invalidate undesirable
restraints contained in an unexpired agreement simply because it has
second thoughts concerning those restraints or makes a mistake injudgment during the negotiations. To permit a union to attack such restraints would undermine the federal labor policy favoring collective
bargaining by giving employers "no assurance that they could enter into
an agreement without exposing themselves to an action for treble damages." 92 In effect, this approach would completely subvert federal labor
law in favor of antitrust policies, a result clearly not intended by Con93
gress or the courts.
By the same token, however, management should not be permitted
to unilaterally impose unlawful restraints indefinitely or after the union
withdraws its consent simply because the union at one time agreed to
the restraint. This result would also undermine the bargaining process.
If this were the law, the union would be disinclined to accept any restrictions proposed by management.
In the current NFLPA-NFL dispute, the decision by the Eighth Circuit to continue to immunize the challenged restraints beyond impasse
neither advances federal antitrust and labor objectives nor accommodates competing antitrust and labor policies. Instead, continuing to immunize the challenged restraints further reduces competition in the
industry, a result inconsistent with federal antitrust laws, without promoting the policies of the NLRA. In fact, the court's decision to continue to immunize these restraints undermines the policies of the NLRA.
Absent the risk of antitrust liability, the owners have no incentive to bargain with the union over the restrictions on free agency. Because of the
lack of meaningful penalties under the NLRA, the NFL can avoid incurring costs by simply refusing to bargain over and continuing to impose
94
the current system on the players.
Within the context of the current NFL-NFLPA dispute, the proper
accommodation of federal antitrust and labor law requires that the labor
exemption expire certainly upon impasse if not simultaneously with the
collective bargaining agreement. -) 5 As Judge Lay points out in his dis91.
92.

Id. at 614.
Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987).

93. Id.
94. See Lock, Employer Unfair Labor Practices During the1982 NFL Strike: Help on the Way,
6 U. BRIDGEPORr L. REV. 189 (1985).
95. For a discussion of the justifications for the expiration of the exemption simulta-
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sent to the Eighth Circuit's denial for rehearing en banc, it is a complete
nonsequitor to hold that the restraints are entitled to protection after impasse "as an accommodation of good faith bargaining." 9 6 The bargaining process intended to be protected by the exemption ceased when the
parties reached impasse in negotiations over the restrictions on player
services. At that point, management was entitled under federal labor
law to unilaterally impose restrictions on free agency. In fact, that is
exactly what management did. The court erred, however, in concluding
that the restraints were, even after impasse, the product of collective
bargaining by virtue of the fact that the union agreed to them in a prior
agreement.
In this dispute, application of the antitrust laws after expiration of
the agreement and upon impasse will not undermine federal labor law.
The parties in this dispute were free to negotiate in good faith from the
conclusion of the 1986 season until sometime after February 1, 1988,
before potential free agents would accrue any damages under the antitrust laws. Thus, the parties had over a year to resolve this dispute
through the collective bargaining process without the risk of antitrust
liability. The parties were unable to reach an agreement during that
time frame - the collective bargaining process had reached a standstill.
As ofJanuary 1990, that standstill remains - absolutely no progress has
occurred in the negotiations between the parties over the restrictions on
player services. Perpetuating the exemption in this case completely negates the antitrust laws without fostering collective bargaining. Thus,
no justification exists for not furthering the purposes of the antitrust
laws.
V.

EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN CURRENT DISPUTE

The right of first refusal/compensation system contained in the
1982 NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement and described
above in the introduction virtually eliminated the movement of veteran
free agents in the NFL. Between 1977 and 1988, only two players
changed teams under that system. 9 7 Moreover, the system precluded
competitive bidding among teams for players and, as a result, suppressed player salaries far below open market levels. An employment
relationship of this nature, in which the employer retains perpetual
rights over employees, is unimaginable in almost every industry other
than professional sports and almost certainly violates federal antitrust
law.
The modified right of first refusal/compensation system unilaterally
implemented by management on February 1, 1989, permits each team
neously with the expiration of the agreement, see Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in

Professional Sports 1989 DUKE L.J. 339.
96. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,

Powell v. NFL, No. 89-5091, at 5 (8th Cir. Jan. 17, 1990) (Lay, C.J., dissenting) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Courts file).

97. See Afidavit of Richard A. Berthelsen, NFLPA General Counsel, at 13-14, Powell,
678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988) (No. 4-87-917).
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to protect thirty-seven players.9 8 The new system, referred to by teams
and sports journalists as Plan B, subjects the thirty-seven "protected
players" on each team to a right of first refusal system similar to the one
contained in the 1982 agreement. Not surprisingly, not a single protected player changed teams under this system in 1989. 99
Under the new system, unprotected players become unrestricted
free agents, free to sign a contract with a new team without the compensation requirements applicable to protected players. 0 0° Two hundred
and twenty-nine unprotected players changed teams in 1989 under Plan
B.' 0 1 A large majority of these players, however, were either aging veterans with large contracts, players recovering from serious injuries, or
marginal players. 10 2 The top thirty-seven players on each team are still
subjected to a right of first refusal/compensation system similar to the
one contained in the 1982 agreement; and, accordingly, the NFLPA has
10 3
also challenged the new system.
The non-statutory labor exemption represents a judicial accommodation between competing congressional policies favoring collective
bargaining under the NLRA and free competition in business markets
under federal antitrust law. 10 4 Nonetheless, with the exception of its
discussion of the holdings in Mackey and Bridgeman v. NBA, the Eighth
Circuit in Powell largely ignores this well-established objective underlying the non-statutory labor exemption. ' 0 5 Instead, the court completely
subverts antitrust law on the premise that immunizing restraints beyond
impasse is somehow required under federal labor law.
The court cryptically states that its ruling does not entail that once a
union and management enter into collective bargaining, management is
forever exempt from the antitrust laws or that restraints on player services can never offend the Sherman Act.' 0 6 At another point in the opinion, the court states that its reading of the authorities leads it to
conclude that the NFL and players have not reached the point in negotiations where it would be appropriate to permit an action under the
Sherman Act.' 0 7 These statements by the court are remarkable in light
of what has transpired since the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement
expired on August 31, 1987.
Since that date the players have adamantly refused to agree to the
98. See Scorecard. SPORTS
99. King, Inside the NFL,

100.
101.
102.
(46%)

ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 13, 1989, at
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 18,

7.
1989, at 68.

Id. See also Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 779-81.
See King, supra note 99, at 68.
See generally id., ("Of the 229 players who switched clubs under the system 105
made opening day rosters. Of these, 33% (14% of the total) started in Week I

103. Id. (" 'It wasn't lawful and wasn't adequate for all players in 1989, and it won't be
lawful or adequate in 1990.' says Doug Allen, the union's assistant executive director.")
104. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 613-14 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
801 (1977) (availability of exemption "turns upon whether the relevant federal policy is
deserving of pre-eminence over federal antitrust policy").
105. Powell, 888 F.2d 559.
106, Id. at 568.
107. Id. at 566.
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continuation of the NFL's restrictions on free agency. Meanwhile, the
players struck and management staged replacement games during the
1987 regular season, both parties have filed unfair labor practice
charges with the NLRB, 10 8 the current antitrust dispute has been
delayed by motions and interlocutory appeals and continues to linger in
the courts while a new action is being contemplated and the NFLPA has
allegedly renounced its union status to enable the players to avoid the
Eighth Circuit's decision. I0 9 Finally, no meaningful negotiations concerning the restrictions on free agency have taken place since the strike
ended in the fall of 1987 and management has since withdrawn from
and terminated both contributions to the NFL pension and the accruals
of severance pay for the 1989 season and thereafter. I 10 Presumably,
these benefits were part of the quid pro quo for the NFL's restrictions on
free agency contained in the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement. If,
as the Eighth Circuit states, its decision does not absolutely preclude
antitrust review, it is difficult to imagine what else must transpire to trigger application of the antitrust laws. As Judge Lay rhetorically asks in
his dissent from the court's denial of hearing en banc: "If the exemption
does not end at impasse, when does it end?"'II Rather than accommodating labor and antitrust policies, the court's decision gives an employer everlasting immunity from the antitrust laws.
Expiration of the labor exemption does not mean that management's restrictions on free agency necessarily have to violate federal antitrust law. The Sherman Act condemns only unreasonable restraints of
trade.'' 2 In the absence of an agreement, management is always free
upon impasse to unilaterally implement reasonable restrictions on free
agency. Presumably, management implemented Plan B with the intention of positioning itself to argue that its restrictions were reasonable in
the event of an adverse decision from the Eighth Circuit. It is unlikely
that a court would conclude that Plan B is a reasonable restraint of
trade. That is not to say, however, that the NFL could not implement a
more enlightened free agency system that would survive antitrust
scrutiny.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the absence of an antitrust exemption, the NFL's current system
of free agency almost certainly violates federal antitrust law. During the
108. See NLRB Case No. 2-CB-12117 (NFLMC charge); NLRB Case Nos. 5-CA-19170,

19508 (NFLPA charges).
109. See Startling Move to Decertify Leaves NFL Union in 'Uncharted Area,' Wash. Post, Nov.
9, 1989, at CIO, col. 1 (NFLPA to "seek decertification as the legal bargaining representative for NFL players in an effort to strip the league of ... antitrust immunity").
110. The NFL withdrew from the pension on March 31, 1989. Telephone interview
with John Macik, NFL staff representative, (Jan. 29, 1990).
1i1. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,
Powell v. NFL, No. 89-5091, at 6 (8th Cir. Jan. 17, 1990) (Lay, CJ., dissenting) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Courts file).

112. See, e.g., Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918);
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56-66 (1911).
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life of the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement and, according to the
district court in Powell, until the parties reached impasse, 113 that system
was exempt from antitrust attack by virtue of the non-statutory labor
exemption. The non-statutory labor exemption is based on union
consent.
The current NFLPA-NFL dispute involves an employment system
that the union has unequivocally rejected for more than two years. It is
absolutely inconceivable that a court could conclude that the NFL's current system is somehow the product of collective bargaining or union
consent, and thereby qualifies for the protection of the non-statutory
labor exemption when in fact the system has been unceremoniously
rammed down the union's throat by management. Yet, this is exactly
what the Eighth Circuit has concluded.
Although the court insists that its decision does not preclude antitrust review, the court gives no indication of what might trigger application of the antitrust laws." 4 The union is thus left with the option of
decertification in order to invoke the protection of the antitrust laws. As
Judge Lay says, "the union should not be compelled, short of self-destruction, to accept illegal restraints it deems undesirable."' 15 The
Eighth Circuit could not possibly argue that the appropriate accommodation of federal labor and antitrust policy requires a union to decertify
in order to invoke, on behalf of its members, rights under the antitrust
laws.

113. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 788-89.
114. Powell, 888 F.2d at 568.
115. Order Denying Petitioh for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,
Powell v. NFL, No. 89-5091, at 8 (8th Cir. Jan. 17, 1990) (Lay, CJ., dissenting) (LEXIS
Genfed library, Courts file).
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MODEST PROPOSAL*
BRODY**

INTRODUCTION

The National Football League's ("NFL" or "League") First Refusal/Compensation system governing team rights to the services of experienced players is under legal attack by the players.' The players are
attacking the system because it seriously inhibits the ability of players to
put their services up for competitive bidding among the teams and
thereby prevents players from being paid what they are worth. 2 They
are attacking the system in court because they were unable to eliminate
3
it through collective bargaining.
The First Refusal/Compensation system permits teams to retain the
services of veteran free agent players, a player who has completed the
term of his contract, by matching any offer the player may receive from
any other team in the league. On the other hand, if a team chooses not
to meet a competing offer for one of its free agent players, it will receive
compensation from the team signing that player. The compensation will
be draft choices in the league's annual allocation of the services of college trained players seeking entry to the league. 4 There can be no
doubt that this system combining the right of first refusal and compensation has been effective to prevent players from changing teams and also
effective to keep salaries depressed by discouraging competitive bidding
5
for player services within the league.
*
The following proposal is the view solely of the author and not that of the
National Football League or the National League Football Players Association.
**
Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.S.C. 1959, J.D. 1961,
DePaul University; LL.M. 1978, Northwestern University. Chairman, 1986-87, Association
of American Law Schools, Section on Sports Law.
1. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.
1989).
2. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, GAME PLAN '87, A COMMITMENT To NFL PLAYERS PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 9 (1987) [hereinafter GAME PLAN].
3. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 781 n.9, ("[t]he Court begins its analysis with the sense that
plaintiffs (the players) are seeking to gain through the courts what they could not win at
the bargaining table.").
4. See generally Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989).
5. In Powell, the Court points out:
Notwithstanding the significant liberalization of the traditional free agency
system, during the five-year period covered by the 1977 Collective Bargaining
Agreement, fewer than 50 out of 600 players received offers from other NFL
clubs after becoming free agents. Plaintiffs allege that the only time players
moved was when, in effect, a trade was arranged between two NFL clubs. That
practice occurred on fewer than 20 occasions and only one player actually moved
from one NFL club to another in a transaction in which draft choice compensation was payable.
Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 780 (emphasis added).
The Powell court also points out that the compensation requirements were again liberalized by the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement in which the salary levels at which
draft choice compensation would be triggered were raised. However, the court goes on to
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THE CURRENT SITUATION

Presently the parties are operating without a collective bargaining
agreement. The 1982 Agreement terminated in 1987 and the negotiations between the players and the league have not been fruitful. There
was a twenty-four day strike during the 1987 season, but the players returned to work without a new contract. The sticking point in negotiations is clearly free agency. The players demand it while the owners,
recognizing they have a good thing going, are adamant about retaining
First Refusal/Compensation Rights. 6 The litigation is an attempt by the
players to establish free agency by denying to the owners the benefits of
the labor exemption to the antitrust laws for the First Refusal/Compensation system. 7 However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has decided that although the parties may have reached an impasse in
negotiations and certainly are at impasse as to free agency, it would not
end the labor exemption for the First Refusal/Compensation system.8
Thus, for the time being, the situation remains fixed in concrete.
The players remain committed to unrestricted free agency because
they want freedom of choice. 9 That freedom will allow each player to
pursue his career with teams, coaching staffs and playing systems of his
choosing. It will also allow each player to choose where he will live and
maximize his ability to create a better life for himself after football. The
players also want free agency because they know that competitive bidding for their services will get them salaries more reflective of their contribution to the production of income. I0
The irony is that the players once had the free agency they now seek
and bargained it away. I I Having bargained it away, they cloaked the
First Refusal/Compensation system with the labor exemption.
The owners remain equally committed to maintaining restrictions
on free agency. All their justifications flow from the unique nature of
sports league competition and the need to maintain a high level of competitiveness within the league in order to sustain spectator interest and
thus revenues.' 2 Without restrictions, teams in the more attractive cities
say, "[t]he modifications incorporated in the Agreement did not increase player movement
in the NFL and, in fact, during the five-year period covered by the Agreement, not a single
veteran player moved from one NFL club to another under the Right of First Refusal/
Compensation system." Id. at 781.
The court also pointed out the chilling effect the system has on bidding when it
stated, "[o]f the 1,415 players who became veteran free agents during the term of the 1982
agreement... apparently only one player even received an offer from another club." Id. n.6
(emphasis added).
6. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 781.
7. Id.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See generally Powell, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989).
See GAME PLAN, supra note 2.
Id.
Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 359

(1989).
12. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
It seems incongruous that the owners are able to justify reducing financial competition
among themselves by saying that restraint is necessary to maintain athletic competitiveness
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within the league would have an overwhelming advantage in the competition for players and would eventually dominate the on-field competition, thereby destroying the essential appeal of league competition.
Other reasons for restricting player movement to other teams flow
more directly from the commercial nature of professional leagues.
There is a need to maintain the integrity of the game by convincing followers that the players are loyal to the team.' 5 One of the ways professional teams create interest and thereby sell tickets is to get fans to
identify with certain popular players and through them, with the team.
Without a means of controlling player movement, a team's substantial
investment in the marketing of a particular pliyer would be destroyed.
Additionally, if there were not some assurance that the athletic talent
within the league would be equitably distributed among the teams,
fewer cities would be able to support teams. 14 Fewer cities translates
into lost income from franchise fees and television revenues. However,
the major reason owners do not want free agency is that it would increase player salaries. 15 So the owners, wealthy business men, competing among themselves with lucrative, valuable toys, are determined to
keep the First Refusal/Compensation system because they view it as an
integral element in maintaining and enhancing the value of their
franchises.
III.

REALITY

It seems apparent that free agency will have to be bargained. The
trial court, in Powell v. National Football League, after finding that the parties were at impasse on the free agency issue, but nonetheless finding
that the labor exemption survived the expiration of the 1982 Collective
Bargaining Agreement, said:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act and substantive national labor laws
establish that federal labor policy favors resolution of labor disputes through collective bargaining accompanied, if necessary,
by economic sanctions. If the Court intervened at this time with
preliminary injunctive relief, it would reverse the bargaining
leverage of the parties and completely disrupt the bargaining
process. The strong public interest in protecting and promoting the bargaining process merits considerable weight in the
Court's analysis. 16
The appellate court expressed the same commitment to bargaining in its
decision, when it said:
among their teams. It becomes doubly incongruous when one realizes that the reduction
in financial competition is achieved, not by restricting the owners, but by limiting the

players.
13. Canes, The Social Benefits of Restrictions on Team Quality, GOVERNMENT AND THE
SPORTS BusINESs 82 n.2 (R. Noll ed. 1974).

14. Id.
15. "Defendants (owners) contend that the players' insistence upon obtaining free
agency is, in fact, little more than an attempt to increase player salaries by inducing bidding among the NFL clubs." Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 781 n.7.
16. Powell, 690 F. Supp. at 818.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2

The labor arena is one with well established rules which are
intended to foster negotiated settlements rather than intervention by the courts. The League and the Players have accepted
this "level playing field" as the basis for their often tempestuous relationship, and we believe that there is substantial justification for requiring the parties to continue to fight on it, so that
bargaining and the exertion of economic
force may be used to
17
bring about legitimate compromise.
The difficulty with bargaining on this issue, at least from the play8
ers' perspective, is that the players have a relatively weak position.'
This results from many 'factors. The disparity of skills of the players,
superstar to marginal, and the resulting undermining of union solidarity, the teams' discretion to determine who shall be on the team and the
resulting lack of job security for most players, coupled with the short
average career of four years, seriously undermine the commitment individuals can make to union objectives. The fact that the players conducted an unsuccessful strike during the 1987 season, combined with
the above disadvantages, put the players in a difficult position to bargain
effectively. 19 The owners, on the other hand, have a very strong bargaining position enhanced by revenue sharing. 20 Such is the disparity
that Professor Lock suggests that the goal of the labor exemption to the
antitrust laws, reconciling the competing antitrust and labor policies,
may not be met through bargaining because whatever compromise
emerges will not be the product of good faith, arm's-length
2
negotiations. '
To correct the situation and establish the proper scope of the labor
exemption in professional sports generally and professional football in
particular, Professor Lock suggests a combination of legislative and judicial action. 22 He suggests that Congress amend the National Labor Relations Act to accommodate the unique nature of professional sports
and that Congress either convince the NFL to establish economic incentives for teams to win so they will compete for players or repeal the
league's present statutory antitrust exemptions. On the judicial side,
Professor Lock recommends that the Minnesota district court hearing
Powell should outline what limitations on free agency it finds acceptable.
Without question these steps would work to resolve the current deadlock, but can these changes be made in the near future?
The Minnesota court could, if it so chose, respond in relatively
quick fashion. But given the commitment to resolving the dispute
through bargaining set forth earlier, can such action reasonably be expected? Further, the legislative process, required to address the questions at the basic level Professor Lock suggests, would be prolonged.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Powell, 888 F.2d at 567.
Lock, supra, note 11, at 354.
Id.
Id. at 357-58.
Id. at 397-98.
Id. at 414.
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Moreover, there is question whether the players, for exactly the same
reasons, would be any more effective in lobbying, than they are in bargaining. Furthermore, because of the high turnover in the player ranks,
extending the time it takes to resolve the problem means that fewer current players share whatever benefits would result.
On the other hand, the owners also have an interest in resolving the
question expeditiously. Obviously, if their bargaining position is what it
23
is believed to be, they will get as favorable terms as they can expect.
More importantly, the league is at the threshold of another period of
growth. Cities clamor for teams and television's appetite for NFL football seems almost insatiable. Opportunities in cable television and "pay
per view" beckon. And on top of all this, there is growing international
interest in the game. The key to maximizing this potential is the stability
only a collective bargaining agreement will bring. The owners want and
need the dispute to be resolved.
The answer is of course good faith, arm's-length negotiation recognizing the legitimate interests on each side. Obviously, neither unrestricted free agency, as the players demand, nor the current First
Refusal/Compensation system is acceptable. Somewhere between these
extremes must lie a point where the owners can have the continuity and
competitiveness that makes for a viable professional league, and the
players can have the freedom they need to control their careers and lives
and be more justly compensated. It is in the interest of both sides to
find a compromise. What follows is an attempt to establish that point by
outlining a free agency system that addresses the legitimate interests of
the players and the teams.
IV.

A

PROPOSAL

The major components of a free agency system must be: (1) determining which players shall be eligible; (2) deciding whether the team
losing a player shall have the right of first refusal; and (3) establishing
the compensation, if any, the signing team must give the team losing the
player,
A.

Eligibility

Veteran players whose contracts have expired and who have been in
the league for four years should be eligible to make their services avail23. What the players have to consider is whether, without judicial intervention, their
bargaining position will improve or further deteriorate with the passing of time. The players are so determined to deny the owners the benefits of the labor exemption for the First
Refusal/Compensation system that they have filed to decertify their current association as
their bargaining representative. Starting Move to Decertify Leaves NFL Union in 'Uncharted
Area', Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1989, at Ci0, col. 1. Even if decertification is successful, the
issue of free agency will eventually be bargained with the current association's successor.
It seems the best that can occur will be that some current players will gain the benefits of
unrestricted free agency unless the owners decided to face antitrust liability for whatever
restrictions they may unilaterally place on player movement in the hope that those restrictions will be upheld under antitrust law's rule of reason.
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able to all teams in the league. Four years seems appropriate because
that is the "average" career length and thus, making this the eligibility
point would mean that all players who were above the norm would be
able to have the benefits of free agency. An effort should be made to set
the time limit for eligibility so that at least fifty percent of the players
become eligible. Certainly, given the short working careers of professional football players, setting a longer term would render the right
without meaning.
Four years is also fair to the teams. It seems long enough to permit
the team to recoup its "investment" in the player. Teams coach players
in conditioning, skills, techniques and the team's own system of play.
Four years would be time enough for the player to learn and put that
learning to use for the team. Further, within four years a team can and
should determine, with some precision, the value of a particular player
to the team. This determination will enable the team, should it so decide, to attempt to sign the player to contracts covering seasons beyond
the fourth. In other words, teams could attempt to get players to bargain away their forthcoming free agency in exchange for, one would assume, a higher salary than might otherwise be offered, some sort of
guaranteed contract or other benefit. Regardless of the form of the benefit given in exchange for foregoing free agency, the availability of this
opportunity can only result in the player being compensated more proportionately with his contribution to productivity.
B.

First Refusal

The right of a team to match any offer made by another team, and
thereby retain the rights to a free agent attempting to leave its team,
should be eliminated because it has too chilling an effect on the exercise
of free agency. 2 4 It has such an effect because teams are not willing to
bargain with a free agent knowing that if they offer him anywhere near
his true worth, his current team will retain his services simply by meeting
the offer. If free agency is to be in any way effective to meet the legitimate interests of the players, there cannot be any right of first refusal.
However, the "losing" team should be allowed to enter the bidding
for a player attempting to exercise his free agency right by negotiating
with another team. This would require teams to accurately assess a
player's value to them, their resulting interest in him and place a dollar
value on that interest. One would think that their offer would reflect his
value to the team as a player, his value in maintaining fan loyalty to the
team and the value to the league generally in keeping the player on his
present team in order to maintain competitiveness throughout the
league. This, however, may be exactly what the owners are trying to
avoid.
Another benefit of denying teams an absolute right of first refusal
but permitting them to enter the bidding for one of their players exer24. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 777.
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cising his right to negotiate with other teams, is that it provides an incentive to teams to treat players well while they are under contract to the
team. This goes beyond paying the player appropriately to include
helping him adjust to the city in which he is contractually bound to play
and live, helping build a future in that city and giving him the belief that
he has the opportunity to play with a winning team.
C.

Compensation

The compensation for signing an eligible veteran free agent should
be a draft choice equal to the draft choice used to acquire the player.
For example, if a team signs a player who was a first round draft choice,
then it owes the losing team a first round draft choice. Or if a team signs
a player who was acquired in a trade for a second round draft choice,
then it owes the losing team a second round draft choice. Draft choices
are a medium of exchange professional football understands and with
which it is comfortable.
The major benefit of this system, as distinct from the current one, is
that the player does not become less attractive as a free agent because
his salary is high. Compensation being set by acquisition cost, rather
than salary, allows a player's salary to reflect his productive value to his
team without it having a chilling effect on his free market value should
his present team undervalue his services. Although the current compensation system gives teams an incentive to pay slightly higher salaries in
order to drive up potential free agency compensation they may receive,
the chilling effect of high free agency compensation has kept player
movement at a minimum and thus kept overall salaries at a lower level.
Removing salary as a criterion in setting free agency compensation
levels will result in each player being paid more in relation to his productive value both by the team currently employing him and by those
teams that may covet his services.
Another benefit of this "same round" draft choice compensation is
that it works to the advantage of lower draft choices who perform better
than anticipated. For example, suppose a player is drafted in the tenth
round but becomes a first team starter and a league all-star. Under current practices such a player is "slotted" for salary purposes, meaning he
has great difficulty getting his salary to a level equal to comparable players who entered the league as highly coveted draft choices. Under the
system proposed, there would be incentive for teams that have such
players to pay them appropriately in order to keep them from seeking
their true value from another team. Undrafted players who become
superstars or even journeymen would also have their salaries quickly
raised to reflect their true worth to the teams employing them.
Thus "same round" draft choice compensation would help create a
free agency system that not only would benefit first round draft choice
superstars, it would benefit players throughout the ranks. It would result in more just compensation for all, and would reduce the impact of
the disparity of skills among the players which weakens the National
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Football League Players Association ("Players Association" or "Association") as a bargaining representative. At the same time, "same round"
compensation free agency requires a number of limitations that serve
the owners' legitimate interest in maintaining competitive balance
throughout the league.
First, in order for a team to sign a veteran free agent it would have
to have an appropriate choice available in order to make compensation.
This has a number of effects. It prevents one team from attempting to
sign all the available superstars; typically, no team would have enough
choices in the high rounds to enter the bidding for more than a few of
available players. Thus it prevents a team from becoming a free agent
predator. It also prevents teams, in what are believed to be the more
attractive cities, from dominating the league because they would not
have enough draft choices to meet the compensation requirements for
all the players that might be attracted to them. The net result is that the
chaos the owners fear would be avoided. Rather, there would be a sufficient number of bidders, especially for the under-valued players, to insure a competitive market so that players would be more justly
compensated.
Second, if the signing team's draft choice in the forthcoming draft is
lower in the round than the choice used by the losing team to acquire
the free agent being signed, the signing team should be required to also
give its draft choice in the next round. The reason for this limitation is
so that successful teams will not have an incentive to, in effect, "trade
up" in the draft by signing a veteran free agent from a weaker team that
used a higher draft choice with which to acquire that player. For example, suppose the current year's Super Bowl champion with the last
choice in each round of the draft, sought to sign a veteran free agent
who was selected with the very first choice in the first round of the draft.
It would be more tempting for the champion to sign established players,
known performers, if all it was required to give as compensation was a
relatively lesser chance to draft a younger player with potential. This
limitation reinforces the underlying theory of the draft by giving the less
successful teams with higher draft choices an advantage in the bidding
for veteran free agents. It also serves to maintain competitive balance
because it makes the compensation price higher for traditionally successful teams. Yet it does not diminish the number of bidders; it merely
shifts bidding power among the bidders in a fashion the league has
favored.
One additional benefit to competitiveness results from "same
round" compensation free agency. The less successful teams with high
draft choices will be encouraged to retain those draft choices rather than
trade them. These choices would become more valuable because they
would represent two ways of improving a team rather than one. They
could be used in the customary way to select entering players or they
could be used to sign established veteran free agents. Increasing the
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value of the higher draft choices held by the less successful teams also
reinforces the underlying theory of the draft.
"Same round" compensation free agency requires one more limitation that prevents chaos but does not diminish competitive bidding for
player services. The period during which negotiations with, and signings of, veteran free agents could occur would have to be restricted to a
time between the end of the season and the next draft. It is convenient
to set this time as beginning after the Super Bowl and ending a week
before the draft. That allows enough time for active bidding and negotiation and also permits time to plan for the changes in teams' drafting
plans that will occur.
A modification in "same round" compensation is needed for veteran free agents in the latter stages of their careers. "Same round"
compensation would have too chilling an effect on the ability of high
draft choices who are in their eighth or ninth season of play to provide
the freedom of choice such players deserve. The physical toll of professional football is so great that it is only in the rarest of circumstances
that a team would surrender a high draft choice to sign a player who had
been playing eight years, regardless of that player's ability. But players
who have been in the league that long and who are capable of contributing to a team so that they may become a coveted free agent, have earned
greater freedom rather than less. Thus, the draft choice compensation
owed by the signing team to the losing team should be adjusted downward. The adjustment could be on a sliding scale geared to the number
of years the player has been in the league, that is the draft choice compensation could be one round lower than that in which the player was
selected for each year beyond six the player has played in the league.
Alternatively, the compensation could be set at a "flat rate," that is, an
eighth round choice for a player signed after his eighth year. However
this modification is made, the point is that it should be made so that
whatever free agency system emerges from negotiation, it meets the interests of these players who have made an extraordinary contribution to
the league.
There is one additional area of compensation that ought to be considered. That deals with extraordinary medical costs. Suppose a player
is severely injured and the team pays all the medical costs to repair the
injury and also pays the player's salary, as it should, while the player
recovers. Suppose the player returns to competition the following year,
plays well and becomes eligible for free agency. Should a team that
signs such a player be required to somehow share those costs, including
the salary that was paid while the player recovered, but did not play? In
Mackey v. National Football League, 25 the court held the teams were not
entitled to compensation for their investment in player development
costs because those expenses were similar to those incurred by other
businesses. 2 6 However, the extraordinary medical costs that often occur
25. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
26. [he reasoning seems akin to the reasoning that essential reliance, as distinct from
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in professional football go beyond and are not similar to those incurred
in other businesses, and some thought should be given to them. While
on the one hand, it is not in the players' interest to raise the required
free agency compensation, it certainly is not in the players' interest to
discourage teams from providing the best medical care and rehabilitation available.
V.

CONCLUSION

It would be beneficial to both the players and the league to resolve
the current dispute over free agency. The quickest way to resolve it is
through bargaining. However, the only bargaining that has any chance
of succeeding is bargaining that recognizes the legitimate interests of
each side.

incidental reliance, is not recoverable in contracts. See Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).

ALLOCATION OF THE RISKS OF SKIING:
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INTRODUCTION

Skiing is a unique and special sport in which an individual skier's
abilities are constantly pitted against a changing winter mountain environment, ranging from gentle groomed trails to steep, ungroomed
slopes. The essence of skiing is the continual challenge of making successful, individual assessments about one's own abilities in light of the
available terrain choices and varying snow conditions.
Fueled by a significant growth in the popularity of the sport as a
major recreational activity, ski area operators have invested millions of
dollars in technological advances to develop, operate and maintain their
areas. Not surprisingly, the ski industry, in general, has become an important factor in the economies of many communities and states. However, individually, many ski areas have become the frequent targets of
litigation arising from injuries sustained by skiers.
Application of common law negligence principles by the courts to
the sport of skiing has shifted between the inconsistent use of various
legal doctrines and has drifted away from an analytical assessment and
allocation of the appropriate responsibilities of skiers and ski area operators. In many states, legislation has been enacted in an effort to more
clearly define the relative duties and responsibilities. As a result, many
courts have struggled to fit novel statutory requirements into the common law frame of analysis.
This article will first outline the development of the common law as
applied to the sport of skiing. Second, subsequent codifications affecting the determination of liability will be traced. Finally, this article will
argue for a return to the fundamentals of tort law to properly assess and
allocate legal responsibility for the risks associated with the sport of skiing. In each individual case, this framework will provide the basis for an
analysis of whether there was a legal duty on the ski area operator upon
which the injured skier may sustain an action in negligence.
Three recent Colorado Supreme Court cases provide the stepping
stones for going back to the basics in the application of tort law to the
sport of skiing. These cases suggest how common law principles of negligence may be reconciled with the recent statutory revisions and how a
*

Resident partner in the Aspen, Colorado office of Holland & Hart. B.A. 1970,

Stanford University; J.D. 1974, University of California at Berkeley. The author also acknowledges the assistance of Latrelle Miller, law clerk with Holland & Hart and a member
of the class of 1990 at the University of Denver College of Law.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol.,67:2

common sense approach may be available in the determination of liability for injuries arising from the inherent risks of skiing.
II.

THE COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT

The evolution of negligence law in the sport of skiing began with
the historic case of Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc. 1 Since that decision,
in 1951, involving the assessment of the responsibilities of a ski area
operator and an injured skier, many different aspects of skiing have been
litigated including ski school classes 2 , skiing competitions 3 , ski lift accidents 4 , ski lift loading and unloading accidents 5 , collisions with ski area
1. 96 F. Supp. 786 (D. Vt. 1951).
2. Ninio v. Hight, 385 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1967)("rules of road" applicable in skierskier collision); Heath v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 325 F. Supp. 223 (D. Colo. 1971)(dismissal
of complaint based upon refusal to permit independent ski instructor at ski area); Davis v.
Erickson, 53 Cal. 2d 860, 350 P.2d 535, 3 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1960)(proximate cause instruction necessary in a collision between a ski school student-plaintiff and another skier); Summit County Development Corp. v. Bagnoli, 166 Colo. 27, 441 P.2d 658 (1968)(no
assumption of risk instruction when ski school student misloaded lift); Seidl v. TrolIhaugen, Inc., 305 Minn. 506, 232 N.W.2d 236 (1975)(comparative negligence instruction
upheld in collision with ski instructor action); Elliott v. Taos Ski Valley, Inc., 83 N.M. 575,
494 P.2d 1392 (N.M. App. 1972)(application of traditional negligence law to injury of a ski
school student when instructor failed to summon assistance), aff'd, 83 N.M. 763, 497 P.2d
974.
3. Garretson v. United States, 456 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1972)(release upheld in jumping competition accident); Marietta v. Cliff's Ridge, Inc., 20 Mich. App. 449, 174 N.W.2d
164 (1969)(liability for use of inappropriate slalom poles), affd, 385 Mich. 364, 189
N.W.2d 208 (1971); Vogel v. West Mountain Corp., 97 A.D.2d 46, 470 N.Y.S.2d 475
(1983)(mere sponsorship of a race did not create a duty to a racer on the part of the
sponsor); Douglass v. Skiing Standards, Inc., 142 Vt. 634, 459 A.2d 97 (1983)(release upheld in a skiing competition accident).
4. Trigg v. City and County of Denver, 784 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1986)(negligence
per se instruction appropriate in a lift accident but not a res ipsa loquitur instruction under
the facts presented); Noto v. Pico Peak Corp., 469 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1972)(instructions
and warnings regarding maintenance of a lift bullwheel do not cover defective designs);
Sabo v. Breckenridge Lands, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 602 (D. Colo. 1966)(contributory negligence not a bar to recovery if ski area is subsequently in a position to avoid the injury and
prevent harm), appeal denied, 376 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1967); Miller v. Arnal Corp., 129 Ariz.
484, 632 P.2d 987 (1981)(no liability for failure to rescue campers stranded in storm);
Anderson v. Heron Engineering Co., 40 Colo. App. 191, 575 P.2d 16 (1977)(lift manufacturer held to express warranties regarding safety), rev'd, 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674
(1979); Lewis v. Big Powderhorn Mountain Ski Corp., 69 Mich. App. 437, 245 N.W.2d 81
(1976)(strict liability not applicable in rope tow accident); Pessl v. Bridger Bowl, 164
Mont. 389, 524 P.2d 1101 (1974)(standard of reasonable care applicable in lift operations
under Montana Passenger Tramway Act); Cowan v. Tyrolean Ski Area, Inc., 127 N.H. 397,
506 A.2d 690 (1985)(inadequate jury instructions in chair lift incident); Bolduc v. Herbert
Schneider Corp., 117 N.H. 566, 374 A.2d 1187 (1977); Ford v. Black Mountain Tramways,
Inc., 110 N.H. 20, 259 A.2d 129 (1969)(ski area not a manufacturer or seller of tramway,
only an entity providing transportation service and thus no action under strict liability);
Allen v. State, 110 N.H. 42, 260 A.2d 454 (1969)(operator of ski lift a common carrier);
Lippman v. State, 83 A.D.2d 700, 442 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1981)(res ipsa loquitur applicable in
case where chairs with riders fell to ground); Lawrence v. Davos, Inc., 46 A.D.2d 41, 360
N.Y.S.2d 730 (1974)(res ipsa loquitur instruction rejected in lift case where plaintiff failed
to use safety chains); Albert v. State, 80 Misc. 2d 105, 362 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1974)(lifts under
New York statutory law not common carriers), aff'd, 51 A.D.2d 611, 378 N.Y.S.2d 125
(1976); Friedman v. State, 54 Misc. 2d 448, 282 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1967)(operator ofa ski lift
is a common carrier), rnodified, 31 A.D.2d.992, 297 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1969); Vogel v. State,
204 Misc. 614, 124 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1953)(contributory negligence in not freeing ski poles
from chair barred recovery in lift unloading accident); Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain,
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equipment 6 and other skiers 7, skier collisions with natural objects and
skier falls 8 . Courts have also addressed evidentiary issues9 , applications
Inc., 21 Wash. App. 130, 584 P.2d 432 (1978)(obligations to invitee in lift accident only
apply to those parts of property which are in the scope of the invitation), aft'd, 93 Wash. 2d
127, 606 P.2d 1214 (1980).
5. Hunt v. Sun Valley Company, Inc., 561 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1977)(highest degree of
care applied to lift operation, yet strict liability rejected); Riblet Tramway Company v.
Monte Verde Corp., 453 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1972)(standard of highest degree of care as
common carrier for lift operations); Houser v. Floyd, 220 Cal. App. 2d 778, 34 Cal. Rptr.
96 (1963)(res ipsa loquitur not applicable in lift case); Summit County Development Corp.
v. Bagnoli, 166 Colo. 27, 441 P.2d 658 (1968);Jordan v. Loveland Skiing Corp., 503 P.2d
1034 (Colo. App. 1972)(res ipsa loquitur instruction rejected in lift unloading case); Arapahoe Basin, Inc. v. Fischer, 28 Colo. App. 580, 475 P.2d 631 (1970)(instructions on contributory negligence sufficient in lift related accident without instruction on assumption of
risk); Grauer v. State, 9 A.D.2d 829, 192 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1959)(operator of a ski lift not
subject to res ipsa loquitur); Math v. State, 37 Misc. 2d 1023, 237 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1962)(operator of lift has same duty as a common carrier).
6. Leopold v. Okemo Mountain, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 781 (D. Vt. 1976)(skier collision
with unpadded lift tower assumed risks of losing control); Phillips v. Monarch Recreation
Corp., 668 P.2d 982 (Colo. App. 1983)(ski area liable in skier collision with sno-cat for
failure to warn skier of grooming activities as required by Colorado Ski Safety Act of
1979); Rowett v. Kelly Canyon Ski Hill, Inc., 102 Idaho 708,639 P.2d 6 (1981)(lighting for
night skiing held to be adequate); Green v. Sherburne Corp., 137 Vt. 310, 403 A.2d 278
(1979)(skier collision with unpadded utility pole; ski area subject to "ordinary" care).
7. Rosen v. LTV Recreational Development, Inc., 569 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1978)(in
collision with skier and then a metal pole, assumption of the risk is a species of contributory negligence; reasonable man standard applicable); LaVine v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp.,
557 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1977)(in skier-skier collision, recognition of "rule of road" for
downhill skier to yield to skiers below); Ninio v. Hight, 385 F.2d 350 (10th Cir.
1967)("rules of road" applicable in skier-skier collision); McDaniel v. Dowell, 210 Cal.
App. 2d 26, 26 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1962)(operation of tow rope not that of a common carrier
since it does not physically carry the skier); Seidl v. Trollhaugen, 305 Minn. 506, 232
N.W.2d 236 (1975)(skier-skier collision where secondary assumption of risk did not include the risk of being hit by another skier); Goss v. Allen, 134 N.J. Super. 99, 338 A.2d
820 (1975)(standard of care for minor in skier collision case is that required of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence and experience); Morse vs. State, 262 A.D. 324, 29
N.Y.S.2d 34 (194 1)(sledding not an inherent danger to a novice skier in a collision with the
sled on a ski slope), aff'd, 287 N.Y. 666, 39 N.E.2d 288 (1941).
8. Rimkus v. Northwest Colorado Ski Corp., 706 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir. 1983)(evidence of remedial repairs permitted); Rosen v. LTV Recreational Development, Inc., 569
F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1978)(in collision with skier and then a metal pole, assumption of the
risk is a species of contributory negligence; reasonable man standard applicable); Mannhard v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 682 P.2d 64 (Colo. App. 1983)(standard of reasonable
care for operation in case where skier was killed in an out-of-bounds avalanche since activity is not "inherently dangerous"); Murphy v. Chestnut Mountain Lodge, Inc., 124 Ill.
App. 3d 508, 464 N.E.2d 818 (1984)(no duty to skier regarding skiing equipment without
evidence on the existence of anti-friction devices on the skis); Tarlowe v. Metropolitan Ski
Slopes, Inc., 34 A.D.2d 905, 311 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1970)(failure of bindings to release could
be attributed to a defect in the equipment), rev'd, 28 N.Y.2d 410, 271 N.E.2d 515, 322
N.Y.S.2d 665, on remand, 37 A.D.2d 810, 324 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1971); Kaufman v. State, I I
Misc. 2d 56, 172 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1958)(skier accepts risk of collision with rock as inherent in
the sport in so far as it was obvious and necessary); Blair v. Mt. Hood Meadows Development Corp., 48 Ore. App. 109, 616 P.2d 535 (1980)(assumption of the risk no longer a
separate defense due to statutory language; skier is an invitee), rev'd, 291 Or. 293, 630
P.2d 827, reh gdenied, 291 Or. 703, 634 P.2d 241 (1981); Zimmer v. Mitchell and Ness, 253
Pa. Super. 474, 385 A.2d 437 (1978)(ski rental release upheld), aff'd, 490 Pa. 428, 416
A.2d 1010 (1980); Rubin v. Loon Mountain Recreation Corp., No. 84-6248 (D.C. Penn.
Oct. 18, 1985)(1985 WL 101)(ski rental release upheld); Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 136 Vt.
293, 390 A.2d 398 (1978)(primarv assumption of risk in skiing fall not applicable if a ski
area operator duty exists and is breached); Meese v. Brigham Young University, 639 P.2d
720 (Utah 1981)(beginning skier noi held to assume risk regarding binding adjustment).
9. Rimkus v. Northwest Colorado Ski Corp., 706 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir. 1983)(evi-
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of statutes of limitations' 0 , standards of care II and the constitutionality
of statutes governing skiing. 12

Throughout the development of the case law concerning skiing,
courts have wrestled with the analysis of the relative responsibilities of
skiers and ski area operators for injuries resulting from the "inherent
risks of skiing." There has been a concerted effort to analyze the issue
pursuant to one or more of the historically defined traditional tort law
doctrines including legal duty, primary assumption of the risk, secondary assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, and comparative
dence of remedial repairs permitted); Opera v. Hyva, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 373, 450 N.Y.S.2d
615 (1982)(evidence of post-accident modifications to binding manufacturer's manual not
admissable to establish negligence; renting defective equipment creates strict liability
situation).
10. Schafer v. Aspen Skiing Co., 742 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1984) (statute of limitations
of Colorado Ski Safety Act barred action); Ritter v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 519 F. Supp. 907
(D. Colo. 1981)(statute of limitations barred wrongful death action); Wanner v. Glen Ellen Corp., 373 F. Supp. 983 (D. Vt. 1974)(statute of limitations did not bar action by a
military serviceman); Pinneo v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 14 Wash. App. 848, 545 P.2d 1207
(1976).
11. Trigg v. City and County of Denver, 784 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1986)(negligence
per se instruction appropriate in a lift accident but not a res ipsa loquitur instruction under
the facts presented); Hunt v. Sun Valley, Inc., 561 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1977)(highest degree
of care applied to lift operation, yet strict liability rejected); Riblet Tramway Co. v. Monte
Verde Corp., 453 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1972)(standard of highest degree of care as common
carrier for lift operations); Houser v. Floyd, 220 Cal. App. 2d 778, 34 Cal. Rptr. 96
(1963)(res ipsa loquitur not applicable in lift case); McDaniel v. Dowell, 210 Cal. App. 2d
26, 26 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1962)(operation of tow rope not that of a common carrier since it
does not physically carry the skier); Mannhard v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 682 P.2d 64
(Colo. App. 1983)(standard of reasonable care for operation in case where skier was killed
in an out-of-bounds avalanche since activity is not "inherently dangerous"); Jordan v.
Loveland Skiing Corp., 503 P.2d 1034 (Colo. App. 1972)(res ipsa loquitur instruction rejected in lift unloading case); Lewis v. Big Powderhorn Mountain Ski Corp., 69 Mich. App.
437, 245 N.W.2d 81 (1976)(strict liability not applicable in rope tow accident); Pessl v.
Bridger Bowl, 164 Mont. 389, 524 P.2d 1101 (1974)(standard of reasonable care applicable in lift operations under Montana Passenger Tramway Act); Bolduc v. Herbert Scheider
Corp., 117 N.H. 566, 374 A.2d 1187 (1977)(ski lift operators are not common carriers);
Opera v. Hyva, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 373, 450 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1982)(evidence of-post-accident
modifications to binding manufacturer's manual not admissible to establish negligence;
renting defective equipment creates strict liability situation); Ford v. Black Mountain
Tramways, Inc., 110 N.H. 20, 259 A.2d 129 (1969)(ski area not a manufacturer or seller of
tramway, only an entity providing transportation service and thus no action under strict
liability): Goss v. Allen, 134 N.J. Super. 99, 338 A.2d 820 (1975)(standard of care for
minor in skier collision case is that required of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence
and experience); Lippman v. State, 83 A.D.2d 700, 442 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1981)(res ipsa loquitur applicable in case where chairs with riders fell to ground); Albert v. State, 80 Misc.
2d 105, 362 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1974)(lifts under New York statutory law not common carriers),
aff'd, 51 A.D.2d 611, 378 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1976); Lawrence v. Davos, Inc., 46 A.D.2d 41, 360
N.Y.S.2d 730 (1974)(res ipsa loquitur instruction rejected in lift case where plaintiff failed
to use safety chains); Friedman v. State, 54 Misc. 2d 448, 282 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1967)(operator of a ski lift is a common carrier), modified, 31 A.D.2d 992, 297 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1967);
Coger v. State, 23 A.D.2d 935, 260 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1965)(duty of occupier of land); Math v.
State, 37 Misc. 2d 1023, 237 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1962)(operator of lift has same duty as a common carrier); Grauer v. State, 9 A.D.2d 829, 192 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1959)(operator ofa ski lift
not subject to res ipsa loquitur); Green v. Sherburne Corp., 137 Vt. 310, 403 A.2d 278
(1979)(skier collision with'unpadded utility pole; ski area subject to "ordinary" care).
12. Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp., 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985); Grieb v.
Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 155 Mich. App. 484, 400 N.W.2d 653 (1986); Brewer v. Ski
Lift, Inc., 762 P.2d 226 (Mont. 1988).
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negligence.' 3 It is important for courts to avoid the instinctive categorization of these responsibilities under such labels without undertaking a
systematic analysis of what results may flow from the application a particular doctrine due to that doctrine's underlying nature or historical
treatment.
The tide that led to the sea of litigation in the area of ski law began
with the historic case of Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc. 14 Wright, an
intermediate level skier, was skiing with her husband at the Mt. Mansfield ski resort in Vermont. On her first run down the slope, Wright
encountered no difficulties. However, during her second run down the
same slope, Wright fell after her ski struck a snow covered stump. As a
result of the fall, she suffered a broken leg. Wright sued Mt. Mansfield
alleging negligent maintenance of the slope.
The Vermont Federal District Court applied the doctrine of volenti
non fit injuria and held that recovery was barred.1 5 The court reasoned
that a skier accepts those dangers that inhere in the sport which are obvious and necessary. 16 Consequently, the risk of injury that results from
17
such conditions is the skier's responsibility.
Relying on traditional premises liability under the common law, the
court classified Wright as an invitee of the ski area operator. The court,
therefore, concluded that the operator owed Wright a duty to inform
her of any dangers which reasonable prudence would have foreseen and
corrected. 18 In this analysis, the court found that the defendants could
not have foreseen the danger which caused Wright's injury, and, therefore, Mt. Mansfield did not have a legal duty to Wright "that charge[d] it
with the knowledge of these mutations of nature and require[d] it to
warn the public against such."' 19

The primary assumption of the risk doctrine was the lynch pin of
the court's rationale for determining Mt. Mansfield to be without a legal
duty to Wright. In its analysis, the court coupled the lack of a legal duty
on the part of Mt. Mansfield to the assumption of the inherent risks in
13. A thorough discussion of the defense of assumption of the risk is contained in
Roselund & Killion, Once a Wicked Sister: The Continuing Role of Assumption of Risk Under Comparative Fault in California, 20 U.S.F.L. REV. 255 (1986). In Blair v. Mt. Hood Meadows
Development Corp., 630 P.2d 827 (Or. 1981), the Supreme Court of Oregon articulated
the relationships among the doctrines as follows:
We used the concept of plaintiff's assumption of the risk in our prior decisions
involving risks present in sports activities even when properly conducted as a descriptive phrase for the legal conclusion that defendant had no duty under the
circumstances or had breached no duty under the circumstances in failing to take
precautions against the risk ....Conduct of the plaintiff in voluntarily and unreasonably encountering a risk created by the defendant's conduct, which was sometimes labeled "secondary assumption" of risk but was in reality a form of
contributory negligence, may now be compared to negligent conduct of the defendant in allocating relative fault and apportioning damages under the comparative fault scheme in ORS 18.470. Id. at 832.
14. 96 F. Supp. 786 (D. Vt. 1951).
15. Id. at 791.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 790.
19. Id. at 791.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2

the sport by skiers. Future courts carefully considered this linkage to
separate the assumption of the "inherent risks of skiing" doctrine in
their determination of whether a legal duty existed on the part of the ski
area operator. The focus became whether the specific injury producing
risk had been "assumed" by skiers, and, if not, the ski area operator
necessarily owed a legal duty to the injured skier.
The decision in Wright was narrowed by Marietta v. Cliff's Ridge,
Inc.20 Marietta was running through the latter portion of a slalom race
course when he struck a sapling pole used as a gate marker. He seriously injured his groin and abdomen area. Marietta proved that this
type of accident was common among slalom racers, and that it was an
industry standard to use more flexible materials for the gate markers.
The Supreme Court of Michigan deviated from the precedent set in
Wright. The court placed greater emphasis upon a ski area operator's
duties to its skiing patrons than on the knowledge, assumption or acceptance of risks by the skier. Marietta provided the court with sufficient
evidence to prove that the use of sapling poles created a foreseeable risk
of harm and that Marietta's injuries were, therefore, reasonably
foreseeable.
Specifically, the court held that ski area operators have a duty to
warn skiers of or prevent those conditions that present a reasonably
foreseeable risk of injury or harm. 2 1 The ski area operator was found to
have breached its duty to Marietta and was, therefore, found to be liable
for his injuries. 2 2 The court added that the proper standard of care for
ski area operators in the discharge of their legal duties was that of a
reasonable man.

23

The dissent in Marietta argued that the "inherent risks of skiing"
24
doctrine should have been applied to bar the plaintiff's claim.
Through application of this theory, the court could have found that Marietta assumed the risk of injury, and, therefore, that the ski area operator
should have been relieved of liability. To the contrary, the majority felt
that a strict application of this doctrine would have unfairly and improperly placed all of the risks of injury upon the skier.
Without citing the Marietta decision, the Supreme Court of Vermont
changed the tide in the sea of ski law with the landmark decision of Sunday v. Stratton.2 5 Sunday, a novice skier, was skiing on "The Interstate,"
a trail maintained by the ski area operator for beginners, when his skis
became entangled in snow-covered brush. As a result of the accident, he
was rendered quadriplegic. Sunday alleged that the defendant negligently maintained the ski trails and failed to give notice of hidden dan20.

20 Mich. App. 449, 174 N.W.2d 164 (1969), aff'd, 385 Mich. 364, 189 N.W.2d 208

(1971).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 212 (Black, J., Dissenting).

25.

136 Vt. 293, 390 A.2d 398 (1978).
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gers. The court restructured and applied the assumption of inherent
risks doctrine.
Specifically, the court reasoned that primary assumption of the risk
imparts no liability on a ski area operator because the ski area operator
does not have a duty to the skier with respect to the risk that led to
injury. 26 However, the court concluded that, in this case, the defendant
27
did owe Sunday a duty as a matter of law.

The court dismissed the doctrine of "primary assumption of the
risk" by drawing a distinction between assuming a risk inherent in a
sport and a risk created by the condition of the "playing field" that is
provided for the sport to take place. 28 The court reasoned that
although skiers often fall, every fall is not necessarily due to an inherent
danger in the sport. 2 9 If the fall is not due to a breach of duty by the
defendant, then the risk is assumed and recovery is barred. Conversely,
when the evidence indicates the existence of a duty, then the assumption
is not of the risk, "but the use of reasonable care on the part of the
defendant" 3 0 in the discharge of the duty.
The court affirmed the jury's determination that the defendant
failed to meet its duty to Sunday, an invitee, and was therefore liable for
negligence. 3 1 The court also upheld the trial court's charge to the jury
concerning contributory negligence and found that the doctrine of "secondary assumption of risk" is merely a phase of contributory
32
negligence.
The court emphasized the changes in grooming techniques since
the Wright decision and stated that, "[i]t is clear from the evidence that
the passage of time has greatly changed the nature of the ski industry
....

[T]he stump that injured the plaintiff in Wright may well be the

'3 3
basis for negligence today in view of improved grooming techniques."
This decision was the height of the tide that shifted the focus from a
skier's assumption of risks to a ski area operator's duty of care. The
Sunday court sent a new message: the timorous need no longer stay at
home. The message was clearly contrary to Cardozo's advice which was
26. 390 A.2d at 403. The Court stated the doctrine as follows:
Where primary assumption of risk exists, there is no liability to the plaintiff, because there is no negligence on the part of the defendant to begin with; the danger to plaintiff is not one which defendant is required to extinguish or warn
about; having no duty to begin with, there is no breach of duty to constitute

negligence.
Id. The Court's analysis focused on whether the risk was "inherent" and therefore subject
to the primary assumption of the risk doctrine since no legal duty would extend to Sunday
if the risk was found to be inherent.
27. The Court approached the issue by analyzing the existence of a legal duty and
concluded that "where the evidence indicates existence or assumption of a duty and its
breach, that risk is not one 'assumed' by the plaintiff. What he then 'assumes' is not the
risk of injury, but the use of reasonable care on the part of the defendant." Id.
28. Id. at 402.
29. Id. at 403.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 404.
33. Id. at 402.
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34
applied in Wright.

In Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc.,35 the Third Circuit applied the
primary assumption of the risk doctrine after concluding that the doctrine survived the enactment of a comparative negligence statute that
included a specific provision relating to downhill skiing. 36 The plaintiff
sued Seven Springs as a result of an accident in which he fell and slid
into a large pole and two snowmaking pipes. The court concluded as
follows:
[A]ssumption of risk in its primary sense is a defense that negates the defendant's duty of care. Here, plaintiff seeks to construct a prima facie case of duty owed to him by the defendant.
Prosser, Law of Torts § 68, at 455 (4th ed. 1971). Defendant
then has the burden of demonstrating that no duty was owed
plaintiff. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496G (1965). Defendant can sustain its burden by proving that plaintiff knew of
the risk, appreciated its character, and voluntarily chose to accept it. Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp., 483 Pa. 75, 88,
394 A.2d 546, 552-53 (1978). The standard to determine
whether assumption of the risk existed is essentially subjective.
255 Pa. Super. 532, 536, 388 A.2d 1094,
Weaver v. Clabaugh,
37
1096 (1978).
Primary assumption of the risk served as the basis for absolving any legal
duty on the part of the defendant to warn or protect the plaintiff. In
Schmitz v. Cannonsburg Skiing Corp.,38 the ski area operator was sued following the death of a skier who collided with a tree. The Court, relying
on Grieb v. Alpine Valley Ski Area,3 9 applied the assumption of the inherent
risks doctrine codified in the Michigan Ski Area Safety Act, 40 and concluded that the skier had accepted the risk of colliding with a tree. The
Court noted:
[i]t is clear from the plain and unambiguous wording of § 22(2)
that the legislature intended to place the burden of certain risks
or dangers on skiers, rather than ski resort operators. Significantly, the list of 'obvious and necessary' risks assumed by a
skier under the statute involves those things resulting from natural phenomena, such as snow conditions or the terrain itself;
natural obstacles, such as trees and rocks; and types of equip34. The Court in Wright quoted from Cardozo's opinion in Murphy v. Steeplechase
Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929).
The antics of the clown are not the paces of the cloistered cleric. The rough and

boisterous joke, the horseplay of the crowd, evokes its own guffaws, but they are
not the pleasures of tranquility. The plaintiff was not seeking a retreat for medi-

tation. Visitors were tumbling about the belt to the merriment of onlookers when
he made his choice to join them. He took the chance of a like fate, with whatever
damage to his body might ensue from such a fall. The timorous may stay at
home.
96 F. Supp. at 791.
35. 716 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 1983).
36. Id. at 1007 (citing 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon Supp. 1982)).
37. Smith, 716 F.2d at 1008-9.
38. 428 N.W. 2d 742 (Mich. 1988).
39.
40.

155 Mich. App. 484, 400 N.W. 2d 653 (1986).
18.483 (22) (2) (Callaghen 1980).

MICH. STAT. ANN. §
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ment that are inherent parts of a ski area, such as lift towers and
other such structures of snow-making or grooming equipment
when properly marked. These are all conditions that are inherent to the sport of skiing 4.....
The skier must accept these
1
dangers as a matter of law.
In California, the court of appeals took a different approach from
the Schmitz court in reviewing the legal duties of a ski area operator
rather than the acceptance of the inherent risks by the skier. The California court of appeals analyzed the existence of a legal duty in Danieley
v. Goldmine Ski Associates, 4 2 in which the plaintiff lost control of her skis
during a turn and collided with a large tree just beyond the groomed
edge of the run, sustaining serious injuries. The trial court granted the
motion from summary judgment filed by the defendant. The primary
issue concerned whether the defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff
to remove the tree that was struck by the plaintiff.
The court did rely on the analysis of the Michigan Supreme Court
in Schmitz upholding the determination by the trial court that the ski area
operator owed no legal duty to the skier to remove the tree she collided
with. The court found: "To impose a duty of the kind urged by plaintiffs would, in our view, have the effect of making Goldmine an insurer
of plaintiff wife's safety, as well as an insurer of the safety of every other
skier on the mountain."' 4 3 The court added that a large tree growing at
the side of a run is an obvious danger and served as its own warning. It
concluded that if a duty existed to remove trees along the edges of runs,
all trees on the mountain should be cut down, which would be an inappropriate result.

44

In the event the risk does not appear to be obvious and necessary, a
ski area operator may be found to owe a duty of care to skiers. For
example, in Rosen v. LTV Recreational Development, Inc. ,45 a collision between the skier and a steel signpost embedded in concrete was not determined to be an obvious danger. Consequently, the court concluded
that the skier could not have assumed the risk of his accident. 46 Even
though the skier in Rosen collided with another skier before striking the
concrete wall, the court allowed proof that the prior collision was not an
intervening legal cause. 4 7 The court also rejected application of the as48
sumption of the risk as a bar to Rosen's recovery.
Courts began to apply the primary assumption of the risk doctrine
based upon whether the risk was inherent in the sport. In Marietta, the
court held that the resort's use of maple sapling poles as slalom markers
was not an inherent risk, particularly since the ski area operator knew of
41.

400 N.W.2d at 744.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

No. E005891 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 1990).
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 15.
569 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1121.
Id. at 1119-20.
Id. at 1121.
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more appropriate slalom pole materials. The failure to use those materials constituted negligence. As part of the determination of whether the
risk of collision with a man-made object was an inherent risk, the court
assessed the obvious and necessary nature of the object. In this case,
the court deemed the object was not an obvious and necessary danger
inherent in the sport of skiing, and, therefore, the skier was not found to
have assumed the risk of injury.
The likelihood that the danger of a collision with a natural object
will be seen as an obvious and necessary risk inherent in the sport was
lessened as a result of Sunday. The court failed to find that the existence
of such a natural obstruction presents a danger which is inherent in the
sport. Such a case-by-case review of whether a particular risk is inherent
in the sport of skiing became the preferred approach in assessing
49
whether the ski area operator owed a duty to the skier.
In Blair v. Mt. Hood Meadows Development Corp. ,50 the defendant was
found not liable after Blair skied into a ravine. Blair took an unfamiliar
route, missed a curve in the trail and skied into a ravine which separated
the ski area from the lodge. He sustained injuries to his arm and shoulder. Blair claimed that the defendant was negligent in failing to warn of
the ravine by flag, warning signs or complete closure of the run. The
defendant used the affirmative defense of contributory negligence by asserting that the plaintiff failed to keep a proper look out and failed to
maintain control of his speed and course.
The court reviewed the appropriateness of the following jury instruction: "Sports activities involve some risks. Every person who takes
part in a sport accepts and submits himself to the dangers that are inherent in or a reasonable part of that sport."' 5 1 The court balanced the
doctrines of primary assumption of the risk and existence of a legal duty
in light of an Oregon statute abolishing "implied assumption of the
risk" and concluded that the instruction "should not have been given by
the trial judge because it focuse[d] upon the plaintiff's implied assumption of risk. It is not couched in the terms of defendant's duty."' 52 This
represented another shift away from an assumption of the risk assessment to a duty analysis.
In cases dealing with collisions between skiers, the courts have
looked to traditional "rules of the road" in skiing in placing the burden
of accident avoidance on the person skiing downhill or "overtaking"
others on the slope. In Ninio v. Hight,53 the plaintiff, Ninio, was participating in a beginners skiing class and was hit by a skier while the class
was stationary on the mountain. The Tenth Circuit applied the "rule of
the road" theory. Under Colorado law, when one has a duty to look for
dangerous conditions he will be presumed, in an accident scenario, to
49. Indeed, the assessment of the nature of the risk was the only criterion considered
by many courts in determining the existence of a legal duty on the ski area operator.
50. 291 Or. 293, 630 P.2d 827 (1981), reh'gdenied, 291 Or. 703, 634 P.2d 241.
51. Id. at 296, 630 P.2d at 829.
52. Id. at 301, 630 P.2d at 833.
53. 385 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1967).
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have looked where he was supposed to look and to have seen what reasonably could and should have been seen. 54 Failure on the part of a
skier to comply with this duty was seen as negligence. 5 5 The court did
not take the next step and consider whether collisions between skiers
constitute one of the inherent risks of the sport.
III.

A.

THE IMPACT OF STATE LEGISLATION

The Codification of Laws Relating Directly to Skiing

Responding to the shift in the case law away from application of the
primary assumption of inherent risks doctrine, legislatures of most of
the skiing states enacted statutes which specifically addressed the responsibilities of skiers and ski area operators. 56 Like the development
of the case law, the various statutes focused on enumerating the respecof the inhertive duties of skiers and ski area operators, the assumption
57
ent risks by skiers or some combination of both.
For example, Utah's legislature followed the assumption of the risk
54. Id. at 352. This instruction is traditionally used in auto accident cases.
55. This rule was applied again in LaVine v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 557 F.2d 730
(10th Cir. 1977). LaVine involved injuries to an expert skier who was hit from behind by a
certified ski instructor. The court applied the "rule of the road" theory.
56. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.135 (1983); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 602(q) & 653(i) (West
(1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-101 to -III
§§ 29-201 to -214 (West Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1101 to -1109 (Supp. 1989); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 488 & 489 (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 143, §§ 71 1
to S (West Supp. 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 408.321 to .344 (West 1985); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-731 to -737 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 455A.010 to.190 (Michie
1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 225-A:1 to :26 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34.4A-1 to -15
(West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-15-1 to -14 (1986); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 865 to 868
(McKinney Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99C-1 to -5 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 5309-01 to -11 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4169.01 to .99 (Anderson Supp.
1988); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.970 to .990 (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102(c) (Purdon
Supp. 1989); R. 1. GEN. LAWS §§ 41-8-1 to -4 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-48-101 to 107 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-51 to -54 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1037
(Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.117.010 to .040 (West Supp. 1989); W. VA.
CODE §§ 20-3A-1 to -8 (1989); WYOMING STAT. §§ 6-9-201 & -301 (1989).
57. State statutes that adopted a primary assumption of inherent risks approach include the following: ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.135 (1983); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1101 to -1109
(Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 488-489 (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 143, §§ 71 1 to S (West Supp. 1989); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 408.321 to .344
(West 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 225-A:! to :26 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34.4A-1
to -15 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-15-1 to -14 (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4169.01 to .99 (Anderson Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.970 to .990 (1988); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 68-48-101 to -107 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-51 to -54 (1987); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1037 (Supp. 1989); W.VA. CODE §§ 20-3A-1 to -8 (1989).
At the time of the writing of this article, the Colorado General Assembly was considering a significant amendment to the Ski Safety Act in Senate Bill 80. The Colorado Senate
and House of Representatives passed the bill and the House version was being reviewed
by the Senate before being sent to the Governor for review and signatures. The bill
adopts the primary assumption of inherent risk doctrine and sets forth those risks in a
similar fashion to the Utah statute. In addition, the proposed statute contains a cap of
$1,000,000 on the damages that may be awarded to skiers injured as a result of a ski area
operator's negligence in those cases not involving a lift. The cap may be lifted in limited
circumstances by the trial court judge. If passed in substantially its proposed form, it will
result in statutorily combining the legal duty and primary assumption of the inherent risks
doctrines in Colorado.
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approach by enumerating specific inherent risks which preclude recovery.5 8 Ski area operators are required to post signs advising skiers of the
inherent risks of skiing and the limitations on liability of ski area
operators.

59

The Colorado General Assembly enacted the Colorado Ski Safety
Act ("Act") 60 in 1979 "to define the rights and liabilities existing between the skier and the ski area operator." 6 1 The Act begins with a declaration that "dangers ...

inhere in the sport of skiing, regardless of any

and all reasonable safety measures which can be employed.''62 The Act
then articulates the responsibilities of skiers and ski area operators, but,
contrary to the Utah approach, does not clearly address the assumption
of inherent risks doctrine. 6 3 On the other hand, the Colorado General
Assembly did not impose any duties upon ski area operators to reduce
or eliminate those dangers that "inhere in the sport of skiing."
The Colorado Ski Safety Act carefully defines the duties imposed
upon ski area operators. 64 Ski area operators are required to comply
with a comprehensive sign system on each of its ski lifts and on its ski
trails. These signs provide information advising skiers about the relative
difficulty of the ski slope, closed areas and danger areas. 6 5 Operators
are also required to inform skiers of any grooming vehicles which will be
present on the slopes. 6 6 Each of the duties is discrete and clearly
defined.
The Act also addresses the responsibilities of tramway passengers. 67 Each passenger of a tramway is expected to have sufficient physical dexterity, ability and knowledge to negotiate or use a tramway
safely. If the passenger does not possess such knowledge, he is required
to seek out such information sufficient to enable him to use the tramway
68
safely.
The statute also codifies the duties of skiers. 6 9 Each skier has the
duty to be aware of his abilities and to ski within those abilities. Skiers
58. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-51 to -54 (1987).
59. See Feuerhelm, Lund, Chalat & Kunz, From Wright to Sunday and Beyond. Is the Law
Keeping Up With the Skiers, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 885; Comment, Utah's Inherent Risks of Skiing
Act: Avalanche From Capitol Hill, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 355.

60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-105 (1984).
61. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-102 (1984); see Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development
Corp., 711 P.2d 671, 675 n.4 (Colo. 1985).
62. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-102 (1984).
63. While the legislative declaration does acknowledge that there are some dangers
which inhere in the sport, the statute does not define those dangers, and, instead, merely
creates a presumption concerning a skier's responsibility for collisions with objects or
other skiers. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-102 & -109(2) (1984); see Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski
Development Corp., 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985); compare MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 143,
§ 71 0 (West Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 225-A:24 IV (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 53-09-06 (Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-48-103 (1987). See supra note 57 and
accompanying text (regarding pending legislation in Colorado).
64. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-106, -107 & -108 (1984).
65. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-107 (1984).
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-108 (1984).
67. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-105 (1984).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-105(1) (1984).
69. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-109 (1984).
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are further required to maintain control of their speed and course at all
times and to maintain a proper look-out to avoid collisions with skiers
and objects. 70 In addition, each skier specifically has the duty "to refrain from acting in a manner which may cause or contribute to the injury of the skier or others." 7 1 While these duties relate to the skier's
conduct and apparently involve the inherent risks of the sport, not all of
the rules of the road were included 72 and skiers are not specifically obligated to accept responsibility for injuries resulting from the inherent
risks of the sport. Furthermore, most of the statutory duties of skiers
relating to their skiing conduct can be difficult to apply to any given fact
situation. 73 A person skiing downhill also has the "primary duty ...to
74
avoid collision with any person or object below him."

Rather than incorporating the primary assumption of inherent risks
doctrine, the statute provides a presumption that the responsibility for a
collision by a skier with a person, natural object or man-made structure
is "solely that of the skier or skiers involved and not that of the ski area
operator." 7 5 This rebuttable presumption has been upheld as constitutional in Colorado state case law. 76 The Act also includes criminal provisions. Violation of several of the duties assigned to skiers could result
77
in criminal liability.
Colorado's rebuttable presumption provision is significantly different from Utah's codification of the assumption of inherent risks doctrine
as the priniple focus in the assessment of liability when the injuries sustained relate to an inherent risk of the sport. While the latter entirely
absolves the ski area operator, the former leaves the operator subject to
potential liability for some inherent risks. Consequently, since Colorado
has adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence, 78 secondary assumption of the risk and contributory negligence by the skier have become critical issues in the ski area operator's defense. However,
70.

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-109(1) & (2) (1984).

71. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-109(5) (1984).
72. For example, several of the responsibilities contained in the Skier's Responsibility
Code are not described specifically. The Skier's Responsibility Code is an informal list of
common sense "rules of the road" endorsed by the National Ski Areas Association. They
including the following responsibilities:
(1)Ski under control and in such a manner so you can stop or avoid other skiers
or objects; (2) When skiing downhill or overtaking another skier, you must avoid
the skier below you; (3) You must not stop where you obstruct a trail or are not
visible from above; (4) When entering a trail or starting downhill, yield to other
skiers; (5) All skiers shall use devices to help prevent runaway skis; and (6) You
shall keep off closed trails and observe all posted signs.
73. While this is true concerning the requirement "to maintain control of course and
speed," there are other provisions that establish clear and discrete duties. For example, in
the case of a collision between two skiers which results in injury, neither is to leave the
scene without first providing a ski area operator employee with his name and address; in
the event such a skier leaves the vicinity for the purpose of securing aid for the injured
party, the skier is not thereby relieved of the obligation to provide his name and address to
the ski area operator. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-109(10) (1984).
74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-109(2) (1984).
75 Id.
76. Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp., 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985).
77. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-109(12)(1984).
78. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1987).
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application of these issues does not provide any assistance whatsoever in
determining whether the ski area operator had common law duties to
79
the skier in the first instance.
B.

The Struggle to Fit Statutory Law with Common Law

Colorado case law is illustrative of the questions that remained after
codification. For example, particular problems arose in the application
of common law principles of premises liability. In the ten years since its
enactment, Colorado courts have had an opportunity to interpret the
Act and integrate its application with the common law.
C.

The Colorado Example

In Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp.,80 the Colorado Supreme
Court held that the statement of ski area operator duties in the Act is not
an exclusive list and that additional duties may exist pursuant to common law. 8 1 The common law duties that have been applied to ski area
operators since passage of the Act are based on the doctrines of prem82
ises liability.
Until 1971, Colorado law governing a landowner's liability followed
the traditional scheme of classifying the injured party into one of three
categories - invitee, licensee or trespasser. 8 3 The nature of the duty of
the landowner, and, therefore, the landowner's liability for an injury to a
person on his land, was directly linked to the status of the injured party.
There are no reported decisions in Colorado involving an action by a
skier against a ski area operator that applied the traditional premises
liability approach. 8 4 However, application of the traditional analysis was
79. Therefore, a summary judgment motion which would likely be granted in ajurisdiction with a statute similar to Utah's, depending upon whether an inherent risk is involved, will not be routinely successful under statutes similar to Colorado's.
80. 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985).
81. Id. at 678. This ruling apparently resolves the issue of whether the Act extinguished all common law duties of ski area operators, even though the Act expressly provides that its purposes is "to define the rights and liabilities existing between the skier and
the ski area operator." COLO. REv. STAT. § 33-44-102 (1984). At least one article has
observed, after listening to the recorded testimony preceding enactment of the Act, that
the Act was intended to "set forth a definitive list of operators' obligations and that, if
complied with, would absolve the operators from further liability or responsibility for injury." Chalat & Kroll, The Development of the Standard of Care in Colorado Ski Cases, 15 COLO.
Lsw. 373, 374 (1986).
82. In Clark v. Breckenridge Ski Corp., No. 84-M-506, slip op. (D. Colo. June 24,
1986), without reference to the Act, the court stated:
It must be remembered that the Breckenridge Ski Area encompasses many acres
and many variations in terrain and snow conditions. While a ski area operator
shares responsibility with other landowners for avoiding unreasonable risks of
harm because of hazards, the existence of a small dome of ice on a ski trail is not
analogous to ice cubes on a store floor.
Id. at 5.
83. Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971)(the obligations of a "landowner" extend to any party responsible for the premises including
possessors).
84. Under Wright, skiers were classified as "invitees." In the classification scheme, ifa
person was determined to be an invitee, a higher standard of care was imposed upon the
landowner than if the person was deemed to be "licensee" or "trespasser." In the case of
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overruled by Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich.8 5
The plaintiff in Mile High Fence was an on-duty police officer who
broke his leg when he stepped into a post hole located on private property. The hole was approximately seven inches from the paved portion
of a public alley.
The court rejected the traditional analysis and adopted a novel basis
for assessing the responsibilities of landowners:
What we are holding is that status or classification of one who is
upon the property of another is not to be determinative of the
occupant's responsibility or the degree of care which he owes
to that person. Rather, the occupant, in the management of his
property, should act as a reasonable man in view of the
probability or foreseeability of injury to others. A person's status as a trespasser, licensee or invitee may, of course, in the light of
the facts giving rise to such status, have some bearing on the
question of liability, but it is only a factor - not conclusive.
(citation omitted).
This traditional tort concept, that is, the probability of injury as foreseen by a reasonable man, was properly applied by
the trial court in the instant case. It was, therefore, within the
province of the trial court to find and conclude that the Company, in leaving the post hole adjacent to a public way unprotected, could foresee or, by the exercise of reasonable care,
should have foreseen, the probability that someone using the
alley might inadvertently deviate from the alley, step into the
post hole and injure himself. Under these circumstances, the
law imposes a duty upon the possessor of land to warn or protect those using the public way from the dangerous condition.
Failing to take such action, the possessor becomes liable for the
86
harm caused by its breach of duty.
The focus of the determination of the existence and scope of a legal duty
was shifted from the status of the injured person to the reasonableness
of the landowner's action. The court reasoned that the status of one
who is upon the land of another should not be the pivotal issue in the
determination of the existence of a legal duty. The question then becomes whether the owner, in the exercise of his legal duty, acted as a
87
reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others.
an invitee, the landowner had a duty to have the land in a reasonably safe condition and to
warn of dangers which were not readily visible. If the person was a licensee, a lesser degree of care applied. In that case, the landowner had a duty to refrain from causing willful
or wanton injury. In the case of a trespasser, no duty was imposed upon the landowner.
See Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856, 860 (Colo. 1989).
85. 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).
86. Id. at 548, P.2d at 314-15 (emphasis added).
87. In 1987, The Colorado General Assembly enacted a new premises liability statute.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-115 (1987). The statute closely resembled the traditional classification scheme (i.e., invitee, licensee and trespasser) which was used before Mile High
Fence by placing the focus of a landowner's liability upon the status of the injured person.
The General Assembly determined that the classification scheme was necessary due to the
unpredictability created by Mile High Fence. Gallegns v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856, 861 (Colo.
1989). Reinstatement of the classification scheme was intended to increase the protection
of landowners. However, the constitutionality of this statute was successfully challenged
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In Mannhard v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp.,88 the Colorado court of appeals held that the standard of care applicable to a ski area operator visa-vis a skier who was killed in an avalanche which was triggered by the
skier in an out-of-bounds area, was that of reasonable care rather than
the highest degree of care. In its analysis, the court stated:
[T]he testimony, including that of the skier's companions, indicated that avalanche danger is a phenomenon of which the public is generally aware, and that conditions under which
avalanches are likely to occur are easily recognized by most skiers so they can be avoided. These89factors were fully known and
appreciated by the skier himself.

While this comment touches on aspects of the primary assumption of
inherent risks doctrine, 90 the court did not specifically address the
doctrine.
In Rosen v. LTV Recreational Development, Inc.,91 the Tenth Circuit
held that a separate instruction on secondary assumption of the risk was
not appropriate in light of Colorado's codification of comparative negligence. The court determined that assumption of the risk should no
longer be considered as a complete defense. 9 2 Rather, it should be
treated as reducing recovery in the same fashion as contributory negligence. Furthermore, the court, citing Prosser, noted that a ski area operator was obligated to act as a "prudent person in maintaining the
premises in a reasonably safe condition considering the probability or
foreseeability, if any, of injury to others." '93 Finally, the court added that
contributory negligence, as a defense, could minimize or negate the ski
area operator's liability.

94

In Rosen, the plaintiff was hurled into a steel pole after a collision
with another skier. The ski area operator argued that the injuries sustained were the proximate result of the prior collision and not the negligence of the ski area. The ski area operator also argued that the
possibility of a skier colliding with another skier and then crashing into a
pole is so remote as to be unforeseeable by the defendant. Furthermore, the operator argued, the first collision should be considered an
intervening and superseding legal cause. The defendant challenged the
court's application of the doctrine of contributory negligence and the
in Gallegos. Gallegos was injured after he fell down a flight of stairs while intoxicated in the
defendant's restaurant. The crux of the claim was that the owner of the restaurant was
liable to Gallegos as an invitee and that the statute offered him less protection as an invitee
than he would have received as a licensee which was contrary to the common law classification scheme. The court agreed and found the statute in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court concluded that no governmental interest
could be rationally related to giving an invitee less protection than a licensee. Id. at 862.
Since the court found no justification for this "inverted hierarchy" of duties, historically or
logically, it held the statute to be unconstitutional. Id.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

682 P.2d 64 (Colo. App. 1983).
Id. at 66.
See supra note 13.
569 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id.
Id. at 1120.
Id.at 1121.
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failure to give an instruction on assumption of the risk. However, the
court rejected each of the defendant's arguments and upheld the verdict
for the plaintiff.
Phillips v. Monarch Recreation Corp. ,95 was the first reported case to
apply the Act. The plaintiff, Phillips, brought an action against the defendant, Monarch ski area, for injuries sustained in a collision on an
open run with a sno-cat which had just groomed a neighboring slope.
There were no signs posted to warn skiers of the possible presence of
sno-cat's in the area. The plaintiff argued that the Act required the posting of a sign to warn skiers that equipment was being used to groom or
maintain the slope. 9 6
The defendant argued that the Act required notice only when a snocat was "grooming" a slope and that the sno-cat involved in the accident
with the plaintiff was not "grooming" at the time, but was traversing the
97
slope after grooming another slope.
The court ignored this argument and held that the Act was
designed to further public policy and such a strict construction would
violate that public policy. "Although the act only requires a sign when
equipment is 'grooming and maintaining' a ski slope, we hold that a
warning sign must also be posted when a sno-cat is present on the ski
98
slopes but is not actually 'grooming' in that particular location."
The trial court instructed the jury concerning the provisions of the
Act and the duties of skiers and ski area operators. The trial court did
not offer a common law negligence instruction relating to a ski area operator's duties, but relied solely on the Act to instruct the jury in that
regard. 9 9 The trial court went on to state that the language of the Act
was clear and that its terms could not be modified through application of
the principles of contract based upon the purchase of a lift ticket which
stated that a skier assumes the risk of skiing. The court of appeals, in
affirming the trial court's judgment, noted that the Act allocated the parties' respective duties with regard to the safety of those around them,
and upheld the exclusion of the purported agreement on the lift ticket
which was an attempt to modify those duties.' 0 0
The Tenth Circuit addressed the Act in Rimkus v. Northwest Colorado
Ski Corporation.'0 ' Rimkus, the plaintiff, sustained injuries after he hit a
rock outcropping not marked by the ski area operator.
The defendant appealed the judgment for Rimkus on the basis that
the Act required it to mark only man-made, rather than natural, objects
which are not readily visible in conditions of ordinary visibility.' 0 2 It
further argued that the "look but not see" instruction approved in Ninio
95. 668 P.2d 982 (Colo. App. 1983).
96. Id. at 985 (citing CoLo. REV. STAT.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

§ 33-44-108(2) (1984)).

Id.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 984-85.
Id. at985.
706 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1064 (citing COLO. REV. STA-r. § 33-44-101 to -111 (1984)).

A critical evi-
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should have been given.10 3 Affirming the judgment below, the court
held that Ninio was inapplicable since there was a dispute as to whether a
reasonable man could have seen the rock outcropping and since the specific duties of skiers under the Act were included in the trial court's
instructions. 104
With respect to the evidentiary issue, the court noted that the evidence of curative measures after the accident (i.e., the marking of the
rock outcropping) was admissible for the purpose of showing that
Rimkus had not committed contributory negligence since the evidence
went to the issue of the feasibility of marking the area. 10 5 The court did
not address the issues of duty or primary assumption of the risk in its
opinion. Again, the appellate review of a skiing accident was restricted
to evidentiary and instruction issues.
The Colorado Supreme Court took a thorough look at the Act in
Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp. 106 Pizza, the plaintiff, was skiing
down a slope known as "Thumper" when he became airborne due to a
variation in the terrain created by a snow covered service road. Upon
landing, he suffered severe and permanent damage to his spinal column.
Pizza brought an action against the owners of the Wolf Creek Ski Area
alleging the operation of a ski area constituted an inherently dangerous
activity which compelled application of the highest degree of care and
further alleging that the "look but not see" instruction should not have
been given. In addition, Pizza challenged the constitutionality of Section 33-44-109(2) of the Act, which created a presumption that the sole
responsibility for collisions with any person, natural object, or properly
marked man-made structure rests with the skier.' 0 7 He claimed that the
presumption violated the fourteenth amendment on vagueness and
equal protection grounds and that it was not founded on a rational evidentiary basis. 108
The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The presumption was considered by the court to be "at most. . . an economic reguladentiary issue arose concerning the admissibility of evidence that defendant marked the
rock outcropping after the accident.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1067. The court also held that the trial court was under no obligation to
instruct the jury that the law did not require the marking of natural conditions on the
slope.
105. Id. at 1065.
106. 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985).
107. The section states:
Each skier has the duty to maintain control of his speed and course at all times
when skiing and to maintain a proper lookout so as to be able to avoid other
skiers and objects. However, the primary duty shall be on the person skiing
downhill to avoid collision with any person or objects below him. It is presumed,
unless shown to the contrary by a preponderance of the evidence, that the responsibility for collisions by skiers with any person, natural object, or man-made
structure marked in accordance with section 33-44-107(7) is solely that of the
skiers involved and not that of the ski area operator.
CoLo. REV. STAr. § 33-44-109(2) (1984).
108. The remaining provisions of the Act were not included in the constitutional
challenge.
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tion, designed to limit the liability of ski area operators,"' 10 9 and,
consequently, the appropriate vagueness standard is less exacting than
that for review of criminal laws or the first amendment.' 10 The court
held:
[W]e construe the presumption as consistently as possible with
common law principles of negligence. We therefore hold that,
while the evidentiary presumption is not unconstitutionally
vague, the skier has the burden of rebutting the presumption
by presenting evidence of the ski area operator's negligence
which outweighs the presumption of the skier's sole negligence ....
Accordingly, a plaintiff in a ski accident case already
bears the burden of proving negligence and causation by a preponderance of the evidence. It follows, therefore, that the presumption is rebutted whenever a plaintiff establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's negligence
caused the collision in which the plaintiff was injured. We must
conclude that if the legislature intended anything greater than
such a showing by the plaintiff, it would have specifically so
provided. I'
The court found that there was a rational basis for the presumption,
and, therefore, that the statute was constitutional.' 12
The court also confirmed that the standard of care applicable to the
discharge of a ski area operator's legal duty is one of reasonable care
rather than the highest degree of care when the injury related to a variation in terrain. The court's analysis was focused upon the relative duties
of the parties in the context of the Act. Pizza did not address the fundamental issue of how to determine the existence and scope of common
law duties and how such duties are altered or displaced by those set
forth in the Act. '3 Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court has yet
to address that central issue. The duty issue has been the subject of a
Colorado court of appeals opinion that was not selected for publication
in Peer v. Aspen Skiing Company. 1 4 Peer, an expert skier, was skiing on
the Aspen Mountain Ski Area on opening day of the 1982-83 ski season.
109.

Pizza, 711 P.2d at 675-76.

110. Id. at 676.
111. Id. at 677-78.
112. The court also stated:
However, where a skier's injury is unrelated to an operator's breach of a specific
duty, as in this case where the injury involved a variation in terrain, the legislature
has chosen to create a rebuttable presumption that the skier is solely responsible
for the collision. Given that the legislature has imposed duties on the operator,
that the skier is under a duty to maintain control and keep a proper lookout, and,
most important, that the sport is inherently risky, we conclude that there is a
rational and natural relation here between the fact proved and the fact presumed.

Id. at 678-79.
113. The court did not address the issue of the duties of a ski area operator except to
the extent that they are set forth in the Act. While the court did not comment on the
doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, it did note the declaration of the legislature as
follows: "Realizing that there are risks and dangers which will always inhere in the sport,
the legislature has attempted to identify those dangers which can reasonably be eliminated

or controlled by the ski area operator." Id. at 678.
114. No. 88CA0190 (Colo. App. Aug. 10, 1989), cerl. granted, No. 89SC548 (Colo. Feb.
20, 1990).
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Peer testified that on his first run of the day down Ruthie's Run he struck
a snow covered service road, fell and was rendered a quadriplegic. His
speed was estimated to be between 35 and 50 miles per hour. Peer also
testified that if he had been skiing significantly slower, he could have
successfully negotiated the transition between the slope and the road.
The Aspen Skiing Company ("Aspen") was found to be 100% negligent
and Peer was awarded $5,000,000.00 in damages. Aspen appealed the
judgment to the Colorado court of appeals. The two primary issues on
appeal were whether a duty was owed to Peer as an expert skier to warn
him of the transition or to groom the slope to accommodate his chosen
speed and whether the trial court improperly denied a motion for a new
trial based upon Aspen's discovery of evidence after the trial that Peer
had skied Ruthies's Run at least two times prior to that run on which the
accident occurred. The court of appeals upheld the decisions of the trial
court and affirmed the judgment. With respect to the duty issue, the
court distinguished Smith by stating that a road across a ski run was not a
natural condition and further distinguished Whitlock by finding that
Aspen had groomed the slope which was an affirmative act by the defendant.' 1 5 It did not apply the analytical framework set forth in those
cases; it merely concluded as follows: "Consequently, because Aspen
had undertaken the task of grooming the slopes, the trial court correctly
concluded that it incurred the concomitant duty of doing so reasonably.' 16 The court did not discuss this duty in relation to the duties of
skiers as articulated in the Colorado Ski Safety Act. Accordingly, it gave
no guidance with regard to the scope of the duty. Certiorari was
granted by the Colorado Supreme Court with respect to the issue of the
denial of a new trial only. Application of the Smith and Whitlock analysis
would force the courts to consider the role of the skier and the skier's
responsibilities in assessing the existence and scope of the ski area operator's duty.
D.

Outside Colorado

In Grieb v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc.,''7 the Michigan court of appeals analyzed the constitutionality of a Michigan statute that provided
that skiers accept the dangers in the sport in so far as they were obvious
and necessary."18 The case involved a collision between skiers at the
defendant's ski area. In a short opinion, the court analyzed the constitu115. See infranotes 130-36 and accompanying text.
116. No. 88CA0190 at 3 (Colo. App. Aug. 10, 1989).
117. 155 Mich. App. 484, 400 N.W.2d 653 (1986).
118. The statute reads as follows:
Each person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts the dangers that inhere in that sport insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary. Those dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries which can result from variations in
terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots; rocks, trees, and
other forms of natural growth or debris; collisions with ski lift towers and their
components, with other skiers, or with properly marked or plainly visible snowmaking or snow-grooming equipment.
Micti. COMP. Lsws ANN. § 408.342(2) (West 1985); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 18.483(22)(2)

(Callaghen 1980).
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tional challenge based upon the equal protection and due process
clauses. The court concluded that the statute passed the constitutional
test:
The purposes of the legislation include safety, reduction in litigation and economic stabilization of an industry which substantially contributes to Michigan's economy. The delineation of
ski operators' and skiers' duties and responsibilities, along with
skiers' assumption of certain expressed inherent dangers, are
reasonably related to obtaining these legitimate state objectives. The safety and economic rationales under the amended
act are legitimate state objectives which are accomplished
through a reasonable scheme rationally related to the stated
legislative purpose. As such, the legislation does not violate
the equal protection or due process guarantees of the
constitution." 119
The opinion clearly supports a legislative approach to articulating the
relative rights and responsibilities of the parties including an acceptance
of the inherent risks by skiers.12 0 As noted above, the Colorado General
Assembly has not taken the second step in its legislation and the Colo12 1
rado courts have not yet done so either.
A successful constitutional attack upon portions of a ski statute occurred in Montana. In Brewer v. Ski Lift, Inc.,122 the plaintiff argued that
the statute denied his fundamental right to equal protection of the laws
without the justification of a compelling state interest. The Montana
statute went beyond codifying the primary assumption of inherent risks
doctrine and specifically imposed responsibility for all risks of injury that
resulted from participation in the sport upon the skier. The court determined that the language of the statute totally absolved ski area operators
from liability, even if an accident was the direct result of the operator's
negligence. It construed the applicable provision as follows:
A skier assumes the risk and all legal responsibility for injury to
himself that results from participatingin skiing; and that the responsibility for collisions with an object is the responsibility of
the skier and not the responsibility of the ski area operator; and
finally notwithstanding the comparative negligence law of Montana, a skier is barred from recovery from a ski area operator
thereby
for loss from any risk inherent in the sport of skiing,
23
eliminating the theory of comparative negligence.1
A rational relationship could not be found by the court between the
state interest of protecting the economic vitality of the ski industry and
extinguishing all legal claims of an injured skier against the ski area operator. The court, therefore, found those provisions of the Act to be
119. Grieb, 155 Mich. App: at 488, 400 N.W.2d at 656.
120. The court subsequently applied the statute in Schmitz v. Cannonsburg Skiing

Corp., 428 N.W. 2d 742 (Mich. 1988). See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (regarding pending legislation in
Colorado).
122. 762 P.2d 226 (Mont. 1988)(concerning MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-731 to 737
(1983)).
123. Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
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124

Although the ruling by the Montana court is the only rejection of
fundamental portions of a ski statute, the constitutionality of similar
12 5
statutes may, in view of Brewer, be subject to close judicial scrutiny.
The focus will be upon how the statutes allocate responsibilities between skiers and ski area operators and whether skiers are totally precluded from stating their claim. As in Montana, if an injured skier is
forced to bear all of the responsibility for all accidents of any kind whatsoever that result from the participation of skiers in the sport, the statute
may not withstand a rational relationship test.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Existence and Scope of the Relative Duties

As illustrated in the various statutory approaches, a tension continues to exist in the relationship between the primary assumption of inherent risks doctrine and the determination of whether a particular risk
should be classified as "inherent." While many statutes have addressed
this issue, the relationship of statutory and common law principles of
negligence in this area continues to evolve. A return to the fundamental
precepts of tort law, as recently articulated by the Colorado Supreme
Court, will provide the proper and necessary focus in the evolution of
these relationships in the future.
The first and most critical element of the tort of negligence is "the
126
Under
existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff."'
Colorado law, the issue of "whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty
to act to avoid injury[,] is a question of law to be determined by the
court.'

12 7

Only if the court has answered this threshold question in the

affirmative, may the trier of fact then consider whether the defendant
acted reasonably in the discharge of the duty. In the absence of a legal
28
duty, there can be no breach of duty, and, therefore, no negligence.1
The existence of a legal duty is entirely distinct from the determination of what standard of care is applicable to the discharge of that duty.
If a legal duty exists, then, in most instances, the actor must exercise
reasonable care in the discharge of that duty. 12 9 As noted above, under
Colorado law, the standard of reasonable care applies to ski area opera30
tors once a legal duty has been found to exist.'
124. Id. at 230.
125. See Morrison & Morrison, ConstitutionalChallenges to Tort Reform: Equal Protectionand
State Constitutions, 64 DEN. U. L. REv. 719 (1988).
126. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 155 (Colo. 1986).
127. Smith v. City and County of Denver, 726 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Colo. 1986); accord
Metropolitan Gas Repair Service v. Kulik, 621 P.2d 313 (Colo. 1980); W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 37 (5th ed.

1984).
128. Smith, 726 P.2d at 1128.
129. See supra note 11.
130. Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp., 711 P.2d 671, 683 (Colo. 1985)(rejecting contention that standard of highest degree of care applies to ski area operators);
Mannhard v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 682 P.2d 64, 65 (Colo. App. 1983).
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Under the common law, there is no legal duty to protect sports participants from the inherent risks of the sports in which they choose to
engage. Since 1986, the Colorado Supreme Court has considered the
criteria governing the imposition of common-law duties within the context of recreational activities on two separate occasions.
In Smith v. City and County of Denver, '3 ' and in University of Denver v.
Whitlock, 13 2 the court addressed the existence and scope of a landowner's duty to protect a recreational user of his property from injury.
Smith and' Whitlock each involved recreational activities with inherent
risks: river diving in Smith and trampoline acrobatics in Whitlock. The
plaintiffs in both cases were rendered quadriplegic as a result of their
accidents. In each case, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs'
complaints, holding that the defendants had no legal duty to protect the
plaintiffs from their accidents and injuries.
In Smith, the court framed the common-law duty analysis as follows:
Whether the law should impose a duty requires consideration
of many factors including, for example, the risk involved, the
foreseeability and likelihood of injury as weighed against the
social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against injury or harm,
and the consequences
13 3
of placing the burden upon the actor.
After applying these criteria, the court concluded that the duties alleged
by the plaintiff did not exist as a matter of law:
[The defendant] did not have a duty to warn the petitioner of
the inherent dangers involved in the activity in which he chose
to engage because the potential for danger was readily apparent. Moreover, because the alleged hazard existed as a result
of the natural condition of the terrain and river at The Chutes,
134
the [defendant] had no duty to make the area safer.
Although a risk of injury to the plaintiff was "foreseeable" in a general
sense, knowledge of and control over the specific factors contributing to
the nature and level of that risk were exclusively within the plaintiff's
ken. Accordingly, the court refused to impose on the defendant a duty
to protect the plaintiff from the consequences of his personal recreational choice.
As in Smith, the Supreme Court's decision in Whitlock rested entirely
upon the question of duty. After reviewing the Smith criteria, the court
stated:
[The Smith] list [of factors] was not intended to be exhaustive
and does not exclude the consideration of other factors that
may become relevant based on the competing individual, public and social interests implicated in the facts of each case. A
131. 726 P.2d 1125 (Colo. 1986).
132. 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1986).
133. Smith, 726 P.2d at 1127.
134. Id. at 1128. In Bittle v. Brunetti, 750 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1988), the Colorado Supreme
Court relied in part on Smith to conclude that a property owner owes no duty to pedestrians to keep abutting sidewalks clear of snow and ice. "[W]e generally have been unwilling
to impose liability for injuries caused by natural obstacles or conditions." Id. at 53.
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court's conclusion that a duty does or does not exist is an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is (or is not) entitled
to protection. No one factor is controlling, and the question of
whether a duty should be imposed in a particular case is essentially one of fairness under contemporary standards - whether
reasonable persons would recognize a duty and agree that it
exists. 135
Applying the Smith criteria, the court then rejected the plaintiff's claim
that the defendant had "a duty ....to protect [him] . . .because of the
foreseeability of the injury, the extent of the risks involved in trampoline
use, the seriousness of potential injuries, and the [defendant's purported] superior knowledge concerning these matters."' 1 6 The court
also held that "the fact that [the defendant] is charged with negligent
failure to act rather than negligent affirmative action is a critical factor
137
that strongly militates against the imposition of a duty ......
In the Colorado Supreme Court's most recent consideration of the
duty issue, Observatory Corp. v. Daly, 13 8 the court stated that a lower
"court must exercise a prudential judgment" based on the factors stated
in Smith and Whitlock, and that those cases are not to be limited only to
those recreational activities involved in each case. 139 The court also
noted that resolution of the duty issue in every case rests upon fundamental considerations of policy. Furthermore, the court held that the
analysis of the asserted duty in each case should be one which is "mindful of the magnitude of the burden that [is] implicated by imposing [a]
140
legal duty" and the practical consequences of such a finding.
To review the existence and scope of a legal duty and the attendant
issue of primary assumption of inherent risks, in an appropriate and
comprehensive manner, it is critical that an inquiry be made into the
analytical bases that fundamentally underlie the labels of these doctrines. Application of the criteria set forth in Smith and Whitlock will give
proper focus to the determination of whether a legal duty exists on the
ski area operator in a particular case or whether the injured skier must
accept and assume responsibility for the risk that caused the injury.
B.

The Nature of the Risk Involved

An evaluation of the risks of skiing begins with the fact that the
sport necessarily involves inherent risks of injury. The essential nature
of the sport requires that it be practiced in a rugged winter environment. The court in Wright articulated the basic attributes of the sport
which involve inherent risks of injury:
Skiing is a sport; a sport that entices thousands of people; a
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Whitlock, 744 P.2d at 57.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 57.
780 P.2d 462 (Colo. 1989).
Id. at 466.
Id. at 469.
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sport that requires an ability on the part of the skier to handle

himself or herself under various circumstances of grade,
boundary, mid-trail obstruction, corners and varied conditions
of the snow. Secondly, it requires good judgment on the part
of the skier and recognition of the existing circumstances and
conditions. Only the skier knows his own ability to cope with a
certain piece of trail. Snow, ranging from powder to ice, can be
of infinite kinds. Breakable crust may be encountered where
soft snow is expected. Roots and rocks may be hidden under a
thin cover. A single thin stubble of cut brush can trip a skier in
the middle of a turn. Sticky snow may follow a fast running
surface without warning. Skiing conditions may change
quickly. What was, a short time before, a perfect surface with a
soft cover on all bumps may fairly rapidly become filled with
ruts, worn spots, and other manner of skier-created

hazards....
To hold that the terrain of a ski trail down a mighty mountain, with fluctuation in weather and snow conditions that constantly change its appearance and slipperiness, should be kept
level and smooth, free from holes or depressions, equally safe
for the adult or the child, would be to demand the impossible.
It cannot be that there is any duty imposed on the owner and
operator of a ski slope that charges it with the knowledge of
these mutations of nature and requires it to warn the public
against such. 14'
These observations on the nature of the risk in the sport remain true
today. 14 2 Consistent with the approach that numerous courts have
141. Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc. 96 F. Supp. 786, 791 (D. Vt. 1951).
142. In Wright, the court applied the common-law doctrine of volenti nonfit injuria ("he
who consents to an act is not wronged by it"). The modern application of this doctrine
traces its roots to Cardozo's landmark opinion in Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.,
250 N.Y. 472, 166 N.E. 173 (1929). In Murphy, the plaintiff had been injured when she
chose to partake in a carnival "fun house" activity, which presented an obvious risk of
injury. In explaining why there could be no recovery in this circumstance, Cardozo stated
the rule succinctly: "one who takes part in such sports accepts the dangers that inhere in it
so far as they are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by his
antagonist or a spectator at a ball game the chance of contact with the ball." Id. 250 N.Y.
at 474, 166 N.E. at 174. Since Wright, several courts have applied the doctrine to a variety
of sports activities to hold that no legal duty is owed to the participants therein. See, e.g.,
Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1988)(no legal duty to
protect jockey bumped by another jockey in violation of safety rule); Neinstein v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 185 Cal. App. 3d 176, 229 Cal. Reptr. 612 (1986)(no legal duty to
protect baseball spectators from "natural hazards of foul balls"); Ridge v. Kladnick, 42
Wash. App. 785, 713 P.2d 1131 (1986)(no legal duty to protect skater from "clear and
obvious" risks of hazardous skating game). Several courts also considered the inherent
risks of skiing. See, e.g., Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 716 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir.
1982)(skier's loss of control and slide into unpadded snowmaking apparatus); Nielsen v.
Jack Frost Mountain Co., No. 87-0532 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1988)(skier's fall caused by large
visible chunks of ice on snow surface), aft d, No. 88-1496 (3d Cir. Nov. 1, 1988); Leopald v.
Okemo Mountain, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 781 (D. Vt. 1976)(skier's uncontrolled slide and ensuing collision with unpadded lift tower); McDaniel v. Dowell, 210 Cal. App. 2d 26, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 140 (1962)(skier's loss of control and collision with another skier); Blair v. Mt. Hood
Meadows Development Corp., 291 Or. 293, 630 P.2d 927 (1981)(skier's loss of control
and fall into ravine).
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taken in the past, 14 3 an important consideration, but not the only consideration, is that the elements creating the risk of injury are inherent in
the essential nature of the sport.
C.

The Likelihood of Injury Versus Social Utility

Although injuries resulting from inherent risks are generally foreseeable, the "likelihood of injury" is necessarily dependent upon the
skier's own judgment and conduct while actively engaged in the sport.
While such injuries are often foreseeable in a general sense, and while
hindsight always provides marvelous clarity, numerous factors must be
considered in each case to determine whether the particular injury was
specifically likely and foreseeable. The location of the accident, the time
of the accident, the snow conditions, the weather conditions, the injured
skier's ability level, the nature of the accident, the skier's conduct and
knowledge, and a myriad of additional relevant factors must be reviewed
in the assessment of whether the particular injury and its cause were
foreseeable or likely. Skier falls and loss of control are random events
that can lead to injury at any time and at any location within a ski area;
these considerations must be weighed against the benefits of the sport in
general.
D.

The Burden of GuardingAgainst the Risk

The magnitude of the burden of guarding against the risk of injury
to skiers is wide-ranging. Obviously, no ski area operator can know the
specific skills and abilities of the millions of skiers who venture onto the
slopes. Nor can any ski area operator control individual skiers' decisions
regarding their speed, course and other behavior while skiing under the
varying conditions which exist at any given time on any given ski mountain or ski slope. Since a skier's loss of control can be an entirely random event, serious consideration must be given to the feasibility and
practicality of requiring ski area operators to anticipate such events and
protect skiers from them. While ski area operators cannot expect to be
totally absolved from any responsibility, 144 it is virtually impossible to
protect all skiers from the inherent risks in the sport or to eliminate such
45
risks in an effort to make the mountain "crashproof."'
For example, the Colorado Ski Safety Act requires the posting of
signs at specific locations throughout the ski area. While the cost of developing and maintaining a sign system may be an acceptable burden, a
significant expansion of this obligation may not result in an increased
benefit to the skier and could jeopardize the economics of a number of
ski areas. Again, this specific requirement calls for a thorough and detached balancing of interests. Such an analysis should be applied to
143. See, e.g., Blair v. Mt. Hood Meadows Development Corp., 291 Or. 293, 630 P.2d
927 (1981).
144. See, e.g., Brewer v Ski-Lift, Inc., 762 P.2d 226 (Mont. 1988).
145. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-101 to -111 (1984) (the Colorado Ski Safety
Act); see Danieley v. Goldmine Ski Assoc., No. E00589 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 1990).
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each duty assessment. This process should also facilitate the integration
of statutory duties with the applicable common law.
E.

The Consequences of Placing the Burden Upon the Actor

The consequences of placing the burden of accepting responsibility
for inherent risks upon the actor (i.e., the individual skier in most ski
cases) can be minimal. Each individual skier is in the best position to
assess his or her own subjective abilities in light of the availaible objective information such as the relative difficulty of the terrain and prevailing weather and snow surface conditions. Such an analysis incorporates
the elements of the primary assumption of inherent risks doctrine as discussed above. As the court in Leopold v. Okemo Mountain, Inc. 146 found:
The skier, not the ski area operator, is the logical one to make
the choice as to whether he should proceed and assume the
consequences of skiing in an area where a plainly apparent and
necessary danger exists. Were it otherwise, ski trails, among
the most enjoyable places to ski, might well have to be eliminated because of the obvious hazards of trees, rocks and adverse terrain which border every trail and which every skier
faces with some degree of peril when he makes his decision to
14 7
venture forth thereon.

The Colorado court of appeals likewise recognized the role of personal choice in the apportionment of responsibilities between the skier
and the ski area operator. In Mannhard, the court held that an avalanche
was a snow condition which the skier had the duty to avoid. -[A] skier
has little or no control over his movements while riding a chairlift or
gondola and must necessarily depend on the operator for his safe passage. Conversely, while on the slopes, as here, the skier has complete
14 8
freedom of movement and choice."'
The inquiry to be made should include a consideration of the factors which underlie the primary assumption of inherent risks doctrine.
Obviously, this also entails regard for the nature of the individual risk.
In addition, the statutory duties of skiers must be carefully reviewed and
integrated into the balancing of interests.
F.

Public and Social Interests

In general, expanding the availability of skiing is in the "public and
social interest." Many of the legislative declarations to the statutes governing skiing refer to the need to maintain the sport in view of the industry's economic contribution to the state as well as the need to properly
allocate responsibilities among skiers and ski area operators.1 4 9 The determination of the existence and scope of a specific legal duty on the
146. 420 F. Supp. 781 (D. Vt. 1976).
147. Id. at 787 n.2. See also Nielson v.Jack Frost Mountain Co., No. 87-0532 (E.D. Pa.
May 23, 1988), aff'd, No. 88-1496 (3d Cir. Nov. 1,1988).
148. 682 P.2d 64, 66 (Colo. App. 1983).
149. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-102 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-51
(1987).
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part of ski area operators necessarily involves consideration of social
policy in assessing responsibility for injuries to skiers, and, consequently, in choosing who is to bear the risk of loss. In making policy
assessments, it is important to balance the essence of the sport of skiing,
the freedom of movement and choice in a mountain environment,
against pressures to protect skiers from themselves. Reference to the
legislative declarations of many ski statutes can provide direction in balancing the various policy issues. Reduced to its essence, the determination of the existence and scope of a legal duty is one based upon public
policy considerations.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since the decision in the historical case of Wright v. Mt. Mansfield
Lift, Inc. ,150 the area of ski law has been through numerous ebbs and
flows. After the Wright decision, the primary assumption of inherent
risks doctrine prevailed. However, the focus shifted awfiy from the existence of a duty upon the skier to a novel focus upon ski area operators.
The expansion of litigation caused many state legislatures to create ski
statutes assigning the duties of ski area operators, lift operators, and
51
skiers. The law remains in a state of flux as it evolves.1
Although the sport of skiing will probably never return to the days
of Wright, when the timorous were advised to remain at home, a return
to the basic tenets of tort law will provide analytical tools and a framework for appropriately assessing the numerous risks in the sport and
allocating the responsibility for injuries that are incurred by skiers. As a
result, the law affecting the sport of skiing will provide a comprehensive
approach to determine the existence and scope of the relative legal duties and the nature and extent of a skier's responsibility for those risks
that inhere in the sport.

150. 96 F. Supp. 786 (D. Vt. 1951).
151. See Feuerheim, Lund, Chalat & Kunz, From Wright to Sunday and Beyond: Is the Law
Keeping Up With the Skiers, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 885, 918.

THOUGHTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS LEAGUES AND THE APPLICATION OF
UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS
KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE*

INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union's victory in the 1988 Olympic basketball competition illustrates the growing popularity of "American" sports in foreign
countries.' The National Basketball Association ("NBA"), Major
League Baseball, National Football League ("NFL") and National
Hockey League ("NHL") are all involved in some level of international
competition. Major League Baseball and the NHL have franchises in
Canada and all of the leagues have played a variety of exhibition games
in Europe or Japan. 2 The NFL has announced that it may begin some
form of international play as early as 1991 with its Worldwide League of
3
American Football ("WLAF").
There is a good deal of evidence to support the proposition that a
truly international sports league could prove to be quite lucrative to
league organizers. First, the value of the Olympic Games, the world's
most popular sports competition, is largely based on international television viewer interest. 4 The Olympic television negotiators for the 1992
Barcelona Games were seeking a record $500 million for the network
rights to broadcast the two week sporting event. 5 Similarly, the overseas
broadcast rights for the NBA are currently $4 million and projected to
be $25 million by 1995.6 If an international professional sports league
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies at the Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania. B.A., 1977, Stanford University; J.D. 1980, Columbia University School of
Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the research grant provided by the Sol C. Snider
Entrepreneurial Center for this project.
I. The New York Times in a sports section cover story titled, U.S. Sports Heading
Overseas discussed the presence of U.S. based sports around the world. See Eskenazi, U.S.
Sports Heading Overseas: Pro Leagues in America Eye the Globe, N.Y. Times, April 9, 1989, Sec. 8,
at 1, col. 2. See generally B. RADER, AMERICAN SPORTS: FROM THE AGE OF FOLK GAMES TO
THE AGE OF SPECTATORS (1983). The NHL's roots are Canadian. See, e.g., Philadelphia
World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 465-66 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (discussing the League's Canadian origins).
2. The NBA recently announced that it would be the first to play regular season
games overseas, announcing two games inJapan for the 1990-91 season. See Sports Industry News, Feb. 24, 1989, at 62. See, e.g., Delaney, Celtics Victorious As Toast of Madrid, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 24, 1988, at C2, col. 5. See also Rosenblatt, A Global NFL Scramble, SPORTS INC.
Oct. 10, 1988, at 3.
3. Most descriptions of the league refer to it as a sort of "minor" league or "farm
system" for the NFL. Such a league could be used to develop athletes for the "major"
leagues.
4. See Rosner, Rights Talks Cut Off, SPORTS INC., March 13, 1989 (noting that additional money will be paid for rights in other countries as well).
5. See Sports Industry News, Oct. 14, 1988, at 315.
6. See Cone, Playing the Global Game, FORBES, Jan. 23, 1989, at 90.
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is successfully developed, the monetary demands on network bidders
and potential sponsors and advertisers could be astronomical. 7 The
economic equation must also include the dismantling of the Eastern
Bloc and the unification of the European market in 1992.
In addition to these television revenues, the revenues from league
licensing and endorsements may be quite large as well.8 It is logical to
assume that foreign interest in a sport will increase if the fans actually
have their own home team. Along with greater interest comes increased
television viewership and increased revenues to the networks and the
leagues.
No defined structure of an international league or the nature of a
true "world championship" has yet been publicly developed. For example, it would be simple enough for the champion of Major League Baseball, or the existing World Series, to play the champion of its Japanese
counterpart. Individual games and series have taken place a number of
times over the years between American and Japanese teams with no specific "championship" designation given to the winner. 9 Robert Whiting,
in his examination ofJapanese baseball You Gotta Have Wa, cites 28 visits
by American professional baseball teams from 1908 to 1988.10
The focus of this article is on the potential antitrust issues in the
operation of a truly international league. The article examines the potential sources of legal actions by private entities as well as actions that
might be supported under various existing domestic and international
government antitrust enforcement guidelines. The overall assumption
is that the leagues hypothetically discussed are fully integrated international entities. This is not a discussion of an occasional meeting of
teams, the special exhibition appearance, a minor league or the financial
or social merits of such a league. There are certainly financial factors
that point against the formation of such a league. The costs of travel for
a team and equipment are just two monetary considerations.II Televi7. There certainly are strong arguments against the profitability of an international
league as well. The arguments used by leagues against domestic expansion and the degree that the need to share league revenues with more partners might offset whatever
franchise fee is paid in the long run is applicable to international expansion as well. See

generally Noll, The Economics of Sports in Leagues in
SPORTS (Uberstine ed.).

LAw OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR

8. See Cone, supra note 6, noting that over $50 million worth of Converse brand NBA
licensed shoes are sold outside of the United States. Id. at 91.
9. See also Sanger,JapaneseTeam's Improvement Surprised U.S. All-Stars, N.Y. Times, Nov.
15, 1988, at D27, col. 3, discussing a U.S. All-star team tour ofJapan ending with a record
of three victories, two losses and two ties.
Former Baseball Commissioner A. Bartlett Giamatti had stated that "the game must
be brought abroad" but he cautioned that it must be done "without imperialistic desire to
run it but to promote it." He did note that exposure to the game abroad will aid in
marketing concerns. Address by A. Bartlett Giamatti, Seton Hall Law School Sports Law
Symposium (April 28, 1989).
10. See R. WHITING, You GOrTA HAVE WA 331-332 (1989).
11. Obviously the travel costs for an NBA franchise are less than that for an NFL or
Major League Baseball franchise. The squads in the NBA are smaller. However, it is possible that the Major League Baseball (American League/National League) format could be
utilized. For example, the "European League" in basketball could play the champions of
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sion time zones, language and exchange rates likewise are other factors
that would have to be examined.
The focus here is on the antitrust issues and the policy considerations that will effect the application of these laws to global issues. This
analysis uses three hypothetical models to outline the major antitrust
issues that could confront an international sports league from its formation stage on through some of the ongoing problems that would be
unique to an operational international professional sports league.
Model I examines a merger or joint venture that forms an international league. This would be the potential mode for creation in Major
League Baseball, the NBA and the NHL. 1 2 In all of these sports, there
are leagues already in existence in foreign countries. 13 In baseball, as
was noted, there is a league in existence in Japan that has maintained its
present format for over 30 years. 1 4 There are also fledgling leagues in
existence elsewhere, including Italy. 15 The quality of play in these
countries is much behind that of the U.S. The overseas basketball
leagues have served as a final stop or a negotiating alternative for NBA
players. 16 They too, someday, may be appropriate for a merger. Finally, there are more Americans playing hockey in leagues in Europe
than in the National Hockey League in North America.17
Football serves as the example for Model II, which is the direct export of an existing American sports entity to a foreign country. The
NFL does not currently have a counterpart outside of North America.
Although the Canadian Football League ("CFL") has been in existence
for decades, even a merger of those two North American entities would
not give football the international flavor for a true world championship. 18 There are football teams in existence in a few European coun-,
tries and a league that even has its own "super bowl" and a seasonal
publication in Italy. These developed largely due to the influence of
televised NFL games overseas and recent preseason games played in
the NBA so that the NBA team would not have to travel overseas until that championship
game.
12. These leagues could also certainly use the expansion mode set out in Model II,
and in fact, as is discussed below, there may be many advantages to the expansion mode.
13. Professional basketball exists in Italy and Spain and professional baseball exists in
Japan and to a lesser degree in Italy. See XX 60 Minutes Transcripts No. 53 at 10 (noting
that 14 teams play baseball in the Seriat Nazionale, national league).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. John Nash, General Manager of the NBA's Philadelphia 76ers, noted that many of
the leagues in Europe can compete for players at the $200,000-$300,000 salary range.
The major shortcoming at present for growth in Europe is the size of the arenas, seating a
maximum of approximately 5,000 people. He estimates that by the year 2000 there will be
real competition with the NBA. Presentation by John Nash at The Wharton School of the
University of Pennsylvania (March 15, 1989) [hereinafter Nash presentation].
17. See U.S., Canada Players Cross the Atlantic For Ice Time, Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 19,
1989, at IE, col. 5.
18. Interestingly, the CFL has made overtures of expanding into the United States,
noting a particular interest in those cities that want, but have not been able to obtain, an
NFL franchise. See CFL-Looks to Expand, USA Today, July 12, 1988, at Cl, col. 1.
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major European cities. 19 Because of the tremendous disparity in the
quality of play between those teams and the NFL, however, it is not
likely that a merger would take place. If Japanese baseball is a few decades off from its American counterpart, the club football teams are
light-years away. In this second model it would actually be necessary to
"expand" or place new franchises in foreign cities, thus causing a different set of international antitrust problems to arise.
Model III notes the possibility of the formation of a completely new
league. It presents the pitfalls that can be avoided by taking care in
forming the domestic or international entity. Furthermore, this section
chronicles some operational concerns that may develop in a completely
new entity.
The models are not meant to predict how the various leagues might
"go international" or even that they in fact will. The models are truly
the author's guess today of how internationalization might best occur.
For example, there is talk of creation of a Global Hockey League as a
newly created entity, as set out in Model III, not the discussed merger
method herein. 20 Obviously there are initial jurisdictional concerns in
any extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. As those jurisdictional concerns are addressed, the potential to apply a foreign states' antitrust
laws should be considered as well. 2 1 An interpretation of antitrust issues, particularly the rule of reason, single entity defense, and the labor
exemption, is quite complex in its own right. With the application of
U.S. antitrust laws to the internationalization of professional sports
leagues, the complexity only increases. This article begins with a brief
overview of the jurisdictional issues in applying antitrust laws. Antitrust
actions may be brought both by private individuals and the federal government under the Sherman Act. The analysis then covers the application and policy issues in the three hypothetical models. A look at the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws to sports franchise relocations and player movement issues concludes this article.
I.

JURISDICTION

Generally the Sherman Act applies to activities "in" or "affecting"
commerce in the United States. 22 U.S. ownership of a franchise located
in a foreign state and a member of a U.S. based league would probably
require that that entity be subject to U.S. antitrust laws. The traditional
analysis emanates from United States v. Aluminum Co. of America ("Al19. See Telander, Go Downpitch and Buttonhook Smartly, .1ate, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug.
11, 1986, at 22; Gammon, The Brits
are Having a Ball, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 7, 1986, at
34.
20. See Fitzpatrick, Clarke Hits the Road as Super Scout, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 4,
1990, at 3-E, col. 1.

21. Obviously an examination of every possible law would be quite expansive and
beyond the scope of this article. Therefore the substantive focus is on United States antitrust laws. An interesting fourth model that could be used to examine these foreign laws is
a foreign based soccer league with a U.S. franchise.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).

1990]

INTERNATIONAL PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES

197

coa "),23 which introduced an "effects" test of subject matter jurisdiction
under the antitrust laws. Under this test, the courts of the United States
have jurisdiction over any conduct that has an intended effect on commerce within the United States. 24 The test for what constitutes a sufficient effect has varied among the different courts. Nonetheless, in an
international league, the effects on U.S. commerce are clearly expected
and intended, especially in the case of a U.S. based league. Any league
activity in a foreign country necessarily affects the league as a whole and
has an effect on commerce inthe United States.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals came up with a different analysis in 1976, in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America ("Timberlane 1").25
The circuit court found fault with the Alcoa analysis for failing to consider the interests of the foreign nation, as well as the nature of the relationship of the actors and the U.S. 26 The court then established a multifactored analysis, including issues regarding both foreign and domestic
interests. The test actually consists of balancing numerous interests,
and has been referred to as a "jurisdictional rule of reason." This analysis has been accepted by the Third,2 7 Fifth, 2 8 and Tenth 29 Circuits.
Under this analysis in the international league cases, the balance would
almost certainly fall on the side of U.S. courts having jurisdiction, as the
U.S. interest in the entire league would be strong enough to outweigh
the interests of foreign countries with smaller stakes. This would definitely be the case in a U.S. based league, but the issue might be more
complicated in a European-based league with a smaller U.S. stake.
In 1982, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act
3°
("FTAIA")
further refined the appropriate jurisdictional analysis,
maintaining that there must be a "direct, substantial and reasonably
foreseeable" effect on U.S. domestic commerce in order to exert jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. Further amplification of this was expressed in Laker Airways v. Sabena Belgian Airlines,3' where Judge Wilkey
articulated that "[j]urisdiction exists under United States antitrust laws
whenever conduct is intended to, and results in, substantial effects
'3 2
within the United States."
23. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
24. Id. at 444.
25. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
26. Id. at 611-12.
27. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1301 (3d Cir. 1979).
28. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 671 F.2d 876, 884-5 (5th Cir.
1982).
29. Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982).
30. See H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982). The American Bar Association's sections of Antitrust Law and International Law and Practice formed a task force to
review a draft of these rules. They criticized the Department on this point for not considering comity issues raised in Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1976). The jurisdictional standard which is probably applicable was more recently expressed in 549 F.2d at 925.
31. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
32. Id. at 925; see also A. Ahistrom Osakeyhtio v. E.C. Commission, Case No. 89/85
(Ct. ofJustice, 1988) (indicating that the FTAIA guidelines are appropriate).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2

Underlying any jurisdictional analysis is whether a court will actually be able to enforce an antitrust judgment. In dealing with a United
States based entity that issue is not so problematic. A judgment can be
enforced against individuals in this country or against their property.
There has been, however, a great deal of activity by foreign states to
deny the enforcement of judgments in their country based on United
States antitrust law. The general basis for denying enforcement is sovereign immunity. That doctrine is based on the international law principle that the courts of one country cannot enforce their judgments
against another country. 3 3 Thus, there is potentially a degree of protection for the foreign based segment of the merger or joint venture.
In summary, under the basic jurisdictional guidelines that do exist,
an international merger, joint venture or other expansion activity by a
United States based sports league is probably subject to the scrutiny of
U.S. antitrust laws. However, there may be, as there is with any other
international legal judgment, the problem of enforcement. Where there
is American ownership of the foreign franchise the judgment should not
be as difficult to enforce. There are judicial tools in place to bring a
judgment personally against an owner based in the U.S. or his or her
property located in the United States. The more difficult cases arise
when the foreign portion of the international venture is, in fact, foreign
34
owned.
II.

FORMATION ISSUES

A. Model I. Merger or Joint Venture
Of all the legal issues that might be addressed regarding the development of international leagues, possibly the most interesting is the application of U.S. antitrust laws to a U.S. based league entering into the
international marketplace. This is largely due to the difficulty courts
have had in applying antitrust laws to purely domestic sports issues.
The application of antitrust laws in sports may be appropriately characterized as stare decisis gone awry. 3 5 In some situations, such as the judicially created antitrust exemption for baseball, the law has been
relatively consistent. 3 6 In other areas, such as sports franchise reloca33. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospaceworkers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d
1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). The United Kingdom, Australia

and Canada also have "clawback" provisions which allow suits against plaintiffs to force
the return of antitrust awards through local court awards. See, e.g., Protection of Trading
Intersts Act (1980) and Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Concerning the Act, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 834 (1982) (United Kingdom); Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act
1984, No. 3 AUSTL. ACTS (1984), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 794 (1985) (Canada). Regarding
controversy over "clawback" provisions. See Note, Enjoining the Applications of the British
Protections of Trading Act in Private American's Antitrust Litigation, 79 MICH. L. REV. (1981).

34.

For a thorough summary of the jurisdiction under Justice Department Guidelines

see, S. GRIFFIN, U.S. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT:

A PRACTIAL GUIDE TO THE

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES A-I 1-18 (1989).
35. See Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, The Rule of Reason
and the Doctrine ofAncillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 943 (1988).

36. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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tions, many commentators have viewed the application of the law as ex3 7
tremely inconsistent.
Historically, antitrust issues have been the basis for major sports'
legal battles: Al Davis in his battle to move the Oakland Raiders to Los
Angeles, Curt Flood in his battle not to be traded, and numerous player
union actions against their respective leagues. 38 The initial issue in this
first model is the level of antitrust scrutiny an international merger
might receive.
1. Antitrust Generally
Most antitrust litigation in sports has involved Section 1 of the
Sherman Act which provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal." '3 9 Section 1 relates primarily to agreements between parties
that impede competition. A number of the cases in this area have dealt
with the rights of athletes to negotiate freely with various teams in a
given league or with teams in a competing league. The restrictions that
the teams agree to that bar a complete free market for the athletes are
commonly referred to as restrictions on "free agency."
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is also applicable to league actions
against member franchises. The area where this application has received the most attention is in cases involving sports franchise relocations. When franchise rights are granted, a specific geographic territory
is assigned. The franchise owner further agrees not to move the home
games of the franchise without the initial approval of fellow owners.
Conflicts arise when the individual franchise owner disagrees with fellow
owners and relocates without consent, or where league consent is denied. Improper denial by the league has been held to violate the antitrust laws. The leading case which addressed this issue is Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League.40 There the NFL
was found to have restrained competition by voting not to allow the then
Oakland Raiders to relocate to Los Angeles, a city already occupied by
41
the Rams franchise.
To a lesser degree, courts have analyzed league antitrust issues
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The concern of Section 2, as it
relates to sports leagues, is primarily whether the behavior of a league
restricts entry by potential rival leagues and whether that behavior establishes the league as an illegal monopoly. The most recent sports
league case to examine this issue was United States Football League v. Na37. See Roberts, supra note 33.
38. Flood, 407 U.S. at 258. See also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. NFL, 791 F.2d

1356 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
40. 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987). See also National
Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed,
484 U.S. 960 (1987).
41. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission, 791 F.2d at 1356.
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tional Football League, where the NFL was found to be an illegal monopoly. 4 2 In that case, the recently formed USFL brought an action against
the NFL alleging, among other things, that the NFL monopolized the
sport of professional football in this country and conspired to drive the
USFL out of business. 4 3 Section 2 of the Sherman Act states in part,
"[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... ,,44 Under Section 2, a plaintiff must also show that the defendant league willfully acpower and as a result of these actions
quired and maintained monopoly
45
the plaintiff was injured.
2.

Mergers and Joint Ventures
a. Mergers

Mergers are fertile territory for the application of antitrust law. The
main concern is that a horizontal merger which extends an existing market may result in the anticompetitive and social consequences the antitrust laws seek to protect against. 46 Any entities considering a merger
must not only consult the case law, but also the merger guidelines issued
48
47
and the Federal Trade Commission.
by the Department of Justice
Generally, if competing firms with substantial shares of a market merge,
there may be a government challenge and a possible finding of a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 49 Private parties may bring lawsuits
under the Clayton Act as well. 50 The Department of Justice guidelines
also make specific reference to international mergers. The key concern
of those guidelines are that the merger would not likely result in a net
5
decrease in consumer welfare. '
A merger may also be scrutinized under the Sherman Act. Under
that statute, the concern is whether the merger can be viewed as a "con42. See 644 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), 842 F.2d 1335, 1341 (2d Cir. 1988)
(where the court found that the NFL had used its monopoly power particularly to injure
the USFL. Although found to be a monopoly, damages were nominal. Id.). The first Section 2 case of the Sherman Act involving a sports league was American Football League v.
National Football League, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
43. United States Football League v. National Football League, 644 F. Supp. 1040
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1976).
45. The AFL case, supra note 43, focused primarily on the possession of monopoly
power; the USFL case on the intent to acquire or maintain monopoly power. In addition
to monopolization action, Section 2 of the Sherman Act, can be used to attack attempts to
monopolize as well as conspiracies to monopolize.
46. See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 575-675 (1977).
47. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823-03 (June 29, 1984)
[hereinafter Guidelines].
48. For guidelines used by state attorneys general, see Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the
National Association of Attorneys General (March 10, 1987), reprinted in 52 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1306, at 476 (March 12, 1987).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
50. Id.
51. See Guidelines, supra note 48.
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tract, combination ... or conspiracy" under Section 152 or as a monopolization attempt or conspiracy to monopolize under Section 2.5 3 Merger
54
analysis, however, typically occurs under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Section 7 specifically prohibits the acquisition of the stock or assets
of another entity where the result of their acquisition "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly ...

in any

line of commerce ....-55 Generally, the prima facie case, which must be
established under the Clayton Act, requires a showing that the merger
will lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the relevant
product and geographic market. Historically, sports league mergers
have been a key focus for antitrust scrutiny. In the past, the two largest
modern sports league mergers were accomplished by a statutory exemption for the 1970 merger of the old American Football League and the
NFL, 56 and the NBA-American Basketball Association merger through
57
the court supervised Robertson Settlement Agreement.
b. Joint Ventures
A joint venture analysis is similar to a merger and so the same general issues apply. A joint venture between a U.S. entity and a foreignbased league is a possible route for international play. Ajoint venture is
generally defined as "[a] legal entity in the nature of a partnership engaged in the joint prosecution of a particular transaction for mutual
profit." 58 Thejoint venture mode of operation allows for some autonomous operation of the separate leagues in their own countries.
The Justice Department Guidelines regarding international antitrust enforcement establish a four pronged analysis. 59 The first two
prongs are similar to the basic enforcement policy of the Department,
that is, whether the anticompetitive effect is outweighed by the procompetitive benefits. 60 The next prong examines the competitive effects of
ancillary non-price vertical restraints. If these three steps indicate that
the joint venture is likely to be anticompetitive, then the joint venturers
must prove that the procompetitive efficiencies of the joint venture outweigh the risk of anticompetitive harm. 6 1 As with merger, the strongest
argument against a successful antitrust action is that ajoint venture does
not decrease competition.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
55. Id.
56. Pub. L. No. 89-800, S. b(6)(1), 80 Stat. 1515 (1966), amending Pub. L. No. 87331, S. 1, 75 Stat. 732 (1961), 15 U.S.C. 1291 (1961).
57. Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
58. BLACK'S LAw DICTiONARY 753 (5th ed. 1979).
59. Trade Regulations Rep. (CCH)
13,109 (Nov. 10, 1988) [hereinafter International Guidelines].
60. InternationalGuidelines, at 20,599-20,605; See Report: Analysis of Department ofJustice
Guidelines InternationalOperations & Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 957, 961
(1988) (analyzing the joint venture section of the International Guidelines).
61. Id.
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Baseball

The sport of baseball is unique in that it enjoys a judicially created
antitrust exemption. 62 The exemption originally applied specifically to
the size and the power of the league and not to player restraints as it is
generally applied today. Even though courts have continued to uphold
the exemption over the years, an international sports league merger has
never been contemplated by the courts. Many commentators, including
Supreme Court Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan, have
63
argued that the exemption should not continue to exist.

The exemption was originally created in FederalBaseball Club of Baltimore Inc. v. NationalLeague of ProfessionalBaseball Clubs 6 4 because the sport
of baseball was deemed excluded from "interstate commerce." Affecting interstate commerce is a necessary element to violate the Sherman
Act. The Court noted specifically that the sport was merely a state affair.6 5 Ironically, in one of the most illustrative examples ofjudicial adherence to the policy of stare decisis is the exemption of baseball from
antitrust law. The exemption exists today even though baseball is now
clearly recognized, even by the Supreme Court, as being part of interstate commerce. 6 6 Each time the exemption is challenged there is the
opportunity for a court to inhibit further expansion of the exemption.
An international application may be such an opportunity. The rationale
used by the Court, in addition to stare decisis, is Congressional lack of
action. 6 7 Since 1922, Congress has had the opportunity to pass legislation which would include baseball within the domain of antitrust law and
it has not done so. Because of Congressional inactivity, the courts continue to follow the 1922 exemption.
One policy argument for the continuation of this exemption is that
baseball developed within this antitrust protection, and it should not be
removed now. A question that a court would be confronted with is
whether this protection should continue beyond domestic borders into
the international development of the sport?
Another factor that should influence courts in international antitrust actions is who the plaintiff is in the action. The parties most likely
to test the continuing exemption would be a competing league or a
player. In baseball, until recently, a competing league as a plaintiff was
unlikely. Major League Baseball has not had any serious competition in
75 years. 68 An action by a player or possibly a players' union is the most
62. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
356 (1953); Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). See also Radovich v. National Football League, 352
U.S. 445 (1957).
63. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 292-93 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
65. Id.
66. Flood, 407 U.S. at 258.
67. Flood, 407 U.S. at 281-83 (viewing the lack of congressional action regarding the
baseball exemption over a50 year period as "something other than mere congressional
silence and passivity." Id. at 283).
68. See Chass, New League Plots to Take Mound, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1989, sec. 8, at 1.

1990]

INTERNATIONAL PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES

203

probable course.
Antitrust actions have been brought against mergers and joint ventures under the theory that they reduce competition. An action by a
player or a players' union in baseball would probably raise that same
issue. In Robertson v. National Basketball Association 6 9 an antitrust action
was initiated because of the proposed merger between the National Basketball Association and the then competing American Basketball Association ("ABA"). 70 A primary concern was the impact the merger of the
two leagues would have on the market for players. The obvious fear
being that the elimination of a competitor in the marketplace would
eliminate the bidding for players' services and lower average contract
prices. Although the Robertson case involved basketball, the possibility of
a merger eliminating a source of competing bids is enlightening. A forty
percent increase in NBA players' salaries in their first five years of competition from 1967-72 is directly attributed to the competition from the
ABA. 7 1 The rapid salary growth slowed following the NBA/ABA
72
merger to an initial annual rate of less than ten percent.
It is this same issue, whether players' salaries would decrease, that
might predominate in an international merger situation. Although
player restraint actions have not been successful in baseball, this would
be yet another opportunity to test the strength of the exemption of baseball from antitrust law reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Flood v.
Kuhn. 73 The Robertson analogy is particularly applicable because in recent years the threat of playing in Japan has been used as a negotiating
tactic by several players, and some, most notably Bob Horner, then of
the Atlanta Braves, have actually played there. 74 Reportedly Horner
signed with the Yakult Swallows in Japan for one year at $1.3 million
with a reported $500,000 signing bonus after rejecting an offer from the
Atlanta Braves for a three year contract at $3.9 million. 75 Homer was
unique in that at the age of 29 he was one of the first Major League
Baseball players to go to Japan while still in his prime. 76 An existing
league has been used for leverage during salary negotiations, as in Robertson, to increase player salaries. Obviously, with an international
merger the alternative market afforded by the Japanese would be foreThere have, however, been recent discussions of creating a new domestic league partially
in response to television network competition increasing for sports programming. See
Sports Industry News, May 19, 1989, at 152.
69. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y., 1975).
70. Id.
71. See Noll, supra note 7, at 45.
72. Id. at 46. There are other market factors that may cause player salaries to increase. Without competition from another league baseball salaries increased dramatically
due to free agency following the Messersmith-McNaty arbitration ruling giving baseball players the right to test the open market at some point in their career. See 66 LAB. ARB. Disp.
SETTrLEMENTS 1011 (1975).

73.
74.
75.
76.

407 U.S. 258 (1972).
See Wolff, A New Kind of Orient Express, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 18, 1987, at 28.
Id.
Id.
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closed to players and competition for athletes in the baseball market
decreased.
It would seem that a court would give serious consideration to an
antitrust action by a player or players' union if American baseball
merged with Japanese baseball. The two factors that the plaintiffs would
have to overcome first would be the antitrust exemption, and second to
prove that competition in the market for baseball players was actually
decreased.
To overcome the baseball exemption, a court would probably have
to distinguish the international case from past cases or justify their policy decision not to adhere to the principle of stare decisis. Apart from
the sentiment expressed in Flood against the exemption, one court did
hold that the exemption was not applicable. In 1949, in Gardella v. Chand/et",7 7 Danny Gardella prevailed in his antitrust action against Major
League Baseball, which he accused of "blacklisting" him because he
played in the rival Mexican league. No Major League Baseball team
would allow Gardella the opportunity to play with them. However, this
78
case was settled before the appeal was heard.
The effect that a merger would have on the market for baseball
players is a factual question. If a court does not perceive the Japanese
league as an alternative, then competition may not be viewed as being
greatly affected. The less competition is affected, the less likely an antitrust action against baseball is to-succeed.
4.

Basketball

The Robertson case precedent would be directly applicable to an attempted merger of existing European league franchises with the NBA.
Perhaps more importantly, no antitrust exemption exists in any sport
other than baseball. 79 Similar to baseball in Japan, only on a more competitive level, the European leagues compete with the NBA for players. 80 Even if there is no genuine competition, the threat of playing in
another country is used more often in basketball negotiations than in
baseball. It appears that the experience is more "enjoyable" for the athlete and there are more opportunities. The ploy of having a European
opportunity is used frequently by late first round draft picks. In the
77. 174 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1949).
78. Gardella reportedly received $60,000 from then Commissioner Chandler to drop
the case. See Maher, Danny Gardella Case Didn't Settle Anything, L.A. Times, Sept. 24, 1975,

Part III.
79. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
356 (1953); Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). See also Radovich v. National Football League, 352
U.S. 445 (1957).
80. Similarly in the NHL there is a steady stream of players to Europe. One report
notes that there are more North American hockey players in Europe than in the National
Hockey League. See U.S., Canada PlayersCross The Atlantic For Ice Time, Philadelphia Inquirer
Feb. 19, 1989, at El, col. 5. See also Allen, U.S. Born Hockey Players Find Europe an Attractive
Alternative, USA Today, March 10, 1989, at 4C (indicating that 20 more Americans are
playing in Europe than in the NHL).
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1989 draft the second pick in the entire draft, Danny Ferry, rejected the
NBA Los Angeles Clippers and signed a reported one year contract for
one million dollars with the Messaggero Rome team of the Italian professional league. 8 1 An international merger of basketball would raise
many of the same issues that were cited in the Robertson case, particularly
the elimination of a potential market for professional basketball players.
An antitrust action by a competing league against the NBA for attempting to monopolize the basketball market would probably enjoy a
higher probability of success than in baseball. The simple explanation
again is the non-existence of an antitrust exemption for basketball.
It is also more likely that a legal action would be brought in a basketball context than in baseball. The success of the ABA in the 1960's
and early 1970's is a much more recent memory than competing baseball leagues of 75 years ago. The success of the "minor league" Continental Basketball Association lends some support to the proposition
that a competing basketball league could survive as opposed to a competing baseball league as well. 82 The limited size of NBA squads indicates that there may be a surplus of players adequate to form a league
that would attract fans.
Overall, the antitrust action by a competing league is more likely in
basketball than in baseball if there is a merger with a foreign entity.
5.

Hockey

When considering a merger, hockey is confronted with many of the
same issues as basketball. There is no special exemption regarding the
application of antitrust laws to the sport and similarly, rival leagues have
competed with the NHL. In the first year of competition between the
NHL and the World Hockey Association ("WHA"), the 1971-72 average
NHL salary was $24,000.83 One year later, the salaries nearly doubled
to $40,000.84 Following the merger, salaries only increased an average

85
of seven percent per year the first six years.
Without the existence of a competing league domestically, the international market has become an alternative for players in the NHL.
Although clearly not a perfect substitute for a domestic playing opportunity, the European alternative does provide some competition. In 1989,
particularly with the value of the U.S. dollar dipping, European teams
were even better able to compete with the NHL. At present, however,
the price competition does not appear to be as great as the NBA-European league scenario, and clearly not on par with the domestic league

81. See Thomas, Ferry Reportedly Forgoing Clippers to Play for a Team in Rome, N.Y. Times,

Aug. 2, 1989, at A17, col. 2.
82. See SPORTS INDUSTRY NEWS, 296 (Sept. 22, 1989) (citing discussion between the
NBA and leaders of amateur basketball regarding an international basketball league).
83. Noll supra note 7, at 47.

84. Id.
85. Id.
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price wars. 86 An action by a competing league would be quite similar to
87
the scenario, discussed earlier, which confronts the NBA.
An NBA player action against a league merger in basketball may
have the highest probability of success within the sports reviewed under
this model. Although the salaries are clearly higher domestically, the
European alternative is a viable alternative. Further, there is no possibility of an exemption being applied to basketball as in baseball.
B.

Model II: Expansion
1. Antitrust

Under this model there will not be a merger between two existing
leagues, instead, the growth of a league will be accomplished by placing
new franchises in foreign countries, a method commonly referred to as
expansion. This method of growth is likely to be subject to far less antitrust scrutiny than discussed in Model 1.88 Gradual growth brought
about by expansion is subject to far less scrutiny than the dramatic creation of an entity through a merger.
The league most illustrative of the possibilities under this model is
the NFL. The NFL has already expressed interest in developing a spring
football league which would include franchises in foreign countries, to
compliment its existing fall schedule.8 9 The general jurisdictional issues
of the applicability of antitrust laws discussed initially are relevant
here. 90 Assuming the NFL remains based in the United States,
franchises in foreign countries will "affect" commerce domestically.
A court would probably have to conclude that the placement of
franchises in a few foreign cities would not constitute monopolization of
the "world" market. A court, as did the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
in AFL v. NFL, would probably hold that even with the NFL's occupation
of a few foreign markets there are plenty of open markets for occupation
by a new league. 9 1 In fact courts would probably view the initial entry
into a city as a "natural monopoly."'9 2 In AFL v. NFL the court held that:
American [Football League] complains that National [Football
League], the first upon the scene, had occupied the more desirable of the thirty-one potential sites for team locations ...

the

86. U.S. and Canadian players tend to sign for the same or less than they would receive in the minor league American Hockey League or International Hockey League.
87. No copy.
88. Interestingly the argument raised most often regarding expansion is that not
enough takes place. See Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984) (an action arguing unsuccessfully that the NFL violated antitrust laws by not granting the city of Memphis, Tennessee an NFL franchise).
89. See supra note 2.
90. See infra note 92.
91. 323 F.2d 124, 130-31 (4th Cir. 1963).
92. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945),
where Judge Learned Hand defines a "natural monopoly" as "a market so limited that it is
impossible to produce at all and meet the cost of production except by a plant large
enough to supply the whole demand." Id. (Obviously the analogy is that a city, or in the
case of foreign markets, maybe a country, can only support one team).
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. enjoyed a natural monopoly does

noi occasion a violation of the antitrust laws unless the natural
monopoly power of those teams was misused to gain a competitive advantage for teams located in other cities, or for the
league as a whole. It frequently happens that a first competitor
in the field will acquire sites which a latecomer may think more
desirable than the remaining available sites, but the firstcomer
is not required to surrender any, or all, of its desirable sites to
the latecomer simply to enable the latecomer to compete more
effectively with it .... When one has acquired a natural monopoly by means which are neither exclusionary, unfair, nor preda93
tory, he is not disempowered to defend his position fairly.
This method of internationalization will probably not violate U.S. antitrust laws. Any case brought would not prevail so long as the expansion
methods are reasonable and there is no predatory intent. This clearly
differs from Model I where market competition is being instantly reduced by eliminating a market competitor.
The International Guidelines seem to confirm this view. They present a two pronged test to determine whether the Justice Department will
pursue an action for monopolization. First, the market share of the entity is examined, 94 as well as the concentration of the entity in the market and the probability of new entrants. If this analysis results in the
"dangerous probability" of creating or sustaining a monopoly, then the
second prong of the test is applied to observe whether the conduct
under scrutiny is predatory. 9 5
It appears that there must be some intent on the part of the international league to bring harm to another entity. 96 Creators of new leagues
have alleged, as well as the National Football League Players Association, that the intent of the NFL in creating its WLAF is to prevent the
development of another competing league. Indeed, one likely plaintiff
in this model would be an upstart league, which would argue that the
expanding league is monopolizing the world market. The failure of earlier leagues with similar arguments within domestic markets, however,
indicates the likely outcome of an international case.
Even more tenuous is the case for an athlete. Expansion does not
directly decrease competition for the athlete's services because, unlike a
merger, expansion generally does not negatively affect price competition and it simultaneously does increase the overall number of employment opportunities. A successful action by an athlete would have to
93. AFL, 323 F.2d at 131. Further the court noted that "[ilt is not unlike the choice a
chain store company makes when it selects a particular corner lot as the location of a new
store. It preempts that lot when it acquires it for that purpose, but, as long as there are
other desirable locations for similar stores in a much broader area, it cannot be said to
have monopolized the area, or, in a legal sense, the lt or its immediate vicinity." Id. at
130.
94. InternationalGuidelines, supra note 60, at 20,595-20,596.
95. Id. at 20,595.
96. Id.
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allege that the expansion prevented another league from forming that
would have created price competition.
C.

Model III: Formation of a new entity

The formation of a new entity, which has met with little success domestically, could avoid many of the legal pitfalls of the first two international league models. The creator of a completely new league could
form the entity with each potential antitrust issue in mind. There exists
enough sports league experience for international league developers to
avoid many of the start-up pitfalls.
One recently formed entity tried to take advantage of some of this
available experience. The sport of arena football was structured as a
corporation, with each team acting as a subsidiary. The goal of such a
structure is to, presumably, place all antitrust disputes between league
members squarely within the so-called Copperweld or "single entity" exemption. 9 7 This single entity argument maintains that it takes two entities to conspire or enter into an agreement to limit competition, and a
single entity cannot do that. That argument, from Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corporation,98 has unsuccessfully been asserted as a defense by a number of plaintiffs in sports litigation. 9 9 In Copperweld, the
issue was whether a parent corporation and its two subsidiaries, or two
sister corporations, could conspire under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court held that the parties were not capable of conspiring
because they were a single entity.
Although forming the league as a single entity theoretically eliminates conspiracy problems, there is still the possibility that the entity can
be found to be a monopoly. However, this is unlikely for a completely
new entity, since it is not clear how such a monopoly could be created by
an entity starting out with no market power at all. Detractors of the
applicability of the single entity defense to sports leagues argue that no
individual team could compete without its fellow league members. In
response to that query, Professor Goldman within a recent article asked
how have the Harlem Globetrotters managed to survive financially for
years without being members of a professional sports league.10 0 Their
special brand of "barnstorming" was at one point more popular than
the NBA and their games were used to boost attendance at NBA
0
games.1
The new entity would be the most difficult to develop but, if organ97. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
100. Although Professor Goldman's point is quite valuable, it does not address the
operation of a traditional sports league. A league by definition, contains member
franchises that compete against each other. Goldman, Sports Antitrust, and the Single Entity
Theory, 63 TUL. L. REV. 751 (1989).
101. See L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAW 127 (1977).
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ized properly it would be subject to the least amount of antitrust
scrutiny.
III.

POST FORMATION ISSUES

Once the international league is formed, whether by merger, expansion, or the creation of a new entity, all of the leagues will then be vulnerable to post formation antitrust issues. This section assumes the
existence of an international league, regardless of the manner of creation, and examines how two troublesome antitrust outcomes may vary
due to their international nature.
A.

InternationalFranchiseRelocations

Once the league is in operation, it may be confronted with an issue
that has dominated the 1980's - - unilateral franchise relocation. The
primary concern of league officials is the relocation of a franchise by an
owner without first obtaining league permission. The leading franchise
relocation case is Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Foot02

ball League. 1

Although it has not been tested in the courts, in general, a league
could probably ban an international relocation without consent. This
conclusion requires two assumptions. First, the decision not to allow a
franchise to relocate must be based on objective standards set forth in
league constitutions and by-laws as outlined in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission. The second assumption is that there is no existing
franchise in the city where the franchise relocates.10 3 The apparent rule
is that a move by a franchise to a city with an existing franchise increases
competition; the head-to-head competition between two franchises in
the same city which, according to the case law, is the type of competition
the Sherman Act desires to promote.' 0 4 In contrast, a move to a city
where there is no franchise would not increase competition and thus
courts would probably uphold a league action denying a relocation
request. 105
The one issue worth considering is how broadly an individual fran102. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
103. Id. This is presumed to be the case even though there was a relocation without
consent in the NFL and no antitrust action brought by the League. This was, however,
probably due to the unique circumstances of the case. The former Baltimore Colts move
to Indianapolis without NFL consent came on the heels of the multi-million dollar damage
award against the NFL in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381
(9th Cir. 1984). Ironically, Indianapolis is a city that did not have a NFL franchise and a
league action barring the relocation may not have been found by a court to be
anticompetitive.
104. Id. A primary issue in that case was the fact that there was already a franchise in
the metropolitan Los Angeles area.
105. This has not been tested. In the NFL the two most recent relocations, Baltimore
to Indianapolis and St. Louis to Phoenix occurred without League legal action. See Sneak
Play, TIME 71 (April 9, 1984) (Baltimore Colts' relocation to Baltimore); Eskenazi, N.F.L.
Votes to Approve Cardinals' Move fflest, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at B6, col. 3. (St. Louis
Cardinals' relocation to Phoenix).
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chisee's territory would be viewed. Initially, would there be a plan to
have only one team per country? And, if that is the case, for antitrust
analysis purposes, should a country be viewed as analogous to a city, or
does it merit different classification?
No court has formally approved the relocation rules of a professional sports league. One rationale for the league relocation rules is
that leagues know best where franchises should be located. Seemingly,
placement in the international markets would be that much more sensitive, so a league would have a greater interest or rationale for controlling international relocations. Thus, even if there is no franchise in the
foreign city where a team relocates, there is probably greater validity to
the league barring that relocation than exists in a domestic relocation
under similar circumstances.
B.

Player Movement

Athletes in all major sports are subject to, in varying degrees, involuntary "transfer" to another team. Most commonly this occurs through
trades, where a team exchanges a player, cash, draft picks, or some combination of these for the same from a franchise in the same league.
Some star players may have "no-trade" clauses in their contracts, however, most athletes do not.
Once an international league is established, issues regarding an athlete's right to determine where he plays expand as well. It is not difficult
to sympathize with a player's desire not to be traded from say, St. Louis
to Philadelphia, particularly when one considers the social, family, and
business attachments that may have been developed in the former city.
That sentiment increases that much more if the move to be considered is
one from St. Louis to Madrid, Spain.
The move from St. Louis to Philadelphia was the act that prompted
former Major League Baseball player Curt Flood to bring an antitrust
action against Major League Baseball in Flood v. Kuhn in 1972.106 Flood
lost and the domestic trade was allowed. Also present in that case was
the interpretation by the court of the labor exemption to the antitrust
laws. This exemption allows the athletes, through their players' union,
to agree to an act or restrictions on their rights that would otherwise
violate the antitrust laws. Through collective bargaining the athletes
may bargain away certain rights, including the right to have complete
freedom of movement or the right to negotiate freely with the team of
their choice.
In the international context, if a collective bargaining agreement is
not revised to reflect the international nature of a league, the players
may have an argument against any involuntary relocations such as
trades. It would seem that absent this specific consent by the players,
such a trade or reassignment by other means would exceed the agreement between the parties.
106.

407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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Another group that may have a particular concern are amateur athletes subject to the draft. Can an athlete be drafted by a team in a foreign country and required to play there if he does not desire to? The
answer is probably yes. The draft in professional football was found to
10 7
be a violation of the Sherman Act in Smith v. National Football League.
The NFL owners maintained that the draft provided a competitive balance, however, the court held that the NFL needed to use less restrictive
means to preserve its competitive balance. Thus, the court forbade the
NFL to have a sixteen round draft. However, following this decision the
National Football League Players' Association agreed to a twelve-round
draft in collective bargaining. That, via the labor exemption, caused the
draft to be "legalized." The collective bargaining process legalized the
draft in other leagues as well.
The unsuccessful challenge that college athletes eligible for the
draft have made, argues that they are not parties to the collective bargaining agreement while they are in college and, therefore, they should
not be bound by an otherwise illegal restraint negotiated in a collective
bargaining agreement. In Wood v. National Basketball Association this was
the argument Leon Wood, a recently drafted basketball player, made.' 0 8
Wood argued that he should be able to negotiate with any NBA
franchise, not just the one that drafted him. The court held that the
National Basketball Players Association inclusively represented his
rights. 109
Under the Wood ruling, if the respective players' union has agreed
to the international draft, newly drafted parties will be subject to negotiating solely with the team that drafts them. It does seem, however, that
Smith would certainly operate to the advantage of the newly drafted
player if there is not a collective bargaining agreement including the
international provisions. Before any internationalization, a league
would be wise to renegotiate relevant collective bargaining provisions
with its players' union.
CONCLUSION

The potential growth of American professional sports leagues into
international markets raises a number of intriguing issues. As has been
the case domestically, antitrust issues will probably continue to
predominate. Should the government decide not to pursue any potential antitrust violations, there is always the possibility that private entities
and individuals in the sports industry will. Historically, the government
has avoided extensive involvement.
With international growth, other existing problems in professional
leagues will have global implications as well, particularly labor issues
and the regulation of sports agents. All of these issues, including the
107. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
108. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
109. Id. at 963.
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antitrust issues, should be considered at length prior to the entry of professional sports leagues into the international market.
Although, from a legal standpoint, the creation of an entirely new
league would be the wisest route to avoid legal entanglements, it almost
certainly would not be the best business decision. History has clearly
illustrated that expansion or merger of existing leagues is the most successful route. The short life span of the United States Football League
illustrates this, as does the growth of the NFL after its merger with the
AFL and the growth of the NBA after its merger with the ABA. There is
no indication that adding an international aspect to a completely new
league would make it any more successful.

AN ACADEMIC GAME PLAN FOR REFORMING
BIG-TIME INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
RODNEY K. SMITH*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Between 1952 and 1985, thirty out of thirty-three institutions,

whose teams won national championships in Division I basketball during
that era, were placed on probation for violating rules of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA" or "Association").' Matters
have not improved much on this score in the 1980s, a decade during
which 57 of 106 Division I-A schools have been censured, sanctioned, or
put on probation at least once. 2 It is little wonder, therefore, that Richard D. Schultz, Executive Director of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, opened the 1990 NCAA Convention with a State of the Association speech calling for major reform in intercollegiate athletics and
indicating that, "[iut's time to develop a new model [for the governance
of intercollegiate athletics]." 3 Schultz concluded his remarks by calling
on the delegates to the 1990 Convention to "be prepared by the 1991
Convention to introduce and pass legislation that will effect major
reform.'"4

With repeated calls from many sources for major reform of bigtime, revenue-producing intercollegiate athletics, 5 the demand for significant change in the operation of athletics programs at the collegiate
level may be reaching a crescendo. A consensus clearly is developing in
support of such reform. 6 Nevertheless, questions remain as to the content of an acceptable reform package. There are those who assert that
the NCAA is institutionally incapable of initiating and maintaining the
momentum in reform necessary to rectify that which is wrong with bigtime intercollegiate athletics. 7 On the other hand, at the de minimis end
of the reform continuum, there are those who believe that it may be
* Dean, Capital University Law School, J.D. 1977, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
Brigham Young University; LL.M. 1982, University of Pennsylvania; S.J.D. 1987, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank my secretary, Linda Rodichok, for her help in
preparing the manuscript of this article.
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COMMITrEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, STUDENT ATHLETE RIGHT-TO-KNOW

ACT, S. REP. No. 209, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].

2. Lederman, Nearly Half the Members in Top Division of NCAA Citedfor Violations This
Decade, The Chron. of Higher Educ., Feb. 22, 1989, at A35, col. 3.
3. The NCAA News, Jan. 10, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
4. Id. at 6, col. 5.
5. This article will focus on the reform of big-time, revenue-producing intercollegiate athletics (typically, football programs at NCAA Division 1-A institutions and basketball
programs at Division I institutions).
6. See Lilley, Convention Seen As Beginning of Era of Reform, The NCAA News, Jan. 17,

1990, at I, col. I [hereinafter Era of Reform].
7. See, e.g., R. TELANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE: THE CORRUPTION OF COLLEGE
FOOTBALL AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO STOP IT (1989) [hereinafter TELANDER]. In that book
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possible to refine the NCAA regulatory system so that it can better respond to the acknowledged excesses of big-time intercollegiate athletics.
Those who argue that the NCAA is structurally incapable of responding in a meaningful manner to the excesses of big-time intercollegiate athletics often assert that such athletics have become overly
commercialized and are a part of an entertainment, as opposed to an
educational, enterprise. 8 For these advocates of major structural reform, the only viable reform strategies require the creation of an entirely
new system of governance for intercollegiate athletics. 9
On the other hand, those who advocate reform from within the
NCAA emphasize that the Association is seriously misunderstood and
that there is significant support within existing structures to support significant substantive reform.' 0 Advocates for this school of reform are
inclined to argue that there is a prevailing mood among regulators supporting integrity in intercollegiate athletics."I These proponents of reform through refinement of existing structures add that, while there are
differing views within the NCAA, there is nevertheless a sentiment that
Telander, a writer for SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, begins by contending that the NCAA "is built
on hypocrisy and exploitation," Id. at 21, and later bares his feelings:
[LIet me tell you how I feel on a very primitive, visceral level about the NCAA: I
hate it. There is, I must confess, something about an organization that employs a
lot of people whose duty is to govern others with whom they have almost nothing
in common that just pisses me off. I see the NCAA's leaders as a bunch of knownothing, self-righteous stuffed suits who are willing to do just enough labor to
keep the organization running forever. That's my prejudice, and having stated it,
let me now set it aside and explain without bias why the NCAA can never bring
integrity to [big-time intercollegiate football].
Id. at 196. His "nonbiased" critique of the NCAA concludes, "[tihe real function of the
NCAA is to promote a good image of itself, make money, and protect the status quo. No
doubt NCAA brass would squawk that such is not the case, that they remain ever vigilant
for fraud and corruption in the college game, but protecting their own butts is what it's
really all about." Id. at 197-98.
Unfortunately, while Telander's book is an interesting and sometimes disquieting accumulation of a series of anecdotes that describe particularly egregious excesses in bigtime football, he is unable to escape his "bias" and his book ultimately serves as little more
than a journalistic diatribe. As will be discussed in this article, neither his reform package,
which largely calls for the professionalization of big-time intercollegiate football, nor his
contempt for the NCAA are justified. Indeed, while the NCAA "brass" is not without
blemish, calls for reform by people like Richard Schultz, the Executive Director of the
NCAA, are far more thoughtful and realistic than those proffered by Telander. Furthermore, Telander's assertion that NCAA officials know nothing about intercollegiate athletics and have little in common with athletes is simply inaccurate. The NCAA makes a
concerted effort to recruit former athletes, who understand intercollegiate athletics, to
work within the Association.
8. Id. at 127. William Friday, former President of the University of North Carolina
System, has argued in a similar vein that, "Americans have turned sports into a religion.
What we're getting pretty close to doing is turning our universities into entertainment
centers." The NCAA News, Aug. 16, 1989, at 4, col. 2 (citing The Washington Post).
9. Even Richard Schultz, the Executive Director of the NCAA [hereinafter "Director
Schultz"], seems to agree that structural reform is in order. See T. Lilley, New Athletics
Model Needed, Schultz Tells Delegates, The NCAA News, Jan. 10, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
10. Bryce Jordan, President of Penn State University has argued that, "Up to this
point, the NCAA has not been able to get the job done." As quoted in T. Sheeran, Public
Wants College Sports Reform, Jordan Says, The NCAA News, Dec. 27, 1989, at 4, col. 2.
I1. David Berst, Assistant Executive Director for Enforcement of the NCAA, recently
noted that he detects "an enhanced integrity mood, an institutional control mood or atmosphere ....
I think that's what everyone's after." Id., col. 4.
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favors reform that will address the ills that currently plague intercollegi2
ate athletics. '
For my part, I contend in this article that reform must combine elements of arguments made by both schools. Structural changes are necessary. Any substantive reform efforts must be supported by structures
that are designed to strengthen the voice of those who support reforms
of an academic nature. Additionally, structural reforms must be accompanied by substantive reforms. In both structural and substantive areas,
the focus must be on academic values. Indeed, one of the major
problems with reform efforts to date is that they have lacked a coherent
and unified focus, a focus that must be centered on academic values. To
date, the NCAA has purported to rely on various purposes and principles in its efforts to govern intercollegiate athletics. 13 While the educational value is one of those principles, perhaps even the principal value
adhered to by the NCAA in its efforts to regulate big-time intercollegiate
athletics,1 4 the NCAA has never adequately focused its reform efforts on
that value. The NCAA has never had a coherent and unified game plan
based on academic values; rather, it has simply moved from play to play,
reform to reform, without any sense of unified academic purpose. The
NCAA has also lacked focus in its reform efforts because it has continued to adhere to values, such as amateurism, that have little to do with
the realities of big-time intercollegiate athletics.
In this article, therefore, after explicating the values the NCAA purports to adhere to in regulating intercollegiate athletics, I begin by arguing that the NCAA should jettison the amateurism principle, at least in
the governance of big-time, revenue-producing sports. By ceasing to
adhere to the amateurism value, the NCAA and others in a position to
influence the reform of intercollegiate athletics can assure that the reform focuses on academic values and can avoid the dissonance and disillusionment related to the sense that the NCAA is inherently suspect
because it indulges in hypocrisy when it asserts amateurism on the one
hand and signs a $1 billion television contract for televising big-time
basketball on the other hand. 15 In addition tojettisoning the amateurism value, the NCAA must create or refine governance structures that
12. Thus, Director Schultz reacted to the "successes" of the 1990 Convention by concluding that "there is now within the membership a very strong and urgent feeling that we
need some reform . . . that we need change. And I think what took place (during the
Convention) is a very positive step in that direction." Era of Reform, supra note 6.
13. See infra notes 16, 18, 19, and 46.

14. See infra notes 16, 18 and 19 and accompanying text.
15. Lederman, New Affluence Brings College Sports a Problem: How Widely to Spread $1-Billion TV Bonanza, The Chron. of Higher Educ., Dec. 6, 1989, at Al, col. 2 [hereinafter cited
as Lederman, TV Bonanza]. Big-time basketball, which was the source of that bonanza,

does not stand alone, however, as a significant commercial enterprise. In 1988, over
$500,000,000 in revenue was generated by 104 Division I-A institutions from gate, television and licensing receipts of big-time football. TELANDER, supra note 7, at 44. This commercialization of big-time football renders calls for amateurism on the part of studentathletes suspect. Questions as to why the athletes who generate those revenues should
remain un- or under-compensated will not be muted until amateurism notions are jettisoned for big-time, revenue-producing sports.
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will aid in the development of a unified package of reforms. The NCAA
needs an academic game plan, not a sporadic effort at piecemeal reform.
The NCAA should design a long-range plan. for reform based on academic values.
In Part II, I deal with the values that ought to underlie intercollegiate athletics and that ought to be central to major reform efforts. Part
III, in turn, examines the types of structural changes that should be implemented to enhance the capacity of those governing big-time intercollegiate athletics to focus on appropriate academic values. In Part IV, I
briefly examine two major substantive issues, whether academic values
could be furthered by holding a national championship in big-time football and whether [and if so, how] we should pay athletes involved in
major revenue-producing sports, in light of those same underlying academic values. Part V is my conclusion.
II.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE VALUES THAT OUGHT TO SERVE AS THE
FOUNDATION FOR BIG-TIME INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS

(AND THOSE THAT SHOULD NOT)

In Article 1 of the NCAA Constitution, the fundamental policy or
basic purpose of the Association is set forth:
The competitive athletics programs of member institutions are
designed to be a vital part of the educational system. A basic
purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing,
between intercollegiate athretain a clear line of demarcation
16
letics and professional sports.
Actually, this policy states two basic values or purposes: (1) the educational value, maintaining intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of
the educational program, and (2) the amateurism value, retaining a clear
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports. These two values or purposes may be complementary in some
instances, but, as will be argued in this article, they are separable. For
example, arnathletic event can be amateur in nature without being an
integral part of an educational program, and as I argue in the following
section, an athletic program may be commercialized without necessarily
compromising its role as an integral part of an educational enterprise.
Thirteen principles for the conduct of intercollegiate athletics by
members of the NCAA are delineated in Article 2 of the NCAA Constitution. Those principles can largely be grouped under either the educational value, the amateurism value, or the value of equal competition.
This third value of equal competition often is referred to as the need for
a "level playing field,"' 17 and is designed to ensure that no school is
16.

NCAA CONST. art. I, § 1.3.1, reprinted in NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N.

1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 1 (1989) [hereinafter NCAA

MANUAL].

17. Wilford Bailey has noted that many problems with the NCAA's legislative process
are attributable to "the widespread desire to achieve a perfectly flat playing field." Cited in
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given benefits that are not also made available under the NCAA rules to
other similarly situated institutions. In the following sections of Part II
of this article, I discuss these values and evaluate each of them to ascertain whether or not they should be foci for the reform of intercollegiate
athletics.
A.

The Educational Value

As previously noted, the educational value is set forth in Section
1.3.1 of Article 1 of the NCAA Constitution. Arguably, it receives further support and definition in Sections 2.2 and 2.4 of Article 2 of the
Constitution. Respectively, those provisions provide as follows:
2.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF STUDENT-ATHLETE WELFARE.
Intercollegiate athletics programs shall be conducted in a manthe physical and educaner designed to protect and enhance
18
tional welfare of student-athletes.
2.4 THE PRINCIPLE OF SOUND ACADEMIC STANDARDS. Intercollegiate athletics programs shall be maintained as a vital component of the educational program and student-athletes shall be
an integral part of the student body. The admission, academic
standing and academic progress of student-athletes shall be
consistent with the policies and standards adopted by the institution for the student body in general. 19
Together with Section 1.3.1 of Article 1, these sections make it clear that
the NCAA professes to adhere closely to academic or educational values
in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, including big-time, revenue-producing sports at the collegiate level. Most commentators favor
tying the regulation and reform of big-time intercollegiate athletics to
educational values or principles, 20 although some recent advocates of
major reform in intercollegiate athletics believe that big-time, commercialized athletics at the collegiate level cannot be tied to academic or
educational values. The skeptics, however, claim that in order to avoid
hypocrisy, institutions ought to recognize that their commercialized athletics programs cannot be effectively tied to pristine educational
2
values. '
NATIONAL

COLLEGIATE ATHLETE'S ASSOCIATION,

NCAA PRESIDENTS

COMMISSION THIRD

NATIONAL FORUM at 60 (1988) [hereinafter THIRD FORUM]). This value largely is set forth
in Art. 2, § 2.7 of the NCAA Constitution, supra note 16, at 4, which provides that:
The structure and programs of the Association and the activities of its members
shall promote opportunity for equity in competition to assure that individual student-athletes and institutions will not be prevented unfairly from achieving the
benefits inherent in participation in intercollegiate athletics.
18. Id. at 3.

19. Id.
20. Chancellor Oliva of New York University has written that:
Athletics have an eminently defensible educational role in higher education. If
you don't believe that, you're in trouble. If you can't justify the relationship between your institution and its athletic program on an educational basis, then you
might just as well make athletics a business enterprise.
Oliva, Do the Right ThingAbout Athletics, REPORTS, THE JOURNAL OF THE Assoc. OF Gov. BDS.
OF UNIVERSITIES AND

21. See, e.g.,

COLLEGES,July and August 1989, at 11-12 [hereinafter Oliva].

TELANDER,

supra note 7, at 217-18.
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Professor John Weistart recently opined that every suggested reform ought to be evaluated under the standard of whether "the particular reforms insure that they will help restore education as institutions'
primary foCUS?" ' 2 2 In doing so, he took the view that the educational
values ought to be central to questions of reform. In that same commentary, however, Professor Weistart evidenced some ambivalence with
regard to this position when he inquired as to whether or not it was
"sensible, or even-realistic, to link all pre-professional training in basketball and football to a four-year degree."'2 3 Actually, there is a certain
consistency to Professor Weistart's view, if one interprets education
broadly, to include other forms of technical training that might not necessarily lead to a four-year degree. Another alternative would be simply
to add a separate minor league of some sort in football and basketball
that was not connected to education. 24 By creating such a minor league,
that emphasized prowess in athletics and that had little or no relation to
formal education or the intercollegiate world, institutions with intercollegiate athletics programs could focus more easily on academic or educational values. This result would occur because the athletes who are
not interested in receiving a formal education would be removed from
their institutions, leaving only students who happen to want to participate in intercollegiate athletics while obtaining an education.
At any rate, even proponents of reforms that would divorce much of
big-time athletics from the academic world argue that they do so in order to strengthen educational values. Thus, significant unanimity remains among the disputants regarding the issue of maintaining
academic or educational values and standards in intercollegiate athletics. Nevertheless, little attention has been brought to bear on the issue
of what educational or academic values inhere directly or indirectly in
intercollegiate athletics. This unwillingness to focus on those issues in a
thoughtful way is exacerbated by the reaction of academics who assert
that big-time athletics is not a "critical ingredient" of the academic life
of the university. 25 Thus, whether as a matter of academic hostility to
athletics, 26 which may itself be based on some lingering class bias, 2 7 or
22.

Weistart, Serious Reform of Colege Sports Must Go Beyond Fine Tuning, The Chron. of

Higher Educ., Jan. 10, 1990, at A52, col. 3.
23. Id. at col. 1.
24. Id. Professor Weistart opts for such a view, as does Rick Telander in his critique
of college football. TELANDER, supra note 16 at 214. For my part, once intercollegiate
athletics is reformed to focus on educational values, I would leave the formation of such a
minor league to market forces. If there is a demand for such a league on the part of
athletes who are uninterested in receiving a formal education and there is a public demand
for the entertainment provided by those athletes, then such a league will no doubt be
formed.
25. A President of a major Big 10 football power recently ruminated that, "I don't
think athletics is even a critical ingredient at this university." The Columbus Dispatch,
Dec. 3, 1989, at IA, col. 3. Such a statement is a blend of naivete and possibly even academic hostility to athletics-a certain hope that by ignoring or isolating intercollegiate
athletics it might go away or responsibility for its operation might be placed on other
shoulders.
26. Richard Lipsky recognizes the existence of "academic hostility toward sports" and
asserts that:
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simply a lack of analytical focus due to inattention to detail, the interplay
between big-time athletics and education has been woefully under-scrutinized. For example, in two recent cases, the Kansas Supreme Court
held. that the NCAA was exempt from state taxes on the ground that the
NCAA was involved in education. 28 In exempting the NCAA on educational grounds, however, the court avoided any examination as to what
constitutes an educational or academic purpose. Indeed, the court simply exempted the NCAA on the ground that it was an association that
represented educational institutions in the operation of their intercollegiate athletics programs. The court never examined the NCAA's involvement in regulating intercollegiate athletics or intercollegiate
athletics itself to ascertain whether or not such athletics are educational
in nature, even though in National Collegiate Realty Corp. v. Johnson County
the court framed the issue as "whether the NCAA's use of the premises
is exclusively for educational purposes." 2 9 Later, in the text of that opinion, the court refrained the issue as "whether any activities in the use of
the property were not exclusively for educational or other exempt purposes. '"30 This framing of the issue should have led the court to inquire
as to whether or not intercollegiate athletics and the NCAA's involvement therein were "exclusively" educational in nature. However, the
court refrained from doing so by simply concluding with a holding that
is little more than an ipse dixit: "There is no serious contention that,
generally speaking, physical education and sports programs in universities
are not within proper 'educational purposes'."'' The court's very use of
the language "generally speaking" seems to indicate that the justices
were troubled by the fact that aspects of sports programs as well as the
NCAA's role in governing those programs may not directly relate to educational purposes. As such, it is hard to understand how, without more
analysis, the court could conclude that the NCAA used its property exclusively for educational purposes.
This superficial equivocation regarding the interplay between athletics and academics hinders efforts to reform intercollegiate athletics by
On many college campuses the football or basketball team carries more prestige
than any academic subject or academician. Historically, coaches and physical educators have struggled with professors and deans over the alleged overemphasis
of intercollegiate sports. Additionally, coaches often are anti-intellectual, which
strikes a responsive chord in the American public. Not to be outdone, intellectuals have exhibited an equally potent snobbery and disdain. As a result, the study
of sports has been left to physical educators, who have not examined its larger
political and social implications.
R. LIPsKY, How WE PLAY THE GAME 6 (1981) [hereinafter Lipsky].
27. The arts are the playground of the rich, and one seldom hears complaints that arts
are not educational and should not be part of the educational enterprise. Athletics are like
arts in significant respects - ballet in all its beauty is akin to the play of a Michael Jordan.
Athletics, however, are in some measure the playground of the poor and are often proclaimed to be uneducational or not a fit part of the educational enterprise. See infra note
32 and accompanying text, for a discussion related to athletics as an artistic endeavor.
28. NCAA v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 781 P.2d 726 (Kan. 1989); National Collegiate
Realty Corp. v. Johnson County, 690 P.2d 1366 (Kan. 1984).
29. 690 P.2d 1366, 1371 (1984).
30. Id.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
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conforming the athletics programs to clearly articulated educational values. As such, a very important part of any effort to assess reform proposals from an academic vantage point, or in terms of educational
values, preliminarily must deal with the issue of whether big-time intercollegiate athletics are educational or can be operated to further educational values.
Donna Lopiano, associate athletic director at the University of
Texas, has argued that:
Athletics, like music, art and drama is a performing art. The
athletic contest is no different than the theatre or the sym-"
phony, albeit the audience appears to be more rabid... Athletics and theatre must be, at their heart, laboratory settings
where the exceptionally talented student maximizes his or her
32
potential.
In her remarks, Lopiano added that, "[i]t is-only when we define athletics as an educational program very closely comparable to an academic
entity that we finally possess the litmus paper with which we can test the
legislative and other answers to problems in athletics, which have
evaded resolution for close to 80 years." ' 33 Thus, at least in one sense, it
can be argued that participation in athletics is comparable to participation in the orchestra or drama and can provide a litmus test for assessing
reform efforts. In this regard, it would also seem that big-time athletics
should be supported as part of the academic enterprise, because such
athletic opportunities give the athlete the opportunity to refine and develop his or her skill in the crucible of the best competition available.
However, despite the appeal of such an argument for those who would
argue that athletics are educational, it is not clear why such activities
must be performed before large, paying audiences or why activities such
as drama, dance and orchestra are themselves educational, thereby rendering athletics derivatively educational so long as athletics can be related to other performing arts.
In addition to arguments that participation in intercollegiate athletics is educational in nature, by analogizing such participation to the performing arts, it has been asserted that athletics is like research, and as
such should be considered an apt part of the academic enterprise at the
intercollegiate level. After arguing that service to society is an important aspect of the educational enterprise, Kenneth J. Weller of Central
College (Iowa) recently made an interesting argument to the effect that:
A pervasive and logical case can and should be made for athletics programs based on societal objectives. Like research, athletics can become somewhat autonomous in its organization
and can be financed from outside sources, and like research it
can and should be respected as an integral part of the mission
32.

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, SIXTH SPECIAL CONVENTION PRO-

CEEDINGS

72 (1987), cited in Smith, Reforming IntercollegiateAthletics: A Critique of the Presidents

Commission's Role in the NCAA"s Sixth Special Convention, 64 N. DAK. L. REV. 423, 450 (1988)

[hereinafter Smith, Sixth Special Convention].
33. Id.
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of an educational institution. 34
Thus, in addition to the assertion that participation in athletics is as
much a part of the educational enterprise as are drama, dance and other
performing arts, it can be argued that big-time athletics, like research,
play an important role in serving societal interests. In both instances,
however, I remain troubled that we still may be begging the question by
merely arguing that by analogy to other practices that are accepted to be
a part of the educational enterprise, athletics should be declared to be
an apt part of the collegiate academic enterprise. Those other practices
- performing arts and research - must themselves be tied to some
educational theory, and then athletics could be assessed in light of that
theory, not only by analogy to the practices that purportedly comply
with the underlying theory. Furthermore, stating that athletics, like research, perform a service function, without further explication of the nature of that service is to indulge in incomplete analysis. One must
examine the nature of the service arising out of big-time intercollegiate
athletics in order to support athletics as academics on such grounds.
President Gordon Gee of the University of Colorado recently argued for a third sense in which athletics can be considered to be an
integral part of the educational enterprise. He noted that, "[c]ollegiate
athletic competition had its origins in the Greek ideal of education.
Apart from intellectual and aesthetic development, physical education
and competition were essential to molding character. ' '3 5 Others have
made similar arguments. Chancellor L. Jay Oliva of New York University has opined that athletics can be justified on educational grounds
because athletic participation develops character by teaching the athlete
to learn to work with other people and to put his or her ego on the line
in support of a perceived worthy objective. 36 Coach Bo Schembechler
of Michigan is perhaps a bit more crass when he asserts that participa37
tion in athletics teaches the participant the importance of winning.
Big-time intercollegiate athletics may support the educational enterprise in other direct ways. Allen Guttman has noted that, "[i]n sport
we can discover the euphoric sense of wholeness, autonomy, and potency which is often denied us in the dreary rounds of routinized work
'3 8
that are the fate of most men and women."
In a similar vein, Richard Lipsky writes that sport is a microcosm of
34. THIRD FORUM, supra note 17, at 36.
35. See Gee, A College Superbowl: The Ultimate Sellout, N.Y. Times,Jan. 1, 1990, at 19, col.
2. One wonders, however, whether sports does as much to build characters (see, e.g., Brian
Bosworth,Jim McMahon, etc.) as it does to build character. Nevertheless, even the building of characters may in some sense promote creativity in expression and may be tenuously tied to educational values.
36. Oliva, supra note 20, at 12.
37. See Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32, at 444, where Schembechler is
quoted as saying that, "it is important to win. That is the American Way." Indeed, while I
use the term "crass" to depict Schembechler's view, it nevertheless may be true that instilling a winning spirit, or the desire for achievement directed to victory, may be a characterbuilding endeavor and may have a place in our educational system.
38. A. GUTrMAN, FROM RITUAL TO RECORD: THE NATURE OF MODERN SPORTS 157
(1978) [hereinafter Guttman].
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life that is "rich [with] symbolism and dramatic structure," 39 and that as
such it "contrasts sharply with a world of widespread alienation, a world
in which people long for close individual and communal ties to overcome the impersonality and coldness of American life." ' 40 Lipsky adds
that, "[t]he Sportsworld becomes a cultic movement that compensates
for the deficiencies of the world surrounding it." ' 4 1 As such, intercollegiate athletics may perform a dual function of creating a healthy diversion for students 4 2 and a sense of community that ties students ever
closer to the educational enterprise and to one another. 43 This is
equally true presumably with alumni and others who are in some way
tied to a given institution.
As each of the preceding arguments for the tie between athletics
and the educational enterprise indicate, it can be argued with some force
that athletics is and should be an integral part of collegiate education.
Of course, one need not examine each of the preceding arguments
closely to discern that the relationship is delicate and must be viewed

circumspectly or at least analytically -

asking whether a particular as-

pect of intercollegiate athletics in fact furthers or is closely related or
fitted to the types of educational interests asserted. Relatedly, questions
must be raised on the micro, individual student-athlete, level as well as
on the macro level which deals with the relationship between athletics
generally and the institution. In this regard, one commentator has
stated that, "[riecognizing that a university owes some form of reciprocal commitment to its student-athletes necessitates an inquiry into the
nature and extent of this commitment. This commitment is typically
termed the University's 'duty' to educate its student-athletes. ' 4 4 Thus,
not only must the relationship between big-time athletics and academia
be clear, but the institution must also fulfill its educational obligation to
39.

LIPsKY, supra note 26, at 10.

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. I use the term "healthy" intentionally, because it is my sense that at times we may
become so immersed in athletics that it becomes more like a religion and an end in itself
rather than a diversion. In her thoughtful article, Professor Rush agrees, noting that college athletics has become "almost religious in nature .... " Rush, Touchdowns, Toddlers and
Taboos, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 549, 560 (1989) [hereinafter Rush]. By focusing on the academic
value of sport as a diversion, however, attention can be drawn to the excesses of such a
view and care can be taken to avoid transforming athletics from a diversion to a drug that
becomes an end in itself that overwhelms the remainder of reality.
43. Ernest Boyer has been quoted as making this point:
Big-time sport, collegiate and professional, is becoming the new civil authority in
our culture. It draws the pride and unifies the community the same way great
cathedrals did in earlier times. Today, successful coaches have an importance
that would rival that of priests and bishops of the church.
Boyer in R. LAPCHICK AND J. SLAUGHTER, THE RULES OF THE GAME: ETHICS IN COLLEGE
SPORT Xi (1989) [hereinafter LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER]. Again, of course, concern must
be directed to assuring that the sense of community created by big-time sport does not
become a substitute for other forms of social and political community.
44. Dixon, Achieving Educational Opportunity Through Freshmen Ineligibilityand Coaching Selection: Key Elements in the NCAA Battle for Academic Integrity of IntercollegiateAthletics, 14 J.C. &
U.L. 383, 385 (1987). See also Jennings and Zioiko, Student-Athletes, Athlete Agents and Five
Year Eligibility: An Environment of ContractualInterference, Trade Restraint and High-Stake Payments, 66 U. DET. L. REV. 179, 216 (1989).
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the student-athlete. Indeed, this second requirement, to the effect that
the educational institution must act in a manner that meets the educational interests of the student-athlete, may be more significant in evaluating individual reforms taken in conjunction with the governance and
operation of the athletics program than is the requirement that athletics
have some direct tie to macro educational values.
Care must be taken to protect both the micro interests of the student-athlete and the macro interests of the educational institution itself
in analyzing any reform package demonstrated by the interplay between
Section 2.2 of Article II of the NCAA Constitution, calling for the protection of the physical and educational welfare of student-athletes, and
Section 2.4, requiring that intercollegiate athletic programs be maintained "as a vital component of the educational program." For the sake
of its own institutional integrity, an institution must evaluate the role
that athletics plays at the institution generally. Additionally, for the sake
of its ethical and educational duty to its individual students, the institution and other entities involved in governing intercollegiate athletics
must be attentive to the educational needs of the student-athletes. Indeed, care must be taken to ensure that structural and substantive reforms address the need to protect the student-athlete's interests,
particularly given the student-athlete's relative lack of power in the decisionmaking process related to the governance of intercollegiate athletics. 4 5 Much of this article, therefore, will focus on the impact of various

reform proposals, both as a structural and as a substantive matter, on
the student-athlete, thus confirming the need to emphasize the educational value as it relates to the individual student-athlete.
As such, I assert that every reform package, my own included, must
be evaluated to ascertain whether or not it directly furthers educational
purposes both at the institutional and the student-athlete levels. If those
questions are not raised and analyzed, then decisions will necessarily be
suspect. Indeed, as I assert throughout this article, one of the major
problems with the governance of intercollegiate athletics is that clearcut thoughtful articulation of the underlying values supporting big-time
intercollegiate athletics, and the evaluation of the relationship between
those values and particular actions, is too often non-existent or post hoc,
occurring at the time that decisions are made rather than at the time that
reforms are formulated. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated in Parts
III and IV of this article, such an analysis is immensely helpful in evaluating the current status of intercollegiate athletics and the reforms offered to deal with existing maladies.
Having concluded that there is both a direct or macro and indirect
or micro relationship between intercollegiate athletics and educational
45. See Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association's Death Penalty: How Educators
Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 1050-57 (1987) [hereinafter Smith, Death
Penalty ], for a discussion of the need for more attention to the interests of student-athletes

and for a delineation of a series of reform proposals to provide greater recognition for the
student-athletes' interests in the governance of big-time intercollegiate athletics.
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values adhered to by colleges and universities, in the remainder of this
section, I will explore whether other asserted governance values or principles are also helpful.
B.

The Amateurism Value

As previously noted, both Sections 1.3.1 and 2.6 of Articles I and II,
respectively, of the NCAA Constitution require that attention be given
to the principle of amateurism, in evaluating NCAA regulations. In particular, Section 2.6 provides that, "[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs
in an intercollegiate sport ....

Student participation in intercollegiate

from
athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected
46
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises."
There is less consensus among commentators regarding the utility
of the amateurism value, particularly as it relates to the heavily commercialized, revenue-producing sports of Division I-A football and Division
I basketball that largely make up big-time intercollegiate athletics. For
example, in his recent book assailing big-time intercollegiate football,
47
Rick Telander argued that the concept of amateurism is "corrupt."
Relatedly, it has been argued that it is questionable to assert that student-athletes should be protected "from exploitation by ... commercial
enterprises" when the NCAA has just signed a $1 billion television contract for big-time basketball. 4 8 Nevertheless, it remains conceivable that
amateurism may nevertheless be defended, as it relates to the role of the
student-athlete, despite the fact that Division I institutions are on a commercial fast-track. As was the case with academic or educational values,
the interests of the student-athlete might be separated from those of the
institution. As such, amateurism might need to retain some vitality to
protect the student-athlete from exploitation, but not necessarily to
eliminate all commercialization of intercollegiate athletics.
It does not take great insight to recognize that assertion of the amateurism value has a certain self-serving allure for the institution, in that
it might justify institutional refusals to share the income generated from
such athletic events with the athlete who helped to earn it. 4 9 However,
even before assailing the amateurism value on the ground that it is selfserving, it would be worthwhile to examine the value itself as it relates to
big-time athletics in the intercollegiate context. To begin with, like "education," amateurism is difficult to define. Professor Ronald Smith has
pointed out that we have never come up with "a successful, workable
definition of amateurism." '50 In fact, if amateurism means that an athlete does not receive anything of economic value for his or her participation in intercollegiate athletics, 5 1 it is recognized more in the breach
46. NCAA CONST. art. II, § 2.6, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 4.
47. TELANDER, supra note 7, at 48.

48. In such circumstances, Telander refers to nonpayment of athletes as "a form of
modern day slavery." Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 50, (citing R. SMITH, SPORTS AND FREEDOM (1988)).

51. An "amateur" has been defined as, "one who engages in an art, science, or sport
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than in reality in both Divisions I and II, because athletes receive scholarships for their participation in many intercollegiate sports at those
levels.
Athletic scholarships, which can be worth more than $10,000 per
year, can hardly-be said to be a non-economic benefit to their recipient.
Pure amateurism would seemingly require that a student not receive
anything of economic value for his or her participation in intercollegiate
athletics. That is why Professor Susan Rush has noted that today we
have "scholarship amateurism" as opposed to "pure amateurism" in
big-time intercollegiate athletics. Nevertheless, Professor Rush goes on,
correctly I believe, to note that the movement from "scholarship amateurism" to "pure professionalism" would be a bold and, perhaps, un52
warranted step.
Actually, the matter of economic value received by the student-athlete for his or her participation in intercollegiate athletics goes well beyond the issue of the receipt of a scholarship. Student-athletes involved
in big-time intercollegiate athletics receive many other benefits of economic value as well, including: access to academic support; room and
board, which are often grouped with tuition in descriptions of scholarship aid; and other tangible benefits including access to training personnel and equipment and related perquisites. Thus, it is clear that
student-athletes do receive substantial economic benefits. 53 Nevertheless, can it be said that some vestige of amateurism ought to remain, as a
litmus test in evaluating regulatory and related reform of big-time intercollegiate athletics?
For a number of reasons, I do not believe that amateurism should
continue to be a significant litmus test, except where it can be asserted
to protect a student-athlete from actual exploitation. First, amateurism
in big-time intercollegiate athletics is anachronistic and may even be reflective of some class bias. 54 It is at best anachronistic and clearly is
hypocritical because institutions are generating substantial revenues
from their major athletic programs and because intercollegiate athletics
have been prone to some degree of professionalism from their very inception. 55 Athletes have been paid; sometimes quite well. 5 6 However,
at least with the rise of the NCAA and its professed allegiance to amateurism, payments beyond those enumerated in the preceding parafor enjoyment rather than money," WEBSTER'S II,NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY, OFFICE
EDITION at 24 (1984).
52. Rush, supra note 42, at 581.

53. See infra notes 306-15 and accompanying text, for a discussion of how studentathletes are "paid" for participating in college sports.
54. See, e.g., Rush, supra note 42, at 552, where Professor Rush argues that amateurism
reflects a "split between social classes," with only the middle and upper-middle classes
being able to afford to be amateurs. As such, it may be anachronistic, in that it is a throwback to an era when only the leisure classes had the time and wherewithal and were permitted to participate in athletics. See also TELANDER, supra note 7, at 49. For his part,
Telander argues that even ancient amateurism is little more than a myth.
55. See Smith, Death Penalty supra note 45, at 987-91.

56. Id. at 989.
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graph have been forced underground or under the table. Nevertheless,
as institutions reap revenues from their big-time sports events, and in
light of the fact that athletes in those sports often come from lower
socio-economic classes, 57 the very appearance of impropriety ought to
be of concern to academic institutions. Relatedly, as Professor Rush has
pointed out, amateurism reflects a "split between social classes," in that
the middle and upper-classes can afford to be amateurs, while the lowerclasses socio-economically can ill-afford such a luxury. 58 Also, it is
troublesome that amateurism may be used as a prop to maintain the
current state of affairs, under which funds are generated by revenueproducing sports, which have a large percentage of minority participants
in their ranks, both racially and economically, and are used by the institution to fund other operations, athletic and non-athletic alike. For example, dollars are often taken from the funds generated by a big-time
football or basketball program to fund "minor" sports, such as swimming, tennis, and other sports that tend to have participants who often
are from other social classes. In a sense, institutions take from the poor
and give to the rich. 59 The same is true to some degree when a revenueproducing sport generates funds that are used elsewhere in the university. Certainly, the minority athlete gets to share in the benefits that
come from such revenue-sharing, but that benefit is indirect and is diluted by the fact that more students from nonminority classes are able to
benefit from such gifts than are minorities at the typical university,
where nonminorities outnumber minorities significantly. Dollars generated by revenue-producing sports should be directed to academic purposes that support the student-athletes who participate in those sports.
To do otherwise may be to engage in subtle, unintended racism and
classism. Of course, one might argue that the funds should go, in part,
to women's athletics, to rectify inequities in funding for women's athletics and Title IX may require as much. However, I would maintain that it
would not be inequitable to have all scholarships for participants in nonrevenue-producing sports be need-based.
In addition to being hypocritical, anachronistic and perhaps even
biased, the invocation of amateurism as a value critical to the operation
of big-time intercollegiate athletics, may inhibit the necessary focus on
the educational value. Indeed, amateurism seems to be of utility only to
the extent that it furthers educational or academic values. The value of
amateurism as a principle related to the governance of big-time intercollegiate athletics seems to be related to its capacity to focus on exploitation that may result from too much attention to economic and
commercial matters and too little attention to educational ones. As
such, nothing would be lost by focusing solely on the educational value
and jettisoning the amateurism value, as applied to big-time intercollegi57. See, e.g., R. Lapchick, Race on the College Campus, in

LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER,

supra

note 43, at 63-68.
58. Rush, supra note 42, at 552.

59. This is precisely what minorities and lower economic classes believe to be happening. See LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 79-82.
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ate athletics. In fact, much might be gained. In particular, enforcing
amateurism values may detract from the educational benefits made available to the student-athlete. I make a version of this argument when I
assert that athletes should be paid, but that pay should be focused on
educational benefits, directly related to the needs of student-athletes
who participate in time-consuming, revenue-generating athletics.
Finally, in a related sense, by focusing on the academic needs of
student-athletes involved in prominent sports, rather than amateurism,
savings might be generated in other areas, including the savings gained
by eliminating non-need-based scholarships for minor sports. 60 Indeed,
amateurism may have some utility at that level, because if the assertion
that there is subtle class bias in the amateurism value applied across the
board, to revenue-producing and non-revenue-producing sports, is accurate, then it might be applied to non-revenue-producing sports in an
even purer form without raising objections of class bias. In other words,
sports like swimming and tennis, which are largely non-revenue-producing and whose participants often come from middle and upper-income
groups, could be made purely amateur, with scholarships granted only
on the basis of need, and the savings generated could be directed to
assistance in the form of academic support for the student-athletes involved in revenue-producing sports.
All of the preceding arguments indicate that it would be appropriate to jettison the amateurism value, as it applies to big-time revenueproducing sports, while retaining it as to other sports; perhaps, so long
as the focus remains on academic or educational values, both at the institutional and the individual student-athlete levels. As such, when one
considers the reform of big-time intercollegiate athletics, amateurism is
of little help and may, in fact, constitute a detriment.
C.

The Principle of Competitive Equity

The principle of competitive equity provides that, "[t]he structure
and programs of the Association and the activities of its members shall
promote opportunity for equity in competition to assure that individual
student-athletes and institutions will not be prevented unfairly from
achieving the benefits inherent in participation in intercollegiate athletics."' 6 1 Additionally, this principle is further defined in Article II Section
2.13 of the NCAA Constitution which provides that, "[ijntercollegiate
athletics programs shall be administered in keeping with prudent management and fiscal practices to assure the financial stability necessary for
providing student-athletes with adequate opportunities for athletics
62
competition as an integral part of a quality educational experience."
60. It has been noted that the "major types of [athletic] expenses classified by object
are grants-in-aid."

M. RAIBORN, REVENUES AND EXPENSES OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
PROBLEMS: ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL T RENDS AND RELATIONSHIPS 1981-85 42 (1986). Since

grants-in-aid are a major expense, eliminating all aid other than need-based aid in minor
sports would generate substantial savings.
61. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 4.

62. Id. at 5.
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Like amateurism, the principle of competitive equity can and should be
subsumed in the academic value.
In its efforts to maintain competitive equity and contain costs, the
NCAA arguably may violate antitrust law. It was on such grounds that
the NCAA was held to violate antitrust law in its exercise of control over
the televising of intercollegiate football. 63 In its efforts to maintain a
level playing field, so the argument would seem to go, the NCAA inhibits competition on the part of those who are more effective and efficient
in developing and packaging their big-time athletics programs.
In questioning such reasoning, Professor Grauer recently contended that:
Because sports league members operate in the broad entertainment market, they are forced to produce an entertainment product that can compete successfully for consumers'
limited leisure time funds. The most effective and competitive
product that sports league members can produce is a series of
competitions among relatively evenly balanced teams, leading
to a championship. Thus, the product that the league members
produce in concert is not simply a unique product that each
league member could not produce on its own; it is also a necessary product for the league members to be able to compete effectively and efficiently for the limited leisure time dollars of
consumers in the broad entertainment market. Because the
production of this product enables the league members to compete effectively and efficiently, the cooperation needed to produce this product must be deemed efficiency enhancing.
Therefore, this cooperation cannot be anticompetitive in the
consumer welfare sense and should be deemed the internal cooperation of a single entity. 64
However, while Professor Grauer makes a substantial argument for why
the NCAA does not necessarily engage in an antitrust violation when it
organizes a championship or otherwise tries to further its level playing
field and cost-containment values, he understandably does not deal with
the issue of whether or not such values should constitute litmus tests in
evaluating and promulgating rules and regulations to govern big-time
intercollegiate athletics. Nevertheless, Professor Grauer's treatment of
the issue highlights the fact that such values are important insofar as
they enhance efficiency and cost savings among members and also
seems to intimate that those values are inherently secondary in nature.
Both efficiency and cost-containment are secondary values, in that one
must always ask why efficiency and/or cost-containment are important.
It is important to save money, but the real importance of such saving
relates to what the money saved will be used to produce or acquire. In
63. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (in which the
College Football Association successfully challenged the NCAA's control over television
broadcasting of big-time collegiate football on antitrust grounds).
64. Grauer, The Use and Misuse of the Terms "Consumer Welfare'" Once More to the Mat on
the Issue of Single Entity Statusfor Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 TUL. L.
REv. 71, 99 (1989).
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Section 2.13, of its Constitution, the NCAA seemingly recognizes this
when it asserts that such fiscal and related cost-containment practices
are necessary to provide "student-athletes with adequate opportunities
for athletics competition as an integral part of a quality educational experience." Efficiency and cost-containment are important to further the
educational value, both in terms of athletic participation as an educational value in itself and in terms of the indirect benefits accruing to the
student-athlete from the efficient operation of intercollegiate athletics.
As such, the primary focus should remain on academic or educational
values; efficiency and cost-containment should not be permitted to become ultimate ends in themselves. If they were to become ends in themselves, they might be used to temper or dilute the educational value,
particularly as it relates to student-athletes involved in big-time intercollegiate athletics. For example, it is conceivable that it might be argued
that funds could be saved by cutting academic services to the studentathletes involved in big-time intercollegiate athletics. It would not be
enough that cost savings or efficiency ensued; it would also be necessary
to inquire whether such savings unduly inhibit educational values.
D.

Summary

In this Part of my article, I have argued that the educational value,
both institutionally and as applied to the particular student-athletes involved in big-time intercollegiate athletics, should be retained and
should become the focal point of all efforts to reform the regulation of
intercollegiate athletics. Other values espoused by the NCAA, including
amateurism, efficiency and cost-containment, are at best secondary, in
that they should be used to enhance the educational value, as related to
big-time intercollegiate athletics. When those values become ends in
themselves, however, they may actually be invoked in a manner detrimental to academic values.
In the remaining sections of this article, I will seek to apply my conclusion that academic matters can and should be used as the primary
litmus test in evaluating reform efforts related to the regulation of bigtime intercollegiate athletics. In Part III, I examine structural reforms
that would further educational or academic values. In turn, Part IV contains an analysis focused on academic values of two major substantive

proposals that are being discussed at this time in light of academic values. The analysis in each of those parts of this article demonstrate that
vitality can be given to the educational value, in a manner that leads to
some surprising conclusions.

III.

REFORMING BIG-TiME INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS THROUGH
FOCUSING ON EDUCATIONAL VALUES: SOME STRUCTURAL
REFORMS

Professor Weistart recently indicated that most proponents of re-

form in big-time intercollegiate athletics advocate a refinement of the
current system, a refinement that focuses on creating new rules to deal
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with old problems. 65 He added that it will not be enough to refine the
current system, unless such refinement is accompanied by "structural"
reforms, such as reforms in the institutional makeup of the NCAA governance system. 6 6 I agree that structural changes must accompany substantive reforms in order to address the problems that appear to inhere
in big-time intercollegiate athletics. Indeed, one of the major problems
with the nature of most proffered reforms is that they are piecemeal in
nature - they address a single problem or related set of problems without recognizing that to tinker with a single problem may simply result in
similar difficulties arising in other areas. For example, increasing the
penalties for violating NCAA rules may increase the risk to one who
would "cheat" to win, and may decrease the relative number of coaches
willing to take that risk, but it may also increase the benefits to those
who are able to "cheat" surreptitiously or who believe that they can or
must do so to win. Similarly, making freshmen ineligible for athletics
competition may help further the academic value,6 7 but standing alone,
it cannot insure that more student-athletes will make significant academic progress and ultimately graduate with an education. Issues of
punishment, eligibility and academic progress, among others, are interdependent or polycentric in a reform sense. Structural and substantive
changes, therefore, must come in packages; packages that are designed
as coherent efforts to further the educational or academic values that
must be at the core of the operation of intercollegiate athletics
programs.
In this section, therefore, I will examine structural suggestions that
will further academic values. However, those structural changes can
only be of significance when they are coupled with substantive changes
that, together with the structural changes, focus on educational values.
A.

Structural Reforms Within the NCAA

The NCAA is often maligned and misunderstood. In his book regarding intercollegiate football, Rick Telander expresses his contempt
for the NCAA and asserts, with only anecdotal support, that those involved in the NCAA "know nothing."'6 8 Whether Telander is expressing
his real view or merely is indulging in journalistic license or exaggeration to make his point that big-time intercollegiate football is in serious
need of reform, his position belies a certain misunderstanding regarding
the operation of the NCAA. The NCAA simply is an association of
schools involved in intercollegiate athletics at various levels. The
schools send delegates to conventions, where those delegates vote on
issues related to the governance of intercollegiate athletics among the
65. Weistart, supra note 22.
66. Id.
67. 1 say "may" because there is evidence that indicates studenit-athletes perform better in an academic sense during the playing season, when they actually are participating in
Whose Interests Are Served, The NCAA
athletic competition, See Slatton, Freshman neligibility:
News, Nov. 6, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
68, IELANDER, supra note 7, at 196.
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membership. As such, the NCAA is not an evil behemoth, but is merely
reflective of the views of its membership as evidenced in the NCAA's
legislative process.
For his part, Professor Brody has argued that the NCAA is inherently suspect because it facilitates the operation of what he refers to as
the "association syndrome" which he defines as, "the ability of a group
[like the NCAA] to hold values that no single member of the group has
or, at least, would admit to having. .

.

. Under the 'association syn-

drome' the sum is not greater than the parts; it is different from any of the
parts." 6 9 If Professor Brody is correct, then the NCAA might well be an
entity deserving of vilification, because it would provide its members
with a structure that is somehow inherently bad or is peculiarly susceptible to being used by those who would impose their tainted view on other
unwitting participants in the NCAA governance process. However, as I
have argued elsewhere at some length, 70 the NCAA membership might
use the "association syndrome" to aid in the collective promotion of
values, such as academic integrity, in the operation of their athletic programs that could not be promoted on their individual campuses for
political reasons. On many campuses, powerful groups, including
alumni, boosters, trustees, legislators and others committed to a "winat-all-costs" athletics philosophy, pressure the President and others to
bend to their will. Indeed, that is just what happened at Southern Methodist University (SMU) throughout the 1970's and much of the 1980's,
when athletics personnel engaged in wanton violation of the NCAA
rules to satisfy the almost insatiable desire of certain institutionally powerful groups for victories on the playing field. 7 1 Collectively, in the
open forum provided by the NCAA, those committed to furthering academic values could do so, with less threat of retribution than might be
felt on their individual campuses, if they only would exert the will to do
so. As such, the NCAA might provide just the kind of forum or climate
"in which college presidents can work for change without fearing for
their jobs."'7 2 If this is the case, as I believe it is, the presidents need
only exercise their "will", assuming they have one. 73 At any rate, it
seems clear to me that at most the so-called "association syndrome" is
neutral, in that those interested in meaningful reform may use it if they
have the will to do so or they simply may defer to those who would use
the system for more pernicious, less academic, purposes.
For my part, I would assert that the NCAA is unfairly maligned on
the facts, as well. Admittedly, the NCAA's record of reform is hardly
69. Brody, NCAA Rules and Their Enforcement: Not Spare the Rod and Spoil the Child Rather Switch the Values and Spare the Sport, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 109, 110 n. 5.
70. Smith, Death Penalty, supia note 45, at 996-98.

71.

THE COMMITTEE OF BISHOPS, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SOUTHERN

METHODIST UNIVERSITY (June 19, 1987) [hereinafter SMU REPORTI.

72.

Lederman, !lesburgh and Friday to tHead Knight Panel on Reforning Sports, The Chron.

of Higher Educ., Oct. 4, 1989, at Al, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Lederman. Panel].

73. As President Friday puts it, "[wle must develop the political will among the academic leadership to address these problems and do something about them .
i..."
Id.
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unblemished, particularly insofar as inaction is concerned. 74 Nevertheless, the NCAA has engaged in some meaningful efforts, preparatory
and otherwise, that could lead to significant structural and substantive
reform. For example, while Senator Bradley has asserted that the NCAA
has done "too little, too late" with regard to disclosing graduation rates,
it should be noted that the NCAA actually initiated efforts to accumulate
and ultimately disclose graduation rates. 75 Thus, it was the NCAA, and
not Senator Bradley, that spawned the idea of accumulating and disclosing graduation rates. The NCAA has initiated studies and has taken action in other areas as well. 76 In particular, the NCAA has initiated or
completed formal studies at both the institutional (e.g., institutional self,
studies 7 7 ) and the national (e.g., the study regarding student-athletes in
the academic environment 78 ) levels. With those studies, as will be discussed throughout the remainder of this article, the NCAA has the beginning of a data base from which to evaluate and promulgate reforms.
Indeed, I believe that the latter-half of the 1980's might well be referred
to as the era of preparation of reform. 79 With the data currently available (and that soon to become available) 80 regarding the academic aspects of intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA is poised to exercise its will,
if it has one, in reforming intercollegiate athletics. A death knell for the
NCAA might be in order if it fails to engage in meaningful reform during the next few years, but it would be premature to commence a dirge
at this time. Indeed, as will be discussed, there are some indications that
the NCAA is mustering both the data and the concerted will necessary to
initiate a game plan of reform.
If the members of the NCAA can muster the needed will, significant
reform will be possible, both structurally and substantively. The following structural reforms should be considered in exercising that will.
1.

Accrediting Intercollegiate Athletics

As early as 1982, an independent Select Committee on Athletic
Problems and Concerns in Higher Education, established by the NCAA,
recommended "a comprehensive audit and certification program in intercollegiate athletics in order to bring 'sunshine' to athletics pro74. In the words of Senator Bradley, the NCAA often does "too little, too late." The
Chron. of Higher Educ., Sept. 20, 1989, at Al. col. 2.

75. NCAA,

REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITrEE ON ATHLETIC PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS

IN HIGHER EDUCATION, at 11 (1983) [hereinafter 1982 REPORT].
76. See, e.g., Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1050-57 for a discussion of some of
the major reform initiated in 1985.
77. Id. at 1006-08.
78. See The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 12, col. 1.for an indepth discussion of the
NCAA Forum regarding the major, independent research project commissioned by the
NCAA regarding student-athletes.
79. The 1990 Convention has been called by some the beginning of the era of reform.
The NCAA News,Jan. 17, 1990, at 1,col. 1. If this is so, as only time will tell, the second
half of the 1980's might well be deemed the era of preparation for reform.
80. For example. the NCAA study regarding restructuring of the governance system is
to be delivered to the Council sometime during 1990. The NCAA News, Oct. 30, 1989, at

1,col. 1.
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grams. ' '81 Since that time there have been some preliminary steps taken
toward the creation of an accreditation or certification program.
In June of 1985, the NCAA passed a resolution that provides that
institutions are to "conduct a comprehensive self-study and evaluation
of their intercollegiate athletics programs at least once every five
years." 82 The self-study must include information regarding institutional purpose and athletics philosophy, the authority of the chief executive officer in personnel and financial affairs, athletics organizations, and
administration, finances, personnel, sports programs, recruiting policies, services for student-athletes and student-athlete profiles. 83 This
self-study was introduced as the precursor to accreditation or certifica84
tion of athletic programs.
The hue and cry for accreditation of intercollegiate athletics has not
dissipated. President Coor recently argued in a national forum that intercollegiate athletics should be incorporated into the accreditation process at the institutional level. 85 He has been joined in that call for an
accreditation process by other influential individuals concerned about
86
the reform of intercollegiate athletics.
In April of 1989, Director Schultz introduced a proposal for the development of a certification/peer review process for the evaluation of
the operation of intercollegiate athletics programs at member institutions. 8 7 Later in 1989, Schultz established a blue ribbon panel to review
college athletics and to examine the status of the certification/peer review process. 88 The NCAA Council has supported Schultz's call for a
certification or peer review process, and would make it voluntary for
1990.89 In the 1990 Convention of the NCAA, Schultz summarized the
nature of the voluntary certification procedure, which he referred to as a
"pilot program." 90
With this move toward voluntary certification, and given that the
self-study and academic reporting requirements are in place, the accreditation of intercollegiate athletics programs should not be difficult. As
Chancellor Oliva recently recognized, since schools already pay for the
81. 1982 REPORT, supra note 75, at 19.
82. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1006-08.
83. Id. See also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, § 6.3 at 40-4 1.
84. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1006 n. 125. Within this framework,

support for accreditation has grown. For example, Father Hesburgh recently stated that
he favors "a stringent accrediting system for college sports, in which all facets of a sports
program - academic, financial and otherwise - would be monitored closely and regularly
by an outside auditor." Lederman, Panel, supra note 72, at 42, col. 2.
85. THIRD FORUM, supra note 17, at 55.
86. See, e.g., J. OLIVA, WHAT TRUSTEES SHOULD KNOW ABOUT INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, AGB SPECIAL REPORT, at 27-29 (1989) [hereinafter AGB REPORT].
87. Certification, Proposal 42 Among Items on Council's August Agenda, The NCAA News,
July 19, 1989, at I, col. 3. Schultz first introduced his certification/peer review proposal in
April of 1989.
88. Initial-eligibilityLegislation has Proved Beneficial, The NCAA News, Sept. 18, 1989, at

3, col. 4.
89. Prepared Text of Schultzs Convention Address, The NCAA News, Oct. 23, 1989, at 3,
col. 3.
90. The NCAA News, Jan. 10, 1990, at 6, col. 2.
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accreditation process, bringing accreditation teams to colleges and universities to take a piercing look at athletics on campus should not create
significant additional economic burdens. 9' Any additional costs related
to the implementation of an accreditation process at the Division I level,
which may be the only level at which accreditation of athletics programs
should be required, could be funded at the national level out of the $1
billion in television revenues to be received under the upcoming contract recently negotiated by the NCAA and out of football revenues, if
the NCAA can wrest some control over those funds away from the historically avaricious College Football Association ("CFA").
Ernest Boyer has argued for a stringent accreditation program:
When serious athletic violations are discovered, the accreditation status of the institution should be revoked - along with
the eligibility status for the National Collegiate Athletic Association. It is ironic that one hears that a university has lost its
athletic eligibility but never hears that a college has been on
beaccreditation probation or suspended because of unethical
92
havior in athletic procedures or its abuse of students.
Stringent accreditation requirements would induce those involved in the
administration of higher education to be more attentive to the operation
of their athletics programs and, as such, would enhance the likelihood
that focus will be placed on academic matters in the operation of bigtime athletics programs-at the institutional level.
While the NCAA might be involved in appointing an accreditation
team member who is familiar with the operation of a big-time athletics
program and with the rules governing such a program, other members
of the accreditation team should not defer entirely to the findings made
by that member of the committee. Other members of the accreditation
team also should be actively involved in assessing the role of athletics at
the school being accredited. Such an accreditation process would have
numerous benefits: it would provide a school with an external evaluation
of its athletics program and would help to buffer an institution from internal pressures that might be contrary to the institution's academic
objectives; it would provide accreditation team members with much
needed exposure to the role of intercollegiate athletics at other institutions and would sensitize them to the kinds of concerns that they ought
to have regarding their home institution's program; and, perhaps most
importantly, it would serve as evidence that athletics are a significant
part of an institution's academic program and would force presidents
and other academic administrators to be directly concerned about the
operation of their institution's athletics program. The accreditation
process would firmly place the athletics program within the academic
mission of an institution and would help to increase focus on educational issues or values as they relate to the operation of intercollegiate
athletics.
91. Oliva, supra note 20, at 13.
92. LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at xii-xiii.
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In developing such an accreditation process, it will be necessary to
establish accreditation standards, both nationally and institutionally.
While those standards can be related to the rules governing intercollegiate athletics, they must do more than just replicate the rules - they also
must focus on direct and indirect educational values served by big-time
intercollegiate athletics and must look closely at the internal operations
of big-time athletics programs. 93 There must be some examination, in
an accreditation visit, of the educational values purportedly furthered by
the operation of an institution's athletics program. In that analysis there
should be some examination of whether or not the athletics program
fulfills an educational value at the macro level by virtue of its: (1) being
treated like a performing art;94 (2) fulfilling a service function analogous
to research; 95 (3) building character in the participants; 9 6 (4) developing
a sense of community among participants and spectators; 9 7 and/or
(5) providing a meaningful diversion from the alienation involved in
routine work. 98 Relatedly, and perhaps more importantly given the potential for a conflict of interest on the part of the institution, the accreditation process also must examine closely the issue of whether studentathletes are being treated as students and are being given the necessary
support to assure that their opportunity to gain an education is maximized. 99 Indeed, it is at this micro student-athlete level that accreditation standards can best be fashioned in a concrete manner. For
example, graduation and academic progress standards,' 0 0 as well as requirements regarding tutorial and academic support programs,0l
should be promulgated and enforced. By examining both the macro,
large value questions, and micro, student-athlete related educational
values furthered by the athletics program, the accreditation process can
do much to ensure that big-time athletics remain consistent with the academic mission of the institution being accredited.
Accreditation should also include a close examination or audit of
the athletics budget, to ensure that academic values are being furthered
in budgetary allocations and to ensure that the budgetary process is
under the control of academic interests within the institution. As such,
accreditation can assure that the budget process is not controlled by interests outside the institution's governance structure. The accrediting
body also should examine recruiting and related procedures to see that
they are conducted ethically and in a manner conducive to academic
integrity.
93. As Father Hesburgh has argued, academic, financial and other aspects of the athletics program should be closely evaluated. Lederman, Panel, supra note 72, at AI, col. 1.
94. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 317-18 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 301-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need to pay
student-athletes with academic support.
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Among structural reforms, the addition of an accreditation process
is a must. While it will not cure problems, it will draw attention to academic values and could help provide the necessary information, pressure and will for more meaningful substantive reforms at the
institutional, conference and national levels.
2.

The Academic Impact Statement

In a recent national forum, Wilford Bailey argued that the NCAA
should require a statement of intent and rationale for each piece of significant legislation considered by the NCAA. 10 2 Proposal 68,103 passed
at theJanuary, 1990 NCAA Convention provides for just such a publication of statements of intent and rationale for all legislation. The next
step that should be taken would be to require that all statements of intent and publicized rationales be grounded in academic values. With
such information in hand, delegates can assess the academic value of
particular legislative proposals.
The Advisory Committee to Strengthen the Presidents Commission
recently recommended that an "academic impact statement" be provided for each proposed piece of legislation.' 0 4 Such a proposal would
take the statement of intent yet a step further toward achieving academic
integrity in the operation of big-time intercollegiate athletics. If every
piece of legislation had to be supported by an academic impact statement, delegates and the public alike would be able to focus on the values
underlying that legislation and would be able to evaluate the legislation
on that basis. Such a structural addition to the NCAA process would be
beneficial both substantively and symbolically, as an indication that the
NCAA genuinely is concerned about academics.
By analogy to other existing legal constructs, an academic impact
statement could be built on a form like that provided for in environmental impact statements which are commonly used to explicate the impact
of a particular land use or related proposal on environmental values. 10 5
102. See THIRD FORUM, supra note 17, at 62, where President Bailey is quoted as saying:
I suggest that the preliminary proposals be accompanied by not only a statement
of intent, but also by a concise statement of rationale for the proposed amendment. The latter should provide a briefjustification for the proposed legislation
as an effective way to address the problem in the context of the principles for the
conduct of intercollegiate athletics to which the membership is committed.
Such a procedure could do much to help focus attention on academic justifications or
purposes related to each proffered piece of legislation.
103. Proposal 68, which was adopted at the 1990 Convention, has been summarized as
follows:

To revise the Association's amendment process to establish new deadlines for
amendments-to-amendments, to require the identification of a primary contact
person for each legislative proposal submitted by the membership, to redefine
permissible amendments-to-amendments, to establish a new publication date for
certain amendments-to-amendments, and to require the submission and publication of
statements of intent and statements of rationalefor all legislative proposals.
Reprinted in The NCAA News, Dec. !1, 1989, at 3, col. 3. (Emphasis added).

104. Commission Receives Advisory Committee Statement, The NCAA News, Aug. 2, 1989, at
3, col. 2.

105. See, e.g., Baker, Kaming and Morrison, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS; A
GUIDE TO PREPARATION AND REVIEW, Practicing Law Institute (1977). In Chapter 5 of that
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As such, the academic impact statement could be built around a series of
questions that address both the macro educational values purportedly
furthered by intercollegiate athletics' 0 6 and the micro effect on the student-athletes' educational opportunities and progress.'1 7 A well-devised academic statement could do much to further a renewed emphasis
on academic values, and might even include a requirement that the anticipated cost of the legislation be balanced against educational values
furthered or at least justified on such grounds. It, therefore, is clear that
use of an academic impact statement, particularly when included with a
meaningful accreditation process, could do much, as a structural matter,
to reinforce academic values in the operation of intercollegiate athletics
programs.
3.

Organizational Changes Within the NCAA

In addition to adding a meaningful accreditation process and a requirement that an academic impact statement be filed with every new
piece of legislation considered by the NCAA, the NCAA could undergo
some structural reform that would support the furtherance of academic
values in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
a.

Federationto Recognize Diferences Among Athletics Programs

There has been significant clamor for increased federation in the
NCAA governance structure. "08 Such federation, which would facilitate
variation in the rules applied to programs at various institutions based
on the differences in emphasis in those programs, seems to be supported by the great disparity economically and in terms of emphasis
among institutions in the operation of their intercollegiate athletics programs. Economically, programs at the Division III level are often run
with budgets in the thousands of dollars, while Division I programs are
operated under budgets in the hundreds of thousands and millions of
dollars.' 0 9 Indeed, even in Division I, the disparity is so great, ranging
from programs operated with a budget of as little as $400,000 to programs operated in the $15-20,000,000 range.I 0 The economic disparity
among programs, even at the Division I level, is indicative of major differences in terms of emphasis in the operation of athletics programs.
Some athletics programs have budgets that make them big businesses,
and the NCAA needs to recognize this by focusing on the furtherance of
educational values in the context of such big-time athletics programs.
Such focus can be enhanced by federation proposals that would permit
text, the authors examine the contents of environmental impact statements and the relationship between such statements and land use values.
106. See supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text, for an explication of the macro
values.
107. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text, for an explication of the micro
values.
108. See THIRD FORUM, supra note 17, at 23.
109. See id. at 24, for a discussion by Director Schultz of the disparity in athletics budgets and the need for giving more attention to federation issues.
110. Id.
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the NCAA to treat different programs in terms of economics and emphasis differently.
With rising revenues generated by such big-time programs, iiand
the need to decide how to best utilize NCAA revenues, which have
grown enormously during the past few years,' 12 there has been more
talk of the need to share revenues among programs to ensure equality of
competition, a level playing field.' 3 Based on this increased push for
revenue-sharing and a recognition that programs within Division I are
quite different in terms of emphasis both economically and in terms of
sports offered, with many Division I programs which do not offer football, Thomas Hansen, Commissioner of the PAC-10 Conference, has argued that schools with broad-based programs should be treated
differently than institutions with limited programs.' "4 Indeed, as early
as 1982, an independent Commission established by the NCAA suggested that, "institutions with major, revenue-producing programs be
provided greater autonomy in the NCAA's legislative process."''1 5 It is
not surprising, therefore, that current legislative efforts reflect a trend
toward increased federation. ' 16
Federation efforts can enhance the focus on academic values in bigtime intercollegiate athletics, but will not do so without some vigilance
on the part of members and without other structural changes, such as
the addition of an accreditation process and academic impact statements. Legislative autonomy, with regard to the promulgation of rules
and regulations governing large programs, that recognizes the differences between those programs and smaller programs, without compromising academic values, should be welcomed on the ground that such
legislation is more realistic and less hypocritical. For example, it is clear
that big-time programs do not further the amateurism value and should
not be subjected to its strictures.' 17 Smaller programs, or minor sports
within larger programs, on the other hand, may be more amateur in
nature.
Furthermore, such federation may be designed in a fashion that directly furthers academic values. For example, it could be coupled with
revenue-sharing among like programs, with such revenue-sharing focusing on academic values and needs that are largely indigenous to big-time
I 1l.

See SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 4, stating that annual revenues for college

sports are estimated to be $50 billion.
112. See, e.g., Lederman, TV Bonanza, supra note 15, at A 1,where it is noted that revenues from the NCAA's television contract alone will average $143 million yearly.
113. Id. See also, 1982 REPORT, supra note 75, at 20-21 (an early call for institutions to
bond together to maximize revenues and benefits generated by big-time intercollegiate
athletics).
114. See Lederman, TV Bonanza, supra note 15, at A29.
115. 1982 REPORT, supra note 75, at 14.
116. See, e.g, Convention Legislation Reflects Trend Toward More Federation,The NCAA News,
Nov. 13, 1989, at 1,col. 3.
117. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the need to jettison the amateurism value as related to intercollegiate athletics.
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athletics.' 18 Similarly, rules might be fashioned to reflect particular
macro values furthered by such major athletics programs, and the micro
interests of the student-athletes who participate in those programs. In
this regard, for example, student-athletes participating in big-time intercollegiate athletics typically spend more time away from their studies
and away from class than do other athletes and students involved in
other extra-curricular programs. Student-athletes in such sports programs, therefore, have different academic needs.' 19 As argued later in
this article, legislation should be devised to meet those different academic needs, 120 and any efforts to further federation should be combined with such legislation.
There also is a sense in which federation-like issues arise at the institutional level. Institutions involved in big-time, revenue-producing
athletics programs, generally football and basketball, typically also offer
minor sports that do not generate significant revenue and are run at a
loss. Thus, a school might offer football and basketball, which generate
revenues, while also offering sports such as track, tennis and swimming,
that may entail costs that exceed revenues. Legislation should be fashioned that recognizes these differences, as well, for a couple of reasons
First, the pressures that accompany revenue-producing sports may
be quite different for all parties involved, including administrators,
coaches and student-athletes, than the demands related to minor sports
at the same institution. Thus, there may be some need to examine potential demands placed on coaches and athletes involved in major pressure-packed sports that may not exist in the operation of minor
sports. 121

Second, as I implied earlier in this article, 122 I have a sense that
there is some lingering bias or racism involved in failing to recognize the
differences between major, revenue-producing and minor, cost-generating programs at institutions. On the one hand, particularly in the case
of football and basketball, many of the athletes involved in major sports
are minorities and come from lower socio-economic backgrounds than
the typical participants in sports like tennis and swimming. 123 Particularly when combined with the time-consuming nature of participation in
big-time athletics, these differences in terms of race and socio-economic
118. Revenue-sharing could be conditioned on the attainment or performance of certain academic objectives or conditions by the recipient institutions.
119. See NCAA Forum, The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 12-13. (A principal research
scientist at the American Institues for Research, Robert J. Rossi, compares the demands
on student-athletes involved in big-time athletics with their student counterparts, who are

heavily involved in extra-curricular activities.).
120. See infra notes 301-18 and accompanying text.
121. The disparity in coaches' salaries between major and minor sports may be reflective of this variance in pressure and risk. It seems clear that a coach in a minor sport might
suffer through a series of losing seasons without jeopardizing his or her contract, while the
position of a coach in a major sport would be in jeopardy if he or she failed to win. But see,
N. Y. Times,Jan. 7, 8 and 9, 1990 (a series of articles regarding pressures in minor sports).
122. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
123. See LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 63-80, for a discussion of racial and
related issues in intercollegiate athletics.
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background may beget differences related to the needs of the studentathletes, in the areas of financial aid and academic support, and should
be reflected in the rules governing such athletics programs.12 4 Taking
dollars that are needed to meet the peculiar academic needs of athletes
involved in big-time athletics to support athletes involved in minor
sports, therefore, may be Robin Hoodism in reverse - taking from the
poor and giving to the rich.
In any event, federation efforts at the national institutional levels,
which appear justified on their face, must be accompanied by a searching examination of their ramifications for academic values, both in a
macro and a micro sense. In moving toward federalism, therefore,
changes should be conditioned on the furtherance of academic values.
In discussing federation, Chuck Neinas, Executive Director of the
CFA, recently suggested four possible options that might be implemented at the Division I level: (1) retaining the status quo; (2) more
stringent membership requirements for Division I; (3) creation of a Division IV category; or (4) creation of an auxiliary organization for major
programs. 12 5 Of these options, I believe that the most viable one is the
second. Given the disparity in emphasis and economics between existing Division I programs, option number one simply is no longer realistic. In turn, creating a new Division IV at the bottom of the NCAA
hierarchy would impact most significantly on Divisions II and III and
would do little to address the enormous disparities of emphasis involved
in Division I programs. Option four is unacceptable because it takes
programs outside the gambit of NCAA control and would only be acceptable if the move were accompanied by very stringent adherence to a
set of rules that focus on academic values. One benefit to such a move
would be that the entire fabric of rules could be newly assessed from an
academic perspective. However, given the likelihood that such a move
26
I
would be motivated by economic as opposed to academic purposes,'
could not support a move away from NCAA governance unless it were
heavily conditioned on academic values. In this. regard, even option
two, which recognizes the need for more federation, must itself be conditioned primarily on academic as opposed to economic needs. Of
course, it is hopeful that the economic and related pressures that seem
to be dictating a move toward federation may give institutions and the
124. See infra notes -306-15 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the need for
additional educational compensation for such student athletes.
125. THIRD FORUM, supra note 17, at 32.
126. For example, from its formation, the CFA has done little to further academic values and was designed to feather the economic nests of its members by serving as a conduit
through which television revenues generated by the broadcasting of football games between member institutions could pass. The experience of the CFA indicates that the creation of a super-division, without expressly tying the creation to academic values, merely
would serve as a new and larger conduit through which revenues could pass to fuel major
athletics programs. However, such greed may well spell the demise of the CFA, as witnessed by the fact that Notre Dame University recently "took the money and ran" in making a contract directly for the televising of its football games. The $40 million contract by
Notre Dame may signal the unraveling of the CFA. See Lupica, With TV Deal, Notre Dame
Sells Higher Ideals Down the Tube, The National Sports Daily, Feb. 11, 1990, at 10, col. 1.
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NCAA another opportunity to examine how academic values can be furthered as a part of such a move.
b.

Redistribution of Power. Increasing the Role of Certain
Institutionaland Other Actors Within the NCAA
Governance Structure

In order to effectuate the necessary focus on academic values in reforming intercollegiate athletics, there will be some need for restructuring within the governance structure of the NCAA and its member
institutions. In restructuring, the emphasis should be placed on empowering those groups that, by their very nature, are most inclined to favor
academic reform. There also is a need for additional support resources
for those groups that would be most inclined to further the academic
values that should inhere in the operation and governance of intercollegiate athletics. However, more than empowerment is required. There
must also be the will and the willingness to commit that most precious of
all resources - time - to institute major reforms on the part of those
who espouse the importance of academic integrity in big-time intercollegiate athletics programs.
Those directly involved in administering intercollegiate athletics
programs, the athletic directors and coaches, have historically had the
greatest interest in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, and that
12 7
interest has often translated into power within the regulatory realm.
The athletic directors and coaches typically have not been leaders in the
reform effort. Unfortunately, oftentimes the proponents of meaningful
reform have been ill-prepared 12 8 as compared to athletic directors and
coaches, and have lacked support from others who should share their
interest in supporting major reform efforts in intercollegiate athletics. 1 29 Without better preparation on the part of those who must lead
the effort for reform and more support from others who should favor
academic integrity in the operation of big-time intercollegiate athletics,
the likelihood of meaningful reform is marginal. Nevertheless, structures can be developed that will help increase preparation on the part of
constituencies prone to support academic values and may provide those
who espouse major reform with the information base necessary to sway
those who waver in their support of such reform.
Recently, there have been calls within the NCAA for the hiring of a
consulting firm to examine the NCAA governance process. 130 Such a
consulting firm should also be directed to examine the structure, as well
as the legislative process, of the NCAA. In doing so, the firm should
evaluate the entire governance process in light of the academic values
127. See discussion in Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32, at 430-39.

128. Id.
129. For example, when the President of the University of Iowa came out in support of
freshmen ineligibility, which in his view would support academic values, the Governor of
Iowa sought favor with the public by denouncing the University President. See The Chron.
of Higher Educ., April 19, 1989, at Al.
130. THIRD FORUM. supra note 17, at 58.
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that must be furthered within the NCAA. In other words, for example,
in assessing the power of the NCAA Council' 3 l in governance issues,
the firm should determine whether the selection process for and makeup
of the Council is reflective of those groups that, by their nature, are
most inclined to support academic values. 132 In doing so, the consulting firm might well conclude, as President Coor has, that there is a need
for a policy committee, made up of individual members of the Presidents Commission, who should naturally, by virtue of their position, be
concerned with academic integrity in intercollegiate athletics, and members of the Council. The committee would be given significant poli33
cymaking authority. 1
In the following sections, I will examine the kinds of structural adjustments that could be made to enhance the likelihood that academic
integrity would be central to the operation of intercollegiate athletics
programs.
(1)

The Executive Director

Historically, the Executive Director of the NCAA has been a significant force in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, less because he
has been given express powers and more because he has been able to
forge his position into one of some authority, by the power of persuasion and by his control over staff and related matters at the NCAA headquarters. In this regard, just as the "reign" of Walter Byers, as
Executive Director of the NCAA, ushered in a "new era" in intercollegiate athletics,' 3 4 the current tenure of Richard Schultz may well portend
yet another new era in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. With
increasing regularity, Schultz has called for major reform of the NCAA
to ensure "academic integrity and rules compliance" in intercollegiate
athletics.i35 Indeed, Director Schultz's early call for a "major reform" 1 3 6 effort in intercollegiate athletics at the 1991 Convention is audacious, in a heartening way. Schultz has placed the force of his position
behind the movement for major reform, and time will tell whether or
not he will have squandered the necessarily limited capital of his position in support of a platform and call for reform that will not be heeded.
However, while it will be informative to observe the 1991 Convention to
see whether or not the delegates respond to his clarion call for reform,
131. The Council consists of 46 members, representing each of the three NCAA divisions, and is arguably the most powerful group currently in the NCAA governance structure, See NCAA CONST., art. IV, § 4.1, repinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 17-20.
132. Drawing representation, as the Council does, from Divisions I1and III might further academic reform because programs at those levels tend to be tied closer to the academic enterprise, but representatives from those divisions might lack understanding
regarding the need for and the nature of reform necessary at the Division I level.
133. See THIRD FORUM, supra note 17, at 56-57. But see Witte's remarks to the effect that
there is little support among influential members for such a committee within the NCAA
governance structure. Id. at 67.
134. For a discussion regarding the "reign" of Walter Byers, see Smith, Death Penalty,
supra note 45, at 993-94.
135. See, e.g., The NCAA News, Jan. 10, 1990, at 6, col. I.
136. Id.
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Schultz deserves to be supported by the presidents and others in his
efforts in this area.
There is little that can be done directly as a structured matter to
support Schultz in his efforts, short of giving him authority to introduce
a major reform package of his own, much like the President is permitted
and expected to offer a legislative agenda in our national government.
If Schultz is able to put together a coherent reform package and garner
support for it from academic circles, it might be worthwhile to give the
Executive Director the power to initiate legislation. Indeed, such an effort might help insure coherence in legislation. Short of giving the Director such power, it might be possible to increase formal ties between
the Executive Director and groups like the Presidents Commission that
should be supportive of his efforts to reform intercollegiate athletics to
ensure academic integrity and rules compliance.
(2)

The Council

The Council is arguably the most powerful entity in the NCAA governance structure as currently constituted. The Council has power to:
(1) "[e]stablish and direct the general policy of the Association in the
interim between Conventions,"' 13 7 (2) "[a]ppoint such committees as
may be necessary for executing the provisions of [the NCAA] constitution or the bylaws,"'13 8 (3) "[r]eport its proceedings to the general business session of the annual Convention,"1 3 9 (4) "[mlake interpretations
40
of the constitution and bylaws in the interim between Conventions," 1
(5) "[r]eview and approve policies and procedures governing the administration of the enforcement program,"' 14 1 (6) "[a]dopt administrative
regulations for the efficient implementation of the Association's general
legislative policies, 142 and (7) "[f]ill vacancies that occur among the officers of the Association or on the Council, the Executive Committee 14or3
other committees of the Association [for the unexpired term]."'
While this executive power does not dwarf the legislative power of the
membership as expressed by the delegates voting in convention, it does
provide for significant express power and also is a source of perhaps
even greater implied power. The implied power is a function of the fact
that members of the Council have access to and can create information
through the committee process. 144 Members of the Council are very
involved in overseeing the day-to-day operations of the NCAA and gain
the power of information by virtue of that immersion. As any lawyer
knows, information is central to persuasion. As such, the Council is for137. NCAA CONSTITUTION, art. IV, § 4.1.3 (a), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note
16, at 19.
138. Id.at (b).
139. Id.at (c).
140. Id.at (d).
141. Id.at (e).
142. Id.at ().
143. Id.at (g).
144. See, e.g., NCAA CONSTITUTION, art. IV, § 4.1.1., reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra
note 16, at 17-19.
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midable, both in terms of its expressed powers and in terms of its implied power of persuasion and access to and control over information.
The Council historically has not been at the forefront of reform. In
the 1990 convention, the Council again indicated its opposition to aspects of the Presidents Commission's rather modest reform proposals. 14 5 While much of the Council's opposition to the Commission's
proposals was well-founded, 146 it is sad that the Council has never used
its authority to work to devise a coherent package of major reforms that
would help to instill academic integrity in big-time intercollegiate athletics. Given this lack of inspired direction on the part of the Council, efforts to reform the governance structure, like those espoused by
President Coor, 1 4 7 should be given serious consideration. More importantly, perhaps, efforts should be made to strengthen both the express
power of other entities such as the Presidents Commission, which by the
nature of their membership, are more inclined to promote reforms supportive of academic integrity and their implied power in terms of access
to information. In the following sections, I discuss how the power of
other entities or groups might be augmented to stimulate meaningful
substantive reform efforts.
(3)

The Presidents Commission

It has repeatedly been asserted that the presidents must become
"proactive rather than passive participants"' 48 in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. The Presidents Commission was formed in 1984
for just that purpose. 149 While the presidents were unable to gain veto
power over NCAA legislation, they did gain significant power relative to
the legislative process, 150 and were ultimately granted a veto over the
selection of the Executive Director of the NCAA, when Schultz was
selected.15'

Despite being given this power, the Presidents Commission has had
a checkered history, in terms of its ability to shape the direction of
NCAA legislation. For example, it was fairly successful in 1985, when it
strengthened penalties for noncompliance with NCAA rules. At that
time, the presidents effectively sponsored what has been referred to as
145. See, e.g., Lederman, NCAA Council Refuses to Back Presidents' Call Limits on Football,
Basketball Seasons, The Chron. of Higher Educ., Oct. 25, 1989, at A35, col. 3.
146. The presidents often act rashly and symbolically without thinking much about the
ramifications of their actions. See infra notes 178-95 and accompanying text, for a discussion of this weakness and the need for more attention to detail on the part of the presi-

dents. Nevertheless, the Council has never initiated a major package of reforms on its
own, perhaps because it tends to reflect the interests of the rank and file membership of
the NCAA delegates, which has been heavily dominated by athletic directors and coaches,
or their supporters, who tend to support the status quo.
147. See discussion, supra note 133 and accompanying text.
148. LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 180.
149. For a discussion regarding the history of the Presidents Commission, see Smith,
Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 997-1000.
150. Id.

151.

Id. at 1000 n. 85.
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the "death penalty" for repeat, major infractions of NCAA rules. 15 2 In
1987, however, in its push for cost-containment, the Presidents Commission was "finessed"' 153 and due to lack of preparation suffered one
legislative defeat after another at the hands of the anti-reform forces
marshalled by coaches and athletic directors.' 5 4 In 1990, the Presidents
Commission again enjoyed marginal success in terms of gaining support
for three reforms it had sponsored. The 1990 reforms dealt with a partial repeal of financial-aid restrictions for freshmen athletes at the Division I level, a requirement that Divisions I and II publish graduation
rates, and a limit on the length of the playing and practice seasons in
basketball. The limit finally agreed upon by the delegates was less than
that which had been sought by the presidents and came only after a
"rancorous, five-and-a-half hour debate and intense arm-twisting by sev155
eral members of the [Presidents Commission].-i
The Presidents Commission has experienced a checkered record for
a number of reasons. First, presidents simply have lacked the will to act
decisively.1 56 Second, the Presidents Commission has not been as prepared as it should be in making its arguments for reform and has been
outmatched by those who are directly concerned with and involved in
the administration of intercollegiate athletics. 15 7 Third, since they often
operate as crisis managers and are unable to give extensive and continuous attention to all matters related to higher education, intercollegiate
athletics have received, at best, sporadic attention from the presidents. 158 Finally, there is some perception that the presidents "are too
politic a class of men [and women] to take any really effective steps
against an enterprise that brings in such large sums of money"' 15 9 and
public attention to their respective institutions. This final problem may
explain, in part, the reason why presidents tend to be intransigent and
why reforms are sporadic and focus more on cost-containment than reform to achieve academic purposes.
The first three reasons why the presidents have not been as effective
as had been hoped in bringing academic reform to intercollegiate athletics are somewhat related and may be cured by strengthening staff and
related support, at the NCAA level, for the Presidents Commission.
Lack of will, failure to prepare, and the president's role as crisis man152. See, e.g., Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45.
153. For a discussion of the resounding defeat suffered by the Presidents Commission
during the summer of 1987, see Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32, at 423.

154. Id.
155. Lederman, NCAA Adopts 3 Mlajor Rules Changes Endorsed by Presidents' Panel, The
Chron. of Higher Educ., Jan. 17, 1990, at Al, col. 4.
156. See, e.g., Commission Receives Advisory Committee Statement, The NCAA News, Aug. 2,
1989, at 1, col. 4. The Presidents Commission Advisory Committee concluded that:

[T]here remains a concern that the involvement of the Commission and of chief
executives in general is not as effective as it could be. For the most part, this is
due to (1) a lack of effectiveness by the Commission in communicating its positions and building support for them among other CEOs, and (2) CEOs' failure in
general to exercise the authority that they hold in the existing NCAA procedures.
157. See Smith, Sixth Special Convention, snpra note 32, at 423.
158. Id. See also, Smith, Death Penalv, supra note 45, at 998.
159. H.L. Mencken, cited ii LPctluCK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 185.
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ager, all might be mitigated by increased institutional support for the
Presidents Commission. Such support could come in various forms, including the creation of a number of full time staff positions reporting
directly to the Presidents Commission,. 60 special committees of interested and dedicated presidents, and increasing presidential authority
and accountability within the NCAA governance process by giving the
Presidents Commission a veto over legislative action taken in
convention.
The final problem - that of the pressures of economics and public
attention - may be more intractable. It takes an extraordinary president to be willing to enforce academic values when he or she must do so
at the risk of losing revenues or the public attention that the institution
may gain through the operation of its big-time intercollegiate athletics
program. Nevertheless, I continue to maintain that it is more likely that
such obstacles to reform can be addressed by conscientious presidents
at the national level, where there is some insulation from institutional
pressures, 16 1 than by a single president at the institutional level. Thus,
as the Presidents Commission experiences some success, the buffer between the pressure felt at the institutional level and the president's desire to further academic purposes may be increased by providing the
president with a set of national rules which mandate compliance. Of
course, such a buffer could be greatly enhanced by requiring accreditation of the athletics program at individual institutions. Indeed, presidents and deans alike understand that accreditation demands can be
very beneficial in efforts to ensure the kind of academic program they
favor by putting pressure on institutional constituencies that oppose
those efforts.
(4)

Conference

In addition to structural changes at the national level, conferences
are beginning to take actions that would enhance academic values in the
operation of intercollegiate athletics at the conference level. For example, one conference recently agreed to give advertisers a rebate if the
schools within the conference failed to graduate all eligible basketball
players, 162 the presidents in the PAC-10 Conference recently decided to
eliminate their conference basketball tournament at the cost of approximately $700,000, in terms of lost revenues to the conference, as a token
of their commitment to academic values by lessening demands on the
student-athlete's time,' 63 the chief executive officers of the Southern
Conference recently met to begin to consider conference-level re160. See Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32, at 455-57.
161. See discussion supra note 69 and accompanying text.
162. MAAC Links Corporate Sponsor Payments to Graduation Rate, The NCAA News, Dec.
11, 1989, at 17, col. I (discussing the M.A.A.C.'s linkage of advertising to graduation

rates).
163. Kelley, PAC-IOs Decision to Drop Tournament Praiseworthy, The NCAA News, Dec. 27,
1989, at 4, col. I [hereinafter cited as Kelly, PAC-JO's Decision].
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forms, 16 4 the Atlantic Coast Conference is expected to initiate a reform

effort directed at cutting costs and relieving time pressures on athletes,' 6 5 and the Big 10 chief executive officers recently acted to support
a ban on freshmen eligibility, although they stressed that they would not
act alone as a conference.1 6 6
As illustrated by the conditional action of the Big 10 in banning
freshmen eligibility only if other conferences follow suit, reform at the
conference level is more difficult to bring to fruition than is reform at
the national level. This is particularly true because of the "level playing
field" or equity in athletics competition concept. As such, if a conference were to initiate major reform in furtherance of academic values, it
might adversely impact on the ability of schools within the conference to
recruit student-athletes and to compete with schools outside the conference that do not adhere to equally stringent requirements. Nevertheless, some conferences may be willing to initiate academically related
reforms in order to place their institutions in a positive academic light in
the media.
As a structural matter, there are some things that can be done nationally and at the conference level to increase the impetus for reform in
furtherance of academic values. Nationally, economic and other incentives can be given to conferences and institutions willing to engage in
meaningful reform. For example, the NCAA might provide funds to
support particular efforts designed to further academic values at both
conference and institutional levels. Similarly, the conference might provide its members with economic and related incentives to engage in
meaningful reform at the institutional level. Economic incentives could
be used as rewards for successes in areas such as graduation rates, as aid
for schools within the conference that have more competitive admission
standards than other conference members, and as support for programs
designed to further academic values.
Efforts at the conference level should be supported both nationally
and at the institutional level. Indeed, a combined effort at reform could
create the momentum necessary to ensure that meaningful reform package is initiated and enacted.
(5)

Board of Trustees

When one turns from the national and conference levels to the institutional level, one must look first to the Board of Trustees in examining what kinds of changes might be made to enhance the academic
values that ought to inhere in big-time intercollegiate athletics pro164. Southern CEO'S Seek Bigger Sports Role, The NCAA News, Nov. 13, 1989, at 13, col. 3.
It should be noted, however, that the suggestions were quite weak in terms of their likely

capacity to generate meaningful reform.
165. The A.C.C. announced that, during the spring of 1990, it would "adopt a series of
league-wide changes designed to cut costs and relieve pressures on athletes." The Chron.
of Higher Educ.. Jan. 17, 1990, at A39, col. 2.
166. Big Ten CEO's Back More to Bar Freshmen, The NCAA NewsJune 21, 1989, at 4, col.
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grams. As Director Schultz recently noted, the Board of Trustees or
governing board is ultimately responsible for everything at a university,
1 67
including intercollegiate athletics.

The degree of potential involvement on the part of a governing
board in the administration of a big-time intercollegiate athletics program was demonstrated during the woes experienced by SMU during
the 1970s and much of the 1980s. 168 In the Report to the Board of
Trustees of SMU from the Committee of Bishops, it was noted that Presidents Zumberge and Shields "were the administrators of the University
during their respective terms, but Cox, Stewart and Clements (board
members) were the 'leadership.' And it was clear that the administrators
reported to and were responsible to that leadership."' 16 9 Indeed, at one
juncture, President Shields reported that Clements told him "to 'stay
1 70
out of [athletics]' and 'go run the university'."'
The SMU experience amply demonstrates that the governing board
ultimately is responsible for intercollegiate athletics. Of course, at most
institutions the-board may take a far less aggressive role in terms of the
operation of the intercollegiate athletics program. However, the fact
that governing boards can be passive in exercising their responsibility to
oversee the operation of the athletics program at their institution does
not absolve them of their responsibility. Indeed, as was concluded in
the SMU report, the board must exercise "reasonable care and diligent
inquiry" in overseeing the operation of the athletics program at their
1
institution. 71
Given that the governing board ought to be responsible for oversight, it would be appropriate to hold them to a duty of care in the exercise of their oversight function. Under NCAA rules, it is arguable that
members of a governing board can and, I believe, should be held accountable in exercising their duty of care to oversee the operations of
their athletics program. 172 Certainly, the NCAA could require that a
particular member of a governing board dissassociate himself or herself
from a program if he or she has either "engaged in or condoned a major
violation [of NCAA rules]."' 7 3 Some states have also passed legislation
167. Schultz noted that, "The message has to start with the governing board at each
university that it is responsible for the integrity of everything that goes on at the university,

including intercollegiate athletics." Quoted in Franckling, Athletics Suffer From Lack of Direclion,
Purpose, Yow Says, The NCAA News, July 5, 1989 at 5, col. 3.
168. See SMU REPORT, supra note 71, at 14.

169. Id.
170. Id. at 18.
171. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1026-27, arguing that the language of the
repeat violator (death penalty) legislation is broad enough to cover presidents. Similarly,
it could be construed to cover board members. It is clear that board members, as representatives of an institution's athletics interests, could be dissassociated under § 19.4.2.6 of
the NCAA Bylaws, which provides in pertinent part that: "'Ithe dissassociation of relations with a representative of an institution's athletics interests may be imposed on a permanent basis, for the duration of the applicable probationary period or for another
specified period of time . . ." reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 270.
172. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 270.
173. See, e.g., Section 10.1 of 1989 Nev. ALS 382; 1989 Nev. Ch. 382; 1989 Nev.
AB563, which provides that:
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that would possibly make such actions by members of a governing board
actionable, either civilly or criminally. 174 Such efforts to hold board
of remembers accountable are laudable and are analogous to notions
175
sponsibility and accountability that exist in the corporate area.
Holding board members accountable for what they know and condone, explicitly or- implicitly, and for what they should have known, in
terms of the operation of their institution's athletics program, will help
to ensure that academic values are furthered in intercollegiate athletics.
Certainly, board members cannot be expected to oversee intercollegiate
athletics on a daily basis, but they can be expected to require their president to report to them on a regular basis with regard to the operation of
the university's athletics program. Relatedly, they can require that the
president and the athletics staff execute contracts that mandate such reporting and that provide for dismissal in the event that there is a major
infraction of NCAA rules on the part of the athletics department. Such a
reporting system, particularly if a level of specificity is demanded and is
coupled with contractual accountability, will have a decided "trickle
down" effect, requiring the president to exercise his or her oversight
more closely and creating a closer relationship between the athletics department and the president. It might also help to ensure that the board
will support the president in taking decisive action against an errant
76
coach or athletics department.'
In addition to holding members of the board accountable, some
structural changes might be invoked that would further academic values
in the operation of intercollegiate athletics programs. First, it would be
helpful for the board to delineate their own responsibility and the responsibility of the president and others with regard to oversight of the
intercollegiate athletics program. 177
Second, and relatedly, the board should require a written report
each year regarding the operation of the intercollegiate athletics program at their institution. The basic form for that report - the questions
to be answered - might be provided by the NCAA itself and should
require the president and the athletics department, and all personnel
A person who causes a student athlete or an institution to violate a rule of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association to which the institution is a member, or

aids in any such violation, is liable to the institution for damages... if:
(a) The person knew or reasonably should have known that a rule was violated or would be violated; or
(b) The violation of the rule is a contributing cause of:
(1)

Disciplinary action, including loss of eligibility, taken by the institu-

tion against a student athlete; or
(2) Disciplinary action taken by the National Collegiate Athletic Association against the institution or a student athlete.
174. See, e.g., Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, Vol. 3,
§ 838 at 177-203. Fletcher notes that, "[a] director can be liable for a violation of the
fiducary duty even in the absence of bad faith or dishonesty; affirmative malfeasance is not

required. Mere passive negligence can be enough to breach the duty and result in liability."

Id. at 181.

175. See Oliva, supra note 20, and AGB REPORT, supra note 86.
176. See, e.g., recommendations to this effect in SMU REPORT, supra note 71, at 46-47.
177. LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at xxix.
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therein, to respond to questions regarding the values and functions actually furthered by intercollegiate athletics at their institution, including
performing arts, research-like functions, building of character, development of a sense of community, and the furtherance of educational values
related to student-athletes involved in the athletics program. The material regarding students should include information as to the academic
progress of each athlete, graduation rates, academic support, time spent
in practice and preparation for performance by the student-athlete in his
or her sport, and a section dealing with the treatment of student-athletes
by their coaches. This final series of questions would be designed to
ascertain whether the coach emotionally abuses his or her athletes. The
questions included on the report form should be designed to require
specific answers and to provide the board with detailed information
about the operation of the athletics program. The form also might be
used as a part of the long-range planning effort for the athletics program. Such a questionnaire would fit in nicely with the idea of an academic accreditation process for athletics programs and would give the
board and the president alike access to information that would heighten
the direct responsibility of both the president and the board. Finally, in
conjunction with the filing of the questionnaire, an annual audit of the
athletics program should be provided, which audit would cover income
and expenses from all sources, including coaches' income from all
sources. All items on the report should be certified, acknowledged or
declared under penalty of perjury, by members of the athletics department and the continuation of the contracts of all those involved in athletics should be conditioned upon the filing of an accurate report.
As closer ties are created between the board, the president and the
athletics department, institutional governance of athletics can be directed to the furtherance of academic values. Where institutions fall
short of academic objectives, despite the use of such a reporting system,
there will be fewer questions as to whom is responsible. In exercising its
responsibility, the board must support the president in his or her efforts
to effectuate academic values in the operation of an intercollegiate athletics program, even when that means firing an otherwise popular coach,
or retaining a coach who is under pressure after having suffered through
a season in which he or she has won fewer games than fans and others
momentarily may demand.
(6)

Presidents

As is obvious from the preceding section, the board must work
closely with the presidents of the various universities. Indeed, given the
president's proximity, on a daily basis, to all that goes on at his or her
institution, the president clearly is directly responsible for the operation
of the athletics program at his or her institution. Of course, the president cannot actually run the athletics program, but he or she can engage
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in more "delegation with accountability."' 78 Indeed, the most oftshirked responsibility of presidents is to "know what is going on [in the
operation of their athletics program]."' 179 As the SMU report concluded, the president must be involved in "active surveillance" and cannot stand by as a "passive sentry."'18 0
Not everyone agrees that the president must be more proactive,
however. Bo Schembechler, former football coach and athletics director
at the University of Michigan, recently asserted, with regard to the
Big 10 presidents' actions relative to the possibility of adding Penn State
University to the conference, that, "[t]his confirms the worst fear I have
of presidents getting too much control in athletics ..... Making decisions like this without ever studying it is terrible. Not one athletic director was consulted on this matter. How can they do that?" 18 1
Schembechler has been even more emphatic with regard to his negative
views relative to the involvement of presidents in reforming athletics.
He has stated that, "[i]n the next five years, the presidents will completely confuse the field of intercollegiate athletics. Then, they'll dump
it on the athletics director and say, '[y]ou straighten this out.' Then,
about the year 2,000, it may be back on track again."' 182 This attitude is
often reflected in battles between the athletic directors, who align with
coaches, and presidents over the nature of and need for reform in inter83
collegiate athletics. 1
Given the movement toward reform in intercollegiate athletics, one
is inclined to disregard views like those expressed by Coach
Schembechler, which seem to imply that all is well in intercollegiate athletics and that reform-minded intervention on the part of the presidents
is uncalled for. However, there is some truth in what the athletic directors and coaches assert. Presidents often are ill-prepared and act rashly,
without considering the implications of their actions for the day-to-day
operations of the athletics programs. 184 Even the recently enacted reform limiting the number of basketball games played during the season
fails to consider the impact of lost revenues on the operations of athletics programs at institutions that have come to depend on those funds.1 8 5
Thus, without much foresight, presidents can place contradictory demands on athletic directors: for example, on the one hand, presidents
178. Id.
179.

SMU REPORT, supra note 71, at 166.

180. Id. at 46.
181. Scorecard, Sports Illustrated, Jan. 1, 1990, at 21.
182. Comment, The NCAA News, Jan. 3, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
183. In commenting on the battles between athletic directors (and coaches) the presidents at the 1990 NCAA Convention, one reporter concluded, "the effort required to pass
[the reform measures adopted] pointed up deep rooted differences in priorities that exist
between academic and athletic interests in intercollegiate athletics." Rhoden, VCAA Restricts Practices, Seasons, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at B9, col. 5 [hereinafter Rhoden].
184. See Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32.
185. DeLoss Dodds, Athletic Director at Texas, argued against cutting the number of
basketball games on economic grounds: "How can you make that [projected loss of
$150,000 per game] up?" Rhoden, supra note 183. See also Kelley, PAC-IO's Decision, supra
note 163.
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demand a balanced athletics budget and an athletics program'that provides access for women and others who participate in non-revenue producing sports; whereas, on the other hand, they take actions that
significantly cut revenues available to run a broad-based athletics program on a balanced budget. Unfortunately, too often, by its very nature,
the office of president demands that a president be a crisis manager,
ever mindful of public pressures that ebb and flow. Presidents often are
inclined to make hasty decisions, in moving from one crisis to another,
seeking symbolic rather than substantive solutions. As President
Slaughter recently acknowledged, "[n]o President or Chancellor can afford to spend the vast amounts of time and energy required to watch
186
over any one part of the campus operation on a constant basis."'
Consequently, complaints by conscientious athletic directors are often
legitimate.
Presidents should exercise more oversight and should play a major
role in reform efforts, by virtue of their position as academic leaders at
their respective institutions, 18 7 although there are some structural
changes that can assist them in doing so in a more reflective and coherent manner. Presidents, like all decisionmakers, are greatly assisted
when they receive accurate information and are privy to ideas generated
by those who have more time to reflect on the issues that are before
them. As such, presidents should seek information and should develop
structures within their respective institutions that would enhance the retrieval of such information. That could be done, in significant part, by
use of the kind of questionnaire suggested in the preceding section. 188
Use of that questionnaire, together with more attention to the self-study
process required by the NCAA,' 89 should help generate necessary information. The president can also enhance his or her access to information
and involvement in the daily operations of the athletics program by appointing a balanced athletic board' 90 that can provide an informed
counterpoint to the athletic director and by selecting an independentminded and conscientious institutional representative to the NCAA itself.19 1 Finally, the president should appoint someone in the general
186. LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 190.
187. See Schultz's State of the Association address in The NCAA News,Jan. 25, 1989, at
3, col. 3.
188. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
189. See NCAA CONST., art. VI, § 6.3, reprintedinNCAA MANUAL, supra note 16 at 40-41.
The president should closely monitor the self-study process rather than treating it perfunctorily as just another minor administrative aggravation.
190. See NCAA CONST., art. VI, § 6.1.2, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 39.
An athletics board is not required under NCAA rules, but should be utilized. Administrative and/or faculty and staff members are to make up a majority of the board, and the
president could do much to strengthen his or her oversight responsibility by appointing
capable, independent faculty and staff to the board.
191.

NCAA CONST., art. VI, § 6.1.3, provides that:

A member institution shall designate an individual to serve as faculty athletics
representative. An individual so designated after January 12, 1989, shall be a
member of the institution's faculty or an administrator who holds faculty rank and
shall not hold an administrative or coaching position in the athletics department.
Duties of the faculty athletics representative shall be determined by the member
institution.
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counsel's office to oversee intercollegiate athletics, both from a compliance point of view and for the sake of reviewing institutional planning
efforts in the athletics area. Since the president cannot be immersed in
what is going on in the athletics department on a daily basis, he or she
must appoint individuals of differing views, all of whom adhere to the
importance of academic values, to positions of authority in the institutional governance of intercollegiate athletics. In turn, those individuals
can provide the president with helpful information and insight into the
operation of the athletics program. Decisions, which necessarily must
be made in the haste that characterizes the life of a college or university
president, can then be made in an environment that enhances rather
than detracts from thoughtful decisionmaking.
As presidents are held responsible, at the institutional, as well as the
NCAA and state and federal levels, 19 2 for the operation of their athletics
program, they will no doubt demand closer administrative ties between
themselves and their athletics programs. Surprisingly, it may turn out
that those closer ties will strengthen rather than weaken the relationship
between the athletic directors and coaches and presidents, because
channels of communication will have been opened. In this regard, it
should be recalled that Coach Schembechler's concern with the action of
the presidents in proposing to add Penn State to the Big 10 was based
on the fact that the presidents never consulted the athletic directors
before making their announcement. Such rash action on the part of the
presidents indicates both a lack of communication and a paucity of planning. With a stronger institutional framework, and more sense of personal responsibility, the presidents may enhance rather than detract
from their relationship with the athletics department.
To further enhance the relationship between the president and athletics personnel, the president should clearly delineate the responsibility
of athletics personnel. There should be no hidden agenda 19 3 and the
institutional expectations should be clearly stated and consistent with
94
academic values. 1

Finally, if such structural changes are to mean anything in the long
run, at the institutional level, presidents must receive support from
those within the institution, including the board, athletics personnel,
faculty, and students, as well as those interested in but outside of the
institution, including alumni, friends, media, etc.
192. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1026-36.
193. See, e.g., Looney, The Ax Falls at Toledo, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,Jan. 1, 1990, at 32-33,

for an article discussing the firing of a successful coach, successful both in terms of his
winning record and in terms of the graduation rate of his players. In such a case, the
hidden agenda is articulated less in words or contractual provisions and more in an implicit demand to win more games.
194. The contract between the coach and the university should be explicit and should
be adhered to by the president as well as the coach. In the academic world, breach of or
institutional refusal to comply with a contract may carry moral and educational as well as
economic implications.
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Athletic Directors

In numerous instances, rather than working closely with their presidents to maintain academic integrity in the operation of their athletics
program, athletic directors have taken a confrontational stance vis-a-vis
their presidents. At times, the level of confrontation reaches a heated
pitch and becomes public, as it did when the athletic directors and
others closely tied to intercollegiate athletics departments did battle
over issues regarding the length of the basketball season during the
1990 Convention 19 5 and over cost-containment issues during the
NCAA's Sixth Special Convention held during the summer of 1987.196
As indicated in the preceding section, part of the fault for this continuing confrontation lies with the presidents who tend to be ill-prepared and fail to consider the ramifications of their actions for the
overall athletics program. However, as the presidents make adjustments
of a structural nature, at the institutional, conference and national
levels, and as they develop more of a will to be general overseers of the
athletics programs - assuming, of course, that they do so - athletic
directors will increasingly be held accountable for what occurs within
their departments. As Doug Single correctly concluded, "[ifn compliance matters, directors of athletics occupy the most important leader97
ship position within intercollegiate athletics."'
The presidents and governing boards must become more willing to
engage in preventative, rather than after-the-fact punitive action. When
they do so, it remains to be asked what they can do to ensure a better
working relationship with athletic directors and compliance with rules
and academic values in the operation of their athletics programs. To
begin with, as has been previously noted, lines of responsibility can be
strengthened by creating and enforcing more stringent reporting requirements and by contractual accountability.
In terms of reporting, the athletic director should be required to
report on a regular basis to the president or his or her designate with
regard to budgetary issues, coaching performance, peculiar time demands related to participation in the athletics program by student-athletes, academic progress of student-athletes, academic support for
student-athletes, and items related to compliance with NCAA and conference rules. They should also report with regard to the institution's
general or macro philosophy of athletics.
In reporting on coaching performance, athletic directors should
have to treat the coaching profession much as academic chairs treat
other teaching positions. Professors are evaluated with regard to their
ability as teachers and scholars. Similarly, coaches should be evaluated
with regard to their technical ability as coaches and their ability as teach195. See Rhoden, supra note 183.
196. See Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32, at 430.
197. LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 159.
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98
ers. If we have student-athletes, then we ought to have teacher-coaches.1
Unfortunately, coaches are often evaluated solely on the basis of their
technical ability as coaches and recruiters and not on their ability as
teachers. It is clear that many coaches may have excellent technical ability or the ability to recruit fine athletes, but it does not follow that they
are equally as able in terms of their teaching ability. Of course, teaching
is difficult to evaluate in any academic discipline,' 9 9 but concrete effort
is made to do so in other academic areas, as it should be. Developing
criteria or standards for the teaching side of coaching will not be easy,
but such efforts will help us to face certain issues, including the tension
between teaching discipline and emotional abuse of players.2 0 0 Like the
head of any other department, the athletic director must be concerned
about the quality of teaching within his or her department.
Athletic directors should also be required to report regarding time
constraints placed on student-athletes. The director of athletics should
assess time demands for the purpose of overseeing the scheduling of
games during the season and practice times. In addition to overseeing
practice demands during the season, athletic directors should also examine off-season demands for training and other purposes. Like his or
her counterpart in other departments, the athletic director is ultimately
responsible for insuring that demands placed on the student-athletes are
reasonable.
The director of athletics should also exercise oversight and, perhaps, even direct efforts in the areas of academic progress and academic
support for student-athletes. 20 1 In doing so, the athletic director should
be concerned with the academic needs of student-athletes. The athletic
director must insure that tutorial and other academic support programs
are run with integrity, particularly given the potential conflict of interest
that may exist between the coach who wants a particular athlete to be
eligible and the student-athlete's academic needs. This may require that
the academic support programs be wholly integrated with academic support programs within the university, or if an athletic director is accountable, personally and institutionally, it may be possible to have an
academic support program with integrity within the athletics department
that meets the special needs of student-athletes involved in big-time in20 2
tercollegiate athletics.

198. The NCAA refers to athletes involved in intercollegiate athletics as student-athletes. They ought to begin to refer to coaches as teacher- or educator-coaches, as well.
199. See, e.g., Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is There a Case Against the Case

System?, 36J. LAw ED. 167 (1986), for an analysis of the difficulty of assessing teaching
methodologies in law school (and elsewhere).
200. One of my colleagues refers to the role of the coach as being analogous to the role
of a drill instructor in the military - a molder of disciplined troops. This may be a legitimate role for a coach, but such a determination ought to be made thoughtfully.
201. See infra notes 301-18 and accompanying text, for a discussion regarding the need

to direct academic resources to serve the educational needs of the student-athletes.
202.

For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Stokes, TheJan Kemp Case. No Penalty
LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra
note 43, at 157.

for Pass Interference, 16J. L. & EDUC. 257 (1987). See also
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Finally, an athletic director must report and be held accountable for
compliance with rules regulating the operation of intercollegiate athletics within his or her department. Under NCAA rules, the athletic director is held accountable for the actions of staff members within the
athletics department.20 3 Similarly, the athletic director should be held
strictly accountable under conference rules and institutional procedures.
The athletic director's contract should be designed to hold the director responsible for the operation of his or her department in the areas of teacher-coach responsibility, time and related demands placed on
student-athletes, academic progress and academic support, and basic
rules compliance. Reporting specific information in each of these areas
will help maintain clear lines of responsibility. Such reporting also
should be combined with the delineation of the athletic director's specific duties, in these areas, in his or her contract with the institution.
Together with strengthening reporting and contractual responsibilities on the part of the athletic director, it is imperative that the athletics
department budget be tied to the university budget. 20 4 With budgets in
the millions of dollars, 20 5 athletics departments can be subjected to economic enticements that can lure them away from academic values.
Budgetary responsibility and control must be invoked at the universitywide level to help insure that the institution's academic values are not
compromised. If values were compromised under such a system, it
would also be clear that the president and the board would be responsible, along With the athletic director. Additionally, by tying the athletics
budget to the university budget, presidents and others will be more inclined to understand the budgetary constraints or ramifications that accompany some of their decisions.
(8)

Coaches

As athletic directors have administrative responsibility for the operation of the athletics department as a whole, the individual coach has
direct responsibility for his or her team members. Like the athletic directors, coaches have had conflicts with their presidents relative to the
operation of their teams. Indeed, given their status as prominent public
figures, coaches often are able to win public confrontations with a lesswell-known president. 20 6 For example, when the President at the Uni203. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1036-50.
204. See Atwell's comments in The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 4, col. 3.
205. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 989 and Wojcienchowski, Notre Dame's
Deal Shouldn't be a Shock, L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1990, at Cl, col. 4, noting that Notre Dame
recently signed a contract worth $40 million for the televising of its football games. Notre
Dame exerted control over the use of the television revenues and directed them to academic purposes, although it is sad to note that Notre Dame diverted those funds away
from the academic needs of the student-athletes who generated them.
206. See, e.g., Lederman, North Carolina State University Professors Debate Faculty Role in Basketball Scandal, Vow More Vigilant Oversight, The Chron. of Higher Educ., Sept. 13, 1989, at
A39, col. 2 [hereinafter N.C. State]. (Following North Carolina State University's "scandal," Chancellor Bruce R. Poulton was forced to resign, while Coach .Valvano was only
asked to step down from his position as athletic director).
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versity of Iowa recently indicated that he would unilaterally invoke a rule
of freshman ineligibility at Iowa, Hayden Fry, the well-known football
coach, 20 7 said that he would like to "redshirt" the president, 20 8 and
Coach Fry was supported by the Governor of Iowa in his confrontation
20 9
with the president.
Assuming that the presidents, boards and athletic directors begin to
exercise their offices more responsibly, what can be done, as a structural
matter, to ensure that coaches maintain academic integrity at the individual team level? Whatever is done must deal directly with the problem
of potentially conflicting demands placed on the coach of a team involved in heavily commercialized intercollegiate sports.
Coaches in big-time intercollegiate athletics programs have little
job security and are subjected to varying and sometimes conflicting demands in terms of the performance of their responsibilities. There is an
unsettling sense the following observation may be accurate: "In college
athletics, there's a hypocrisy that reeks. There's a wear-it-on-your-shirtsleeve attitude that what we are here for is to educate people. A lot of
times that is just lip service. The bottom line in college athletics is you'd
better win."12 10 This demand that a coach in a big-time sport win or risk
losing his or her job is tied,2 1 I no doubt, to the fact that big-time sports
are heavily commercialized and are expected to provide revenues to
fund their operation as well as the operation of many nonrevenue producing sports. 2 12 Winning teams simply bring in more revenue, revenue needed to fund other programs. At the same time, at least lip
service is given to the need for the coach to further academic values in
the operation of his or her team sport.2 1 3 At times, these sometimes
207. Coach Fry was the football coach at Southern Methodist University for a period of
time in the 1970's, when the football program was riddled with infractions of the NCAA
rules. SMU REPORT, supra note 71, at 14. He is a popular coach, however.
208. See supra note 129.
209. For a discussion of the conflict between Coach Fry and the President, see The
Chron. of Higher Educ., April 19, 1989, at A1, col. 2 and TELANDER, supra note 7, at 19091.
210. Lederman, Season-End Firings Send Mlessage to Football Coaches: 'You'd Better Win', The
Chron. of Higher Educ., Jan. 3, 1990, at A33, col. 4 [hereinafter Firings].
211. See also Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1038-39.
212. See Lederman, Firings,supra note 210, at A33, col. 4 (pressure placed on coaches in
big-time revenue-producing sports to provide funds for operating other nonrevenue-producing sports).
213. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 44, at 397, for a discussion of Coach Curry's contract at
the University of Alabama. Coach Curry's contract was tied, in part, to academic performance. Similarly, in moving from Michigan to Arizona State University, Coach Frieder received a contract that included an incentive of $10,000 for graduation rates, but that
incentive was dwarfed by incentives tied to winning and commercial success. The
acacemic incentive in Coach Frieder's contract was miniscule in comparison to incentives
related to winning basketball games. Coach Freider received a salary of $154,000; a guarantee of $350,000 in annual income from summer camps, a sneaker company contract and
television and radio deals; $20,000 if his team finishes .500 or better or has a recruiting
class in the top 20; $20,000 if the Sun Devils win at least ten conference games; an extra
week's salary if they win one game in the conference tournament or get a N.I.T. bid; two
week's additional salary if they get an NCAA berth; three week's salary if they reach the
NCAA regionals; four week's salary if they reach the "Final Four;" five week's salary if they
win the National Championship; $20,000 ifthe average attendance at home games is at
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conflicting messages create confusion on the part of the coach as to his
or her job responsibilities.
With pressures to win and produce revenues being given highest
priority, there is a sense that intercollegiate athletics have become
professionalized and resemble more an entertainment industry than an
educational enterprise. 2 14 This professionalization of intercollegiate
athletics is hardly new. With the risk, in terms of job security, that accompanies this professionalization of intercollegiate sports, select
coaches who are able to win with regularity at major programs are rewarded economically. Indeed, a successful coach may make well in excess of $300,000 per year from all athletics-related sources. 2 15 As such,
coaching salaries often exceed those of the president and are the highest
in all of higher education.
This professionalization of the coaching profession at the big-time
level has led to a denigration, or at least confusion, as to the coach's role
with regard to academic values in the coaching profession. A coach generally knows that he or she must "win," and reap a bounteous economic
2 16
It
harvest, but the need to adhere to other values is far less clear.
would appear that often the coach is called upon primarily to be a business person and coach and only secondarily, if at all, to be a teacher.
Even though institutions may not emphasize the teaching side of coaching, it is clear that student-athletes are greatly influenced by their
coaches. 2 17 Given this influence, an institution hypocritically abdicates
its responsibility when it fails to place some emphasis on the coach as a
teacher.
Structurally, action must be taken to help redirect the focus of the
coaching profession. On the economic side, presidents are right when
they assert the need for cost-containment to help in this effort, although
cost-containment initiatives often seem to be ill-conceived in terms of
their capacity to further academic values directly. 2 18 However, there are
numerous other actions that may produce even more effective results:
placing emphasis on responsibility of the coach as a teacher; increasing
job security at the same time that an institution engages in cost-containment; and, providing for stricter enforcement of ethical standards and
rules compliance on the part of the coach.
In the previous section, I discussed the importance of emphasizing
least 7,500; $30,000 if the average attendance is at least 11,000. See Extra extra Incentive,
The National Sports Daily, Feb. 1, 1990, at 28, col. 3.
214. Telander argues, for example, that, "[m]oney, received for providing vicarious
thrills to viewers, is what drives college football these days." TEIANDER, supra note 7, at

25.
215. See, e.g., Poskanzer, Spotlight on the Coaching Boa'. The Role of the Athletics Coach Wlithin
the Academic Institution, 16J.C. & U.L. 1, 2 (1989) and a report that Coach Curry at Alabama
received $500,000 per year in salary and side benefits. N. Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1990, at 30,
col. I.
216. See Lederman, N.C State. supra note 206.
217. See, e.g., Polidoro, Survey Examines Coaches'ConcernsAbout Ethics, The NCAA News.
Nov. 20, 1989, at 4, [hereinafter Polodorol and The NCAA News, Feb. 15. 1989, at 12-17.
218. See Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32.
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the coach's responsibility as a teacher, both in terms of reporting and in
terms of the coach's contractual responsibility. Of course, there are
those who assert that big-time coaches are not teachers. 2 19 However,
athletes involved in big-time sports view their coaches as teachers
although they often feel that their coaches are little concerned with aca2 20
demic values.
Given that student-athletes view their coaches as teachers, an institution acts hypocritically when it fails either to disabuse the studentathlete of that conception or to change the attitude of the coach. Since I
contend that intercollegiate athletics should be reformed to further academic values, I will only look at ways in which the attitude of the coach
and others may be changed to conform to the model of coach as teacher.
At the outset, in changing attitudes and direction, one must face the
issue of what is effective teaching on the part of the coach. For example,
some individuals in the coaching profession believe that Bobby Knight,
the head basketball coach at Indiana-Bloomington, engages in "dehumanizing" behavior in handling his players. 2 2 1 Indeed, based on a recent NCAA study, student-athletes in many big-time athletics programs
feel that they are often emotionally abused by their coaches. 2 2 2 Nevertheless, there are those, including someone as thoughtful as Wilford
Bailey, President of the NCAA, who feel that it would be inappropriate
to conclude too quickly that coaches are engaged in emotional abuse or
dehumanization of their players. 22 3 It is true that standards regarding
teaching, particularly within the coaching profession, are not easy to for22 4
mulate. There have been efforts to articulate standards in the past,
but it might be worthwhile for coaches to develop their own contemporary standards. They could then deal with the issue of what constitutes
dehumanization or emotional abuse, as they deal with other less troublesome issues related to the coach's responsibility as a teacher.
In addition to their teaching function in the coach-athlete relationship, coaches also perform a teaching function as emissaries of their institutions. Unfortunately, with increasing media attention and rising
219.
220.

supra note 7, at 86.
See Polidoro, supra note 217.
TELANDER,

221. J.

FEINSTEIN,

A

SEASON ON THE BRINK

(1986). See also The Chron. of Higher Educ.,

Jan. 20, 1988, at A37, col. 1 (Comments of Coach Dale Brown).
222. The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 13.

223. Id. at 15.
224. In August of 1952, the American Football Coaches' Association adopted the following code of ethics:
The distinguishing characteristic of a profession is that its members are dedicated to rendering a service to humanity. Personal gain must be of lesser consideration. Those who select football coaching must understand the justification for
football is that it provides spiritual and physical values for those who play it, and
the game belongs, essentially, to the players.
The welfare of the game depends on how the coaches live up to the spirit and
letter of ethical conduct and how coaches remain ever mindful of the high trust
and confidence placed in them by their players and by the public.
Coaches unwilling or unable to comply with the principles of the Code of
Ethics have no place in the profession.
Cited in LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 138.
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tempers in the heat of athletic battle, many coaches have engaged in
angry theatrics that detract from their teaching function. Anyone who
has observed the antics of some coaches, from the throwing of chairs to
profusions of public profanity, is well aware that coaches sometimes provide a negative image. As public representatives of their respective institutions, coaches necessarily are teachers and must be held to higher
standards. Like other teaching standards, standards of public conduct
ought to be included in the coach's contract. In my view, such standards
would do little to chill the coach's capacity to perform his or her legitimate coaching and teaching responsibilities or their right of expression,
although they might detract from the coach's role as an entertainer. 22 5
Focus on the coach's role as a teacher can be enhanced by clearly
spelling out that responsibility in his or her contract. The contract
should focus on academic values. Coaches' contracts can and often do
include incentives for or requirements that the coach further certain academic values, including matters such as academic progress, graduation
rates, academic support, monitoring of class attendance. 226 Even where
present, however, incentives are often minimal 22 7 and requirements
often remain unenforced if the coach can manage to win. 2 28 Relatedly,
even when a coach is quite successful in terms of academic performance,
jobs can rarely be retained unless wins on the court or field accompany
229
even the most startling academic success.
Thus, there is little hope for much progress on the academic or
teaching front, unless it is included in a package consisting of some costcontainment and job security for coaches, to reduce pressures placed on
coaches in big-time sports. To enforce academic and teaching values in
coaching, many have advocated that coaches be tenured. 230 Others
have argued for rolling long-term contracts for coaches, 23 1 that would
225. Indeed, Bylaw 11.1.1 of the NCAA rules requires that:
Individuals employed by or associated with a member institution to administer,
conduct or coach intercollegiate athletics shall deport themselves with honesty

and sportsmanship at all times so that intercollegiate athletics as a whole, their
institutions and they, as individuals, represent the honor and dignity of fair play
and the generally recognized high standards associated with wholesome competitive sports.
Reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 46.
226. Dixon, supra note 44, at 396-97.
227. Payments for production of wins and revenues far exceed payments for academic
achievements in the contracts of coaches involved in big-time revenue-producing sports.
See supra note 213.
228. See N.C. State, supra note 206.
229. See LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, and statement made in 1989 by the
President of Miami University of Ohio that "we don't fire coaches because we lose," followed by the firing of their football coach in 1990, after a losing season. The Chron.
Higher Educ., Nov. 29, 1989, at A43, col. 1, and Lederman, Firings, supra note 210.
230. See, e.g., Coach Raymond's call for the tenuring of coaches in Opinions, The NCAA

News, Nov. 13, 1989, at 5, col. 2.
231.

A "rollover clause" in a coach's contract essentially provides that:

[A] coach always has a commitment from the university for a specific number of
years - a tenure clause for coaches. At the end of each year (or other period),
unless one party notifies the other of the intention not to rollover, the contract's
term extends for another like term so that the total term of the contract is, once

again, x years.
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give them time to develop a program and also would provide them with
job security sufficient to permit them to focus on academic values as well
as the economics of their program. Perhaps the most significant of the
alternatives offered is one proposed by Richard Schultz, the Executive
Director of the NCAA. He suggests that coaches be given "tenure," in
the form of a 5-year rolling contract that can be terminated only for a
major rules infraction on the part of the coach. 23 2 Such a contract, even
if it were widened to provide for dismissal on grounds related to academic or other purposes, would provide substantial security for a
teacher-coach. The concept has been followed. Coach Bowden, the
football coach at Florida State University, for example, recently was
23 3
given just such a contract.
The contract could be designed to further other academic and costcontainment objectives, as well. It could limit the time spent by coaches
on outside ventures designed to provide the coach with additional income, but which detract from their efforts as a teacher. It could include
academic progress and support provisions, designed to force the coach
to focus on academic values in handling his or her players. It could even
require that all or a significant portion of outside funds generated by a
coach be used to fund academic support or related programs designed
to assist student-athletes within the athletics program. Laudably, both
Bobby Knight and Dean Smith, basketball coaches at Indiana-Bloomington and North Carolina-Chapel Hill, respectively, allocate all or a significant portion of the funds generated from their shoe contracts to
academic, as opposed to personal, uses. 23 4 The University of Virginia
requires that dollars received for shoe contracts be used for academic
purposes. 23 5 Such rules regarding the academic use of funds generated
by a coach in the performance of his or her responsibilities as an employee of the institution could be mandated by the NCAA. 2 3 6 Indeed,

the NCAA could do much to further such a redirection of funds generated by a coach's relationship with the athletics program to academic
purposes, although it might be contended that such action constitutes
an antitrust violation, in that it restrains competition by limiting compensation for coaches. 23 7 Tenure, in any form, will no doubt put pressure on institutions to extract an economic or related quid pro quo from
Stoner and Nogay, The Model University Coaching Contract ("MCC ")." A Better Starting Point for

Your Next Negotiation, 16J.C. & U.L. 43, 47 (1989).
232.

Prepared Text of Schultz's Convention Address, The NCAA News, Jan. 10, 1990, at 6,

col. 3.
233. Coach Bowden recently was given a lifetime contract, after having held a 5-year
rollover contract. As reported in Columbus Dispatch, Jan. 5, 1990, at 8, col. 1.
234. Brown, Rubber Sole: Should College Basketball Coaches Accept Sneaker Money?, ENT. &
SPORTS LAW. No. 2, at 5.

235. Id.
236. The NCAA already regulates coaches' contracts in a significant way. See NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 16, at 48-50. It would take little effort, but perhaps a great deal of
support, to revise those sections of the Manual to deal with the use of funds. The NCAA
also might require institutions involved in big-time sports to offer coaches a quidpro quo in
the form of designated 5-year rollover contracts.
237. See, e.g., discussion in WEISTART AND LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS. at 759-76
(1979).
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the coach.2 38 As such, it might result in cost savings that would limit the
economic risks to both the coach and the institution related to the "winat-all-costs" mentality that has pervaded contemporary big-time intercollegiate sports. If combined with revenue-sharing for academic purposes, 23 9 it would surely have that effect.
The contract with the coach might also include a covenant not to
compete, or a liquidated damages provision to provide the institution
with compensation for a breach of the contract by the coach. Such a
covenant would limit the attractiveness to an ambitious coach of abandoning his players and a program that has provided a long-term contract. This would also help the institution to do better budget planning,
because it could rely on the term of the contract.
Such reforms to assure academic integrity in the coaching profession will be of little practical impact, even if enacted, unless the institutions have the will to enforce them. For example, North Carolina State
University had a contract provision with Coach Valvano, their basketball
coach, that provided that he could be dismissed and a $500,000 buyout
waived, if major infractions of the NCAA rules occurred in the operation
of his basketball program. However, they lacked the will to enforce
these provisions when it became evident that improprieties had occurred in his program.2 40 Thus, as has been the case with many of the
reforms suggested in this article, a redirection of priorities with regard
to coaches and others in the operation of big-time intercollegiate athletics can come to fruition only when a game plan, rather than a single
play, for reform is initiated.
(9)

Faculty

For such reforms to be viable, faculty must also get more involved
in the operation of intercollegiate athletics at their institutions. Historically, faculty once exercised extensive control over the operation of their
athletics program.2 4 The shift of authority for the operation of intercollegiate athletics away from faculty came in part as a result of a certain
haughtiness and hostility that developed in academic circles for athletics
and athletes. 2 4 2 However, there is a growing and welcome sense on
some faculties that the faculty must be more involved in the day-to-day
operation of their athletics programs to ensure that academic integrity is
238. See Golenbock, Jumping Through Hoops: A Quick Course in College Sports Hypocrisy And 11 Ways to Deal With It, Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1989, at CI.

239. See supra note 113 and accompanying text, for a brief discussion regarding the
need for revenue-sharing.
240. Lederman, N.C. State, supra note 206.
Since this article was written, Coach Valvano and North Carolina State have ended a
10-year relationship with a settlement of $238,509.24 on his contract. Coach Valvano can

potentially earn an additional $250,000 to $375,000 off a separate agreement with the
booster club.
Valvano Leaves N.C. State as Suttonjoin Okla. State, USA Today, April 9, 1990, at 7C, col.

4.
241.
242.

See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45. at 989.
LIPSKY, supra note 26, at 6.
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maintained. 24 3
A recent American Association of University Professor's Report
(AAUP) has urged more faculty involvement in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. 24 4 In that report, the committee suggested that
faculty take a more active role regarding athletics budgets, selection of
athletics council members, and related matters.2 4 5 In a somewhat similar vein, the faculty should be more directly involved in the preparation
and analysis of the self-study that must be prepared by the athletics department and should demand an oversight role with regard to academic
support programs operated by the athletics department. 246
Unfortunately, as was the case with the faculty at SMU, passivity
with regard to the governance of an institution's intercollegiate athletics
program can result in some loss of prestige for an institution's academic
reputation. 24 7 While an otherwise strong institution can regain its reputation, it cannot do so without suffering some lingering tarnish to its
academic image and without actually addressing structural problems
that can become endemic in an athletics program if they are not addressed early enough. As with experience in other areas, preventive
measures are far less costly than measures relied upon after the damage
has been done. Additionally, as educators, faculty members must be
concerned as an ethical or moral matter as to what is being done in
other departments at their institution relative to the education of their
student body. The athletics department should not be exempt from
faculty scrutiny.
(10)

Student-athletes

Support has increasingly been developing for having more student
involvement in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. 24 8 With further evidence that student-athletes want to be successful academically,
as students, 24 9 this development is most welcome and represents a significant change from the 1950's, when student-athletes were routinely
discouraged from "blowing the whistle" on errant athletics
2 50
programs.
At the national level, Schultz has been a supporter of increased student involvement since assuming the position of Executive Director with
243.
244.

See, e.g., Lederman, N. C. State. supra note 206, and SMU REPORT, supra note 71.
Lederman, AA UP Report Urges Bigger FacultY Role in Governing Sports, The Chron. of

Higher Educ., Jan. 10, 1990, at A 1, col. 2 [hereinafter AA UP Report].
245. Id.
246. See Stokes, supra note 202, at 270, indicating that the lesson to be drawn from th
Jan Kemp case is that there is a need for academic professionals to oversee tutorial and
academic support programs.
247. See SMU REPORT, supra note 71, at 43.
248. See, e.g., THIRD FORUM, supra note 17, at 30; Wilford Bailey's call for incorporating
more effective voice for student-athletes in NCAA processes, id. at 63; and Smith, Death
Penalty, supra note 45, at 1052.

249. Former Indiana University President John Ryan has indicated that research has
shown that the "athletes want to be students." The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 17, col.
3, summarizing and discussing AIR research regarding student-athletes.
250. Oliva, supra note 20, at 11.
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the NCAA. 2 5 1 With Schultz's support, the NCAA recently established a
Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, to be made up of 16 students and
3 members of the NCAA Council. 2 52 This Committee is designed to
provide student-athletes with input into NCAA governance.
While a student-athlete advisory committee falls far short of suggestions that student-athletes be appointed personal representation before
the Infractions Committee of the NCAA, a model based on the public
defender system used in our criminal system, 2 5 3 and be permitted to be
directly involved in the NCAA legislative and staff processes, 2 54 it is certainly a step in the right direction. Further involvement by student-athletes in the governance process, either directly or by representatives
selected to defend their interests, would help to ensure that academic
interests of student-athletes would be considered in the legislative and
enforcement processes.
Increased involvement on the part of student-athletes at the conference and institutional levels is also recommended. Student-athletes
should be represented on the athletics and other boards or groups involved in making athletics policy at the institutional level. They also
should take an active role in the institutional self-study process and
should participate on search committees for coaches and other athletics
personnel. Finally, if my prior recommendations regarding accreditation and academic impact statements are adopted, students should be
involved in those processes, as well. Student input need not be dispositive, from a policy-making standpoint, but it should be given weight in
the decision-making process. Not surprisingly, given the lack of representation on the part of student-athletes in the NCAA governance process, glaring inequities in the treatment of student-athletes have
developed. Institutions have been protected in their relationship with
student-athletes but student-athletes lack parity with their institutions.
Student-athletes should be given more security in terms of their
scholarship status. Currently, under NCAA rules, a student-athlete has
only a one-year "contract," which is terminable at will by the institution
after the expiration of that one-year period. 25 5 While a student-athlete
is to be afforded a hearing opportunity before having his or her scholarship terminated, 2 56 that hearing can be before either "the university's
athletics department or its faculty athletics committee," '2 5 7 and the stu251. Early in his tenure, Director Schultz began to argue that student-athletes should
be assembled in regional meetings. See remarks of President Bailey in THIRD FORUM, supra

note 17, at 63.
252. Sixteen student-athletes were selected (eight from Division I and four each from
Divisions II and III, respectively) to serve with three members of the Council on the Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, The student-athletes are to serve for up to two years
after they have used up their eligibility and are to react to NCAA legislation and legislative
proposals. See NCAA Selects Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, The NCAA News, July 19,
1989, at 1.
253. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1050-53.
254. Id.
255. NCAA Bylaw § 15.3.5, reprinted in NCAA MANUAt.. supra note 16, at 143.
256. NCAA Bylaw § 15.3.5.1.1, reprinted in id.
257. Id.
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dent-athlete is provided no substantive protection should the coach
want to replace the student-athlete with another athlete. Procedurally,
the hearings process should be amended to provide for a hearing before
a board that is not dominated by the athletics department and that
includes student-athletes as voting members. Substantively, schools
should be limited in terms of when they can "run off" a student-athlete
or take away the student-athlete's scholarship, by a set of standards related to the student-athlete's academic performance and his or her involvement in practice and fulfillment of legitimate responsibilities as a
member of the team. Existing procedural and substantive infirmities are
exacerbated by an inequality of bargaining power between the studentathlete and the institution. It is not surprising, therefore, that the institution may terminate the student-athlete's contract essentially at will after any academic year, while the student-athlete has no comparable right
to terminate. Indeed, the student-athlete can be precluded from participating in intercollegiate athletics at another institution for a one-year
termiperiod, even in instances when the institution has unilaterally
2 58
nated its scholarship agreement with the student-athlete.
To help insure that student-athletes are not exploited by this onesided process, changes should be made to provide for equity. The student-athlete should be permitted to transfer and receive a scholarship to
play at another institution, without having to sit out a year. Bylaw 14.6.5
expresses the rationale for the rule against transferring, when it notes
that the prohibition is directed to limit contacts of a student-athlete at
one institution by representatives of another institution, without the
permission of the first institution. 25 9 Given this rationale, the proper
penalty for transfers induced by a contact from another institution
should be to take action against the institution inducing the transfer, not
260
against the under-represented student.
Of course, if the institutions were willing to give four- or five-year
scholarships, the rules limiting transferees would be defensible, because
neither side would have the capacity to terminate at will. Lengthier
scholarship agreements also would seem to further academic objectives,
in that they permit an athlete to continue in the academic program of
one institution, without the threat of losing hours through a transfer.
Institutions should be required to bear more of the risk if they erred in
recruiting an athlete who does not prove to have the talent or ability to
258.

Bylaw § 14.6.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 119. See also § 14.6.5,

dealing with four-year college transfers, id. at 124-27, and § 13.1.1.3, id. at 72, restricting
contacts by another institution's athletics staff with a student-athlete when that studentathlete is attending another four-year institution. However, contact may be made if the
institution that the student-athlete currently attends deigns to permit such a contact.
259. Id. Contact may be made if the student-athlete's home institution, the institution
where he or she is matriculating or as to which the student-athlete has signed a letter of
intent, gives its consent to such a contact.
260. Bylaw § 13.1.1.3 provides that such a contact would constitute an infraction of the
NCAA rules. Id. at 72. Indeed, under that rule, the second institution may not provide aid
to the student-athlete who transfers for a one-year period. See G. Schubert, R. Smith &J.
Trentadue, SPORTS LAw 99 (1986) [hereinafter Schubert], for a discussion of potential
legal infirmities related to such restrictive transfer rules and limitations.
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fit into their program that the recruiter believed they would have. The
recruiter has access to more information regarding the fit of the studentathlete with the institution's athletic program. The institution, therefore, should bear the risk of a poor fit rather than the student-athlete.
In a somewhat related sense, institutions should be penalized for or
otherwise prevented from "running players off." Whenever an institution terminates a student-athlete's scholarship, that institution forces the
student-athlete to transfer, with all that entails in terms of adverse academic impact, and may deprive the student-athlete of the funds necessary to continue his or her education. To help deal with this inequity, at
a minimum, institutions should be given only a limited number of scholarships each year. For example, if a basketball program has 16 scholarships, it should only be permitted to offer 4 or perhaps at the most 5
scholarships in any given year. Such a rule would create a disincentive
for an institution inclined to "run off" players who do not turn out to be
as good a fit, in terms of talent and temperament, with the institution's
athletics program and philosophy as the coaching staff anticipated. Incidentally, such a rule would have another positive academic impact: it
would require the institution to work with student-athletes who have academic problems and whose academic eligibility might be limited unless
they are supported in their academic efforts. The number of scholarships overall might be increased, if the NCAA declared freshmen ineligible and permitted institutions to give athletes a fifth year scholarship
and, perhaps, even a sixth year of competition, as recommended else26 1
where in this article.
Student-athletes have little input in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Therefore, it should not be surprising that they have been
subjected to numerous procedural and substantive inequities. Studentathlete involvement in the governance process at all levels should be
increased, and they should be afforded more equitable treatment in a
substantive sense, as well.
c.

The Role in Reforming Big-Time Sports of Entities Outside the
TraditionalIntercollegiateAthletics Governance Process

In addition to the NCAA, conferences and institutions, all of which

are directly related to intercollegiate athletics, governmental and private
entities sometimes get involved in the movement to reform big-time intercollegiate athletics.
(1)

The Federal Government

The federal government has exercised some indirect oversight over
intercollegiate athletics during most of this century. Indeed, the NCAA
was organized, in part, as a response to a call by President Theodore
Roosevelt in 1906 for the reform of intercollegiate football, after a
261.

See discussion infra notes 316-18 and accompanying text.
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number of deaths had occurred during 1905.262 Thereafter, government activity was relatively sparse for over 50 years, but beginning in the
2 63
1970s, involvement on the part of the federal government intensified.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma,264 has had a significant effect on intercollegiate
athletics. While Congressional activity has not resulted in the passage of
federal legislation, it nevertheless has had a significant effect on the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
In its 1990 Convention, the NCAA passed graduation disclosure
legislation, 2 65 in direct response to proposed Congressional legislation
calling for such disclosure. 26 6 That bill, S. 580, which had been sponsored by Senator Bill Bradley and which would have required graduation rate disclosure, had been voted out of committee favorably, by a
vote of fifteen to one. 2 6 7 The NCAA, however, was able to hold off floor
action on the legislation, by promising that they would consider and presumably pass such legislation during the 1990 Convention, to be held in
the coming January. 2 68 In responding to the Committee's report regarding the disclosure of graduation rates, Chancellor Tucker of Texas
Christian University was quoted as having said, "[w]e either take this
action for ourselves or we'll have it done for us. If it is done for us, it
26 9
will be done to us."
In their support of S.508, the Senators asserted that the NCAA had
neglected academic values and had offered only "fitfull progress" in
its reform effort. 270 Similar complaints surface from time to time in
Congress, 2 7 ' and tend to spur on reform of intercollegiate athletics.
Thoughtful Congressional action has had a positive influence in stimulating the process of reform with the NCAA.
Given the positive influence of federal governmental activity in furthering reform of intercollegiate athletics, a game plan for reform could
be supported by conscientious action in the halls of Congress and within
262.

See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 990-91.

263. Id. at 993-94.
264. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). This decision, which limited the NCAA's power relative to the
televising of football games, has had the effect of making the NCAA almost entirely dependent on revenues generated from basketball games to fund its operations, including enforcement and compliance in all sports, and its reform efforts.
265.

See Lederman, NCAA Adopts 3 Major Rules Changes Endorsed by Presidents' Panel, The

Chron. of Higher Educ., Jan. 17, 1990, at Al.
266. S. 580 would require institutions of higher education receiving federal financial
assistance to provide certain information with respect to graduation rates of student-athletes at such institutions. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1.
267. Id. at 3.
268. Schultz Offers Views on Pending Legislation, The NCAA News, Nov. 20, 1989, at 1,col.
4. Schultz argued that the legislation was unnecessary because the NCAA would act and
that governmental interference in the governance of intercollegiate athletics was
undesirable.
269. The Columbus Dispatch, Jan. 9, 1990, at Cl, col. 4.
270. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
271. See discussion regarding prior efforts in Congress to regulate or initiate reform in
intercollegiate athletics, Smith, Death Penalty. supra note 45, at 1035-36.
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the Executive Branch, for that matter. 2 72 In that regard, Congress
should hold hearings in support of a broader reform package, like the
one espoused in this article. Unfortunately, Congress has a tendency to
act on a piecemeal or single play basis, offering suggestions for limited
reform, like the graduation disclosure bill, rather than acting in a more
coherent and broadbased manner. At a minimum, the federal government might put pressure on the NCAA to establish accreditation standards and an academic impact requirement for all legislation. In these
areas, the federal government could regulate by denying financial aid
funds to schools that do not accredit or otherwise promote academic
values in their athletics programs.
Such action by the federal government might induce significant reform on the part of the NCAA and would constitute just the kind of
support needed by those within the NCAA who favor major reform to
ensure academic integrity. Of course, such a dynamic is not without risk
- if the federal government threatens regulation and the NCAA fails to
respond, the federal government would either have to respond by acknowledging that their action was but an idle threat or by passing some
legislation or initiating regulation, thereby entering the realm of intercollegiate athletics regulation.
National legislative pressure is preferable to state or local pressure,
because it provides for uniform application of the rules, and would not
run afoul of the equal competition or level playing field principle. It
might be argued, as well, that national legislative action is less likely to
be subject to the provincial biases that sometimes afflict state and local
2 73
governmental action.
In addition to holding hearings on legislation that would provide
for a major reform package, Congress might consider exempting the
NCAA from antitrust law. In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court has
previously held that the NCAA violated antitrust law when it exercised
2 74
control over the football television package offered by its members.
The Supreme Court's decision in that case has been criticized. 27 5
Whether that criticism is justified or not, Congress should consider exempting the NCAA from antitrust law if the NCAA acts in a manner that
furthers academic values and integrity in sharing the revenues received
from its $1 billion television contract for basketball. If the NCAA comes
up with a revenue-sharing plan that allocates funds in a way that furthers
academic values, Congress should permit it to control television revenues attributable to football, as well, since the CFA, which recently
272. See Schubert, supra note 260, at 100-13, for a discussion of sources of federal regulatory authority related to the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
273. But see Senator Wants Athletes to Stay in School, The NCAA News, May 3, 1989, at 16,
col. 1, for an analysis of Senator Johnston's (D-La.) legislative proposal designed to prevent college athletes from signing professional contracts while attending school. Although
introduced at the federal level, Johnston's bill was provincial in that it was designed to
protect a Louisiana university from losing one of its best athletes to the professional ranks.
274. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
275. See, e.g., Grauer, supra note 64 at 95-99.
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signed a $210 million television contract with ABC, 276 has done little or
nothing to reform athletics in furtherance of academic values.
(2)

State and Local Government

State governments, in particular, have been increasingly active in
passing legislation that regulates intercollegiate athletics. 2 77 They have
278
Of particular interest for
also engaged in significant judicial activity.

an analysis of structural reforms, are recent legislative efforts in Florida 2 79 and Nevada 2 80 that would hold individuals liable if they engage in
activities that cause an institution of higher education in that state to be
punished by the NCAA for a major infraction. That type of legislation, if
applied to board members, presidents, athletics directors, coaches and
others, may help to support academic accountability in the governance
of intercollegiate athletics at institutions in those states.
Similarly, Boards of Regents in various states have taken actions
that could help further academic values in the governance of intercollegiate athletics in their states. For example, the Florida regents have established a class attendance policy for athletes 28 1 and have considered2 82a
requirement that public universities in Florida share bowl revenues.
Illinois has adopted legislation that facilitates the University of Illinois in
its efforts to gain control over its athletics budget. 283 Finally, Washington has adopted legislation to help ensure equity, particularly for women, in intercollegiate athletics.

2 84

Not all state governmental action is equally laudable, however. For
example, the Oklahoma regents recently passed guidelines for athletes
that would make a player charged with a crime ineligible to participate in
intercollegiate athletics.

28 5

That legislation is designed to help clean up

the athletics program at the University of Oklahoma, but it is poorly
focused. It would punish student-athletes, in effect finding them guilty
until proven innocent, and fails to address real academic needs. As out276. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1990, at 45, col. 3.
277. See, e.g., The NCAA News, July 5, 1989, at 16, col. 1 listing pending legislation.
278. See, e.g., Kansas cases, supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text, and cases discussed in Schubert, supra note 260.
279. Florida H. I 1i0 provides that persons involved in the violation of NCAA rules and
regulations must compensate for damages incurred by a university or college penalized by
the NCAA. The NCAA News, July 5, 1989, at 16, col. 1.
280. See supra note 173 and accompanying text, and The NCAA News, July 5, 1989, at
17, for a discussion regarding Nevada A. 563 that provides for a similar cause of return.
281. The NCAA News, Aug. 30, 1989, at 3, col. 4.
282. Florida CEOs Control Funds, The NCAA News, Dec. 20, 1989, at 4, col. 4. Such
revenue-sharing should be tied to academic purposes. The Regents also acted to give
CEOs control over spending at the University to ensure that all income for coaches is
directed through the university. Id.
283. 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. 86-6 provides that "[a] domestic corporation which carries
on athletic sports and promotes athletic interests among students of a state university with
which it is affiliated may be merged into a body corporate and politic which manages and
governs the state university."
284. The NCAA News, July 5, 1989, at 18, col. 3. H. 2020 would provide state funds
for scholarships for women student-athletes to help promote gender equality in intercollegiate athletics.
285. The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 22, col. 1.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2

lined in this article, a state like Oklahoma could do much to reform its
athletics programs, without unduly and inequitably impacting on student-athletes. For example, the Regents might create reporting and accreditation standards for its universities.
State legislators and other governmental officers often are reluctant
to move in the direction of reform for fear that they will jeopardize the
ability of their institutions' athletics programs to compete with institutions outside the state that are not similarly governed. For example, the
Governor in Florida recently called for the establishment of a statewide
athletics control office, but he cautioned that Florida could not act unilaterally in a way that would compromise the ability of the state's institutions of higher education involved in big-time intercollegiate athletics to
compete with schools outside the state. 28 6 Thus, while state and local
action to stimulate reform should be applauded, it would be naive to
anticipate that local or statewide reform will be very significant.
(3)

Private Entities

Private entities also play a role in stimulating reform in intercollegiate athletics. Foundations and other entities concerned with the operation of intercollegiate athletics can be a positive force in reform efforts.
The Knight Foundation recently has funded a blue-ribbon committee to study big-time intercollegiate athletics and to offer suggestions for
reform. 28 7 The study is due during the summer of 1991. The makeup
of this committee almost guarantees that its suggestions will be thought2 88
ful and helpful.
Other foundations and entities could provide support for studies
and for programs initiated at the institutional or conference levels
designed to promote academic values in the operation of big-time athletics programs. For example, foundations and groups familiar with academic support and related issues could offer economic support and
expertise to institutions that conscientiously desire to provide academic
assistance to their student-athletes and to ground their athletics programs in academic values.
Finally, as the NCAA considers how it will spend the revenues generated by the $1 billion television contract, consideration should be
given to providing significant funds for research and development of
programs, at the institutional and conference levels, to further academic
values in intercollegiate athletics. A foundation might be created or
2 89
funded for precisely that purpose.
286. The NCAA News, Nov. 6, 1989, at 3, col. 5.
287. See Lederman, Reform Panel, supra note 72, at Al, col. 1.
288. Id. Father Hesburgh, former President of Notre Dame, and President Friday,
President Emeritus of the University of North Carolina system, are both respected and
knowledgeable figures in the area of intercollegiate sports.
289. The NCAA Foundation "was formed by the Association for the purpose of receiving and administering funds to advance scientific, educational and charitable purposes of
the NCAA." NCAA Executive Regulation 31.9.4, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16,
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(D)

Summary

With a focus on academic values, structural reforms could be effectuated at numerous levels that would improve intercollegiate athletics.
In turn, those reforms can be most meaningful when they are considered as a package, rather than as parts of a reluctant, piecemeal reform
effort. If, indeed, the 1991 Convention of the NCAA is to be reformoriented in a major way, it should consider a package of structural reforms. The NCAA's structural reform effort could be supplemented or
stimulated by prompt and thoughtful governmental demands and foundational support.
IV.

EFFECTUATING ACADEMIC VALUES:

A

BRIEF LOOK AT SOME

CONTEMPORARY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Placing one's focus on academic values in evaluating reform efforts
related to the governance and operation of big-time intercollegiate athletics suggests and casts light upon significant substantive reforms, as
well as structural ones. In this part of this article, I will briefly examine
two substantive issues of contemporary significance and will suggest
how a focus on academic values can inform one's analysis of those issues. This analysis is not intended to be exhaustive either as to the
breadth of the issues covered or as to the depth of analysis as to the
issues discussed. It is, nevertheless, intended to outline an appropriate
analytical approach to such issues.
A. A National Championship in Football
The issue of whether or not there ought to be a national championship in football was raised with some furor again this year, in part due to
lingering doubts with regard to who should be declared the national
champion in 1989. Numerous academics, including Gordon Gee, President of the University of Colorado, 290 are joined by many coaches in
29 1
If
opposing the idea of holding a national championship in football.
created, such a playoff would no doubt be modeled in some fashion after
the national championships at the Division II and III levels and the national championship in basketball, although it is unlikely that the field of
participants would be as large in football as basketball because football
teams play far fewer games and need more time to prepare physically for
a game.
In offering his thoughtful piece opposing a national championship,
President Gee asserted that, "it is clear that calls for a national playoff
game are marked by disregard for academic identity and values and by
at 351. This Foundation provides the shell for such activity and ought to be utilized more
effectively.
290. Gee, A College Superbowl: The Ultimate Sellout, N.Y. Times,Jan. 1, 1990, at 19, col. 2
[hereinafter Gee].
291. In a recent survey of Division I-A football coaches, it was revealed that 28 of 67 of
the coaches responding were opposed to a national playoff in any form. Columbus Dispatch, Jan. 5, 1990.
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unseemly commercialism.' '292 Later in that same article, Gee opined
that, "[t]he drive for success-at-all-costs would only be accelerated if we
added a national playoff game. We in higher education have no business entertaining such notions, for a championship would take us one
step further toward the complete commercialization of collegiate athlet2 93
ics."
Finally, he relates his argument to the needs of student-athletes
when he states that, "[w]e have a responsibility to our students and to
society to seek cost containment and reduction. Even if additional revenue were to be directed to academic programs, those programs would
then become inappropriately dependent upon commercial interests
' 2 94
completely unrelated to academic values or the public interest.
At first blush, President Gee's argument seems to indicate that a
national championship in football necessarily runs counter to academic
values. However, upon further reflection, his argument appears to be
superficial. Broken down into a simple syllogism, Gee's argument runs
something like this: a national championship in football would result in
further commercialization of big-time intercollegiate football; commercialization is contrary to academic values; therefore, a national playoff is
contrary to academic values. Each step in this syllogism is suspect.
First, it is not clear that a national championship would result in
further commercialization of football. With the College Football Association obtaining a $210 million, five year television package, and with the
29 5
vast sums of money earned by teams involved in football bowl games,
it is not clear that revenues or commercialization would be increased if a
national championship were to be held. The bowl field is much wider
than the playoff field would have to be. A national playoff, therefore,
might result in a reduction of revenues.
Second, it is hardly clear that commercialization or revenue production2 9 6 is contrary to academic values. Gee argues that, even if the dollars generated from a playoff were used for academic purposes or in
furtherance of academic values, the end result of such a playoff would be
contrary to academic values. Gee seems to be implying that since funds
would not be received on a consistent basis, schools would be induced
to try to win-at-all-costs to avoid losing the funds that would go to the
winners in any given year. This reasoning is faulty because: (1) the concept of a national championship could be combined with a revenue-shar292. Gee, supra note 290.
293. Id. at col. 4.
294. Id. at col. 6.
295. See, e.g., Lederman, Bowl Game Revenue May Top $57 Million, The Chron. of Higher

Educ., Dec. 6, 1989, at A29.
296. See, e.g., discussion in Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32. In particular,
Donna Lopiano, Associate Athletics Director at the University of Texas, argued that commercialization is neutral. She added, however, that:
We must agree with [those]... who support the notion that the NCAA must con-

trol distribution of NCAA championship profits to benefit all institutions, in the
same way that a multiinstitutional research consortium equitably distributes profits among all members regardless of the institutional affiliation of the researcher

who makes a commercially viable discovery.
Id. at 451-52.
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ing package that would share funds among schools at that level and
direct the vast majority of funds to academic purposes on an annual basis; and (2) even if there were not such revenue-sharing package, it is not
clear that the sporadic receipt of funds would denigrate academic purposes, if funds were used to create an endowment to benefit studentathletes or were otherwise spent wisely. 29 7 Indeed, President Gee is no
doubt involved in fundraising on a regular basis at the University of Colorado and it is unlikely that he would be inclined to turn down a onetime gift of seven figures, simply because receipt of that gift would whet
the appetite of the academic program receiving it. Thus, it would seem
to follow, contrary to Gee's reasoning, that receipt of the funds is, if
anything, neutral, and focus must be directed to how it is spent. Furthermore, if a national championship in football could be tied to academic values and revenue-sharing for such purposes, it might be a
beneficial reform.
What steps should be taken to tie a national championship to academic values? First, to maximize the academic values furthered, such a
championship should be tied to a revenue-sharing program that would
direct revenues or a substantial proportion of the revenues received to
academic purposes. Second, care would have to be taken not to extend
the season in a manner that increased the academic impact on the student-athlete's academic program or progress. In this regard, if the
championship could be tied to a shorter season, as it effectively is in
Divisions II and 111,298 academic values might be furthered. Of course,
if the number of games in a team's season were cut, it might place the
student-athlete in the classroom with more regularity, a fact that seems
to be directly related to his academic performance, 2 99 but it might entail
some loss in revenue to the institution. Where revenue currently is used
for academic purposes, such losses might indirectly inhibit the furtherance of academic values.
If a national championship were included in a reform package, and
was tied to significant revenue-sharing for academic purposes, it might
be a boon to academic values. Indeed, given the sporadic commitment
of dollars to academic purposes and programs by the CFA and others
involved in big-time football, as it is currently organized, a national
championship might be warranted. However, before a playoff is inaugurated, I would want to be assured that it could be tied to academic val297. President Gee seems to be arguing that the receipt of one-time or sporadic funding taints intercollegiate athletics. While receipt of such funds no doubt whets the academic appetite, it need not taint the operation of intercollegiate athletics any more than
the receipt of a one-time grant or gift would taint the operation of another academic department. The funds are not the problem. The way they are monitored and administered,
however, might create problems, particularly if unfair demands are placed on athletics
personnel regarding the need to win-at-all-costs to generate more funds in the future.

298. The Division II and III playoffs end before many of the bowl games are played by
Division I-A schools. Indeed, the season could be structured to have the playoff end
before final exams in the fall semester. Of course, to do so might require a reduction in
conference games, but such reductions certainly are feasible.
299. See Bohrnstedt comments regarding the AIR Report dealing with the performance
of student-athletes in The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 14, col. 2.
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ues. This might be achieved through federal legislation exempting the
NCAA from antitrust liability for televising big-time football on the condition that a substantial portion of the funds generated are used for a set
of clearly delineated academic purposes.30 0 If such legislation were introduced in Congress, it might also stimulate the CFA to use a portion
of its funds for academic purposes, in an effort to sidetrack the legislation. At any rate, such legislation could stimulate meaningful reform.
B.

PayingAthletes

For the past several years, there has been repeated support for the
proposition that student-athletes participating in revenue-producing intercollegiate sports should be paid for their efforts. 30 1 Even some of the
presidents of major universities are now calling for compensation for
athletes involved in revenue-producing sports.30 2 The President of the
University of Washington, for example, recently argued that athletes
should be paid since major revenue-producing sports were little more
than "farm clubs for the NFL and NBA." 3 0° 3 Other commentators have
argued that a semi-professional or minor league should be established,
either within higher education or under the auspices of a separate,
noneducational entity.3 0 4 These arguments for paying college athletes
draw support from the notion that the athletes are more like entertainers than students and, as such, should be compensated for the entertainment they provide.
Short of the actual establishment of a minor league or outright payment of salaries to the athletes, steps already have been taken to increase the value of the scholarships received by student-athletes, at least
where need is evident.3 0 5 In his 1990 State of the Association address,
Director Schultz recently advocated even more aid for student-athletes
involved in big-time sports:
Let's permit institutions to provide athletes all supplies re-'
quired for a course by a professor and approved by the faculty
athletics representative, and let's provide financial aid in Division I up to the cost of attendance, regardless of need. Let's
300. Director Schultz has said that he "would like to get back to where we just play for
the championship and the trophy. If we're going to achieve reform in college sports, we
need to change the model, and the distribution plan is a good place to start." Lederman,

TV Bonanza. If the NCAA initiates such revenue-sharing of basketball revenues for academic purpose, it should be given power, through relaxation of antitrust laws, over televi-

sion revenues for football as well.
301.

See, e.g., Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1053-54, for a discussion of a

number of such proposals.
302. See, e.g., The NCAA News, Nov. 6, 1989, at 5, col. I (Comments of the President at
the University of Washington).
303. Cited in Freshman Ineligibility- Whose Interests Are Served?, The NCAA News, Nov. 6,

1989, at 5.
304.

See, e.g., TELANDER, supra note 7, at 212-21, and Rush, supra note 42, at 589-91.

305. During 1980's, the amount of actual aid received by needy student-athletes has
increased as has the relative value of a college degree. See Vobeja, Relative Value of a College
Degree Soared in 1980s, Wash. Post, May 3, 1989, at A12 [hereinafter Vobeja] and NCAA
Bylaw § 15.2.4, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL supra note 16, at 139, indicating increased support for student-athletes from government grant sources.
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establish an emergency loan system for needy athletes and
transportation expenses home for those who are required to
forgo vacations for reasons of athletics participation.
We should continue to review rules that pertain to elite and
Olympic athletes, including trust funds that would be administered by a national governing body. And we should consider
an endowment fund that would permit30a 6small cash bonus for
an athlete graduating within five years.
With actual moves to increase existing aid and with growing support for
further compensation, it is inevitable that student-athletes involved in
major, revenue-producing sports will be receiving additional compensation, but the form that such payments will take is quite important.
The focus of such compensation should not be on the athlete as an
entertainer but rather should be on the athlete as a student. Compensation should further educational values and objectives. As one former
athlete has noted, "[fjor 99% of scholarship athletes in revenue-producing sport, college education is the primary value desired." 30 7 This observation receives corroboration in the recent independent study of
college athletes prepared for the NCAA - student-athletes, even in rev30 8
enue-producing sports, want to receive an education.
Nevertheless, there are advocates of academic values who still argue
that leagues should be formed using players who are not full-time college students, in recognition of the athlete's right to choose. 30 9 In my
view, if such minor leagues are established, they should be sponsored by
entities outside higher education. Indeed, if there really is a market for
a "minor league" in football and basketball, that talented athletes would
choose over athletic opportunities tied to educational institutions, that
market ultimately should generate such a league in response to existing
demand. In such a league, rather than being compensated with educational opportunity, the athletes could receive actual salaries or
compensation.
Higher educational institutions should not compromise their educational purposes by creating such leagues. Nevertheless, they should do
nothing to prevent an athlete from choosing to leave school to participate in professional sports. 3t 0 Institutions of higher education should
focus the thrust of additional compensation packages on educational
values. Thus, while I agree that student-athletes involved in major, revenue-producing sports should receive more compensation, because they
are responsible for the generation of that revenue and ought to receive
306. The NCAA News, supra note 90, at 6,col. 4.
307. David Meggyesy in LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 120.
308. See NCAA News, Feb, 15, 1989, at 17, and supra note 249.
309. Weistart, supra note 22, at 59.
310. See article regarding the National Football League's relaxation of its rules related
to undergraduate access to the NFI's draft. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1990, at !, col. 4. Student-athletes who desire to go professional should be permitted to do so, although it is
arguable that the NFL. team drafting the athlete should provide him with a scholarship
should he decide to return to school.
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the just fruits of their labors, that compensation can and should be directed to educational purposes.
To begin with, the institutions ought to recognize and share with
the student-athlete the fact that there is value related to the education
they supply. 3 11 Furthermore, they should recognize the fact that student-athletes have significant demands on their time and, therefore, typically take at least five years to graduate. 312 Given this fact, institutions
should be required to provide a five-year scholarship to their athletes. 313 In 1982, an independent Committee established by the NCAA
recommended that student-athletes be given a fifth year scholarship after having used up their four years of eligibility. 3 14 Such a suggestion is
laudable and could be made even more practical, from a cost-containment point of view, by permitting the student-athlete to have five rather
than four years of eligibility. If a rule requiring freshmen ineligibility is
warranted, the scholarship could be for five, or perhaps even six years,
based on some definite academic progress requirements tied to graduation in a timely fashion. Evidence seems to indicate that student-athletes do as well or better academically during the season when they are
participating in their sport, 3 15 thus there would seem to be little harm to
the student-athlete, if we were to extend his or her compensation an
additional year, in exchange for another year of participation.
I opt for this practical approach, that acknowledges the need for
cost-containment, because I agree with Professor Weistart's observation
that reform proposals need to be accompanied by "efforts to reduce and
equalize athletic expenditures among institutions. ' 3 16 I would also provide for further cost-containment by limiting scholarships in minor, nonrevenue-producing sports to aid based on need. In my view, there simply is no reason why well-to-do athletes in minor nonrevenue-producing
sports should receive compensation out of a pool largely generated by
student-athletes in revenue-producing sports. Put more bluntly, it
hardly seems right to take dollars generated by basketball and football
players at the Division I level, a large number of whom are minorities
and individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds, to support
athletes in minor sports who come from more privileged backgrounds.
The only possible exception to this need-based limitation would be major women's sports, which could be subsidized on the basis that such
assistance is designed to remedy past discrimination, although one must
wonder as to whether it is appropriate to fund women's sports out of the
efforts of basketball and football players, many of whom are from disad311. See Vobeja, supra note 305.
312. Given time demands on the student-athlete, five years of study are typically required. See, e.g., The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 12, col. 1,for a discussion of the AIR
Report that tends to confirm this fact.
313. Some schools, including Big 10 institutions, voluntarily give an athlete a fifth year
scholarship after he has completed his athletic eligibility. This voluntary practice should
be made mandatory.
314. 1982 REPORT, supra note 75, at 22.
315. See supra note 249.
316. Weistart, supra note 22.
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vantaged or minority backgrounds. The money saved by reforming
scholarship or financial aid rules in this manner could be used to fund
additional scholarship aid for needy athletes and for academic and related support for these athletes.
Previously, I have argued that student-athletes should be given a
scholarship over the period of their anticipated time of eligibility, rather
than for the one-year period provided for under current rules.3 17 Extending eligibility for an additional year would provide for five years of
scholarship assistance and a five-year educational "contract" between
the student-athlete and the institution. From the student-athlete's point
of view, the only conditions subsequent placed on the term and enforcement of the contract should be that: (1) he or she meets rather stringent
academic progress requirements - these rules should reflect progress
toward a degree on a five, or perhaps, six-year timetable; and (2) he or
she complies with reasonable team rules.
The mandatory five or six-year scholarship, as additional compensation, should be accompanied by further aid or compensation in the form
of academic support. Since the student-athletes generate substantial
18
revenue, and take considerable time out of their study week to do so, 3
they should be supplied with academic assistance, in the form of tutors
supplied and overseen by academic as opposed to athletics department
personnel and study aids such as computer access and training. Meaningful academic compensation could be supplied if study and computer
rooms for athletes were designed that rivaled weight and training facilities currently provided. Indeed, expenditure of funds for such purposes
would send a significant signal to the athletes and others that academics
are important. In extending such academic assistance, care should be
taken to ensure that student-athletes are not entirely separated from the
remainder of the student body; however, such need for integration
should not and need not take precedence over the student-athlete's special academic needs.
By focusing on academic values in compensating student-athletes,
and by coupling that focus with attention on equitable cost-containment,
institutions could help their academic image without incurring additional costs. If revenue-sharing at the national level were designed to
support such an effort, great strides could be taken to limit costs, while
strengthening the academic image of intercollegiate athletics. Such
moves would not detract from either the macro or the micro educational
values that must be central to the operation of intercollegiate athletics
programs and would do much to strengthen those values.
V.

CONCLUSION

The push for the reform of intercollegiate athletics continues.
However, reform efforts have been sporadic and lacking in a coherent
317.
318.

See supra notes 312-15 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., AIR Report discussed in The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 12, col. 1.
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philosophy or theme. No self-respecting coach would ever enter a significant game with a game plan as ill-conceived as the one heretofore
espoused by reformers of intercollegiate athletics. It is little wonder,
then, that reform efforts have seemed almost laughable at times. If the
1990s are to be the era of major reform in intercollegiate athletics, and
institutions of higher education are to retain their academic integrity, a
game plan for reform based-on academic values must be established and
implemented.
In this article, I have discussed the nature ofjust such a game plan.
It is certainly beyond the scope of this article to discuss every aspect of
such reform in detail, but it is hoped that this effort is sufficiently specific
to provide a meaningful game plan for reform efforts in early 1990's.
Even the best devised game plans are revised during the course of the
game, but they nevertheless provide the foundation for what ensues. It
is just such a foundation that has been lacking in reform efforts to date.
Perhaps, educators have something to learn from their coaching counterparts with regard to game plans, and surely everyone in education
can benefit from participation in learning experiences.

DRUG TESTING OF STUDENT ATHLETES: SOME
CONTRACT AND TORT IMPLICATIONS
LEROY PERNELL*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The death of Len Bias' brought home to many of us the stark reality
and grim truth of both the danger and the insidious nature of illegal
drug use. For many, Bias' death symbolized modem athletics, with its
pressures and pitfalls. For others still, stereotypical images of the inner
city student-athlete, more often than not, African-American, were more
firmly entrenched by this tragedy.
Whatever the reaction to Bias' death, it is clear that it heightened
efforts across American campuses to intervene in the life of the studentathlete. Fueled by the perception that drug use is a particular problem
for the student-athlete, 2 drug testing through urinalysis has become the
3
order of the day.
Universities and colleges defend drug testing as necessary to deter
the type of situation that led to the death of Bias. Academic institutions
are also quick to point out that the student-athlete readily consents to
such testing as a quidpro quo for the privilege of participating in athletics
and for the significant financial advantage of a scholarship.
The establishment of drug testing as part of the life of the studentathlete has not been without controversy. Particular concern has been
raised where government involvement occurs in the context of state
university administered drug testing programs 4 or where the quasi-governmental nature of intercollegiate regulation imposes such testing requirements. 5 Much of this concern centers on the fourth amendment
*

Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University College of Law. B.A. 1971,

Franklin & Marshall College; J.D. 1974, Ohio State University College of Law.
1. Len Bias died on June 19, 1986. His death and that of Cleveland Brown's defensive back Don Rogers, on June 27, 1986 sparked strong public reaction. See Reilly, When
the Cheers Turned to Tears, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 14, 1986, at 28.
2. The public perception of drug use among athletes stems from initial inquiries by
The National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") concerning the use of performance enhancing drugs in the 1970's. See Comment, Drugs, Athletes, and the NCAA: A Proposed
Rule for Mandatory Drug Testing in College Athletics, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 205 (1984). Only
in more recent years has attention turned to "recreational" drug use, i.e. marijuana and
cocaine. However, a 1985 study by the University of Michigan indicates that marijuana use
among student-athletes ranged from 25% to 35% as opposed to 42% among all students.
Cocaine use was estimated to be the same (17%) for student-athletes and non-athlete students. W. ANDERSON AND D. MCKEAG, SUBSTANCE ABUSE HABITS OF COLLEGE STUDENT
ATHLETES, INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN (1985).
3. See Pernell, Random Drug Testing of Student Athletes By State Universities in the Wake of
Von Raab and Skinner, IJ. NAT'L SPORTS L. INST. 201 (1990).

4. Id.
5. In the fall of 1986 the NCAA enacted a comprehensive drug testing program that
requires all student-athletes participating in NCAA championship play to submit to a
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implications of drug testing as a search and seizure. Thus, private colleges have not faced the same level of constitutional scrutiny. 6
Discussion in the past centered on the concept of consent. 7 Consent is an issue often raised as the answer to fourth amendment constitutional challenges. 8 Consent can, however, be of significance in another
context as well. 9
Consent plays a significant role in contract and tort law. It is in this
context that very little has been discussed relative to drug testing of student-athletes. Yet momentary reflection suggests that consent in this
classic context has a significant role to play in the brave new world of
urinalysis on demand.
Consider for a moment the typical student-athlete entering college.
In almost all cases the student is asked in his or her senior year of high
school to make significant choices concerning not only what college to
attend, but also to agree to the terms and conditions imposed by the
institution. These conditions are most often a prerequisite for obtaining
grants-in-aid or other forms of financial support. Decisions concerning
these choices and acquiescence to these conditions are most often
sought from individuals who are no more than eighteen years old.
Consent to the university requirement of drug testing is most often
required of the entering freshman prior to his or her first day on campus. Universities are particularly apt to require such testing in the high
visibility, revenue producing, intercollegiate sports.' 0
Public attention regarding athlete drug use has centered on football
and basketball. The Black student-athlete, disproportionate to his or
her presence in society, accounts for a significant percentage of the rosscreening for use of prohibited drugs. The NCAA plan calls for the testing of athletes from
member institutions "who compete in NCAA Championships and certified post-season
football contests." NCAA Exec. Reg. 1, § 7(a). Eighty substances are included in the testing protocol including psychomotor stimulants (cocaine and amphetamines), sympathomimetic amines, miscellaneous central nervous system stimulants, anabolic steroids,
diuretics, street drugs, including heroin and marijuana, and substances banned for particular sports. Whether or not constitutional issues are applicable to the NCAA program is
beyond the scope of this article. However, it should be noted that the NCAA was determined not to be a state actor under the fourteenth amendment in NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109
S.Ct. 454 (1988). In Tarkanian, the Court found that no state action existed as to the

NCAA, even though a state university carried out its disciplinary policy against the
plaintiff.
6.
7.

See Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d 49 (1989).
See Scanlan, Playing the Drug Testing Game: College Athletes, Regulatory Institutions, and

the Structure of ConstitutionalArgument, 62
8.

IND.

L. J. 863, 930-42 (1986-87).

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1977) states:
(1) One who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his
interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting
from it.
10. The University of Illinois, Indiana University, University of Michigan, Northwestern University, Ohio State University, Purdue University, and the University of Wisconsin
all have some form of drug testing. Some schools including Ohio State test all athletes. All
of the indicated schools test athletes in at least the revenue generating sports of basketball
and football. See Drug-testinga Hot Topic Among Big 10 Coaches, Chi. Tribune, Aug. 4, 1986, at

6.
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ter in these activities. This student is often poor, and perhaps poorly
prepared to resist the temptation to agree to almost anything for the
opportunity to "make it" in intercollegiate athletics.
If the issue of consent, beyond the constitutional consideration, is a
significant one then it would make some sense to explore the implication
of asking young high school students, often poorly equipped to make
intelligent or voluntary choices, to give such consent.
It is the intent of this article briefly to note some issues that may
arise concerning the enforceability of this consent as a matter of contract
law, and to consider the extent to which consent will shield the university from tortious liability. To do this it will be necessary first to explore
the contractual nature of the relationship between the student-athlete
and the university and then to discuss the consequences of enforcement
of such a relationship. The tort law analysis of consent will examine the
public policy implications of allowing consent to serve as a barrier to
liability for the intrusive nature of drug testing. Finally the article explores ways of eliminating "questionable" consent and of allowing for
the administration of drug testing in an environment in which free, intelligent choice exists.
II.

THE STUDENT-ATHLETE AND THE UNIVERSITY -

THE CONTRACTUAL

LINK

The legal relationship between the student-athlete and the univer-

sity is, to some extent, a smaller part of the larger question of the relationship between the university and students in general. Traditionally
the courts were reluctant to interfere with academic relationships.' I Social changes during the past forty years have caused the legal system to
pay closer attention to issues pertaining to the business and administrative function of the university. These changes, particularly in the areas
of civil rights and consumer protection, have brought about increased
concern regarding student rights, and in particular, the student's
status. 12
11. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968), the Court states:
Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation
raises problems requiring care and restraint.... By and large, public education in
our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities. Courts do
not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily
operation of school systems ....
This doctrine of academic abstention, by which courts have deferred to educators and
administrators, as applied in the university context is discussed in depth in Nordin, The
Contract to Educate: Toward a More Workable Theory of the Student-University Relationship, 8J. C.
& U. L. 141 (1981-1982).
12. Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) represented a major undermining of Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In unanimously finding that an all black law school was
unequal in facilities, curriculum, reputation and professional opportunity, to the then all
white University of Texas, Sweat served as the forerunner of Brown v. Board of Ed. of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Civil rights concerns also served as a basis for judicial scrutiny of university operation in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)
and the earlier cases of Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) and Sipuel
v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
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The theories initially relied on for judicial intervention grew, in
large part, from the involvement of the state in education. Thus, early
cases focused on due process as it applied to state-run or state-sponsored schools. 13 However, attempts to apply the same due process prin14
ciples to private institutions have met with little success.
In response to the difficulties in applying across the board due process analysis, courts have offered various other theories for determining
5
the rights and duties between the student and the university.1
Contract theory is the most popular method used to support student claims against colleges. In Perett v. State of Montana, 16 the court
described the theory by reference to a Notre Dame Lawyer note 17 which
stated in part:
This contract is conceived of as one by which the student
agrees to pay all required fees, maintain the prescribed level of
academic achievement, and observe the school's disciplinary
regulations, in return for which the school agrees to allow the
(1961) is often thought to be the first modern case recognizing a judicial willingness to
intercede in the relationship between a student and the educational system. In Dixon, the
court noted that in regard to expulsion, the student must be given the rudimentary trappings of due process. For a more complete discussion of the growth ofjudicial intervention see Nordin, supra note 11,. at 142.
13. The issue of whether the activities of a state school are state action for purposes of
constitutional analysis was resolved by the Supreme Court's analysis in New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In T.L.O., the Court found that a search conducted by a state
high school principal was state action for purposes of the fourth amendment. Further, the
Court recognized the application of due process to the state campus in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring due process in suspension and expulsion proceedings) and
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (applying due process to the administration of
corporeal punishment).
14. In Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967) the court held that,
"[i]t is clear ...

that the principle ...

that a Government college or university may not

expel its students without notice of charges and an opportunity to be heard, is not applicable to Howard University, for it is not a public institution nor does it partake of any governmental character." Id. at 612. See also Krohn v. Harvard Law School, 552 F.2d 21 (1st
Cir. 1977).
15. Professor Nordin indicates that theories ofloco parentis and fiduciary relationships,
among others, have been used to describe the relationship between the student and the
university. Nordin, supra note 11, n.5.
The loco parentis theory suggests that the university serves in the place of the parent
and can exercise the control that a parent could when dealing with their child. See Gott v.
Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913). Such a theory has obvious drawbacks in
a modern higher education context where the age of majority is achieved at eighteen, and
where even minors are recognized as persons for purposes of individual rights. Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
The "fiduciary" theory is illustrated by the language in People ex rel. Tinkoff v. Northwestern University, 333 Ill. App. 224, 77 N.E.2d 345 (1947) in which the petitioner sought
mandamus to require his admission to the university. The petitioner contended that the
university wag a private corporation "entrusted" with a public interest as evidenced by its
charter granted by the legislature. This argument was rejected as was the petition for
mandamus.
16. 464 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Mont. 1979), revd on other grounds, 661 F.2d 756 (1981).
In Perettistudents of an aviation technology course brought suit regarding the termination,
due to budget cuts, of their course. The court held that an implied contract existed between the parties that could be enforced as a protected right under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
17. Note, Expulsion of College and Professional Students - Rights and Remedies, 38 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 174 (1963).

1990]

DRUG TESTING OF STUDENT ATHLETES

student to pursue his course of studies and be granted a diploma upon successful completion thereof.' 8
Although such contracts are seldom in writing, the court accepted
the notion that the existence of the contracts is implied, and that the
terms can be found in the university bulletins and through the custom
and usages within academia. 19
Similarly, in Lowenthal v. Vanderbilt University,20 the court found that
was inapplicable where the allegathe doctrine of academic abstention
2
'
contract.
of
breach
of
tion is one
The contract theory as a basis for judicial intervention, while used
often, has not escaped criticism. The contract theory has been criticized
as inappropriate because the student-university relationship does not reflect "a true bargaining and promise orientation ' 22 associated within
the classic theory of contract. It is apparent that the application of conapply printract theory reflects in many instances a disguised attempt 2to
3
ciples of due process to both public and private settings.
18. Id. at 183.
19. See also Krasnow v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 414 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. Va. 1976);
Papish v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 331 F. Supp. 1321 (W.D. Mo. 1971),
aff'd, 464 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1972); Andersen v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 531 (1972); Balogun v. Cornell Univ., 70 Misc. 2d 474, 333 N.Y.S.2d 838 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1971).
20. No. A-8525 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Davidson County Aug. 15, 1977). Discussed in detail
in Note, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An Application of Contract Theory, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 96, 108-09 (1985).

21. The case arose from the student/plaintiff allegation that the failure of the university to provide an announced innovative program within the Graduate School of Management, breached a contract to provide competent educational services. Once again, the
court found that contract terms may be implied from the school's bulletin, doctoral studies
guidelines, and other official statements.
22. Dodd, The Non-ContractualNature of the Student- University Contractual Relationship, 33
KAN. L. REV. 701, 730 (1985). Professor Dodd argues that "the lack of a true business,
bargained-for relationship between student and educational institution is a major reason
why contractually based analysis is not fully appropriate .. " Id. at 704. As evidence of
this, the article points out that the traditional rules of offer and acceptance do not fit the
university setting. Student expectations of performance, in Professor Dodd's view, do not
normally rise to the traditional strength necessary to constitute contractual promise. Id. at
724.
Despite her criticism, Professor Dodd does note that the modern law characterizes the
relationship between student and university as primarily contractual. Id.at 702.
23. The early cases of contract law application to the student-university relationship,
often involved matters of discipline which today would be resolved, in the public institutional setting, as a matter of due process. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Due
process on the campus is not, however, unlimited. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (restricted to non-academic decisions); see Note,
Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. L.J. 253, 265-67 (1972) (inapplicability to the private campus).
Typical of contract approach to disciplinary issues is Goldstein v. New York University, wherein the court states:
But obviously, and of necessity, there is implied in such contract a term or condition that the student will not be guilty of such misconduct as would be subversive
of the discipline of the college or school, or as would show him to be morally unfit
to be continued as a member thereof. The power of suspension or expulsion of
students is an attribute of government of educational institutions. It was ample in
this case.
76 A.D. 80, 83, 78 N.Y.S. 739, 740-41 (1902).
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Whatever uncertainty may be raised by the student-university relationship in general, it is certain that the relationship between the university and the student-athlete is indeed contractual.
A student-athlete certifies his intent to attend a NCAA member institution by executing a National Letter of Intent ("Letter"). 24 The Letter obligates the student to attend only the indicated institution. Any
enrollment in another institution within one year of the execution of the
Letter results in intercollegiate ineligibility for two years, unless the initial institution formally releases the student. 2 5 The bargained for exchange is the offering of financial aid.
The National Letter of Intent serves as the athlete's acceptance of
the university's offer. By signing, the athlete accepts the specific terms
that are in the Letter, as well as those that are part of the previous
course of dealings between the college and the student-athlete.
In Taylor v. Wake Forest University,2 6 in what is considered to be the
leading case on the issue, 27 the court held that the relationship between
a student-athlete and the university was contractual. In Taylor, the plaintiff received a football scholarship contingent on his compliance with the
rules of the Atlantic Coast Conference, the NCAA and Wake Forest University. Both the university and the athletic associations required that
Taylor attend practice sessions in order to maintain his eligibility.
Because of poor grades Taylor quit the football team after his freshman year. As a result, Taylor's scholarship was cancelled. The failure of
Taylor to participate in football was the reason given for termination.
In an action brought to recover the cost of Taylor's subsequent education, 28 the court found that the relationship between the university
and the student-athlete was contractual, and that "in consideration of
the scholarship award, [Taylor] agreed to maintain his athletic eligibility,
and this meant both physically and scholastically. ' 2 9 Because Taylor
breached this contract by failing to attend practice, the court held that
the university was not liable for its promise to provide a scholarship.
The court found that the terms of the contract were drawn not only from
the grant-in-aid application filed by the plaintiffs3" but also from oral
24. The National Letter of Intent program was devised by the NCAA to deter "school
jumping." See Sturrup v. Mahan, 290 N.E.2d 64, 68 (Ind. 1972). The Letter indicates the
adverse consequences that may befall the student who attempts to attend, within the prohibited period any school other than the one named in the Letter.
25. NCAA Bylaw l-2-(a)-(2)-(vi) (1988).
26. 16 N.C. App. 117, 191 S.E.2d 379 (1972), cert. denied,' 192 S.E.2d 197 (1972).
27.

See G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH ANDJ. TRENTADUE, SPORTS LAW 40 (1986).

28. Interestingly, the plaintiff sought recovery apparently for "wrongful termination"
of the athletic scholarship. As such the action would appear to sound in tort as well as
contract. See Woods and Mills, Tortious Interference with an Athletic Scholarship: A University's
Remedy for the Unscrupulous Sports Agent, 40 ALA. L. REV. 141 (1988).
29. 16 N.C. App. at 120-22, 191 S.E.2d at 382.
30. The application entitled, "Atlantic Coast Conference Application.For A Football
Grant-In-Aid Or A Scholarship" stated in part: "This Grant if awarded, will be for 4 years
provided I conduct myself in accordance with the rules of the Conference, the NCAA, and
the Institution. I agree to maintain eligibility, for intercollegiate athletics under both Conference and Institutional rules." Id. at 380.
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agreements entered into between the plaintiffs and Wake Forest. 3 '
In Begley v. Corporation of Mercer University,32 the court again found
that a contract existed between the plaintiff Begley, a basketball player,
and the university. Begley received a grant-in-aid in exchange for his
participation in the basketball program. The university withdrew its
scholarship award after discovering a miscalculation of Begley's high
school average. In finding that the university was entitled to rescind its
promise to provide a scholarship, the court read into the terms of the
contract the NCAA requirement that grant-in-aid awards may only be
made to students with entering averages higher than that of the
33

plaintiff.

Taylor and Begley both support the contention that the relationship
between the university and the student-athlete is contractual since athletic services are offered in exchange for a scholarship. Such a contract
can be implied and will be interpreted in light of the expectations and
34
promises of the parties.
The recognition of the contractual relationship between the student-athlete and the university, both as a matter of express and implied
contract, is more easily achieved than the recognition of the same relationship between the university and the student body generally. As
stated in the Columbia Law Review
The terms and conditions by which a student athlete goes to
college are markedly different from those that govern the general student body. First, non-athlete students are under no
specific written contract to follow the rules and regulations of
the university. Student athletes, on the other hand, are under
written obligation, the terms of which are specified in both the
National Letter of Intent, which compels attendance at the designated institution, and the financial aid statement, which stipu31. Weistart and Lowell raise the issue of whether the recognition of a contract based
on a financial aid award violates the concept of amateurism and in addition note: "If an
award is granted in exchange for participation, the arrangement could be viewed as a vocational arrangement - that is, as compensation for personal services. And if the award is
compensation for services, then the athlete might also be an 'employee' of the institution
for workmen's compensation purposes." J. WEISTART AND C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS

11 (1979).
For further discussion of the concept of the student-athlete as an employee see, University of Denver v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 432 (Colo. 1953) (injured football
player was an employee for purposes of workmen's compensation); Van Horn v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963) (football player killed in a plane accident
while returning from a game held to be an employee for family compensation purposes).

32. 367 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
33. Id.
34. The rationale of Taylor and Begley has been followed in practically all cases that
have since litigated the rights and responsibilities between student-athletes and the university. See Gulf South Conference v. Boyd, 369 So.2d 553 (Ala. 1979). The court stated:
It should be noted that the relationship between a college athlete who accepts an
athletic scholarship and the college which awards such an athletic scholarship is
contractual in nature. The college athlete agrees to participate in a sport at the
college, and the college in return agrees to give assistance to the athlete. The
athlete also agrees to be bound by the rules and regulations adopted by the college concerning the financial assistance.
Id. at 558.
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lates the specific terms and conditions of the scholarship.
These documents impose rules and regulations upon the student athlete in excess of those ordinarily implicit in the rela35
tionship between the university and the non-athlete student.
If the special relationship between a college and a student-athlete is
contractual in nature, of what significance is a required consent to drug
testing in the overall contractual relationship?
A.

Consent to Drug Testing as a Contractual Term

Terms of a contract may be implied as well as specifically stated.
Terms may be implied from the surrounding circumstances, the standard terms and the history of the course of dealings between the parties. 36 In the student-college relationship it is traditional for the terms
of the contract to be derived not only from expressed agreements between the parties but from other documents expressing intent - such as
the college catalog. 3 7 The contractual relationship between the studentathlete and the university builds upon this general approach by including all documents, agreements and rules that evidence the responsibili38
ties of each party to the other.
The typical consent to drug testing required by university athletic
programs is the type of agreement or term that is implicitly part of the
contract between the student-athlete and the university. 39 The language
of such consent is exemplified by the forms used by Ohio State Univer41
sity4 0 and the University of Illinois.

The Ohio State form emphasizes that the student's consent to drug
35. Note, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An Application of Contract Theory, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 96, 104 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
36. J. CALAMARI ANDJ. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 56 (3d ed. 1987); A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS 525 (1952).

37. Davenport, The Catalog in the Courtroom: From Shield to Sword?, 12J.C.U.L. 201, 206
(1985) states: "Beginning in the 1890's, courts have held that the relationship between a
college and its students is fundamentally a contractual one and that the school's catalog is
the main document setting forth the terms of the legal contract."(footnotes omitted).
38. Thus in Taylor, 16 N.C. App. at 117, 191 S.E.2d at 379 (1972) the contract terms
were derived from the rules of the Atlantic Coast Conference and the NCAA as well as the
grant-in-aid application signed by the plaintiff. In Begley, 367 F. Supp. at 908 (E.D. Tenn.
1973) Begley's failure to obtain the requisite high school grade point average implicitly
breached the rules of the NCAA and Mercer University which were read as part of the
contract. In Gulf South Conference v. Boyd, 369 So.2d 553 (Ala. 1979) the court enforced
the athletic association by-laws regarding the transfer of students as part of the contract
between the student and the university.(The court held that the university could not declare the student ineligible because of a transfer from one conference school to another.).
See also Barile v. University of Virginia, 2 Ohio App.3d 233, 441 N.E.2d 608 (Ohio Ct. App.
1981) (finding that the Interconference Letter of Intent evidenced and was part of the
contract between the university and the student-athlete).
Of particular significance to this article is Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713,
532 N.E.2d 49 (1989). Student-athlete Bally refused to sign the consent to drug test and
was not allowed to participate in the track program. The university prevailed on its claim
of breach of contract because of the student's refusal to sign the Northeastern University
and NCAA consent forms.
39. See Batty, 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d 49.
40. See Appendix A.
41. See Appendix B.
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testing is "in consideration for the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athletics at The Ohio State University.''42 The Illinois program,
while not using the classic consideration term for contractual intent,
speaks of consent as the bargained for exchange required for athletic
43
competition.
Required consent as the quid pro quo for the receipt of a benefit particularly where the delivery of a personal service is involved - is traditionally found to be an implicit term of contract. Thus in Larsen v.
Motor Supply Company, 44 the court enforced as a term in a contract for atwill employment, the employer's standardized consent form for a psychological stress evaluation test.
However, if we accept drug testing consent requirements as implied
contractual terms, whether and to what extent such terms will be judicially enforced, must be determined. Such a determination involves an
evaluation of contractual rules pertaining to the intent of the parties as
well as those rules concerning the enforceability of the terms. In this
regard it is necessary to examine the application of traditional rules of
contract avoidance including duress, undue influence and unconscionability.
1.

Drug Testing Consent and the Doctrine of Duress

The concept of duress speaks to the free will of a party entering into
a contractual agreement. 45 The modern rule is "that any wrongful act
46
or threat which overcomes the free will of a party constitutes duress."
The determination of free will, for contract purposes, is made by looking to the particular person and determining if that person's will has
been overcome. 4 7 In the context of the student-athlete it must be determined if the university, through a wrongful act or threat, has overcome
48
the will of the student-athlete at the time of requiring consent.
Duress also turns on whether the coercive party is unjustly enriched. In this context the issue of whether intercollegiate athletics exploit the athlete for the economic gain of the university is particularly
49
germane.
42. See Appendix A.
43. The Illinois form states:
I also understand that my participation in intercollegiate athletics is conditioned

upon my full and good faith participation and cooperation in all aspects of the
program including testing, education, counselling and rehabilitation. See Appendix B.
44. 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977).
45. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 25 Il1. 2d 181, 185 N.E.2d 706, 709 (1962).
46. J. CALAMARI ANDJ. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 337 (3d ed. 1987).
47. See Silsbee v. Webber, 171 Mass. 378, 50 N.E. 555 (1898).
48. The age and sophistication of the student-athlete has an important role to play in
determining the strength of his or her will. In 1980, 72.6% of entering freshmen were 18
years old. Only 6% were 20 or over. Dodd, The Non-ContractualNature of the Student-University ContractualRelationship, 33 KAN. L. REV. 701, 715 (1985).
49. There seems to be little question that the economic benefit of athletics to the
university far exceeds any economic gain of the unpaid student-athlete. See McKenzie and

Sullivan, Does the NCAA Exploit College Athletes? An Economic and Legal Reinterpretation, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 373 (1987); Yasser, Are ScholarshipAthletes At Big-Time Programs Really Univer-
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But most importantly, duress requires that the act or threat be
wrongful. 50 Regarding requiring drug testing consent, two issues are
raised concerning the "wrongfulness" of the university's activity or
threat.
First, by requiring the student-athlete to consent to drug testing
under pain of loss of scholarship or non-participation, the university
forces the student to waive significant constitutional and common law
rights to privacy. 5 1 Such a forced waiver, at least in terms of the state
university, may well be wrongful because of the doctrine of unconstitu52
tional conditions.
Second, the modern trend in determining duress emphasizes the
exercise of a legal right "in oppressive or abusive ways" 5 3 as Calamari
and Perillo state in describing an employee who may legally be fired
without cause:
[A] threat to fire him unless he agrees to sell his shares of stock
in the employing corporation back to the employer constitutes
an abuse of the employer's rights and the employee who succumbs to the threat may recover his shares if the trier
of fact
54
finds that the employee had been coerced by threat.
Like the employee above, the student-athlete, although not entitled
to a scholarship or to intercollegiate competition, may be the victim of
duress if his or her consent to drug testing is obtained by threat of loss
of those privileges.
sity Employees?-You Bet They Are !, 9 BLACK L.J. 65 (1984); Note, Compensationfor Collegiate
Athletes: A Runfor More Than The Roses, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 701 (1985).
50. The Restatement of Contracts addresses what may constitute wrongful threats for
purposes of duress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (1979) (regarding
when duress by physical compulsion prevents formation of a contract), RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (1) (1979) (regarding when a threat is improper) and in particular, for purposes of this article, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (2) (1979)
which provides:
A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly
benefit the party making the threat,
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of assent is
significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat,
or
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for intellegitimate ends.
51. See Pernell, supra note 3. As to the common law right to privacy and drug testing
at the private university. See Bally v. Northeastern University, 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d
49 (1989).
52. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has its roots in the 1925 decision of
Frost Trucking Co. v. Railway Comm'n., 271 U.S. 583 (1925):
It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state,
having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as
it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited;
and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditiofis which require the
relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of
one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel
the surrender of all. It is conceivable that the guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.
Id. at 593-94.
53. J. CALAMARI ANDJ. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 340 (3d ed. 1987).
54. Id. at 340.
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If duress exists, the remedy for the student is to void the contract. 5 5
In this instance only the contract provision for consent to drug testing
need be voided. In addition, the student may invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court to reform the contract or to grant such other equita56
ble relief as may be required.
2.

Drug Testing Consent and the Doctrine of Undue Influence

Undue influence as an equitable concept was developed as a means
of setting aside a contractual agreement imposed by a dominant party
upon a subservient one. 5 7 Unlike duress it requires no proof of a
wrongful act or a threat. Instead, what must be shown is that one party
used its superior psychological position to induce the subservient party
to consent to an agreement that the latter would not have otherwise con58
sented to.
Calamari and Perillo speak of four elements that make a primafacie
case of undue influence: 59 (1) susceptibility of the party influenced; (2)
evidence of the opportunity to exercise influence; (3) evidence of a disposition to exercise undue influence; and (4) evidence of the unnatural
nature of the transaction. Applied to the requiring of drug testing consent, undue influence appears to have validity.
The mental status of the influenced party plays a significant role in
determining susceptibility. The young high school athlete presents a
mentally vulnerable subject. It is hard to imagine a more impressionable person than an eighteen year-old high school student-athlete without prior experience asserting individual rights. It is ironic that the very
universities which have questioned the academic preparation of the high
school athlete, 60 now expect the same student to demonstrate the
mental maturity necessary to bargain and consent on an issue as complex as drug testing.
The opportunity to exercise undue influence normally connotes a
confidential relationship. 6 1 It is unclear whether the confidentiality
often alleged to exist in a university drug testing program qualifies as
the type of relationship conducive to undue influence. Even if it does
not, the relationship between a school and a student may still meet the
requirement of undue influence.
55.

Id. at 349.

56. Id. at 349-50.
57. J. CALAMARI ANDJ. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 351 (3d ed. 1987).
58. Id. at 352.
59. Id. at 352-53. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1979).
60. At the NCAA annual convention in 1981 amendments purporting to "restore academic credibility to the postsecondary career of the student athlete" were adopted. Widener, Suits by Student-Athletes Against Collegesfor Obstructing Educational Opportunity, 24 ARiz. L.
REV. 467 (1982). These amendments followed in the wake of documentation of the educational shortcomings of many college athletes. See Axthelm, The Shame of College Sports,
NEWSWEEK, September 22, 1980, at 50, and Sanoff, Big-Time College Sports: Behind Scandals,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., April 5, 1982, at 60.
61. See Note, Use of Non-confidential Relationship Undue Influence in Contract Recision, 49
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 631, 632-33 (1974).
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In Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District,6 2 the coerced resignation of a
school teacher for unproven homosexual activity was found to be the
product of undue influence. The teacher was weakened by forty hours
without sleep. The court stated: "The difference between legitimate
persuasion and excessive pressure, like the difference between seduction
and rape, rests to a considerable extent in the manner in which the par63
ties go about their business."
If the teacher can succumb to the coercion then so can the student.
Like the teacher in Odorizzi, the student is often faced with the demand
that consent be given at once and without question. Like the teacher,
the student lacks an advisor and may not have the opportunity to consult
anyone other than a parent who may know even less than the student
about dealing with the forces of higher education.
Third, the fact that the university almost always takes the initiative
in both contacting the student and in requesting consent is significant
64
Finally, the unevidence of a disposition to exercise undue influence.
natural nature of the transaction is evidenced by the uniqueness of drug
testing. The current public attention regarding drug use and the intimate nature of the testing procedure, make consent to urinalysis a
strange transaction indeed.
As with duress, the remedy for undue influence in drug testing consent lies in equity. The student that successfully establishes this claim
may void that provision of the contract or demand that the scholarship
portion be specifically performed.
3.

Consent to Drug Test and Unconscionability

Perhaps the contract doctrine most suitable to drug testing consent
analysis is unconscionability. Unconscionability is a concept that,
although defying precise definition, 6 5 prevents the enforcement of contracts or contract clauses that are grossly one-sided. In Weaver v. American Oil Company, 6 6 one of the leading cases on the doctrine, the court
held that if the substantial burden of the contract or clause is on a party
in a weaker bargaining position, the superior party must demonstrate "a
real and voluntary meeting of the minds and not merely an objective
meeting."67
Superior bargaining power, while alone not sufficient to make a
contract unconscionable, will result in the provision being struck if there
62. 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966).
63. Id. at 134, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
64. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 55, at 353.
65. Calamari and Perillo state: " 'Unconscionable' is a word that defies lawyer-like
definition. It is a term borrowed from moral philosophy and ethics. As close to a definition as we are likely to get is 'that which affronts the sense of decency.' " Id. at 406 (quoting Gimble Bros., Inc. v.Swift, 62 Misc. 2d 156, 307 N.Y.S.2d 952 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970)).
66. 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971).
67. Id. at 464, 276 N.E.2d at 148.
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is a lack of meaningful choice. 68 The typical student-athlete often
presents the classic example of a weak bargaining position with no
meaningful choice. The student-athlete is totally dependent on the university for financial aid. As a result of the Letter of Intent, 69 the student
may not market his or her skills to other institutions without severe penalties. The mandatory nature of drug testing consent and the widespread existence of programs throughout the major institutions, leaves
the student with no realistic choice but to sign.
Closely aligned with substantive unconscionability is the modem interpretation of contracts of adhesion. 70 Although the concept of adhesion developed primarily as a response to the general common law
"duty to read,"' 7 1 modern courts have found that such contracts may be
unconscionable, even if technically "read." In Weaver v. American Oil Co.,
after finding the contract to be one of adhesion the court stated:
When a party can show ... the contract ... to be ...an unconscionable one, due to a prodigious amount of bargaining power
on behalf of the stronger party, which is used to the stronger
party's advantage and is unknown to the lesser party,. . . the
contract provision, or the contract as a whole, if the provision is
not separable, should not be enforceable on the grounds that
72
the provision is contrary to public policy.
The student-university contractual relationship has been compared
to a contract of adhesion by several commentators. 73 Courts also have
viewed the relationship between the college and the student in adhesion
terms. 74 As Professor Dodd notes, the nature of the written materials
setting forth the contract terms lend themselves to classic adhesion
analysis:
[T]he various written materials that constitute the contract between student and university, a school's catalogues, circulars
68. See Campbell Soup v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
69. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
70. The term contract of adhesion refers to standardized, pre-printed contracts,
merely providing blanks to be filled in or signed by the non-drafting party. See Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629
(1943).
71. The traditional duty to read rule indicates that a party who signs an agreement is
deemed by their actions to have read and understood the document. See Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757 (2nd Cir. 1946). In contracts of adhesion, courts have
found the duty to read to be inapplicable where the "clause was in fine print and contained
no title heading .
Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 461, 276 N.E.2d 144,
147 (Ind. 1971).
72. 257 Ind. at 464, 276 N.E.2d at 148. See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
73. Dodd, The Non-ContractualNature of the Student-University Contractual Relationship, 33
U. KAN. L. REV. 701, 714 (1985); Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A
Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643 (1966);Jennings, Breach of Contract Suits by Students Against
Postsecondary Education Institutions: Can They Succeed?, 7 J.C.U.L. 191 (1980-81).
74. See Corso v. Creighton Univ., 731 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1984). "[T~he contract is
on a printed form prepared by one party, and adhered to by another who has little or no
bargaining power .. " See also K.D. v. Educational Testing Serv., 87 Misc. 2d 657, 386
N.Y.S.2d 747, 751-52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
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and bulletins, are not drafted to be contracts. The information
so disseminated is written most often by school administrators,
not lawyers, and one wonders if the drafters themselves, much
less student readers, perceive that the documents are contractual materials. At least the typical consumer who must sign a
contract of adhesion, although she may not comprehend nor
truly agree to the terms it contains, is presumably aware that
the proffered document is a legal 75instrument creating certain
duties on the part of both parties.
The plight of the student-athlete is even greater. Included in the
various materials such as catalogs and bulletins are rules and regulations
of the respective university specifically aimed at athletes and rules and
requirements of the various athletic associations. Very seldom are the
forms associated with these materials, including the drug testing consent
form, explained to the student as legal documents containing binding
contractual terms.
Dodd also points out that the public policy concern over oppression
is enhanced by the youth of the subservient party. 76 Although most students are past the age of majority upon entering college, they still lack
77
the life experience necessary to make intelligent contractual decisions.
B.

Avoiding ContractualProblems in Obtaining Drug Testing Consent

The foregoing discussion suggests that the current practices relating to obtaining consent for drug testing create potentially serious contractual problems. The private school can no longer breathe a sigh of
relief because it has avoided the constitutional problems faced by its sis78
ter state university.
However, the contractual problems raised are not necessarily insurmountable. There are several courses of action that a college concerned
with the rejection of its drug testing consent program can pursue.
First, recognition of the source of contractual difficulty is essential.
The concept of oppression is the central concern of duress, undue influence and unconscionability. Removing oppression from the drug testing consent process is thus the primary goal of any attempt to prevent a
voidable contract.
Oppression in drug testing is characterized as the invasion of a student's substantial rights by denying him the opportunity to choose between options. Severe penalties for non-consent, and the absence of a
reliable source of information and advice for the student called upon to
make the choice, also results in oppression.
Second, choice and relief from severe penalty and advice are both
factors that can be addressed by concerted university action. Choice,
sufficient to remove oppression, may be accomplished by making drug
75.
76.
77.
78.

Dodd, supra note 73, at 714-15.
Dodd, supra note 73, at 715.
Cf. Ryan v. Hofstra Univ., 67 Misc. 2d 651, 324 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
See Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d 49 (1989).
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testing truly voluntary. Proponents of mandatory drug testing might
claim that a truly voluntary program would not work as a deterrence for
those involved with drug use. However, a student-athlete involved with
one of the "major" sports lives under constant scrutiny. His or her conduct is monitored by other students, faculty and the media. The student-athlete, recognizing the importance of image may be highly
motivated to demonstrate a "clean bill of health" without being required to provide urine on demand.
Universities might also consider the possibility of not making scholarships contingent on consenting to drug testing. In addition to providing an opportunity for choosing to submit to testing, such an approach
has the added advantage of not coupling the relinquishment of the right
not to be tested with the contractual consideration, scholarship. An alternative "penalty" might be to link drug testing solely with intercollegiate competition. It has long been recognized that the student-athlete
has no vested right to compete and such is not the basis of the
79
contract.
Finally, the use of an independent advisor would meet the concern
expressed in Odorizzi, 80 providing a shield against undue influence, and
would also allow the student to make an informed choice. The concept
of an advisor does not necessarily mean a lawyer. 8 ' However, the complexity of the issue may well require not only an adult, but also a person
with a fair amount of sophistication.
While the above might be a good starting point for evaluating drug
testing, it in no way guarantees that such programs will be risk free for
the university. In addition to the uncertainty as to whether contract law
hurdles may be overcome, there are some questions of tort liability that
have not received much consideration.
III.

SOME COMMON LAw TORT IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG TESTING

Consent has significance in tort as well as contract. 8 2 Valid consent
83
can protect the university from tort liability.
79. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Gillard, 352 So.2d 1072 (Miss. 1977);
Colorado Seminary v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo.
1976), aff'd, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978).
80. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
81. The onerous nature of the student-school contract was, of course, greatly
lessened in previous eras when the contract frequently was between the parent
and the school. A person who is a parent would be an older person and presumably more aware than a student would be of the nature of the contractual relationship with the school.
Dodd, supra note 73, at 717.

82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (1977) provides:
(i) Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur. It may be manifested by
action or inaction and need not be communicated to the actor.
(2) If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as
consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact.

83.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 892A (1977) states:

(i) One who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his
interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or harm resulting
from it.
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Drug testing exposes the university to liability that far exceeds mere
negligence.8 4 While constitutional liability is problematic, 8 5 the sensitive nature of the information gathered and the privacy interest of the
test subject create a significant potential for liability in many jurisdictions if confidentiality is not strictly maintained.86
The effect of a signed consent for drug testing on potential liability
for invasion of privacy under the common law is an area of inquiry that
has to date been neglected. In light of the widespread use of drug tests,
the potential for liability in this area should be considered.
A.

The Common Law Right to Privacy and Drug Testing

Of the existing causes of action in tort, common law claims of invasion of privacy present the greatest likelihood of liability for the university.8

7

Privacy, or the right to be let alone, is the student-athlete's

88
interest that is most jeopardized by mandatory drug testing.
The right to privacy, as a common law cause of action, is a concept
which includes four distinct claims. 8 9 Of these four, the two that are
particularly relevant to drug testing are: (1) unreasonable intrusion

(2) To be effective, consent must be
(a) by one who has the capacity to consent or by a person empowered to
consent for him, and
(b) to the particular conduct, or to substantially the same conduct.
(3) Conditional consent or consent restricted as to time, area or in other respects
is effective only within the limits of the condition or restriction.
(4) If the actor exceeds the consent, it is not effective for the excess.
(5) Upon termination of consent its effectiveness is terminated, except as it may
have become irrevocable by contract or otherwise, or except as its terms may
include, expressly or by implication, a privilege to continue to act.
84. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail the always existing potential for liability that may occur as a result of physical injury or mistaken findings that are
the product of negligent administration of the testing procedure.
85. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (1989); Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (1989) (allowed the drug testing of
employees of the government, or who were subject to government regulation, thus opening the door to constitutional drug testing).
86. The common law now recognizes that physical intrusion into the solitude or private affairs of another is actionable as an invasion of privacy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B (1977). Liability also exists for the public disclosure of private facts. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962). Invasion of privacy
claims such as these, and as discussed infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text, should not
be confused with constitutional invasion of privacy claims arising under federal or state
constitutions. See Note, The NCAA Drug-Testing Program and the California Constitution: Has
California Expanded the Right of Privacy?, 23 U.S.F. L. REV. 253 (1989).
87. Liability for negligence based causes of action are of course a real possibility, particularly if erroneous test results are generated. See Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps.,
27 Cal.3d 916, 616 P.2d 813 (1980) (defendant hospital was liable for negligent inflection
of emotional distress as a resul " of erroneous interpretation of venereal disease test).
88. See, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890):
[Mian, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual;
but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy,
subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by
mere bodily injury.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977) states:
(1) one who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the
resulting harm to the interests of the other.
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upon the seclusion of another, and (2) unreasonable publicity given to
the other's private life.
Intrusion upon seclusion requires proof that the defendant intentionally intrudes upon the private affairs of others in a way that would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.9 0
In Bednarik v. Bednarik,9 1 the right to privacy principle was applied
to invalidate an illegal compulsory blood test. Bednarik involved an action where the petitioner sought a court ordered blood test of both parties and a minor child. In denying the request the court found that "to
subject a person against his will to a blood test is ...clearly an invasion
'92
of his personal privacy."
O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America, Inc.93 also upheld the application of
this theory of invasion of privacy to a testing situation. Interestingly, for
purposes of this article, the plaintiff brought suit for invasion of privacy
after his employer forced the plaintiff, under threat of being fired, to
take a polygraph examination relating to alleged drug use.
Applied to the drug testing of student-athletes, there can be little
doubt that urinalysis, the preferred method of testing, involves an intrusion into a classic area of seclusion. Nor can there be any question that
reasonable people would find the observation of urination and collection of one's urine by another, for non-medical purposes, to be highly
offensive as the court stated in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private
than the passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally
performed without observation; indeed, its performance in
94
public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in sec.
652B; or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness, as stated in sec. 652C; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated in
§ 652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public, as stated in sec. 652E.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976) states: One who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the

intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
In Housh v. Peth, 135 N.E.2d 440, 450 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955) the court defined the cause
of action as one where there is "wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such

manner as to outrage or to cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of
ordinary sensibilities."
91. 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80 (1940).
92. Id. at 90. Although the taking of a blood sample is clearly at invasion of a privacy
interest, today modem civil discovery would allow for court ordered physical examinations
including such test. See FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a).

93. 780 F.2d 1067 (1st. Cir. 1986).
94. 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987). Quoted with approval by the United States
Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1413
(1989).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2

Urinalysis, as an invasion of the seclusion of another, was specifically addressed inJennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc..95 InJennings, the
plaintiff brought suit against her employer seeking injunctive relief to
prevent required drug testing by urinalysis. Although the court found
that the cause of action for invasion of privacy was barred by the plaintiff's consent, 9 6 the court characterized the plaintiff's common law right
to right to privacy, "to be free of any unwarranted intrusion into-her
private affairs," '9 7 as undeniable.
A person's right to privacy can also be violated when his private life
is exposed to unreasonable publicity. To constitute an invasion, the disclosure must involve private facts that are highly offensive and objectionable to the public. 9 8
A headline such as "star quarterback not to play in big game after
team takes drug test" could fall within the meaning of the restatement as
to publicity given to private life. Most university programs indicate that
drug testing results are for use by team personnel or by the player's
family only. 9 9 However, the imposition of team or school sanctions may
be as revealing to the press as direct access to the information. The
fishbowl existence of the "major" college athlete results in little privacy
for the athlete. At the same time there are few things that can be more
damaging to the professional career of an athlete than to be associated
with drugs. Witness the fate of the Canadian runner Ben Johnson. 100
The Massachusetts Supreme Court considered the issue of public
disclosure of private facts regarding the drug testing of student-athletes
in Bally v. Northeastern University. 101 Although the plaintiff's cause of action arose under a Massachusetts statute, as opposed to common law,
the court construed a claim to exist only if there is a public dissemination of information. The plaintiff failed to present any evidence that information regarding his participation in drug testing was exposed to the
public.
The university again escaped liability in Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper.10 2 In Bilney six basketball team members brought suit as result of a
story that appeared concerning their academic standing. Like drug testing information, actual academic performance is considered confidential. The plaintiffs' cause of action against the newspaper failed because
the information was divulged by an unnamed source at the university
and not the newspaper.
95. 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
96. See infra notes 103-112 and accompanying text.

97. Jennings, 765 S.W.2d at 500.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976) provides:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
99. See Appendix A and B.
100. See Ben Johnson Worlds Fastest Scapegoat, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1988, at A27.
101. 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d 49 (1989).
102. 43 Md. App. 560, 406 A.2d 652 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
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It is likely that the issues confronted by the courts in Bally and Bilney
will arise again without the impediments encountered by the plaintiffs in
those cases. When they do, the court will have to determine what significance, if any to give to signed consent.
B.

Signed Consent and Tort Liability

03
As noted earlier, consent, if valid, will bar recovery in tort.'
Whether the consent to drug testing discussed above will be viewed as
effective in tort, depends on the considerations of several factors.
Consent, for the purpose of excusing tort liability, is defined as a
willingness for conduct to occur that is manifested by action or inaction. 104 Consent embodies the concept of volenti nonfit injuria,'0 5 and as
such falls within the realm of assumption of risk.
To be effective, consent must not be the product of duress.' 0 6 The
tort concept of duress would appear to be broader than the contract
definition. 10 7 Consent was found to be a bar to a right to privacy claim
in Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, 10 8 regarding an employment required drug testing program. However, Jennings apparently did not
claim that her consent was the result of duress or that it was in any way
involuntary.
There is a close relationship between consent and assumption of
risk. This close relationship raises a significant issue of whether public
policy concerns, sufficient to void express assumption of risk agreements, will also nullify similar express consent provisions.
In Tunkl v. Regents of University of California,10 9 the court confronted
a signed release that sought to shield the defendant medical center from
all liability arising from the negligence or wrongful acts of its employees.
The court found that such provisions were against public policy if (1) the
subject of the agreement involved a business generally suitable for public regulation, (2) the party seeking exculpation is involved in providing
a service of great importance to the public, (3) the party seeking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage in bargaining position, and (4) the
person seeking this service places himself under the control of the party

103.
104.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1977).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (1977) states:

(1) Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur. It may be manifested by
action or inaction and need not be communicated to the actor.
(2) If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as
consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact.
105. To one who is willing no harm is done.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (3) (1977).

107. Unlike the contract definition discussed above, tort duress applies to any conduct
of the actor which constrains another's will and makes the giving of consent involuntary.
Comment j. to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (1977) states:

Duress is constraint of another's will by which he is compelled to give consent
when he is not in reality willing to do so. Persuasion amounting to a form of
constraint can take various forms and many of them, commonly encountered in
daily life, are without legal effect and are not normally characterized as duress.
108. 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
109. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441 (1963).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2

seeking exculpation.' 10
The transition from exculpatory clause to consent was made in Beeck
v. Tucson General Hospital,I I where a surgical consent signed by the
plaintiff, prior to surgery, which stated that all doctors providing services were independent contractors was held invalid under the Tunkl
principle. 112
If a similar transition between exculpatory clause and signed consent is made regarding university required consent to drug test, then
Tunkl may pose significant problems regarding the enforcement of that
consent in a right to privacy action.
The applicability of Tunkl is limited to the type of business that is
generally suitable for public regulation. The defendant in Tunkl was a
university and, like all universities was subject to considerable regulation. The importance of the university to the athlete and the public in
general, as a source of education is great. The decisive advantage of the
bargaining position of the university vis-a-vis the student has already
been discussed, and indeed forms the heart of the problem. For good
or for ill, the student surely places his or herself in the hands of the
university for their academic and athletic future.
It is by no means certain that signed consent will protect universities from invasion of privacy liability. Nor is it certain, that the university
will be adequately protected by its current consent policy. What is certain, is that more thought and planning regarding potential liability beyond search and seizures claims must be considered.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As the smoke settles from the initial furor over drug testing and its
constitutionality, universities must now consider the impact of the more
traditional legal theories of contracts and torts. The recognition of the
relative lack of bargaining power of the student-athlete, regarding the
significant intrusion of privacy that drug testing creates, leads to serious
problems of oppression and coercion.
The common law doctrines of duress, undue influence and unconscionability are ripe for application in the contract milieu of universitystudent transactions. Planning and awareness of these factors may lead
to a more equitable balancing of the relationship.
The significant interests of privacy must not be assumed to have no
life beyond the constitutional inquiry. The common law protection of
privacy may provide greater protection for the student than might be
found to exist by constitutional edict. The university must be vigilant in
guarding the confidentiality of the student and at the same time work to
assure a greater role for free choice.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 447.
18Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972).
Id. at 167, 500 P.2d at 1155.
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APPENDIX A
CONSENT TO TESTING OF URINE SAMPLES
AND
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE PF
INFORMATION

To:

Team Physicians
The Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio 43210

I hereby acknowledge that I received a copy of The Ohio State University Intercollegiate Athletics Drug Education Program. I further acknowledge that I have read said program, and that I understand the
provisions of the program.
In consideration for the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athletics at The Ohio State University, I am entering into this the terms of
this consent and authorization.
I do hereby give my consent to have a sample of my urine collected
during the school year of 1986-87, and testing for the presence of certain drugs or substances in accordance with the provisions of The Ohio
State University Intercollegiate Athletics Drug Testing Program. I also
consent to have a sample of my urine collected and tested at such other
times as analysis testing is required under the program during the academic year. I further authorize you to act as my physician for the limited
purpose of conducting analysis testing under the program and agree
that you may make a confidential release of the results of the testing to
the head athletic trainer at The Ohio State University; my parent(s) or
legal guardian; the head coach of any intercollegiate sport of which I am
a member; and the athletic director of The Ohio State University. To
the extent set forth in this document, I waive any privilege I might have
in connection with such information.
I understand any urine samples will be sent to the Clinical Laboratory at
The Ohio State University Hospital, for actual testing.
In consideration for the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athletics at The Ohio State University, I also release from legal responsibility or liability The Ohio State University, its Board of Trustees, its
officers, employees, representatives, and agents for the release of such
information and records as authorized by this form.

Signature

Name (Please Print)

Date
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APPENDIX B
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAM
ADOPTED BY THE

A.A.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS AT A

SPECIAL MEETING -

MAY

23, 1985

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAM AND LIMITED WAIVER OF
CONFIDENTIALITY

I,
, a student at the University of Illinois, Urbana Campus,
as a condition to participating in the Intercollegiate Athletic Program
conducted under the auspices of the Athletic Association, do hereby
consent to participate in the Substance Abuse Program. I acknowledge
that I have received, read and understand the policy statement concerning this program, which includes provisions for testing through non-invasive procedures for the presence of substances, education and
counselling with regard to substance abuse, and disciplinary sanctions
which might be imposed as a result of this program if it is determined
that I have violated the provisions and intent of the policy.
Further, I understand that as part of the program, the results of this
testing may be disclosed to the coaching staff, the support staff and to
my parent(s) or legal guardian(s) as provided for in the program statement. I also understand that my participation in intercollegiate athletics
is conditioned upon my full and good faith participation and cooperation in all aspects of the program including testing, education, counselling and rehabilitation.
I further expressly waive any rights under applicable state or federal
laws, or University policy, including but not limited to The Family Education and Privacy Act (20 USC 1232g), the physician-patient privilege,
to the confidentiality of the information and documents resulting from
my participation in this program, to the extent that disclosures are made
as pursuant to the program statement. It is understood that the information will not be available to any other person without first obtaining
my consent.
Signed this

Witness

day of

,

19.

Student

48

PROPOSITION

AND THE BUSINESS OF

INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: POTENTIAL
ANTITRUST RAMIFICATIONS UNDER THE

SHERMAN ACT
DEBORAH E. KLEIN*
WILLIAM BUCKLEY BRIGGS**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Intercollegiate athletics have been extensively criticized for failing
to establish and adhere to satisfactory academic standards for student
athletes. I In response to such pressure, the National Collegiate Athletic
Association ("NCAA") Division I and II institutions have adopted certain academic requirements which must be met by incoming freshman
athletes in order for the athletes to be eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics. These requirements, referred to in the vernacular as
"Proposition 48," were first introduced in 1987. The effect of Proposition 48 is to limit the Division I and II universities' ability to permit the
athletes who do not meet the requirements to participate in intercollegiate athletics, during the athletes' freshman year, although the students
may attend a Division I or II university on scholarship or may participate
athletically at a junior college or a non-Division I or II school. 2 Thus,
* Attorney for the Federal Trade Commission. A.B. 1982, University of Michigan;
J.D. 1988, University of Toledo College of Law. The views expressed in this article do not
represent those of the Federal Trade Commission or of any individual commissioner.
** Visiting Associate Professor at the New York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations at Cornell University. Lecturer, University of Pennsylvania Law School. B.S.
1976, Cornell University; M.A. 1978, George Washington University; J.D. 1982, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, recently conducted an examination of NCAA statistics on graduation rates of football and basketball
players, at the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, one of the sponsors of the Student
Athlete Right To Know Act. Many Athlete Graduation Rates Below 2076, N.Y. Times, Sept.
10, 1989, at 1, col. 2. The study is divided into a section covering the 103 schools classified as Division 1-A in football and another section covering the 97 of those 103 schools
that also had basketball programs. Id. Data was collected from September 1982 to September 1987 and the graduation rate was based on the completion of degree requirements
within five years. Id. at 18, col. 1.
A draft of the report shows that 35 of the 97 schools surveyed for basketball had
graduation rates of 0 to 20 percent among players; that 33 colleges had graduation rates of
21 to 40 percent; 11 had graduation rates of 41 to 60 percent; 10 had graduation rates of
61 to 80 percent; and 8 had graduation rates of 81 to 100 percent. Id. at 18.
For example, Deion Sanders, former defensive back for Florida State University,
helped lead his team to a victory in the 1989 Sugar Bowl, despite the fact that he had
stopped attending classes months earlier, had taken no exams and had passed no courses.
Sanders was able to compete because he had enrolled in classes for the semester preceding the Sugar Bowl. The Old College Lie: Slavery, Hypocrisy and The Campus Athlete, Philadelphia Enquirer, Oct. 15, 1989, (Magazine), at 36.
2. A college's decision to admit a student is independent of any restrictions Proposition 48 may place on the student's ability to participate in athletics. "[Proposition 48]
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Proposition 48 has the effect of limiting the athlete's ability to compete
3
in his or her sport for one year.
Recent developments suggest that the application of the federal
antitrust laws to institutions such as colleges and universities may be
appropriate. 4 The Justice Department is investigating whether certain
colleges and universities, by setting similar levels of tuition and financial
aid, are in violation of the antitrust laws. 5 This article will focus on a
potential antitrust challenge to the NCAA's Proposition 48 under federal antitrust laws by a male college basketball player who is ineligible to
compete under Proposition 48. Do the presumably "good motives" of
the NCAA in adopting Proposition 48 pass antitrust muster, or are the
anticompetitive implications of Proposition 48 too broad to withstand
scrutiny? It should be noted that the type of analysis contained herein
may be applicable to other arguably anticompetitive restrictions imposed by the NCAA.
For the purposes of determining athletic eligibility, the 1989-90
NCAA Manual divides entering freshmen into three categories: Qualifiers, partial qualifiers and nonqualifiers. Under Section 14.3.1.1 of the
NCAA Manual a qualifier is defined as:
establishes a minimum standard only for athletics eligibility; it is not a guide to a student's
qualifications for admission to the institution. Under NCAA legislation, a student's admission is governed by the regularly published entrance requirements of each member institution." GUIDE TO THE COLLEGE FRESHMAN ELIGIBILITY SC REQUIREMENTS FOR NCAA
DivisIoN I AND II INSTITUTIONS 11 (1989).
3. See McKenna, A Proposition With a Powerful Punch: The Legality and Constitutionalityof
NCAA Proposition 48, 26 Duo. L. REV. 43, 68-78 (1987), for a comprehensive statistical
analysis of the effect of Proposition 48 on various conferences and schools.
4. A Wesleyan University student, Roger Kingsepp, has filed a class action suit in
federal district court in New York against Wesleyan and I1 other private universities and
colleges. Kingsepp v. Wesleyan University, Civil Action No. 89-6121 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6,
1989). See also Student Sues WesLeyan on Tuition-Fixing, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1989, at 21, col.
4. Kingsepp contends that the colleges "engaged in a conspiracy to fix or artificially inflate
the price of tuition and financial aid." Id. On behalf of all students affected by the practice, Mr. Kingsepp seeks treble damages under section one of the Sherman Act.
5. The justice Department has sent formal requests for information to "about 20"
schools to determine if those colleges and universities fixed prices in violation of the Sherman Act. U.S. Investigates Prestigious Universities, Colleges for Possible Antitrust Violations, Wall
St. J., Aug. 10, 1989, at B4, col. 3. John Burness, a vice president of Cornell University,
one of the schools under investigation, stated that:
[H]igher education is the only industry that has as its fundamental purpose the
open exchange of information. From accreditation reviews to curriculum and the
publishing of research results, we openly share information with institutions with
which we compete for faculty and students. Our admissions publications, for example, state clearly that we discuss financial aid policies and practices. We believe these policies and practices are legal.
Suit Charges Tuition-Fixing, Cornell Alumni News, Nov., 1989, at 12-13.
According to a recent account, "at least 57 of the nations' most prestigious private
colleges and universities are the subject of the inquiry." Like Fall Applicants Colleges Await
Fate, Wash. Post, April 7, 1990, at 1, col. 4.
TheJustice Department's New York office has reportedly begun an inquiry into activities of United States Swimming, the national governing body for that sport. Inquiry Into
Antitrust Allegations, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1989, at 41, col. 4. The inquiry is based on allegations that United States Swimming interfered with an attempt by the New York Amateur
Sports Alliance to sponsor a swim meet. There are also allegations that United States
Swimming operates as a monopoly. Id.
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one who is a high school graduate and who presented the following academic qualifications:
(a) A minimum cumulative grade-point average of 2.000
(based on a maximum of 4.000) in a successfully completed
core curriculum 6 of at least 11 academic courses, including at
least three years in English, two years in mathematics, two years
in social science, and two years in natural or physical science
(including at least one laboratory class, if offered by the high
school).7

(b) A minimum 700 combined score on the Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT), verbal and math sections, or a minimum
15 composite score on the American College Test (ACT). The
required SAT or ACT score must be achieved under normal
testing conditions.

8

A qualifier is eligible to receive financial aid and participate in intercollegiate athletics in his of her first academic year.
A partial qualifier is a student who does not meet the requirements
for a qualifier, but who presents a cumulative grade-point average of at
6. Core curriculum requirements for Division I schools must be met as of the time of
graduation from high school. For division II schools, core curriculum requirements must
be fulfilled prior to initial enrollment at a collegiate institution. See NCAA MANUAL
§ 14.3.1.1.2.1(a) and § 14.3.1.1.2.1(b) (1989-90), respectively.
7. The record of the above courses and course grades must be certified on the high
school transcript or by official correspondence. See NCAA MANUAL § 14.3.1.1 (a) (198990).
8. In addition to § 14.3.1.1 (Proposition 48), the NCAA has also introduced for consideration what has become known as Proposition 42. Proposition 42 states in part that:
(2) An entering freshman with no previous college attendance who matriculated
as a nonqualifier in a Division I institution and whose matriculation was solicited
per § 0.1.100 shall not be eligible for financial aid, regular-season competition
and practice during the first academic year in residence, except that a high school
graduate who presents an overall accumulative minimum grade-point average of 2.000 but
who fails to present the required grade-point average in the core curriculum and achieve the
required test score may receive financial aid based upon institutional and conference regulations. A nonqualifier orpartialqualifiershall be entitled to three seasons of eligibility per Bylaw 5-1 -(d) subsequent to the initial year of residence at the certifying
institution. (Emphasis in original).
This restriction applies to Division I schools only. Proposition 42 also states that:
(3) An entering freshman with no previous college attendance who matriculated
as a nonqualifier in a Division I institution and whose matriculation was solicited
per § 0.1.100 shall not be eligible for regular-season competition and practice
during the first academic year in residence; however, such a student whose admission and financial aid were granted without regard in any degree to athletic ability
shall be eligible for nonathletic financial aid, provided there is on file in the office
of the director of athletics certification by the faculty representative, the admissions officer and the chair of the financial aid committee that admission and financial aid were so granted. A nonqualifier orpartialqualifier shall be entitled to three
seasons of eligibility per Bylaw 5-l-(d) subsequent to the initial year of residence
at the certifying institution.
At the NCAA annual convention in January, 1990, the NCAA voted 258-66-1 to adopt
a new regulation, Proposition 26, in lieu of Proposition 42. N.C.A.A. Eases Its Restrictions on
Aid to Athletes, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1990, at 1, cols. 3-4. The new regulation would still
prevent incoming freshmen who fail to achieve minimum college-entrance exam scores or
a 2.0 grade-point average from receiving athletic scholarships and from participating in
sports for one year. Proposition 26 does, however, allow these student-athletes to receive
financial aid based on their family income. Id.
This article does not address the legality of or the issues involved in either Proposition 42 or Proposition 26.
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least 2.000, based on a 4.000 scale, at the time of graduation from high
school. 9 A partial qualifier may receive financial aid from the institution,
but may not practice or compete during his or her first academic year. '0
A non-qualifier is a student who either has not graduated from high
school, or who presented neither the core curriculum grade-point average and SAT/ACT score required for a qualifier, nor the grade-point
average required for a partial qualifier. II A non-qualifier is not eligible
for competition or practice during his or her first academic year. 12 The
above requirements apply to Division 113 and Division 1114 institutions,
but do not currently apply to Division III 5 schools. Although the regulations establish a minimum standard for athletic eligibility, admission to
the university is nevertheless governed by the entrance requirements of
the member institutions. t 6 Accordingly, the only possible waiver of
these initial eligibility requirements for Proposition 48 students must be
initiated through the member institution after the prospective student
has been admitted. 17 The waiver must be "based on objective evi9. See NCAA MANUAL § 14.02.9.2 (1989-90) (defines partial qualifier).
10. Id. at § 14.3.2.1.
11. Id. at § 14.02.9.3 (defining non-qualifier).
12. Id. at § 14.3.2.2.
13. Division I membership requirements are delineated in the NCAA MANUAL § 20.9
(1989-90). These requirements include a minimum of six varsity intercollegiate sports,
including at least two team sports, involving all male teams or mixed teams of males and
females, and a minimum of six varsity intercollegiate sports, including at least two team
sports involving all-female teams. NCAA MANUAL § 20.9.3.3 sets out the minimum
number of contests required for team sports and individual sports. Section 20.9.4 lists the
requirements for Division I in basketball scheduling.
14. Division II requirements are set out in NCAA MANUAL § 20.10 (1989-90). A Division II school must sponsor four varsity intercollegiate sports, including at least two team
sports, for both male and female teams. Section 20.10.3.5 lists the minimum contests and
participants necessary for qualification as a Division II institution.
15. Division IIImembership is defined in § 20.11. A school must sponsor four varsity
intercollegiate sports, including at least two team sports, for both males and females. Section 20.11.3.2 sets out the minimum contests and participation requirements.
16. In a survey of 2348 college presidents, deans and admissions officers, conducted
by U.S. News and World Report, almost one of every four respondents admitted, "the
issue of separate admission standards for athletes had created conflict or controversy" at
their institutions. A New Era on Campus, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Oct. 16, 1989, at

56-57.
17. Under NCAA regulations, a student does not possess an independent right to
appeal an ineligibility determination under Proposition 48. See GUIDE TO THE COLLEGE
FRESHMAN ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR NCAA DIVISIONS I AND II INSTITUTIONS, Mar.

1989, at 10-11. The waiver requirements provide that:
[T]he NCAA Council Subcommittee on Initial-Eligibility Exceptions may grant
exceptions to the initial-eligibility requirements of this legislation based on objective evidence that demonstrates circumstances in which a student's overall academic record warrants the waiver of the normal application of this regulation. All
appeals under this regulation must be initiated through a member institution that
has officially accepted the prospect for enrollment as a regular student. Prospective student-athletes should contact the involved member institution for more information concerning this waiver process.
An exception also may be granted for a student who left high school after
completion of the junior year or during the senior year to enter a Division I or II
member institution under an early admissions program solely on the basis of outstanding academic performance and promise. An exempted student must have
maintained an accumulative 3.500 grade-point average and must have ranked in
the top 20 percent of the class for the last four semesters completed in high
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dence" demonstrating circumstances warranting such a waiver.' 8
Though there would seem to be several bases on which a student-athlete
could challenge Proposition 48, a recent Supreme Court case has significantly weakened the likelihood of a successful constitutional challenge
to this legislation. In ruling on the constitutional issue involved in
NCAA v. Tarkanian,19 the Supreme Court seemed to have resolved the
issue in favor of the NCAA. The Supreme Court rejected the argument
that the NCAA is a state actor for constitutional purposes, which appears to dramatically limit the opportunity for an athlete to challenge
Proposition 48 on constitutional grounds. 20 In Tarkanian, the issue was
whether the NCAA's participation in the events leading to Jerry
Tarkanian's suspension as basketball coach at the University of Nevada
Las Vegas ("UNLV") constituted state action as prohibited by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment 2 l and were performed
under color of state law within the meaning of Section 1983.22 The
Tarkanian Court noted the dichotomy between state action under the
2 3
fourteenth amendment and private conduct.
The Court found that the NCAA was an organization independent
school. In addition, all requirements of a qualifier (core curriculum and test
scores) must be met except graduation from high school.
Id.
18. For example, Eric Manuel, once a player at the University of Kentucky, was ruled
ineligible to compete in intercollegiate basketball by the NCAA for having allegedly
cheated on his ACT entrance exam. Under NCAA regulations, Manuel had no right to
appeal the NCAA ruling, even though he denied the allegation of cheating. He was therefore forced to transfer to Hiwasse College, a two-year institution. Manuel must now wait
for an NCAA member institution to sign him and initiate an appeal process to attempt to
restore his NCAA basketball eligibility. Banished Player Yearns for Rescue, N.Y. Times, Nov.
27, 1989, at 35.
19. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
20. See Id. The NCAA's Committee on Infractions found 38 violations of its recruiting practices by the University of Nevada Las Vegas, and 10 violations by Tarkanian. The
NCAA imposed sanctions against UNLV; UNLV suspended Tarkanian. Tarkanian sued
UNLV and the NCAA in Nevada state court, alleging a violation of his fourteenth amendment due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Tarkanian received injunctive relief and attorneys' fees from the state court. The court concluded that the
NCAA's conduct constituted state action for jurisdictional and constitutional purposes and
that its decision was arbitrary and capricious. The NCAA appealed to the Supreme Court.
21. "No State shall .. .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . "U.S. CONST., amend XIV, cl.1.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Tarkanian, 109 S.Ct. at 461-63 n.14 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
23. The protections of the fourteenth amendment do not extend to "private conduct
abridging individual rights." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722
(1961). The pertinent inquiry, in Justice Stevens' view in Tarkanian, was whether the
"[sitate provided a mantle of authority that enhanced the power of the harm-causing individual actor." Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 463-65. See alsoJackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419
U.S. 345 (1974). "[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Id. at 351.
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of any state. 24 In the Court's view, UNLV retained the authority to withdraw from the NCAA and establish its own standards. 25 Further, the
Court held that "[tihe NCAA is properly viewed as a private actor at
odds with the State ....-26 Thus, since the NCAA enjoyed no governmental powers, 2 7 it was to be considered a private entity. In addition,
the NCAA's function of fostering amateur athletics at the collegiate level
28
was not a traditional, exclusive state function.
Given the limitations that Proposition 48 places on certain athletes
and the apparent status, after Tarkanian, of the NCAA as a private, nongovernmental entity, the question becomes: On what grounds might an
athlete challenge Proposition 48? Tarkanian seems to decrease the likelihood of a successful constitutional challenge. This article will examine
the ability of a Proposition 48 student-athlete to challenge Proposition
48 under the antitrust laws, specifically section one of the Sherman
Act. 29 In particular, this article will address the Proposition 48 restriction as it pertains to men's college basketball.
In college basketball, member institutions of the NCAA earn mil24. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
"[W]hatever de facto authority the [private standard setting] Association enjoys, no official
authority has been conferred on it by any government .
Id.
25. Tarhanian, 109 S. Ct. at 461.
26. Id. at 462.
27. The NCAA did not have subpoena power, power to impose contempt sanctions or
to assert sovereign authority over any one individual. Id. at 461-62.
28. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483
U.S. 522 (1987). "Neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has been a
traditional government function." Id. at 545.
29. There are several other possible challenges to Proposition 48. There may be a
cause of action for the tort of interference with contract, or interference with prospective
business relationship or business advantage. Another possible challenge to Proposition
48 may lie in its racially discriminatory impact upon blacks. Thus, Proposition 48 may be
subject to an attack on its discriminatory impact or effect under the equal protection
clause, or under a civil rights statute. The Presidents Commission of the National Collegiate Athletic Association has commissioned a report on the effects of participation in
intercollegiate athletics on student-athletes who are black. See Report No. 3. The Experiences
of Black IntercollegiateAthletes at NCAA Division I Institutions, Center for the Study of Athletics,
American Institutes for Research, March 1989. Among the findings of the study was that
58% of black football and basketball players, 19% of nonblack football and basketball
players, 35% of other black student-athletes, and 27% of black extracurricular students
score in the lowest quartile on the SAT (752 or below). Id. at 2. One educator has written
that "[t]hese 'objective' tests are certainly economically, if not racially biased, and their use
as a litmus test disproportionately affects black youngsters." Healy,John Thompson's Protest:
The Academic Background, GEORGETOWN, Winter 1989, at 7. Georgetown University recently
traced the college grades of 224 high risk students over seven years. These students had
SAT scores of 900 or lower. Eighty-nine percent of these students have graduated from
Georgetown and the remaining eleven percent are currently enrolled at Georgetown. Id.
These statistics may have some bearing on the alleged discriminatory impact of the SAT
tests and therefore on Proposition 48.
According to the NCAA, more than 90% of the 242 basketball and football players
who lost their eligibility in the first year of Proposition 48 were black. P. HoosE, NECESSITIES, RACIAL BARRIERS IN AMERICAN SPORTS, at 157 (1989). University of Nebraska football coach Tom Osborne, holder of a Ph.D. in educational psychology, stated "[d]uring the
time I was doing my graduate work and my field teaching I came in contact with much data
that showed there's about a 100 point cultural bias on the SAT test ....Because of this, I
think that many minority students are at a disadvantage when taking these examinations."
T. Osborne, Three Views on Proposition 48, NEW PERSPECTIVES, Winter 1988, at 6.
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lions of dollars from NCAA sanctioned regular season games and from
the NCAA tournament. 30 Since the one-year ban on eligibility imposed
by Proposition 48 prevents a player from receiving significant exposure
and training which may be instrumental in preparing him for a possible
professional career, such an athlete may be sufficiently harmed by Prop31
osition 48 to challenge its validity under the antitrust laws.
II.

AMENABILITY TO SUIT

The first issue to be addressed when considering a legal challenge
to Proposition 48 concerns the amenability of the NCAA to a suit on
antitrust grounds. Charles Grantham, Executive Director of the National Basketball Players Association ("NBPA"), has stated that Proposi32
tion 48 "is not an academic issue, but is, in fact, an economic issue."
The most likely vehicle for a plaintiff challenging Proposition 48 on antitrust grounds would be a suit alleging a violation of section one of the
Sherman Act. The NCAA possesses all of the classic elements of a cartel
in that the members establish the terms and conditions under which
33
they compete or do not compete with one another.
Section one of the Sherman Act provides that "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal .... -34 The express language of the Sherman Act

seems broad enough to proscribe nearly all agreements between businessmen. 3 5 However, the Supreme Court has held that only those
agreements which "unreasonably" restrain trade are barred by the act. 36
In Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, Justice Black wrote that,
"[a]lthough this prohibition is literally all-encompassing, the courts have
30. In 1988, the NCAA basketball tournament grossed $68.2 million. The four
schools which advanced to the final round each received $1.2 million, most of which goes
to the athletic departments of their respective universities. Gup, Fout, TIME, April 3,
1989, at 55. The NCAA recently signed a seven-year, one billion dollar television contract
with CBS giving that network the exclusive right to televise all NCAA tournament games
starting with the 1990-91 NCAA season. CBS Lands Sole Rights to NCAA, Binghamton Press
and Sun Bull., Nov. 22, 1989, § C, col. 2.
31. Although millions of dollars are generated by the commercial aspects of college
athletics, the athletes themselves are governed by the NCAA's "Principle of Amateurism."
See NCAA MANUAL, § 2.6 (1989-90) The Principle of Amateurism, which states:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and
social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is
an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commerical enterprises.
32. Remarks by Charles Grantham, Executive Director, National Basketball Players
Association, Sports Careers Conference '89, Phoenix, Arizona (May 13, 1989).

33. See McCormick & Meiners, Sacred Cows, Competition, and Racial Discrimination, NEW
PERSPECTIVES, Winter 1988. "The NCAA is a price fixing cartel.. " and "is immune to the

general disdain afforded most cartels." Id. at 47.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
35. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). "Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very
essence." Id. at 238.
36. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I (1958); Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246
U.S. at 231; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911).
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construed it as precluding only those contracts or combinations which
' 37
unreasonably restrain competition.
The purpose of the Sherman Act has been to foster economic competition. The Supreme Court has stated that the "[a]pplicability of the
antitrust laws ... rests on the need for vindication of their positive aim
of insuring competitive freedom." '3 8 In the sports law context, recent
caselaw establishes that the NCAA is amenable to a cause of action alleging violations of the Sherman Act. Thus, the argument that the NCAA
should enjoy an exemption from the antitrust laws, as does major league
baseball, 3 9 has been refuted.
In NCAA v. Board of Regents, 40 for example, Justice White, in dissent,
wrote that "the NCAA does not enjoy blanket immunity from the antitrust laws .... ,,41 Similarly, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,4 2 in arguing
that the learned professions should not be excluded from antitrust regulation, the Court stated that, "Congress intended to strike as broadly as
it could in section one of the Sherman Act, and to read into it so wide an
'4 3
exemption as that urged on us would be at odds with that purpose."
In Mackey v. National Football League,4 4 an action was brought challenging the National Football League's ("NFL") rule allowing the
league commissioner to require a club acquiring a free agent to compensate the free agent's former club. The NFL asserted that the restriction
of competition for players' services is not a type of restraint proscribed
by the Sherman Act, 4 5 since the NFL restraints constituted a labor market to which the antitrust laws did not apply. 46 The Mackey court dis37. 356 U.S. at 5.
38. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963).
39. Baseball's antitrust exemption is a historical anomaly. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258, 282 (1972) calling baseball's antitrust exemption an aberration, but noting that the
"aberration is an established one . . . entitled to the benefit of stare decisis." But see
Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1957)(limiting the rule exempting baseball from
the antitrust laws to the business of organized professional baseball); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 243 (1955)(implying in dicta that not all professional sports are outside the scope of the antitrust laws).
40.
41.

468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Id. at 133.

42. 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975). Goldfarb involved the claim that the minimum fee
schedule of a state bar association constituted price fixing in violation of section one of the
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held the fee schedule to be in violation of the Sherman
Act.
43. See United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). "That
Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust
and monopoly agreements . . . admits of little, if any, doubt." Id. at 558.
44.

543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).

45. Id. at 616.
46.

In Mackey, the NFL cited section six of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988), and

Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). Section six of the Clayton Act provides
that "[t]he labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce." The Apex
Hosiery Court observed that "[riestraints on the sale of the employee's services to the employer, however much they curtail the competition among employees, are not in themselves combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce under the Sherman
Act." Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 503. The Mackey court analyzed the Clayton Act in light of
the intent of the Act to exempt certain union activities from the antitrust laws. Mackey, 543
F.2d at 617. The Mackey court also distinguished Apex Hosiery since it involved restrictions
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agreed, writing: "We hold that restraints on competition within the
'4 7
market for players' services fall within the ambit of the Sherman Act."
The Mackey court cited other professional sports cases which applied the Sherman Act to owner-imposed restraints on competition for
players' services. 48 It could be argued that Proposition 48 is akin to an
owner-imposed restraint on competition, since, although it is imposed
by the NCAA, it was, voted upon by the member institutions and is administered through the member institutions.
In another recent case, Hennessey v. NCAA, 49 the court acknowledged the business aspect of the NCAA, both in terms of providing
coaches and athletic events for the public. In Hennessey, the court held
that the NCAA was not entitled to a blanket exclusion from antitrust
regulations. 50 The court noted that the NCAA and its member institutions, in "presenting amateur athletics to a ticket-paying, television-buying public, engaged in a business venture of far greater magnitude than
the vast majority of 'profit-making' enterprises." ' 5 1 In addition, "[t]he
NCAA has a multi-million dollar annual budget . . ." and "negotiates
and administers for itself or its members television contracts exceeding,
for all sports, over $20,000,000 a year.' '52 These money-making charac53
teristics of the NCAA put it into what can be labeled "big business"
on competition for employee services imposed by the employees themselves, not by employers. Id.
47. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 618.
48. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 617. See also Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Kapp v.
NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aft'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 907 (1979); Smith v. Pro-Football, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Robertson v.
NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers,
348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972), remanded on other grounds, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972);
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), stay
vacated, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
49. 564 F.2d 1136, 1149 (5th Cir. 1977).
50. Id. at 1148-49.
51. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1149 n.14. Collegiate athletic departments have budgets of
millions of dollars per year. For example, the current University of Iowa budget is $14.2
million for 1989 and is exceeded in the Big Ten Conference by both the University of
Michigan at $18.5 million and Ohio State University at $21.3 million. See Winning Warms
Up "Climate For Giving, " Boosts Enrollment, Cedar Rapids Gazette, May 2, 1989, at 7A. In
1988-89, men's athletics at the University of Iowa had a total of $12,800,000 in revenue.
Of that total amount, $2,420,000 came from men's basketball, $1,2000,000 from televised
Conference play and $1,300,000 from local television. Id.
52. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1149 n.14. See also Johnson, Three Views on Proposition 48,
NEW PERSPECTIVES (Winter 1988).
I believe that athletes should be given more money .... [I]t's almost ludicrous to
have kids bringing in all that money and not benefitting from the proceeds. I'm
not advocating giving them a contract, but there are restrictions under the rules
of the NCAA that prevent these kids from receiving even minor expenses. That's
just ridiculous, because these athletes are bringing in millions of dollars. The
Rose Bowl probably brings in close to eight or ten million dollars for the various
schools.
Johnson, at 12.
53. Perhaps application of the antitrust laws to the business of college athletics is long
overdue.
[Oinly childlike innocence or willful blindness need prevent American colleges
from seeing that the rules which aim to maintain athletics on what is called an
'amateur' basis, by forbidding players to receive pay in money, are worse than
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and thus, within the ambit of the antitrust laws. 54

In Hennessey, the NCAA asserted that it was outside the purview of
the antitrust laws. 5 5 The NCAA cited earlier cases which discussed the

limitations of the Sherman Act to purely commercial objectives. 5 6 For
example, in Marjorie WebsterJuniorCollege v. Middle States Association,5 7 the
court of appeals stated that:
[T]he proscriptions of the Sherman Act were 'tailored .

..

for

the business world,' not for the noncommercial aspect of the
liberal arts and the learned professions. In these contexts, an
incidental restraint of trade, absent an intent or purpose to affect the commercial aspects of the profession,
is not sufficient
58
to warrant application of the antitrust laws.

The Supreme Court has reiterated the view that the primary focus
of the Sherman Act is on combinations having commercial objectives
and is only applied to a limited extent to organizations having other
objectives. 59 Similarly, in EasternRailway Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,60 the Court ruled against the extension of the Sherman
6
Act to areas outside the business world. '
The more recent Supreme Court cases of Goldfarb and Board of Regents, however, support the view that the NCAA is not entitled to a blanket exclusion from the antitrust laws. For example, in Board of Regents,
the paramount question concerning the Court was not whether the
Sherman Act applied to the NCAA at all, but rather whether the particular restraint violated the Sherman Act. 62 In Washington State Bowling Proprietors Association v. Pacific Lanes, Inc.,63 the court of appeals stated that
the recent decisions of the Supreme Court refuted appellants' contention that the Sherman Act only applied to commercial boycotts. Thus,
the weight of recent caselaw suggests that the NCAA is subject to the
useless because, while failing to prevent men from playing for pay, they breed
deceit and hypocrisy.
R. TELANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE 43 (1989) (citing an article from 1915 in THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY by William T. Foster).
54. Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1149.
55. Id. at 1148. The NCAA cited Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 493, for the proposition
that, "[t]he end sought [by these laws] was the prevention of the restraints to free competition in businesses and commercial transactions .
56. Id. at 1148.
57. 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
58. Id. (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1969)).
59. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959).

60. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
61. The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for the business world, are
not at all appropriate for application in the political area . . . all of this caution
would go for naught if we permitted an extension of the Sherman Act to regulate
activities of that nature simply because those activities have a commercial impact
Eastern R.R., 365 U.S. at 141.
62. The Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984) determined that the non-economic nature of the NCAA's self-regulation was relevant in determining whether the restraint in question violated the Sherman Act. It was not relevant in
applying the Sherman Act to the NCAA.
63. 356 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 1966).
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reach of section one of the Sherman Act. Indeed, the recent Justice Department inquiry into the practices of some private colleges and universities' in fixing tuition and financial aid levels for students further
supports the contention that the NCAA's actions would fall within the
ambit of the antitrust laws. 64
III.

STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Since it appears well-established that the NCAA is amenable to suit
under the antitrust laws, the question becomes how the rather vague
mandate of section one of the Sherman Act would be enforced against
the NCAA. 6 5 Two tests have traditionally been used by courts to evaluate restraints of trade under section one of the Sherman Act: The per se
test 6 6 and the rule of reason test. 67 Additionally, although per se language is used in some cases6 8 the court may have in reality utilized an
unarticulated rule of reason analysis. 69 This article will proceed to eval64. Justice Department officials said that educational institutions are exempt from
some provisions of the antitrust laws, but not from laws against price fixing. Price-Fixing
Inquiry at 20 Elite Colleges, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1989, at 1, col. 3. Irving Scher, a New York
attorney who heads the American Bar Association's antitrust section, is quoted as saying
that evidence of schools agreeing to financial aid packages or fixing tuition increases
"would be a traditional antitrust violation." U.S. Investigates Prestigious Universities, Colleges
for Possible Antitrust Violations, Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1989, at B4, col. 4.
An earlier Wall Street Journal report called the schools "part of a price-fixing system
that OPEC might envy." Do Colleges Collude on FinancialAid?,Wall St.J., May 2, 1989, at BI,
col. 3. The fact that the Justice Department is investigating how prices are set in a field not
usually viewed as commercial may signal a more vigorous approach to antitrust enforcement. Although colleges and universities are not normally the sort of businesses regulated
by antitrust laws, they "are to some extent selling a product-education-with a price-tuition," said Phillip Areeda, an antitrust professor at Harvard Law School. Wall St.J., Aug.
10, 1989, at B4.
Questions have also been raised as to whether agreements to fix financial aid payments complied with the "Principles of Good Practice" of the National Association of College Admissions Counselors, a self-regulatory group to which most of the 23 schools being
investigated belong. Do Colleges Collude on FinancialAid?,Wall St.J., May 2, 1989, at BI, col.
3. Members of the group of 23 colleges have acknowledged that they have met annually
for the past 35 years to share information on applicants seeking financial aid. Barrett and
Chipello, at B4, col. 3. By comparison, the NCAA has much more of an appearance of a
classic cartel. The NCAA has existed since 1906, meets annually and has established elaborate written rules and requirements by which its members must abide, under the penalty
of serious sanctions. NCAA Guidefor the College-Bound Student-Athlete 1 (1989-90).
65. For an analysis of the application of antitrust laws to challenged restraints in general, see Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 34344.
66. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
68. This absence of a rigid delineation between per se and rule of reason analysis will
be addressed in the context of group boycotts, infra notes 112-135 and accompanying text.
However, according to a recent commentary on Preferred Provider Organizations, the "selection of the legal standard [per se or rule of reason] to be applied to a group boycott is
likely to determine the outcome of the controversy." Youle and Daw, Preferred Provider

Organizations: An Antitrust Perspective, 29 ANTITRUST

BULL.

301, 343 (1984).

69. One commentator has noted that, "[tlhere are cases where one can weigh the
harms, benefits, and alternatives and conclude almost instantaneously that conduct is unlawful; one decides the particular case so rapidly that he may express his result in 'per se'
language." P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS § 391(b)(2d ed. 1974).
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uate the Proposition 48 regulation under both a per se and a rule of
reason analysis.
A.

Per se Analysis

Certain types of agreements have been identified as being so unreasonable that they may be deemed illegal per se, without further inquiry
into their justification. One commentator has noted that "[b]ehavior is
illegal per se when the plaintiff need prove only that it occurred in order
to win his case, there being no other elements to the offense and no
allowable defense." ' 70 In Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, 7 1 the
Court stated:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
72
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Justice Black, in Northern Pacific, noted that per se unreasonableness
avoids the necessity for "an incredibly complicated and prolonged eco73
nomic investigation" into the history of the industry involved.
Several practices have been identified by the courts as meriting per
se analysis. Among the practices which the courts have deemed per se
illegal are price fixing, 74 division of markets, 75 group boycotts, 76 and
77
tying arrangements.
B.

Rule of Reason Analysis

In Standard Oil v. United States, 78 Justice White set forth what has
become known as the "rule of reason." He wrote, "It]he criteria to be
resorted to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining whether
violations of the section have been committed, is the rule of reason
70. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, at 18 (1978).
71. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
72. Id. at 5. See also Worthen Bank & Trust v. National BankAmericard, 485 F.2d 119
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
73. 356 U.S. at 5.
74. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed ... with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging,
or stabilizing the price of a commodity . . . is illegal per se." Id at 223; United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). "Agreements which create such potential
power may well be held to be . . . unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry into whether a particular price is ... unreasonable ... ."ld. at 397.
See also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons Inc., 340 U.S.
211 (1951).
75. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
76. See infra notes 112-135 and accompanying text.
77. See Standard Oil v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949). "[T]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition." Id. at 305-06;
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); International Salt Co.,
Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
78. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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.... -79 Justice White also utilized the rule of reason analysis in United

States v. American Tobacco Co.,80 where he defined a restraint of trade as a
restraint which, "[o]nly embraced acts or contracts or agreements or
combinations which operated . . .by unduly restricting competition or

unduly obstructing the due course of trade, or which, either because of
their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of the
81
acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade."
In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 8 2 the rule of reason standard was further delineated. Justice Brandeis wrote, "the true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." 8 3 The factors to be considered
when applying the rule of reason analysis are: The facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied, its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed, the nature of the restraint, the history of the
restraint, and the reason for adopting the remedy. 84 Thus, the rule of
reason standard is a malleable concept which courts must mold to conform to each individual fact situation. More recently, the focus of the
courts in rule of reason cases has been on the procompetitive effects of
85
the restraint. In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,
the Court cited the test espoused in Standard Oil, which asked whether
the challenged agreements or acts "were unreasonably restrictive of
competitive decisions." '8 6 Unreasonableness could be based on either
the nature or character of the agreements or on the surrounding circumstances. 87 Thus, the inquiry focused on the impact of the restraint on
competitive conditions.
In ProfessionalEngineers, the Court stated that "the inquiry mandated
by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that
promotes competition or one that suppresses competition." ' 88 Therefore, the competitive effect of an agreement is evaluated by "analyzing
the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the
reasons why it was imposed." 89 Thus, the Court will balance the anticompetitive effects of the restraint against any procompetitive benefits
associated therewith. In recent years, however, there seems to have
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 62.
221 U.S. 106 (1911).
Id. at 179.
246 U.S. 231 (1918).
Id. at 238.
See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 615 (1953), which

states that the factors to be considered should include "the percentage of business con-

trolled, the strength of the remaining competition [and] whether the action springs from
business requirements or purpose to monopolize."
85. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
86. Id.
87. Id.

88. Id. at 691. See also Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165
(9th Cir. 1966). "The pertinent inquiry .. .is whether an association intends to use that
power in a manner which tends to suppress or destroy competition." Id. at 171.

89. 435 U.S. at 692.
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been a blurring of the clear, bright line distinctions between the per se
and rule of reason tests. In Professional Engineers, the Supreme Court
noted that the purpose of either a per se or rule of reason analysis is "to
form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint." 90
In another industry heavily dependent upon agreements among
would-be competitors, a rule of reason analysis was deemed appropriate
by the Supreme Court. In BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.,91 the plain92
tiff, CBS, sought a license on a per-use basis from two organizations
which acted as clearinghouses for their members. When the organizations refused the license CBS sued, alleging price-fixing under the Sherman Act. The sole issue before the Court was whether the blanket
license arrangement of the two organizations was properly within the
94
per se category, 9 3 as held by the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court ruled that the blanket license was not a "naked
restraint of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition."-95
Even though the "per se rule is a valid and useful tool of antitrust policy
and enforcement,"' 96 the licensing arrangement "should be subjected to
a more discriminating examination under the rule of reason."' 97 In explaining its decision to apply a rule of reason analysis, the Court noted
that "[t]here are situations in which competitors have been permitted to
form joint selling agencies or other pooled activities, subject to strict
"98
limitations under the antitrust laws .
C.

Sports Cases

In NCAA v. Board of Regents, 99 the Supreme Court discussed what
would be considered "procompetitive" for the purpose of applying the
test espoused in ProfessionalEngineers. 10 0 Justice Stevens found that the
NCAA may be viewed as procompetitive since its role of preserving the
quality of amateur athletics widens consumer choice. Similarly, in Smith
v. Pro Football, Inc., 10 the court of appeals noted that "under the rule of
reason, a restraint must be evaluated to determine whether it is significantly anticompetitive in purpose or effect."' 1 2 If the restraint is found
90.

Id.

91. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
92. The organizations involved were the American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers ("ASCAP"), and Broadcast Music, Inc., ("BMI").
93.

Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 4.

94. CBS, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
95. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).
96. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 8.
97. Id. at 24.
98. Id. at 14 (quoting Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiaeon Pet. for Cert.
in K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., O.T. 1967, No. 147, at 10-11) (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); United
States v. St. Louis Terminal, 224 U.S. 383 (1912)).
99. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
100. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
101. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
102. Id. at 1183.
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to have "legitimate business purposes" which promote competition, the
"anticompetitive evils" of the challenged practice must be carefully bal0 3
anced against its "procompetitive virtues."'
From the Proposition 48 challenger's perspective, there would be
several advantages of a per se analysis over a rule of reason analysis.
First, the per se test is a bright line test which judges can apply. Conversely, the rule of reason test requires a certain amount of judicial
discretion in determining reasonableness, which may result in consideration of a myriad of differing factors as to what restraints are reasonable.
In Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.,' 0 4 Judge Ferguson wrote,
"the Supreme Court has on numerous occasions recognized these difficulties and has declared that with regard to certain practices the
problems of making adequate economic determinations and setting appropriate guidelines are so complex that they simply outweigh the very
limited benefits deriving from those practices ....
115 Second, from
the Proposition 48 challenger's perspective, there is an economy and
efficiency justification for applying a per se test when warranted by the
facts and circumstances of a given case. Time problems, court costs and
burdens on the judicial system are minimized with a per se analysis. The
Denver Rockets court stated that "[tihe primary disadvantages of the rule
of reason are that it requires difficult and lengthy factual inquiries and
very subjective policy decisions which are in many ways essentially legis'06
lative and ill-suited to the judicial process."'
In the case of a Proposition 48 player who would lose one year of
eligibility under the rule, application of the per se test would be necessary for the player to obtain a quick and meaningful remedy. The time
required by a rule of reason analysis would effectively eliminate the
Proposition 48 player's ability to overturn the regulation in the one year
time period during which he is barred from competition. In Denver Rockets, player Spencer Haywood challenged the National Basketball Association's ("NBA") restriction which purportedly made Haywood ineligible
to enter the NBA until four years after his high school class graduation.
Haywood sought to enter the NBA after his second year of college basketball, and eventually received partial summary judgment to permit
him to do so, with the court acknowledging the extreme time delay of an
extended rule of reason analysis. 10 7 The time delays involved in a challenge to Proposition 48 under a rule of reason analysis would militate
strongly in favor of a per se analysis; time is of the essence to the Proposition 48 challenger.
The Proposition 48 challenger would most likely seek an injunction,
thus allowing the athlete to compete during that school year. Injunctive
relief or summary judgment is preferable for the athlete challenging
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1183. See alsoKapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
Id. at "1063.
Id.
Id. at 1058-59.
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Proposition 48 because money damages for the loss of one year of competition may ultimately be difficult to ascertain. Commenting on the difficulty of computing damages in antitrust cases, the Supreme Court has
observed that "damage issues in these cases are rarely susceptible of the
kind of concrete, detailed proof of injury which is available in other contexts." 1 08 A federal appeals court in a sports case has noted the "Alicein-Wonderland" quality of the computation of antitrust damages.' 0 9
Therefore, because of the substantial delays involved in a rule of reason
analysis and the inherent difficulty in ascertaining money damages for a
player prohibited from competing under Proposition 48, application of
the per se standard and injunctive relief are preferred remedies from the
Proposition 48 challenger's perspective.
Judge Ferguson in Denver Rockets applied the following traditional
criteria to determine that granting an injunction was appropriate given
the defendants' illegal per se conduct:"I 0
A preliminary injunction in this type of action should be
granted where the plaintiff shows that: (1) the conduct to be
enjoined is in furtherance of the alleged violation of the antitrust laws; (2) there is a substantial likelihood the allegations of
the complaint will be sustained at the trial of the cause; (3) that
irreparable harm to the plaintiff will result if the injunction
pendente lite is denied; and (4) that there is no conduct by the
plaintiff which would bar the granting of equitable relief. I '
Under a Denver Rockets analysis, a Proposition 48 challenger would have
to meet all of the above criteria to be granted an injunction to strike
down Proposition 48 and to be permitted to compete.
IV.
A.

GROUP BoYcor-rs

Generally

The NCAA's establishment of Proposition 48 restrictions is susceptible to Sherman Act attack as a group boycott. A group boycott, also
known as a concerted refusal to deal, 1 2 is a situation where commercial
entities agree to refuse to deal with another entity in order to influence
improperly the latter's business practices. Classic group boycotts have
historically been susceptible to a per se analysis." 3 Although there may
108. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969).
109. Smith v. Pro Football Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
110. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1061. Judge Ferguson noted that, "[s]ummary
judgments have been frequently used by courts in group boycott cases." See, e.g., Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
111. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1058..
112. W. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW - HANDBOOK, (1987). "The term group boycott generally connotes a refusal to deal or an inducement of others not to deal or have business
relations .... "Id. at 101. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 618 (1976) (citing Kalinowski,

The Per-Se Doctrine - An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 2 UCLA L. REV. 569, 580 n.49
(1964)).
113. "[C]ases adopting a per se rule typically involve a "classic group boycott," i.e., a
"concerted attempt by competitiors at one level to protect themselves from non-group
members who seek to compete at that level." Youle and Daw, Preferred Provider Organizations: An Antitrust Perspective, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 301, 345 (1984). See Klor's, Inc. v. Broad-
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be a blurring of the distinction between the per se and rule of reason
tests, in general, where the boycott is "manifestly anticompetitive" or a
"naked restraint" of trade,' 14 an application of a per se test may still be
appropriate. These concerted refusals to deal involve attempts to gain
market power at the expense of other competitors. 1 5 However, one
commentator has noted that certain refusals to deal, primarily in areas
such as scheduling, are necessary in certain circumstances involving
sports leagues.' 16
In E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. ConsolidatedAir Tour Manual Commission," 7 the court identified three categories of per se illegal group boycotts. The first group consisted of horizontal combinations among
traders at one level of distribution whose purpose was to exclude direct
competitors from the market." 8 The second group consisted of vertical
combinations among traders at different levels who excluded direct
competitors from the market." 19 The third group was comprised of
combinations designed to influence coercively the trade practices of
20
boycott victims, rather than to eliminate them as competitors.'
Several cases established that the per se test was appropriate in the
group boycott area. In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 12 1 Klor's alleged that Broadway-Hale and other manufacturers had agreed not to
way-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941).
114. Careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances surrounding a particular refusal to deal is helpful in predicting the legal standards that will be applied.
Where a refusal to deal is used to implement an illegal restraint of trade which
itself would be subjected to per se analysis, the arrangement is also likely to be
judged by the per se standard. Thus, a refusal to deal designed to promote a
price-fixing scheme, eliminate discounting competitors, allocate markets dealing
contracts, or create monopoly power will be struck down without inquiry as to its
effect upon competition in the relevant market.
Youle and Daw, at 344.
115. But see Business Elecs. Corp., v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988)(holding that a vertical restraint was not per se illegal unless it included some agreement on
price or price levels); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986)(discussing the Court's reluctance to extend per se analysis where the economic impact of the
restraint is not immediately obvious). See also Northwest Wholesale Stationer's, Inc. v.
Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985)(where the Supreme Court held
that it was not per se illegal for a group of retailers to expel a competing retailer because
the plaintiff had failed to show that the defendant possessed market power or control of a
vital service or product needed to compete effectively).
116. Agreements to refuse to deal are essential to the effectiveness and sometimes
to the existence of many wholly beneficial economic activities. All league sports
from the Ivy League to the National Football League . . . rest entirely upon the
right to boycott .... Members of the league agree not to play with nonmembers
or to limit the number of games with nonmembers. Were leagues denied the
power to enforce such agreements . . . the league would be destroyed.
R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 322 (1978).
117. 467 F.2d 178, 186 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973).
118. See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914).
119. See Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
120. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). See also
Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See infra
notes 172-82 and accompanying text, in which the Blalock case is analogized to the third
category of group boycotts, as exemplified in Fashion Originators'.
121. 359 U.S. 207, 209 (1959).
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sell to Klor's or to sell to Klor's only on unfavorable terms. The
Supreme Court held that "[g]roup boycotts, or concerted refusals by
traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden [per se] category."' 12 2 In Klor's, the Court found a wide combination of manufacturers, distributors, and a retailer which took away
from Klor's its freedom to operate in an open, competitive market, and
23
thus interfered with the natural flow of commerce.'
The Supreme Court did not accept the defendants' argument that
the boycott should be tolerated because the victim's business was so
small as to make little difference to the economy.' 2 4 In the case of a
prospective college student-athlete challenging Proposition 48, it is
plausible that the NCAA would argue that the Proposition 48 student's
non-participation in athletics for a one year period would have little effect on the overall economy. However, if one follows the Kor's approach, this makes no difference. It is the "nature," "character," and
"monopolistic tendency" of the interface with interstate commerce
which matter. 12 5 Similarly, in another group boycott case, Fashion Originators'Guildof America v. FTC,' 2 6 the Supreme Court refused to hear evidence of the reasonableness of the methods used by the defendants.
The Court ruled that the Fashion Originators' Guild's plan to sell only
to retailers who would not deal in copied garments was an unreasonable
restraint of trade. The plan narrowed the outlets to which manufacturers could sell and from which retailers could buy; it subjected all retailers and manufacturers who decline to comply with the plan to an
organized boycott; it stripped members of freedom of action, and it had
12 7
as its "purpose and effect the direct suppression of competition."'
It was not required that a complete monopoly be achieved, because
"it is sufficient if it really tends to that end and to deprive[s] the public
of the advantages which flow from free competition."' 128 The purpose
and object of the combination, its potential power, its tendency toward
monopoly, and the coercion it practiced upon a rival method of competition, all brought the combination within the proscriptions of the Sherman . . . Act."' 12 9 The Court refused to hear evidence offered of
0
reasonableness. 13

In drawing an analogy between Fashion Originators' and Proposition
48, it is apparent that Proposition 48 also narrows the pool from which
122. Klor's Inc., 359 U.S. at 212. See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951); Binderup v. Pathe Exch.,
Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealer's Ass'n v. United States,
234 U.S. 600 (1914).
123. Klor's, 359 U.S. at 213.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941).
127. Id.at 465.
128. Id. at 466 (quoting United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895).
129. Id. at 467-68.
130. Id. at 468.
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Division I and II colleges can recruit athletically eligible freshmen and it
narrows the choice of schools which those students may attend if they
wish to participate in intercollegiate athletics during their first year. The
plan subjects all students who fail to qualify under Propositin 48 to an
organized group boycott by all NCAA Division I and II schools with regard to the student's participation in intercollegiate athletics during the
first year, and it restrains the universities' ability to place on their intercollegiate teams certain students already admitted to the school under
the school's independent admission standards. Overall, the plan has the
purpose and effect of direct suppression of competition. It suppresses
both the student's freedom to attend and to compete athletically at the
school to which he or she has been admitted, and the school's freedom
to allow its students to compete. Furthermore, the NCAA's Proposition
48 exclusively affects athletes. A non-athlete student who has not met
the Proposition 48 standards could still participate in other school-sponsored activities, but the student-athlete who has not met the Proposition
48 standards is prevented from athletic participation by the NCAA
rule. 131
An exception to the rule of per se analysis for group boycotts was
enunciated in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange. 132 The Silver Court held
that the concerted action of the New York Stock Exchange constituted a
group boycott which was per se illegal, but because of the other statutory scheme at issue, the Securities and Exchange Act, the Court did not
end the inquiry there. 13 3 Instead, the Court created an exception to the
per se rule of group boycotts when a statutory scheme of self-regulation
is involved. When such a scheme exists, it will result in a rule of reason
inquiry.' 3 4 The Court reasoned that certain organizations need to develop internal guidelines to promote safety rules and rules to ensure the
integrity of competition and to provide for orderly execution. However,
Silver may have limited applicability in the sports law context since
35
sports cases may not fall within the Silver exception. 1
B.

Sports Cases
A body of caselaw has developed pertaining to the application of
131.

William V. Muse, the president of the University of Akron, advocates requiring

that each school treat athletes the same way it treats other students as to admission and
retention standards and eligibility for participation in extracurricular activities. He has
written that, "[w]e should not prohibit freshmen from competing in athletics unless we are
also willing to prohibit them from playing in the band, holding office in student government, pledging a fraternity or holding a part-time job." Muse, in a letter to the editor
printed in SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 18, 1989, at 5, col. 3.
132. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). Silver involved the question of whether and to what extent
the federal antitrust laws apply to securities exchanges regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 342. The antitrust claim in Silver alleged that the New York
Stock Exchange had conspired with its member firms to deprive petitioners of their private
wire connections and stock ticker service in violation of sections one and two of the Sherman Act. Id. at 345-46.
133. Id. at 347-49.
134. Id. at 360-61.

135. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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per se and rule of reason analysis to sports cases.1 36We will analyze the
Proposition 48 restriction under both guidelines.
1. Per Se Illegality
Several sports cases have applied the per se standard to group boycotts. In Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., t37 the court ruled that
the NBA's bylaws prohibiting a player from negotiation with an NBA
team until four years after his high school class graduation constituted a
group boycott which was illegal per se.
Spencer Haywood was an accomplished high school All-American
basketball player. After two years of college basketball, Haywood entered into a contract under which he later refused to perform with the
Denver Rockets of the American Basketball Association ("ABA").' 3 8
Haywood next entered into a contract with the Seattle Supersonics of
the NBA. However, NBA Bylaw 2.05139 made a player ineligible to
compete in the NBA until four years after his high school class had graduated.14 0 Haywood contended that Bylaw 2.05 constituted an unlawful
restraint of trade in violation of sections one and two of the Sherman
Act. 141
The Denver Rockets court identified two threshold elements which
must be present before a concerted refusal to deal can be illegal under
section one of the Sherman Act:
(1) There must be some effect on "trade or commerce
among the several States," and
(2) there must be sufficient agreement
to constitute a
42
"contract, combination ...

or conspiracy."'

136. See generally Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 339, 344-51.
137. 325 F. Supp. at 1053.
138. Haywood alleged that the Denver Rockets made fraudulent misrepresentations to
him. Id. at 1054.
139. A person who has not completed high school or who has completed high
school but has not entered college, shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be a
Player [in the NBA] until four years after he has been graduated or four years
after his original high school class has been graduated, as the case may be, nor
may the future services of any such person be negotiated or contracted for, or
otherwise reserved. Similarly, a person who has entered college but is no longer
enrolled, shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be a Player until the time when
he would have first become eligible had he remained enrolled in college. Any
negotiations or agreements with any such person during such period shall be null
and void and shall confer no rights to the services of such person at any time
thereafter.
NBA BYLAws § 2.05 reprinted in Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1055.
140. In 1958, this restriction precluded Wilt Chamberlain from entering the NBA draft
after his junior year of college, when he chose not to play during his senior year at the
University of Kansas. Because of the NBA's restriction, Chamberlain could not enter the
NBA in 1958. He toured, instead, that season with the Harlem Globetrotters. See W.
CHAMBERLAIN & D. SHAW, WILT 93 (1973).
14 1. This article will deal with only the section one allegations made in Denver Rockets
v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
142. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1062. The NCAA has been called a "price fixing
cartel that limits payments to athletes." McCormick & Meiners, Sacred Cows, Competition,
and Racial Discrimination, NEW PERSPECTIVES 47 (Winter 1988).
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It was uncontested in Denver Rockets that both of these elements were
present. Likewise, the elements are present in the case of the NCAA and
Proposition 48. The NCAA schedules games in various states and receives television and radio revenue from the nationwide broadcasting of
those games, thus constituting interstate commerce. Also, through the
application of Proposition 48, the member institutions of the NCAA
have agreed not to permit the students affected by Proposition 48 to
compete.
The Denver Rockets court ruled that "[t]here is a substantial probability ... that NBA By-law 2.05 constitutes a group boycott as defined
in Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. .... .,143 But for the by-law provision, Haywood would have been eligible to play in the NBA.' 4 4 Similarly, the college student barred by Proposition 48 would be eligible, but
for the NCAA rule, to play collegiate athletics for a Division I or II
school to which admission had been granted. The Denver Rockets court
considered By-law 2.05 to be a "restraint upon free trade in interstate
commerce (in the form of an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction of
the ability of qualified basketball players to bargain freely in a competitive market)...
145
The court labeled the NBA rule "a 'primary' concerted refusal to
deal wherein the actors at one level of a trade pattern (NBA team members) refuse to deal with an actor at another level (those ineligible [for
the NBA draft under the] rule)."1 46 In the case of Proposition 48, the
refusal to deal is between actors at one level, NCAA Division I and II
schools, and actors at another level, college students. Thus, a court examining Proposition 48, citing the analysis in Denver Rockets, could also
47
find a primary concerted refusal to deal.'
The Denver Rockets court identified three instances of harm resulting
from such a boycott. First, the victim is injured by being unable to
enter the market he seeks. Second, competition in the market in which
the victim attempts to enter is injured. Third, the individual members of
the NBA have established their own private government by pooling their
143. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1056.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1057.
146. Id. at 1061.
147. Even prior to the Denver Rockets case, a suit was filed against the NBA, alleging a
group boycott for the League's failure to permit a player to compete. See Hawkins v. NBA,
288 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Pa. 1968)(civil antitrust action); Hawkins v. NBA, 295 F. Supp. 103
(W.D. Pa. 1969)(private antitrust action). In 1966, attorneys for basketball player, Connie
Hawkins, filed an antitrust suit against the NBA, claiming that, as the only major league in
professional basketball, the NBA possessed a monopoly on all jobs in the field. D. WOLF,
FOUL! 302 (1972). Hawkins alleged that the NBA teams and the League, through the
Commissioner, had conspired to blacklist Hawkins in restraint of trade and in violation of
Federal antitrust laws. Id. at 302-03. Until that time, "no one had ever applied the principal of group boycott to a sports case." D. WOLF, FOUL! 303 (quoting Roslyn Litman, attorney for Connie Hawkins).
Hawkins v. NBA was eventually settled before it reached trial. Hawkins was admitted
into the NBA, and he received a substantial monetary settlement. D. WOLF, FOUL! at 34445.
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economic power. 148 With Proposition 48, all three instances of harm
are present. The college student is injured by being unable to play his
sport for a Division I or II school for the period specified by Proposition
48. Overall competition in college athletics is hurt because of the absence of Proposition 48 players. Finally, the individual members of the
NCAA have, in effect, established their own private government which
allows them to exclude players at will. It is noteworthy that the court
ruled as it did in Denver Rockets even though the employment option of
the ABA was open to Spencer Haywood,' 49 just as the option of attending a non-Division I or non-Division II school is available to the Proposi150
tion 48 student.
The argument that the Silver exception' 5 1 should be extended to
professional sports was rejected in Denver Rockets. 15 2 The court ruled
that the case did not fall within the rule of reason exception provided by
Silver, since the NBA by-laws contained no provision for a hearing
before the provision in question was applied to exclude an individual
player. Since there was also no provision for a player to petition for an
appeal, the court concluded that the NBA rules in question "fall outside
the Silver exception and are subject to the per se rule normally applicable to group boycotts."' 153 Similarly, the same argument could be made
for the Proposition 48 student who has no individual right to seek an
exception to the application of Proposition 48 to him; 15 4 there are no
provisions for a hearing or an appeal contained in Proposition 48, so,
therefore, the Silver exception would not apply.
Some similarities to the Denver Rockets case can also be seen in Gardella v. Chandler,15 5 where the plaintiff, a professional baseball player,
violated the terms of the reserve clause of his major league baseball contract by playing professional baseball in Mexico while under contract to
the New York Giants. He sought to return to major league baseball, was
subsequently banned from organized league baseball in the United
States for five years, and was thus "deprived pro tanto of his means of
livelihood."' 1 56 Gardella filed an antitrust suit under the Sherman and
Clayton Acts. 15 7 The case was dismissed by the district court.' 5 8
148. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1061.
149.

The ABA had no counterpart to By-law 2.05 of the NBA.

150. While it is true that Division III and junior colleges are available alternatives for
Proposition 48 students, they do not offer the same level of exposure and competition for
the athlete. The money spent on athletics and the media exposure a player receives at a
non-Division I school are not comparable to that of a Division I school.
151. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
152. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
153. Id.
154. Any application for a waiver of the applicability of Proposition 48 to a particular
student must be made by the institution, and only after the student has already enrolled at
the institution.
155. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
156. Id. at 403.
157. A major portion of the opinion in Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) was devoted to an analysis of whether baseball constituted interstate commerce.
That issue is no longer in question. The inapplicability of the Sherman Act was enunciated in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Base-
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In a two-to-one decision remanding the case,' 59 Judge Frank referred to the "involuntary character of the servitude which is imposed
upon players by the strength of the combination controlling the labor of
practically all of the players in the country."' 160 Likewise, in the case of
Proposition 48, the member institutions of the NCAA control the labor,
albeit noncompensatory labor,16' of virtually all of the prospective pro62
fessional basketball players in the country.1
In Gardella, Judge Frank also wrote that:
ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); see also Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356
(1953). In Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972), the Court found that "professional
baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce .... With its reserve system
enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an
exception and an anomaly. Federal Baseball and Toolson have become an aberration confined to baseball." Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. We cite Gardella for the limited purpose of
showing how a person, such as the Major League Baseball Commissioner, or a group, such
as the NCAA, can illegally inhibit and restrain a player's right to compete.
158. See Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
159. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sent the case back to the district
court for a trial on the merits of the complaint, but the case was settled and Gardella was
reinstated before the trial. L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW, 18-19 (1977).
160. Gardella, 172 F.2d at 410.
161. William Gerberding, president of the University of Washington, has questioned
the wisdom and necessity of the existing regulatory structure which prohibits college athletes from receiving compensation.
At the core of the existing regulatory structure is the idea that having college
athletes 'play for pay' is obviously wrong for society and wrong for them. I'm less
and less sure about such matters, and I'm even less sure as I contemplate the
obvious facts that so many of the most gifted athletes are economically and educationally disadvantaged blacks. I have become increasingly uncomfortable about
the defensibility of a largely white establishment's maintaining an elaborate system of rules that deprive black students athletes of adequate financial support in
the name of 'the ideals of amateurism'... Why should a talented flute player be
able to receive a music scholarship and also be able to help make his or her way
through college by playing in jazz and classical groups for pay, while a person
whose gifts are athletic and whose gifts help sustain expensive intercollegiate programs school should not be able to model T-shirts or sell cars on play his or her
sport in the summer for money or -perish the thought -join a national union of
collegiate players who bargain collectively with universities regarding their financial support?
College Sports: Maybe They Should Play For Pay, Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 1989, at A19, col. 1.
162. See Frank Deford, Remarks at the House Education and Labor Subcommittee
hearing (May 18, 1989), quoted in End Athletic Scholarships, Shorten Seasons, Educator Urges,
Detroit News, May 18, 1989, at IA. "[B]ig-time college athletics has always been a scandal
and always will be, unless major changes are made. It is a professional game that poses as
amateur; a big business that uses free labor". College coaches, on the other hand, seem to
be rewarded very handsomely for their involvement with their athletic programs. In accordance with the 1989-90 NCAA Manual, coaches may be compensated for endorsing
products and may receive "direct cash payment in recognition of a specific and extraordinary achievement (e.g ...
winning a conference or national championship.)." NCAA
MANUAL § 11.3.2.3. (1989-90).
It is estimated that Tom Davis, head basketball coach at the University of Iowa, receives an overall income package of at least $250,000. SalariesJust Part of Package, Cedar
Rapids Gazette, May 3, 1989 at 7A, cols. 1-4. Lute Olson, head basketball coach at the
University of Arizona, has reportedly signed a new contract package worth at least
$400,000 per year. Id. Bill Frieder, head basketball coach at Arizona State University, is
reportedly receiving $700,000 per year guaranteed income. College Coaches' BriefEncounters,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1989, at A31, col. 3. Rick Pitino recently left the New York Knicks of
the NBA to accept the head coaching job at the University of Kentucky, a school which is
on NCAA probation, for a reported $5 million over seven years. Pitino Feels at Home in
Kentucky, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1989, at B12, col. 1.
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[T]he most extreme of these penalties is the blacklisting [for
violation of the reserve clause] of the player so that no club in
organized baseball will hire him . . . [tihe right to play with
organized baseball is indispensable to the career of a professional baseball player. The violator may perhaps become ... a
bartender or a streetsweeper, but his 6 chances
of ever again
3
playing baseball are exceedingly slim.1
Similarly, Proposition 48 is a form of blacklisting for college basketball
players. They are declared ineligible for one year and forever branded
with the Proposition 48 label. Indeed, the "right to play" organized Division I or II college basketball is the normal course of preparation for
the athlete seeking a career in professional basketball. It is quite possible that substantial harm could be inflicted upon an athlete's professional career by virtue of the one year ban Proposition 48. The clubs of
the NBA, after Denver Rockets, may draft or sign a player after his high
school class has graduated or after any year of collegiate play. 164 Even
the NFL has now allowed undergraduates in the draft. 16 5 If a player is
prevented from competing during his freshman year, he may lose certain leverage and marketability in the highly competitive market for professional basketball players. 166 Also, the specter of injury looms large; a
163. Gardella, 172 F.2d at 410.
164. The NBA rule is as follows: "A person whose high school class has graduated
shall become eligible to be selected in a College Draft if he renounces his intercollegiate
basketball eligibility by written notice to the NBA at least forty-five (45) days prior to such
draft." 1988 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the National Basketball Association and the National Basketball Players Association, Art. IV, § 1 (h) (Nov. 1988).
For example, Ralph Sampson, a former player for the University of Virginia, was a
much sought-after player after his freshman, sophomore and junior years of college and
was eventually drafted after his senior year. Michael Jordan, a former player for the University of North Carolina, was drafted after his junior year, before his college eligibility
expired. In his freshman year, Jordan's game winning shot helped the University of North
Carolina defeat Georgetown for the National championship. Indeed, after Denver Rockets,
several players, such as Moses Malone and Darryl Dawkins, entered professional basketball
directly from high school. In 1989, Jay Edwards of Indiana University, J.R. Reid of the
University of North Carolina, and Nick Anderson of the University of Illinois were among
those who entered the NBA draft before they had completed four years of collegiate
basketball.
165. The NFL recently allowed 1988 Heisman Trophy winner Barry Sanders of
Oklahoma State to be eligible for the 1989 NFL draft, even though he had collegiate eligibility remaining. The NFL ostensibly carved out an exception for Sanders, based on a
statement by NFL spokesman Joe Browne. He stated that:
We've always believed it best for both professional and college football that the
NFL's eligibility rules not work to disrupt college programs or players' educational opportunities. But when an underclassman whose program is under NCAA
sanctions decides to turn pro with the full support of his college coach and athletic director and when he has lost any remaining college football eligibility in the
process, we have no realistic choice but to accept him.
Indianapolis Star, April 5, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
The NFL has revised eligibility procedures for the 1990 college draft. College players
may now enter the draft, if three years have elapsed since their high school graduation.
Big TV Deals will be at Top of Agenda when NFL. Owners Meet Sunday, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9,
1990, at 13B, col. 2.
166. However, some athletes who have lost a year of eligibility to Proposition 48 feel
that they have benefitted academically and personally. Terry Mills, of the University of
Michigan basketball team, is quoted as stating that losing his freshman year of eligibility
under Proposition 48 has helped him adjust to college life and has placed him on track to
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longer college career heightens
the prospects of a career-threatening or
67
career-ending injury. 1
The per se rule has been applied elsewhere in the sports law context. In Washington State Bowling ProprietorsAssociation v. Pacific Lanes, Inc.,
the court invalidated a regulatory plan by the Bowling Proprietors Association by applying a per se rule.' 6 8 In doing so, the court reiterated
that "group boycotts are per se violations of the Sherman Act."'1 6 9 The
court also specifically rejected the notion that only commercial boycotts
receive the per se standard.17 0 In response to the defense that the association's restrictions were intended to promote the sport, a defense the
NCAA would be likely to make in defending Proposition 48 from antitrust challenge, the court held that "[s]uch circumstances do notjustify a
private association passing regulations to deal with the problem when
their effect is to restrain or regulate interstate commerce." 71
Another sports case has also applied a per se rule to professional
athletics. In Blalock v. Ladies ProfessionalGolf Association, 172 Blalock, a professional golfer, filed an antitrust action against the defendant organization alleging a violation of section one of the Sherman Act. By decision
of the executive board of the Ladies Professional Golf Association, composed of Blalock's fellow competitors, Blalock was fined and suspended
for cheating. The court first determined that the two threshold elements discussed in Denver Rockets 173 were also present in the Blalock
case. 174 Interstate commerce was present and the defendants had an
75
agreement to refuse to deal with the plaintiff. 1
The Blalock court cited E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air
Tour, ManufacturingCo. ,176 for the proposition that there are three types
of per se illegal group boycotts. 177 The McQuade court concluded that
the "touchstone of per se illegality has been the purpose and effect
of the arrangement in question."' 178 The per se rule has been applied
graduate in four years. Mills: From Prop 48 to Hometown Hero, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 22,
1989, at 7D, col. 2.
167. Witness Danny Manning, who considered but rejected turning professional after
his junior year at the University of Kansas, only to suffer a severe knee injury in his first
year of professional basketball. In the words of the poet Robert Herrick, "Gather ye
rosebuds while ye may." Herrick, To The Virgins, To Make Much of Time.
168. 356 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966). In Denver
Rockets, 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 1971), the court distinguishes the per se violation in Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371
(9th Cir. 1966) from the ruling of no violation in Deesen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 358
F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966). The explanation given for the

differing results reached in the two cases involved the hearing and procedural safeguards
present in Deesen but not present in Washington State Bowling.
169. Washington State Bowling, 356 F.2d at 376.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
173. See supra notes 104-111 and accompanying text.
174. Blalock, 359 F. Supp. at 1263.
175. Id.
176. 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973).
177. Blalock, 359 F. Supp. at 1264.
178. E.A. McQuade Tours, 467 F.2d at 187.
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to exclusionary or coercive conduct which is a "naked restraint of
trade."179 Using this as a basis, the Blalock court concluded that the purpose and effect of the defendants' agreement to suspend the plaintiff for
one year was to exclude the plaintiff from the market and was therefore
a "naked restraint of trade" and "tantamount to total exclusion from the
market." 18 0

Given the willingness of some courts to apply a per se analysis to
group boycotts in certain situations, the group boycott as exemplified by
Proposition 48 might also receive per se treatment and/or summary
judgment. Summary judgments "have been frequently used by the
courts in group boycott cases." 18 1 Also, "[s]ummary judgment for violations of the antitrust laws is proper where less restrictive means than
those used could have been employed." 18 2 Following prior caselaw, the
per se test may be appropriate for Proposition 48.
2.

Rule of Reason

If, however, the per se test is not applied, a rule of reason test
would likely be used.' 8 3 Under the rule of reason test, the Proposition
48 athlete would seem to have a substantial chance of prevailing. Since
the Proposition 48 athlete is denied the opportunity to compete, it is
highly unlikely that such a practice could be deemed by a court to be
"procompetitive."
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 1 84 the Society's rules prohibited its members from submitting
competitive bids for engineering services. The Society argued that in
attempting to set fees it was preventing the public harm which unrestrained competition would produce.' 8 5 The Supreme Court applied
the rule of reason in analyzing the restraint.
179. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 334 (1978). "Since the naked boycott is a
form of predatory behavior, there is little doubt that it should be a per se violation of the
Sherman Act."
180. Blalock, 359 F. Supp. at 1265. The court cited the "completely unfettered, subjective discretion" of the defendants and the fact that the suspension was imposed by competitors of the plaintiff as reasons for its decision. Id. But cf.Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp.
2411 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Defendant sued the NBA and its member teams for damages for
alleged violations of the antitrust laws after Molinas had been indefinitely suspended by
the league for gambling. The court held that the suspension of Molinas was proper and
not an unreasonable restraint of trade because Molinas was suspended pursuant to both a

clause in his contract and a league rule prohibiting gambling.
181. See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp 1049, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1971) which noted that
group boycotts were specifically mentioned by the Supreme Court as one type of case
which was appropriate for resolution without trial, and that partial summary judgment is
appropriate in antitrust cases. See also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 260
(1963); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 3 F.R.D. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Bla-

lock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1262 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
182. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066. See also International Salt Co. v. United

States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947); International Business Machines Corp. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936).
183. But see Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066, which ruled that the case did not fall
within the rule of reason exception provided by Silver, supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.

184. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
185. id. at 687.
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The ProfessionalEngineers Court cited the test set out in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 18 6 asking whether the challenged contracts or acts
"were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions." Unreasonableness could be based on either the nature or character of the contracts
or on the surrounding circumstances.' 8 7 Thus, the inquiry focused on
the impact of the restraint on competitive conditions.
In Professional Engineers, the Court wrote that "[t]he inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one
that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition."' 188 In
NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court discussed what would be
considered "procompetitive" for the purpose of applying the Professional
Engineers test. In Board of Regents, the plaintiff universities objected to the
NCAA's limitations on the number of football games broadcast on television and on the number of appearances by any one team. The Court
determined that "it would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule to this
case" because the Court believed that horizontal restraints on competition were essential if the product was to be available at all.18 9
However, the Court noted that "[ojur analysis of this case under the
Rule of Reason, of course, does not change the ultimate focus of our
inquiry."' 190 Although the Court declined to apply a strict per se test, it
did not require a detailed market analysis and proof of market power. '9 '
The Board of Regents Court quoted Professional Engineers for the view that
"no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticom92
petitive character of such an agreement."'
In Board of Regents, the Court stated that certain restrictions of the
NCAA can be viewed as procompetitive. 9 3
However, the Court rejected both of the NCAA's justifications supporting its restraints on television rights. In rejecting these arguments, the Supreme Court cited
Professional Engineers for the proposition that "the Rule of Reason does
not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is
unreasonable." 194 The Court also rejected the NCAA argument that its
interest in maintaining competitive balance justified the regulation.' 9 5
Therefore, Proposition 48 is unlikely to be labeled as "procompetitive"
186. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
187. Id. at 58.
188. ProfessionalEng rs, 435 U.S. at 691. See also Deesen v. Professional Golfer's Ass'n of

America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966). "The pertinent inquiry ...is whether an association intends to use that power in a manner which tends to suppress or destroy competi-

tion."Id. at 171.
189. NCAA v. Board Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984).
190. Id. at 103.
191. Id. at 109.
192. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984) (quoting ProfessionalEngineers,

435 U.S. at 692).
193. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102. The Court, however, also discussed the "anticompetitive consequences" of the NCAA television arrangement and noted that
"[i]ndividual competitors lose their freedom to compete." Id. at 106.
194. Id. at 117 (quoting Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 696).
195. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117. See R. McCormick and R. Meiners, Sacred Cows,
Competition, and Racial Discrimination, NEW PERSPECTIVES, Winter 1988. "To allow athletic
conferences and independent schools to set their own standards for admission for athletes,
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under the ProfessionalEngineers test.196
In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,197 the court of appeals declined to apply
a per se rule to the NFL draft. The court noted that the hallmark of the
group boycott is the effort of competitors to "barricade themselves from
competition at their own level."' 98 The court differentiated the NFL
draft from the classic group boycott for two reasons. First, the court
said that the NFL clubs were not competitors in any economic sense, 19 9
because the clubs operate as a joint venture in the production of an entertainment product, football games and telecasts. 20 0 No NFL team can
produce this product without "agreements and joint action with every
20
other team."
Second, the court held that the NFL clubs had not combined to exclude competitors or potential competitors from the market. 20 2 Smith,
as a football player, was never seeking to compete with the NFL clubs
and no decrease in competition for providing football entertainment to
the public resulted.
The Smith court noted that "[w]hen confronted with concerted refusals to deal that do not fit the classic 'group boycott' pattern, the
courts almost without exception have held the per se rule inapplicable. '"203 In the case of sanctioning organizations, which oversee sports,
the rule of reason has been frequently applied.2 0 4 In addition, the Smith
court held that the per se rule should not be applied to "concerted refusals that are not designed to drive out competitors but to achieve
some other goal."' 20 5 The courts have refused to invoke the per se rule
where the "need for cooperation among participants necessitated some
as they do for all other students, and to determine the number and value of athletic scholarships would enhance competition rather than destroy it." Id. at 47, 51.
196. Defenders of the NCAA contend that the regulations it imposes on college
athletics enhance amateur competition. There is little doubt that many of the
NCAA rules, particularly the rules of play, are useful. However, the blanket mandate of uniform academic standards and scholarship limitations for all NCAA
schools does not enhance competition.
McCormick & Meiners, supra note 190, at 49.
197. 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
198. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1977)(quoting L.A.
SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST, at 245 (1977)).
199. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1179.
200. See also Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977); Levin v. NBA. 385 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); San Francisco Seals v.

NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969 (C.D. Cal. 1974); R.

BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX

(1978),

(citing the joint venture characteristics of, respectively, the NFL, the NBA and the NHL).
But see Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984), upholding directed verdict issued by district court holding
the NFL not to be a single entity.
201. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1179.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1179 n.22.
204. See United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, Inc., 665 F.2d 781, 787
(7th Cir. 1981); AIAW v. NCAA, 558 F. Supp. 487 (D.C.C. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 577 (D.C.
Cir. 1984);Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v.
United States Tennis Ass'n, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Neb. 1981), aff'd, 665 F.2d 222
(8th Cir. 1981);Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
205. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1180:
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type of concerted refusal to deal ....

329

, 206

The court reasoned that since it could not be said that the draft had
"no purpose except stifling of competition" or that it is without "any
redeeming virtue," it should not receive per se analysis.
The court analyzed that the draft forces each seller of football services to deal with only one buyer, thus robbing the seller of any real bargaining power. The Smith court then stated:
NFL teams are not economic competitors on the playing
field, and the draft, while it may heighten athletic competition
and thus improve the entertainment product offered to the
public, does not increase competition in the economic sense of
to enter the market and to offer the prodencouraging others
20 7
uct at lower cost.
The anticompetitive evils of the draft could not be balanced against its
procompetitive virtues. 20 8 The Smith court assessed the procompetitive
20 9
effects of the draft as "nil."
The Smith definition of competition as competition for players, not
competition on the playing field, is contrary to a potential NCAA argument that Proposition 48 is procompetitive because of what it accomplishes on the playing field. The court in Smith labeled the draft
anticompetitive because of its "effect on the market for players' services,
because it virtually eliminates economic competition among buyers for
the services of sellers." '210 A court attempting to balance the procompetitive virtues of Proposition 48 against its anticompetitive evils under the
Smith analysis could well conclude that Proposition 48 is not
procompetitive.
The Smith court referred to ProfessionalEngineers for the proposition
that the purpose of antitrust analysis is to form a judgment about the
competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a
policy favoring competition is21in the public interest, or in the interest of
the members of an industry. '
206. Id. See also Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977).
"[I]n an industry which necessarily requires some interdependence and cooperation, the
per se rule should not be applied indiscriminately." Id. at 652-53. Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
207. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186.
208. It should be noted that player drafts and other restrictions are permissible under
the non-statutory labor exemption when they are negotiated with a union. See McCourt v.
California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn.
1988), rev'd, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989). For an analysis of the development of the nonstatutory labor exemption, see Closius, Not at the Behest of NoniaborGroups: A Revised Prognosis
fora MaturingSports Industry, 24 B.C.L. REV. 341 (1983). In Smith, the union had not agreed
to the restriction in question. In the Proposition 48 case, there is no union involved in
representing college athletes. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the decision to adopt
Proposition 48 should receive the same type of protection from the antitrust laws as is
afforded collectively bargained restraints.
209. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186.
210. Id.
211. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978).
See also Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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The Smith court cited less anticompetitive alternatives. With Proposition 48, there may also be less restrictive alternatives which have not
been explored by the NCAA. 2 12 A restraint will survive scrutiny "only if
it is demonstrated to have positive, economically procompetitive benefits that offset its anticompetitive effects, or, at the least, if it is demonstrated to accomplish legitimate business purposes and to have a net
2' 13
anticompetitive effect that is insubstantial.
In Board of Regents, the Court stated, "whether the ultimate
finding is
the product of a presumption or actual market analysis, the essential
inquiry remains the same whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition. '2 14 Furthermore, the Court observed that "there
'2 15
is often no bright line separating per se from rule of reason analysis."
21 6
Thus, even though a court may decline to apply a per se test,
the rule
of reason test may not always require the kind of detailed analysis that
has been required in the past. 2 1 7 Nevertheless, whatever test the Court
chooses to apply, the sine qua non of the inquiry remains the procompetitive aspects of the restraint.
V.

CONCLUSION

In a Sherman Act challenge to Proposition 48, it is presumed that
the NCAA would raise the justification that Proposition 48 is intended to
promote the athlete's pursuit of an education. In the 1989-90 NCAA
Manual, the NCAA sets forth certain principles governing eligibility.
The Manual states that "[elligibility requirements shall be designed to
assure proper emphasis on educational objectives, to promote competitive equity among institutions and to prevent exploitation of student
212. University of Iowa President Hunter Rawlings proposed in April of 1989 that the
University of Iowa limit all freshman participation in intercollegiate athletics. Freshman
Eligibility Shows Mixed Results, Cedar Rapids Gazette, May 1, 1989, at 10A, Col. 2. In addition, Charles Reed, Chancellor of the Florida State University system, has proposed to ban
freshman eligibility and to delay the start of the basketball season until mid-December at
Florida's nine publicly financed universities. Cuts at 9 Florida Schools Asked, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 21, 1989, at 34, col. 1.
According to a recent survey conducted by the NCAA's Committee on Basketball Issues, Division I Coaches and Athletic Directors voted 207-56 and 99-97, respectively, to
recommend declaring freshmen ineligible for Division I men's basketball if they are allowed four subsequent years of eligibility. Freshman Ineligibility A Real Possibility, USA Today, Sept. 22, 1989, at 9C, col. 2. The committee also endorsed a proposal to limit
athletes to three years of eligibility, with a fourth "conditioned upon ... being within 24
semester or 36 quarter hours of graduation." Id.
213. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1189.
214. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 84, 104 (1984).
215. Id. at 104 n.26.
216. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding that the
more discriminating examination under the rule of reason may be appropriate in situations where competitors operate with some form of joint agreements).
217. For example, in Board of Regents, the Court first determined that the restriction in
question "on its face constitutes a restraint upon the operation of a free market." 468 U.S.
at 113. The burden then shifts to the petitioner (defendant) to establish an affirmative
defense which "competitively justifies" the deviation from the operations of a free market.
After disposing of the petitioner's two proffered justifications, the Court deemed the restraint illegal under the rule of reason. Id.
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athletes." 21 8
In Denver Rockets, the NBA similarly asserted that its regulation was
necessary to guarantee that each prospective basketball player had the
opportunity to complete four years of college.2 1 9 The court noted that:
However commendable this desire may be, this court is not
in a position to say that this consideration should override the
objective of fostering economic competition which is embodied
to be made, it
in the antitrust laws. If such a determination is220
must be made by Congress and not the courts.
Furthermore, the argument that Proposition 48 is necessary to promote an athlete's pursuit of educational goals is flawed by studies which
indicate that only 27% of NBA players actually obtain college degrees. 2 2 1 Obviously, the vast majority of the players who do compete
for the full four years and later enter the NBA do not receive a college
degree. 2 22 This data shows the fallacy in assuming that attending college for four years necessarily leads the NBA bound college basketball
player to a college degree.
The view that many athletes do not attend college primarily to receive an education has been amplified in a recent case. In Hall v. University of Minnesota,2 23 the court set forth an "economic reality" test, taking
the position that the student-athlete is not in college merely for an edu218. See NCAA MANUAL § 2.9 (1989-90) The Principle Governing Eligibility. The manual also contains § 2.11, The Principle Governing Playing and Practice Seasons, which
states, "[t]he time required of student-athletes for participation in intercollegiate athletics
shall be regulated to minimize interference with their opportunities for acquiring a quality
education in a manner consistent with that afforded the general student body." But see
REPORT No. 3: THE EXPERIENCES OF BLACK INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETES AT NCAA DIvIsION

I INSTITUTIONS, Center for the Study of Athletics, American Institutes for Research 37

(Mar. 1989) citing the same Institute's REPORT No. 1, which found that "[D]ivision I football and basketball players spend more time in their sports during the season than they
spend preparing for and attending class combined." Black football and basketball players
also spend more time on their sports than on their studies and the "reason probably has to
do . . . with the nature of intercollegiate athletics." Id. at 41.
219. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (C.D. Cal.
1971).
220. Id.
221. Quote from Keith Lee, Associate Director of the Center for Sport in Society, Jan.
24, 1990, in phone conversation with one of the authors.
222. The typical NCAA Division I basketball team plays nearly thirty games in a fourmonth period, running from December to early March. Usually, a team will have to travel
to its opponents' site for approximately half of its games. Many teams have conference
tournaments, and sixty-four teams participate in the NCAA tournament, which does not
generally conclude until early April. Given the time constraints of games and practice, and
the fact that the NCAA basketball season runs through the fall and spring semesters at
most colleges, the low graduation rate is not surprising.
At the NCAA annual convention in January, 1990, the NCAA voted to reduce the
number of regular-season basketball games from 28 to 25, move the beginning of basketball practice from October 15 to November 1, and move the opening date of the basketball
season from the fourth Friday in November to December I. NCAA Restricts Practices, Seasons, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at 46, col. 4.

223. 530 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D. Minn. 1982). Although Hall involved constitutional
issues, its analysis of the economic aspects of collegiate athletics is also applicable to antitrust law.
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cation. 2 24 The court, in addressing the suit of an NCAA Division I basketball player who was ostensibly ineligible, stated that "[t]he plaintiff
and his fellow athletes were never recruited on the basis of scholarship
..and are given little incentive to be scholars."' 22 5 The court observed
that "[t]he exceptionally talented student athlete is led to perceive the
basketball, football, and other athletic teams as farm teams and proving

grounds for professional sports leagues." 2 26 Placing the blame squarely

on the university for having fostered the business-like aspect of collegiate athletics, the court also said that the university, not the individual, should suffer the consequences for the lack of emphasis on
academics and the overemphasis on the money-making aspects of athletics. 2 27 The court stated that "[i]t well may be true that a good academic
program for the athlete is made virtually impossible by the demands of
their sport at the college level."12 2 8 Thus, the university cannot frustrate an athlete's effort to pursue a professional career, since the athlete,
according to Hall, is primarily at the school to compete in athletics, not
to go to school. 229 Lest there be any concern that the court in Hall is
224. One commentator on college athletics described the role of the big-time college
athletes as follows: "They're the serfs who toil in the feudal business of college sports,
generating hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue, through TV rights, tickets and souvenirs - all of it going to others." Philadelphia Enquirer, Oct. 15, 1989, (Magazine), at 16,
col. 3. Harry Edwards, a California sociologist who specializes in sports, describes the
system as "a slave system ... the athlete isn't receiving anything. He's just a victim of all
the greed, avarice and utter exploitation that colleges resort to." Id. at 34, cols. 2-3.
225. Hall, 530 F. Supp. at 109.
226. Id. But see NCAA MANUAL § 12.02 (1989-90). Amateur Student Athlete, which
states that -[a]n amateur student-athlete is one who engages in a particular sport for the
educational, physical, mental and social benefits derived therefrom and for whom participation in that sport is an avocation."
227. See R. Telander, A Question of Fairness, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 1, 1989.
The unfairness stems from the colleges' having laid most of the economic restrictions on the athletes and few on themselves. Players may not make money or sign
with agents until they're through with their collegiate careers. All they receive for
their efforts on the field or court are free educations, which some don't want or
aren't smart or mature enough to pursue. Either way, these athletes should not
be taking up space on college campuses.
Id.at 114. See also McCormick & Meiner, Sacred Cows, Competition and Racial Discrimination,
NEw PERSPECTIVES (Winter 1988). "Almost no one talks about the enormous sums of
money created by the play of lowly paid athletes. The situation, controlled by the NCAA
and its member institutions, borders on economic peonage." Id. at 48.
228. Hall, 530 F. Supp. at 109. One of the most venerated coaches in college football
history, Paul (Bear) Bryant, of the University of Alabama, expressed a similar view that
academics played a secondary role to athletics in college sports. He said:
I used to go along with the idea that football players on scholarship were 'student-athletes,' which is what the NCAA calls them. Meaning a student first, an
athlete second. We were kidding ourselves, trying to make it more palatable to
the academicians. We don't have to say that and we shouldn't. At the level we
play, the boy is really an athlete first and a student second.
J. KIRBY, FUMBLE 77 (1977) (quoting Paul (Bear) Bryant).
229. Big Ten Commissioner James Delaney has stated that:
I'm not comfortable with keeping a student in school only because the colleges
and pros think this is where he should be. I don't think the colleges should be
acting in concert with the pro leagues. We should be about education. If someone isn't interested in an education and wants to turn professional, then he
should be allowed to do it.

Telander, A Question of Fairness, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 1,1989, at 114 (quoting Big Ten
Commissioner James Delaney).
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engaging in judicial hyperbole, the University of Minnesota president
confirmed to the NCAA special convention in 1987: "We in Division I
are in an entertainment business and we can't fool ourselves.''230
Hall presents a very unflattering scenario in its analysis of college
athletics. But the queasiness that a Hall-type analysis may create does
not diminish the veracity of the fact that big-time collegiate athletics and
academics are frequently incompatible. 23 1 But perhaps big-time college athletics have become such a substantial revenue generating indusviability is compatible
try that it is unrealistic to think that its continuing
23 2
with traditional notions of amateurism.
There is widespread disagreement as to the effectiveness of Proposition 48 within the academic and athletic communities. 2 33 John Chaney, the Temple University basketball coach and a critic of Proposition
48, says that Proposition 48 will not markedly change the quality of education. He stated, "ft]hey're not going to move in the direction of teaching the kids in these schools. They're certainly not going to do anything
230. TELANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE 191 (1989) (quoting University of Minnesota
President Kenneth Keller).
231. New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley, a former collegiate and professional basketball
player, is sponsor of the Student-Athlete Right-To-Know Act, S. 580, 101st Cong., Ist
Sess. (1989), which requires colleges and universities receiving federal financial assistance
to make public detailed information with respect to the graduation rates of student athletes. Colleges and universities would report annually to the Secretary of Education the
graduation rates of athletic-scholarship recipients, broken down by sport, sex and race.
Schools would be required to provide this information to all high school athletes being
recruited as athletic-scholarship candidates. In addition, students' national letters of intent would require the student to acknowledge that he or she has reviewed the report and
discussed it with a guidance counselor or principal.
The NCAA has opposed the Student-Athlete Right to Know Act, in part because it
may violate federal privacy laws which require that the academic records of individual students be kept private. Jim Marchiony, the spokesman for the NCAA, said, "[tihe opinion
of the colleges and universities within the NCAA is that, while the intent of the bill is good,
it is not something that should be federally legislated." N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, at 18,
col. 3.
At the NCAA annual convention in January, 1990, the NCAA voted to require Division I and II schools to provide data to be published annually on graduation rates of athletes. Senator Bradley was quoted as saying, "[I] am very pleased by the NCAA's action
.... The NCAA Division I and Division II schools were nearly unanimous in their support
of requirements to release graduation rates to future student athletes and families. This is
fully consistent with the legislation that we have sponsored." NCAA Restricts Practices, Seasons, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at 46, col. 4.
232. Representative Tom McMillen, (D-Md.), says, "[w]e'll never get the genie back in
the bottle because there's too much money, too much infrastructure, too much television.
But what we can do is build a fort around it to bring America back into perspective." N.Y.
Times, Oct. 10, 1989, at 18, col. 1. Charles Grantham states that, "[t]he business of college basketball, like the business of professional basketball is simply about money and
today money abounds in basketball because it's great entertainment and the game is
played like its never been played before by an endless supply of great athletes." It's Time to
Give College Players a Cut, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1990, at 10F, col. 2.
233. There was even more disagreement when the NCAA introduced Proposition 42.
Georgetown University Coach John Thompson, protesting the NCAA's adoption of Proposition 42, walked off the court in a January 14, 1989 game between his team and Boston
College and did not appear for his team's January 18 game against Providence. Thompson returned to the court after NCAA officials agreed to recommend postponing enactment of Proposition 42 until the NCAA finishes a five-year study examining whether
standardized test scores can predict collegiate academic success. Griffin, GEORGETOWN 7
(Winter 1989).
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more because the NCAA says it. Ninety-nine-and-a-half percent of their
students have nothing to do with athletics. Why should they change
their curriculum? ' 23 4 James Zumberg, President of the University of
Southern California, disagrees with Chaney. He said, "[g]iven sufficient
time, I believe Proposition 48 will ultimately have high schools direct
more effort to academic preparation.' '235
The whole system of intercollegiate athletics has come under criticism relating to abuses within the system. 23 6 One commentator has
noted:
The charade of amateurism and the "student-athlete," the relentless pursuit of revenue by autonomous, self-aggrandizing
athletic departments; the see-no-evil-attitude of egocentric,
out-of-touch coaches; the unwritten restraint of trade collusion
between the NCAA and the NFL - although that policy appears
to be in tatters - prevent college players from entering the pros
until they have exhausted their collegiate eligibility, while
al23 7
lowing the NFL to use the colleges as its minor league.
Based on the foregoing analysis, it appears that a Proposition 48
student-athlete could prevail on a section one Sherman Act challenge to
the NCAA restriction, either under a per se analysis or the rule of reason. A per se analysis would be more likely to benefit the individual
player, while a rule of reason analysis could ultimately invalidate the restraints of Proposition 48.
If Proposition 48 did not receive per se analysis, resulting in either
an injunction or summary judgment, the challenging athlete would almost certainly lose one year of eligibility. An extended rule of reason
inquiry, which by its nature involves a detailed examination of the facts
of the case, would consume valuable time and would probably constitute
a Pyrrhic victory for the athlete who would have lost a year of eligibility
while challenging the restraint.
Given the unique nature of the relationship among the members of
the NCAA, it appears unlikely that a strict per se analysis would be applied. Since a certain amount of cooperation is necessary to operate a
successful athletic program on a college or professional level, various
rules and regulations are necessary to assure the viability of such an endeavor. This makes it unlikely that a per se analysis would be applied in
the Proposition 48 situation, notwithstanding judicial predisposition towards application of per se standards in certain group boycott situa234. Proposition 48 Here to Stay, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Mar. 31, 1989, at 8C, col. 1.
235. Id.
236. The House Education and Labor Subcommittee held hearings on the state of collegiate athletics on May 18, 1989. William C. Friday, former President of the University of
North Carolina, is vice-chairman of a commission financed by the Knight Foundation and
formed to examine problems in intercollegiate athletics and to recommend reforms to the
system. Panel To Speak Reforms in Athletics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1989, at D27, col. 1. At an
interview to announce formation of the commission, Friday said, "[t]here is a place for a
good intercollegiate - athletics program at every college .... The problem is that we are

turning institutions of higher education into entertainment centers." Id.
237. A Question of Fairness, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 1, 1989, at 114.
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tions. 2 38 It appears more likely that a court would follow a rule of

reason analysis, either in a traditional sense 23 9 or the "truncated" or
"quick-look" rule of reason analysis as exemplified in NCAA v. Board of
Regents.240

The NCAA's ostensible goal of promoting scholarship among student-athletes is admirable, but pursuit of such an admirable goal does
not justify the NCAA's imposition of a restriction on would-be studentathletes which constitutes an illegal group boycott. The court in Denver
Rockets recognized the "commendable" desire of the NBA to give every
college basketball player the opportunity to graduate, but held that such
a desire could not override the objectives of the federal antitrust
laws. 24 ' As Judge Frank stated in upholding a major league baseball

player's antitrust challenge to a ruling of the Major League Baseball
Commissioner in Gardella v. Chandler, "[n]o court should strive ingeniously to legalize a private (even if benevolent) dictatorship. "242 In
light of Tarkanian, the NCAA may now be akin to such a dictatorship.
The desirability of the motives of Proposition 48 is not the issue. The
road to illegal behavior is frequently littered with good motives. As the
Supreme Court noted in Board of Regents, "[g]ood motives will not validate an otherwise anticompetitive practice." '24 3 The issue is whether
Proposition 48 can withstand antitrust scrutiny, given the Supreme
244

Court's requirement in Professional Engineers

2 45
and Board of Regents

that the conditions imposed by the restriction be procompetitive. It appears that the NCAA's Proposition 48 restriction may not be the least
anticompetitive alternative and may not satisfy the Supreme Court's requirement that such a restriction be "procompetitive."
VI.

SUGGESTIONS

If Proposition 48 cannot survive Section One Sherman Act scrutiny,
the question then remains: How can academic eligibility standards be
established for college athletes in a legal manner? One sports television
industry insider believes "the key to handling the problems is the total
involvement of the presidents and chancellors of the various schools.
They simply have to retake control of athletic programs. '2 46 Under
238. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 78-111 and accompanying text.
240. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). See supra note 41. See also remarks by the Honorable Janet

Steiger, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, before the 23d New England Antitrust
Conference, Cambridge, Mass., Nov. 23, 1989, (citing the approach in Massachusetts
Board of Registration in Optometry, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
22,555 (June 21, 1988),
which focuses inquiry first on whether the joint conduct by competitors is inherently suspect, then on whether any claims of efficiency justifications are plausible and factually
supportable).
241. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (C.D. Cal.

1971).
242. 172 F.2d 402, 415 (2d Cir. 1949).
243. 468 U.S. at 101 n.23.

244. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
245. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
246. J. SPENCE & D. DiLES, UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL 124 (1988). Indeed, the Florida
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such an approach, each individual school's academic administrators, not
the NCAA, could establish the guidelines for students to compete in extracurricular activities, such as intercollegiate sports. Such a return of
power to each campus would vitiate the arguably anticompetitive influence of the NCAA cartel in the Proposition 48 area, 2 4 7 by allowing individual schools, rather than the NCAA, to make decisions involving each
school's athletic program. 24 8 One college president recently wrote that
"[c]ollege and university presidents are beginning to take a more active
role in the NCAA; clearly, they have the ability to bring about meaning2 49
ful reforms."
However, perhaps only a Pollyanna 250 would think that, in this day
and age of multi-million dollar college athletic budgets 2 5 ' and an emphasis on successful, winning, college athletic programs, individual college administrators would deal with athletic eligibility issues in a
reponsible manner. Indeed, the same commentator who suggested the
key to handling college athletic programs is to return decision-making to
college administrators 2 52 also questions the resolve of college presiBoard of Regents recently voted to put university presidents in control of athletic booster
groups. This move will give the presidents both authority over executive directors of organizations that raise or spend money for the benefit of the university and approval of the
budget and expenditures of the booster groups. USA Today, December 15, 1989, at 13c,
col. 1.
NCAA Executive Director Dick Schultz recently expressed a similar view. He said,
-[r]ight now, colleges and universities are not perceived as controlling their athletics programs . . . . You are what you are perceived to be. We need to re-style some things.
Universities need to be in control of their athletic programs, and I'm not so sure they
always are." In College Sports, the Real Players Collect Millions From the Networks, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 31, 1989, at 6E, col. 2.
247. See supra note 30.
248. It is important to note that the viability of this approach is predicated on each
school making its own eligibility decisions.
249.

Muse, Letter to the Editor, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 18, 1989, at 5.

It should be

noted that the college adminsitrators, in taking such action, would still be participating
under the NCAA cartel. Muse, President of the University of Akron, is "encouraged" by
the formation of a task force, headed by the Reverend Theodore Hesburgh, President
Emeritus of Notre Dame, and William Friday, President Emeritus of North Carolina, to
study reforms in collegiate athletics.
President Muse recommends three changes from the current system. First, "[rieduce
the economic motivations for winning" by distributing the proceeds of the NCAA men's
basketball tournament to all of the Division I schools, with those schools playing in the
tournament receiving set percentages and the noncompeting schools receiving an even
share of the remaining funds. In addition, schools participating in football bowl games
"should be required to contribute a share of their proceeds to the NCAA for equal distribution to all other schools participating in that division." Second, Muse advocates allowing football players to go to the NFL at the end of any school year, because "if it is the
player's objective to participate in professional athletics, we ought to allow him to take
advantage of the opportunity when it arises." Muse reasons that other students can drop
out of school and go to work at any time. Third, Muse favors requiring that each school
treat its athletes the same way it treats its other students with regard to admission and
retention standards and to eligibility for participation in extracurricular activities. Muse,
Letter to the Editor, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 18. 1989, at 5.
250. "[Ain excessively or blindly optimistic person . . . [from the name of the child

heroine created by Eleanor Porter (1868-1920), American writer]." THE RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, (2d ed. 1987).
251. See supra note 31.
252. J. SPENCE & D. DILES, supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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dents and chancellors in taking matters into their own hands, when a
253
losing athletic program may result from tightened standards.
If the morass that is intercollegiate athletics is not reformed from
within, there are signs that Congress may step in to regulate the intercollegiate sports industry. United States Representative Tom McMillen,
a knowledgable observer of the existing situation in intercollegiate athletics and a former college and NBA basketball player, states that "[t]he
NCAA is at a crossroads. The question today is: Will the colleges get
back to their original mission of educating young people? A few more
Lennie Bias 2 5 4 stories could open a Pandora's box that would force
' 2 55
Congress to begin micromanaging the affairs of the NCAA."
Perhaps the legal solution to the struggle between Proposition 48
and section one of the Sherman Act emanates from an unlikely sourcethe pot of gold generated by intercollegiate sports. 25 6 In the aftermath
of CBS television's agreement to pay $1 billion to televise the NCAA
basketball tournament from 1991 to 1997, NCAA Executive Director
Dick Schultz was quoted as hinting that "major reform" to college athletics might result from the windfall. Schultz was quoted challenging
NCAA committees "to come up with new ways of distributing this
money . . . " citing possibilities such as to "give the [NCAA Basketball
tournament] qualifying schools substantial expense money and a small
amount for winning . . ." and to "[a]ward more money to schools that
'25 7
give more athletic scholarships, possibly tying it to graduation rates."
Executive Director Schultz reportedly said that "creative" proposals to
"spread the wealth" 2 5 8 would be considered by the NCAA. 259
One "creative" proposal could "spread the wealth" where it is most
deserved: to the athletes who are largely responsible for generating the
revenues, and, thereby, help provide a framework to protect the NCAA
from antitrust attack for its cartel-like behavior in adopting Proposition
260
48 and other similarly anticompetitive measures.
253. Id. at 125-26.
254. Len Bias was a former University of Maryland basketball player who died of a
cocaine overdose, just hours after he was drafted by the Boston Celtics of the NBA. See L.
COLE, NEVER Too YOUNG TO DIE: ThE DEATH OF LEN BIAS 7-61 (1989).
255. Krupa, The Big Squeeze in College Athletics, SPORTS INC., Jan. 9, 1989, at 14, col. 2.
256. Under the current arrangement, the NCAA's $56.8 million take from the 1990
NCAA Basketball tournament will be divided as follows: Forty percent ($22.7 million) to
the NCAA; $274,845 to each of the 32 first-round losers; $549,689 to the 16 second-round
losers; $824,534 to the 8 third-round losers; $1,099,379 to the 4 fourth-round losers; and
$1,374,224 to the final four teams. Colleges Plan to Share the CBS Billion, N.Y. Times, Nov.
23, 1989, at 42, col. 3.
257. Next NCAA Challenge: How to Split the Take, USA Today, Nov. 22, 1989, at 3c, col. 1.
258. Colleges Plan to Share the CBS Billion, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1989, at 42, col. 2.
259. To this end, the NCAA's Executive Committee agreed to create a special panel to
study ways to distribute the $1 billion. It was anticipated that the special committee would
make its recommendations to the NCAA budget committee in July, 1990, and a final decision was expected as soon as August, 1990. NCAA Names Panel on TV Deal, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 5, 1989, at 45, col. 1.
260. Another creative proposal for the distribution of the new-found wealth is suggested by Neil H. Pilson, President of CBS Sports, who notes:
In the next five years, we estimate that the entire television industry will dispense
between $1.2 billion and $1.5 billion to colleges and universities. But that money
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If the NCAA were to compensate, in some manner, the Division I
basketball players from the proceeds generated by televising the NCAA
basketball tournament, benefits could accrue to the players 26 ' and to the
NCAA itself. The benefit to the players is obvious and fair: in return for
performing the hundreds of hours of service required of them, they receive some monetary compensation out of the hundreds of millions of
dollars they generate. The players' receipt of compensation for performing their athletic services could enable them to organize under the
National Labor Relations Act 2 6 2 to form a union to negotiate the player/
263
employees' terms and conditions of employment.
A direct benefit could redound to the NCAA from the player/employees' ability to organize and collectively bargain the terms and conditions of their employment. The Supreme Court has held that, in order
to properly accommodate congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets with congressional policy favoring collective
bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act, certain union-employer agreements must be granted a limited nonstatutory exemption
from antitrust sanctions. 264 The non-statutory labor exemption may
thus insulate from antitrust challenge certain otherwise-illegal restrictions if such restrictions, such as Proposition 48 are collectively
bargained.
In the seminal sports labor-exemption case, Mackey v. NFL,2 6 5 the
court fashioned a three-part test "governing the proper accommodation
of the competing labor and antitrust interests involved here."'2 66 The
test requires that: 1) the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may
potentially be given preeminence over antitrust laws where the restraint
on trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining
relationship, 2) federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail
only where the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining, and 3) the policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust
laws only where the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of
should be viewed by college administrators as a positive force and as an enormous and attractive resource for higher education. It is money the educational
institutions do not have to raise from tax payers, parents, alumni and students,
and it is money they can use for any purpose: to build new classrooms or dorms,
to reduce tuition, or to pay coachs' salaries." TV Cash can give Colleges High Marks,
N.Y. Times, April 1, 1990, at IOF, col. 3.

261.

Charles Grantham, Executive Director of the National Basketball Players Associa-

tion, has proposed the establishment of individual trust accounts for players at schools
where basketball is a revenue-generating sport. It's Time to Give College Players a Cut, N.Y.

Times, March 18, 1990, IOF, col. 5.
262. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151-157 (1982).
263. Id. at § 157 (1982).
264.

See Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,

421 U.S. 616 (1975); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,
Inc., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
265.

543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 401 (1977)..

266.

Id. at 614.

1990]

PROPOSITION 48

26 7
bona fide arm's-length bargaining.
It would seem that the eligibility issue unilaterally addressed by the
NCAA through the adoption and implementation of Proposition 48
could be shielded from antitrust attack by the non-statutory labor exemption. If the NCAA were to earmark a share of its recent billion dollar television windfall for player compensation, thereby making the
players employees, the players could unionize to negotiate terms and
conditions of employment with the NCAA. It seems that the subject
matter of Proposition 48, determination of player eligibility, is an area
268
which would fall squarely under the three-pronged test of Mackey.

It is evident that the NCAA may be subject to antitrust attack by a
Proposition 48 victim or victims. 2 69 A successful antitrust challenge
under the Sherman Act rewards the challenging plaintiff with treble
damages 2 70 and attorneys' fees. 27 1 Permitting NCAA athletes to be
27 2
compensated for generating hundreds of millions of dollars annually,
and permitting them to organize to bargain collectively would benefit
the players in obvious ways. Such an arrangement could also benefit the
NCAA in derivative ways, by enabling the NCAA to protect itself from
antitrust liability emanating from such arguable restraints of trade as
Proposition 48.273
Presumably, the "system" of intercollegiate athletics will also benefit. The National Labor Relations Act places paramount importance on
encouraging parties to bargain collectively to establish the terms and
conditions of employment in a given industry. 2 74 A judge in a recent
sports case decision echoed this sentiment: "national labor laws establish that federal labor policy favors resolution of labor disputes through
collective bargaining ....-275
267. Id. See also Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988), modified, 690 F.
Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 888 F.2d 559 (8th cir. 1989); McCourt v. California
Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
268. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614. First, the eligibility restraint in question "primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship," in this case the player/
employees and the NCAA/employer. Id. Secondly, "the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of bargaining," in this case, wages, hours and working conditions. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Thirdly, the subject of eligibility
would, presumably, be the product of "bona fide arm's-length bargaining" if it were addressed in a collective bargaining agreement between the players and the NCAA. Mackey,
543 F.2d at 614.
269. See supra at Section V.
270. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
271. Id.
272. This article does not purport to address any potential compensation schemes.
273. Notwithstanding Justice Marshall's dissent in Flood v. Kuhn, where he states that
"benefits to organized labor cannot be utilized as a cat's-paw to pull employers' chestnuts
out of the antitrust fire," it is clear from subsequent case law development that management derives substantial benefit from the non-statutory labor exemption. Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258, 294 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Women's
Sports Wear Mfr. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949)). See also Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559 (8th
Cir. 1989); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Kupp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
274. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
275. Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812, 818 (D. Minn. 1988).
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If NCAA athletes were cloaked in employee garb, in addition to
their athletic uniforms, Proposition 48 could be addressed in a collective bargaining context, and the player/employees would have a role in
determining less restrictive or fairer means of determining eligibility.
Granted, this is a radical idea which involves substantial deviation from
the NCAA's notions of traditional amateurism,2 76 but it is also an idea
which may immunize NCAA policy from antitrust attack, and benefit,
college athletes, in the process.

276. The NCAA MANUAL § 1.3.1 (1989-90) states, "[a] basic purpose of this Association is to... retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports."

THE AEROBICS FITNESS INDUSTRY: EVOLVING
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE
GREGORY

I.

M.

STAHMER*

INTRODUCTION

America is in the midst of a fitness boom that has engulfed people
from all walks of life.' Our preoccupation with fitness and health has
turned it into more than a five billion-dollar a year industry. 2 As early as
1985, eighty-five million Americans were involved in some type of exercise program, a figure constituting thirty-five percent of the nation's
3
population.
One of the most popular forms of exercise in the United States is
aerobic dance or fitness. 4 Millions have been drawn to such programs
for both the cardiorespiratory as well as psycho-physiological benefits. 5
Along with the increase in popularity of aerobic fitness, has been an
increase in the number of injuries as well as subsequent legal action 6
associated with these programs. 7 Physicians and athletic trainers are
finding that they treat a significant number of people injured while participating in aerobic fitness classes. 8 Although there is some disagreement as to the interpretation of the data, 9 recent studies,10 compared
* B.A. 1986, University of Colorado; J.D., M.B.A. 1990, University of Denver. For
the past ten years the author has served as a Senior Paramedic with the Denver Paramedic
Division, Denver, Colorado and is certified in Advanced Cardiac Life Support by the
American Heart Association. The author would like to thank Karri Smith, M.S., Associate
Physical Education Director, Marin YMCA, San Francisco, California for her thoughts and
insight on the aerobic fitness industry.
I. Hyman & Feiger, Legal Aspects of Health and Fitness Clubs: A Healthy and Dangerous
Industry, 15 COLO. LAw. 1787 (1986).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Aerobic dance generally refers to an exercise regime put to music in a format
similar to a dance routine. It is the author's impression that aerobic fitness encompasses
aerobic dance as well as other exercises that work the cardiovascular system. As a matter
of consistency, the author will use the term "aerobic fitness" throughout this article.
5. Francis, Aerobic Dance Injuries: A Survey of Instructors, 13 PHYSICIAN SPORTSMED. 105
(1985).
6. While there are no reported decisions dealing with the standards of competence
of aerobic fitness instructors, there are a number of trial court decisions dealing with the
liability of fitness centers for exercise related injuries. See, e.g., Sosa v. Jack La Lanne, No.
C339856 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles, Cal. 1985) (aggravation of preexisting physical problem
following exercise); Battaglia v. Holiday Health Club, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 9489 (Dist. Ct.
Denver, Colo. 1986) (injury while using exercise machine); Jacobson v. Holiday Health
Club, No. A85 CV 1249 (Dist. Ct. Arapahoe Co., Colo. 1986) (injury from weight training
machine); Heher v. Stratford Racquetball, No. CB-81-197255S (Super. Ct. Fairfield Co.,
Conn. 1985).
7. Francis, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. Richie, Medical-Legal Implication of Dance Exercise Prescriptionand Leadership: The Risk
of Injury, 2 EXERCISE STANDARDS MALPRACTICE REP. 17, 21 (1988).

10. In a study presented at the IDEA Industry Convention in Anaheim, California,
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with studies done five years ago,"I show that the influx of injuries related to aerobic fitness programs has declined.
While not all the factors that have contributed to this decrease in
injuries are known, it does appear clear that an increase, over the past
few years, in the level of instructor training and competence has played a
dominate role.' 2 Perhaps the greatest impact on instructor training has
come from a clearer definition of industry standards and the development of more comprehensive certification programs for aerobic fitness
instructors.' 3 Although this evolution represents a substantial improvement in the state of the industry, the process is far from complete. In
order to define more clearly the accepted standard of practice, the industry must work towards developing a nation-wide uniform level of
competency.
This article explores the evolution of the standards of practice in
the aerobic fitness industry. Included in this discussion is a survey of the
standards of practice which have been promulgated by the leading industry organizations, followed by an application of these standards to
aerobic fitness program activities. Finally, legislative action in the area is
examined along with the concomitant problems of legislatively mandated standards of practice.
II.
A.

STANDARDS OF PRACTICE

Overview and History

At present there are no applicable standards that regulate the conduct of exercise professionals' 4 in any state statute. 15 Hence, in the absence of any standard defined by statute, the instructor's conduct must
be measured against an industry standard. Once an instructor is held
out to possess the experience and training necessary to teach an aerobic
fitness class, he or she is expected to exercise the skill and knowledge
recognized by the members of the industry.' 6 Indeed, instructors in
Drs. Peter and Lorna Francis reported a decrease in injuries among instructors from 64%
in 1986, to 76% in 1983. The study also concluded that 57% of the reported injuries were
aggravations of injuries not associated with aerobic fitness. Richie, Id.
11.

Garrick, The Epidemiology of Aerobic Dance Injuries, 14 AM.J. SPORTS MED. 67 (1986)

(33% of all students and 25% of all instructors will suffer injuries associated with aerobic
fitness classes); Francis, Aerobic Dance Injuries: A Survey of Instructors, 13 PHYSICIAN SPORTSMED. 105 (1985) (76.9% of aerobic fitness instructors reported injuries from teaching
classes); Richie, Aerobic Dance Injuries: A Retrospective Study of Instructors and Participants, 13
PHYSICIAN SPORTSMED. 130 (1985) (43.3% of all students and 75.9% of all instructors sur-

veyed reported at least one injury associated with regular participation in an aerobic fitness class).
12. Richie, supra note 9, at 21.
13. Claremont, The Ability ofInstructors to Organize Aerobic Dance Exercise Into Effective Cardiovascular Training, 14 PHYSICIAN SPORTSMED. 89, 90 (1986).
14. There are, however, numerous state statutes which regulate health club membership and marketing. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-101-114 (1973 & Supp. 1989).

15. Wisconsin has enacted legislation presumably to regulate the training and qualifications of fitness instructors. However, the statute sets no standards and requires almost
no training. See the discussion of Wis. STAT. ANN. § 134.705 (West 1988) at section IV
infra.
16. The appropriate standard is set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
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other sports are held to reasonable standards in light of their superior
learning and experience in their respective fields. 17 In addition, the
commentators have noted that special circumstances exist when one
holds him or herself out as having superior training and experience in a
particular field. In that case, the instructor should not be held to the
traditional reasonable person standard, 18 but instead should be held to
what is reasonable in light of the instructor's superior training and
experience. 19
It appears clear from the latest research in the field, as well as efforts on the part of the industry to regulate itself, that there is a need for
uniform standards for aerobic fitness instructors. 20 While there is some
disagreement as to the risk of injury from participation in aerobic fitness
programs, 2 1 more and more physicians and athletic trainers have found
that they treat a significant number of individuals who complain of injuries received while taking part in aerobics classes. 22 Others have argued
that the lack of competency standards led to the increased level of injuries. 2 3 By the mid-1980's, this increase, combined with the lack of any
specific standards in the industry, compelled at least two nation-wide
organizations to recognize the need for a set of authoritative
24
guidelines.
Today, three organizations are taking the lead in setting standards
for the aerobic fitness industry. These organizations are: The American
College of Sports Medicine ("ACSM"),2 5 International Dance-Exercise
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to
exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or
trade in good standing in similar communities.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 299A (1977) (emphasis added).

17. LaVine v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 557 F.2d 730, 733 (10th Cir. 1977) (skiing
instructor held to the standard of care commensurate with that of an experienced and
trained ski instructor); Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 376 Mass. 280, 380 N.E.2d 653
(1978) (hockey instructor with substantial experience in the game of hockey held to a
higher standard of care and knowledge than an average person); Fantini v. Alexander, 172
N.J. Super. 105, 410 A.2d 1190 (1980) (karate instructor held to level of skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of his profession and citing, with approval, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1977)).
18. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 32 (5th ed. 1984).
19. 3 HARPER JAMES AND GRAY, [HE LAW OF TORTS § 16.6 (2d ed. 1986); PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra note 18, at § 32; Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV.
1, 13, 41 (1927).
20. Herbert, Dance Fitness Standards: Is There a Need for Standards of Competency for Dance
Exercise Instructors?, I EXERCISE STANDARDS AND MALPRACTICE REP. 27 (1987).
21. Legwood, Does Aerobic Dance Offer More Fun then Fitness?, 10 PHYSICiAN SPORTSMED.
147-51 (1982).
22. Francis, Aerobic Dance Injuries: A Survey of Instructors, 13 PHYSICIAN SPORTSMED. 105
(1985).
23. Claremont, The Ability of Instructors to Organize Aerobic Dance Exercise Into Effective Cardiovascular Training, 14 PHYSICIAN SPORTSMED. 89, 90 (1986).
24. Fenly, Dance Exercise Guidelines Planned, 12 PHYSICIAN SPORTSMED. 31 (1984)
(describing the efforts of the International Dance Exercise Association and the American
College of Sports Medicine to recognize the need for guidelines).
25.

AMERICAN

COLLEGE OF

SPORTS MEDICINE,

TESTING AND EXERCISE PRESCRIPTION (3d ed. 1986).

GUIDELINES

FOR GRADED EXERCISE
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Association ("IDEA") 26 , and the Aerobics and Fitness Association of
America ("AFAA"). 2 7 In addition, the Young Men's Christian Association ("YMCA") has also developed rigorous guidelines to be used by its
staff and members throughout the world. 28 There are also several other
organizations that set standards in the industry. However, their relative
influence with respect to aerobic fitness instruction varies. 29
The approach that these industry guidelines have taken differs depending on the organization, and often lead to inconsistent results.
Some organizations set forth standards in terms of'behavioral objectives, while others are stated in terms of clearly defined standards of
practice. 30 Generally, a behavioral objective describes a level of knowledge that a competent instructor should have in order to correctly develop a class format. 3 ' These behavioral objectives state no specific
standard to be met, but focus more on the subjective knowledge of the
instructor. In other words, there is no clear statement about the type of
32
exercises or the length of the exercise period that is appropriate.
In contrast, standards of practice are specific statements of the type
of conduct that an instructor should exhibit based on both a comprehen33
sive review of the literature and the accepted practice in the industry.
Standards of practice describe the content of an exercise regime as well
as its duration.
It is obvious, even to the casual observer, that these two different
types of guidelines are difficult to reconcile in practice. One states the
proper standard in terms of what an instructor should know, while the
other states the standard in terms of specific instructor performance.
Any legal analysis of instructor conduct, using published industry standards, requires careful attention to the distinctions between behavioral
objectives and standards of practice as well as the logical inconsistences
26. INTERNATIONAL DANCE-EXERCISE ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION, AEROBIC DANCE-ExERCISE INSTRUCTOR MANUAL (N. Van Gelder ed. 1987).
27. AEROBICS AND FITNESS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, AEROBICS THEORY AND PRACTICE
(P. Cooper ed. 1988).

28. See Y's WAY TO PHYSICAL FITNESS, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO FITNESS TESTING AND
INSTRUCTION (L. Golding ed. 3d ed. 1989); THE Y'S WAY TO PHYSICAL FITNESS, LEADERS
GUIDE (R. Jones ed. 1986).

29. Other organizations have promulgated standards which have either a direct or an
indirect application to fitness programs. These organizations include but are not limited
to: The American Medical Association, Committee on Exercise & Physical Fitness, American
Med. Ass 'n, Evaluationfor Exercise Participation: The Apparently Healthy Individual, 219 J. AM.
MED. A. 900 (1972); The American Heart Association, COMMITrEE ON EXERCISE, AMERICAN HEART Ass'N EXERCISE TESTING AND TRAINING OF APPARENTLY HEALTHY INDIVIDUALS:

A HANDBOOK FOR PHYSICIANS (1972). These standards are directed towards the physician
and are in conflict with the standards published by the American College of Sports
Medicine discussed in the body of the text. See Herbert, A Trial Lawyer's Guide to the Legal
Implications of Recreational, Preventive and Rehabilitative Exercise Program Standards of Care, I I

AM.J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433, 444 (1988).
30. Angsten, An Overview of the Standards of Practicefor Dance Exercise and Aerobics, Part
Two: The Use of Expert Witnesses and Standards of Practicein Court, 1 EXERCISE STANDARDS AND
MALPRACTICE REP. LAw. ED. 36 (1987).

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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between them.
These industry standards determine accountability as they are a
guide to the level of competence and experience to be expected from a
trained professional.3 5 An exercise leader who has been certified by one
that is
of these organizations must demonstrate the basic 3knowledge
6
needed to lead others safely in an exercise program.
To fully understand the application of these standards to any particular exercise program, it will be helpful to examine the underlying purpose and focus of each of the these published industry standards.
B.

ACSM Guidelines

The American College of Sports Medicine ("ACSM") was initially
involved in developing standards for rehabilitative exercise programs.
The ACSM first published its standards in 1975 and has since revised
them twice. The standards express the ACSM position for various
phases of preventive and rehabilitative exercise programs. 3 7 The
ACSM's Guidelines for Exercise Testing and Prescription,38 contains behavioral objectives that detail the competencies for each of the ACSM certification categories.
The ACSM standards for aerobic fitness programs are part of the
"preventive tract" and are entitled Behavioral Objectives Exercise
Leader/Aerobics. 39 The standards contain core behavioral objectives
required of all classifications in the preventive tract. In addition, there
that can be found in The
are specific behavioral objectives for aerobics
4°
Exercise Leader/Aerobics Behavioral Objectives.
These objectives are further delineated as either general objectives,
describing the un-observable mental process, or specific learning objectives, describing behavior in observable terms. 4 1 For example, under
"Exercise Physiology" the general objective states the instructor "will
demonstrate a knowledge of basic exercise physiology," '4 2 and the specific learning objective requires the instructor to 43"define and explain the
concept of specificity of exercise conditioning."
34. Id. at 36.
35. Herbert, A Trial Lawyer's Guide to the Legal Implications of Recreational, Preventive and
Rehabilitative Exercise Program Standards of Care, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433, 435 (1988).
36. Gerson, "No Pain, No Gain ". What's Wrong With Some Exercise Leadership, 1 EXERCISE
STANDARDS AND MALPRACTICE REP. 52, 53 (1987).
37. HERBERT & HERBERT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF PREVENTIVE AND REHABILITATIVE EXERCISE PROGRAMS 165 (2d ed. 1989).,
38. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SPORTS MEDICINE, GUIDELINES FOR EXERCISE TESTING AND
PRESCRIPTION (3d ed. 1986).
39. The ACSM has separate sets of behavioral objectives in its preventive health/fitness personnel tract: Health Fitness Director, Health Fitness Instructor and Fitness
Leader/Specialty. The Specialty categories include aerobic fitness as well as military and

law enforcement specialties. See also supra, note 38, at 113.
40. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SPORTS MEDICINE, GUIDELINES FOR EXERCISE TESTING AND
PRESCRIPTION (3d ed. 1986).

41. Id. at 106.
42. Id. at 114.
43. Id.
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IDEA Guidelines

The International Dance Exercise Association ("IDEA") is an organization committed to furthering the interest of dance exercise instructors. 4 4 Originally IDEA planned to develop standards as well as a
certification program in concert with the ACSM. However, in 1985 the
IDEA Foundation was formed as a non-profit organization to promote
research and consumer education in the field. 4 5 In 1986, IDEA published a position paper setting forth objectives for the training of danceexercise instructors. The statement, entitled Training Guidelinesfor DanceExercise Instructors ("Guidelines'), has the following three-part stated
purpose:
[To] represent the minimum level of proficiency and theoretical knowledge essential for the dance-exercise instructor to (1)
design a safe and effective class setting, (2) lead and instruct
others in dance exercise, and (3) respond to the typical questions and problems that arise in a class setting. These training
guidelines apply only to instructors teaching healthy persons
who have no apparent physical limitations or special medical
46
needs.
The Guidelines are essentially divided into three main sections. The
first section deals with core knowledge and skills necessary for teaching
aerobic fitness classes. The second section addresses more operational
issues such as health screening, emergency training and legal issues.
The third deals primarily with nutrition and weight control issues.
The Guidelines contain behavioral objectives that describe the level
of knowledge that a competent instructor should have. For example, the
Guidelines require an instructor to "[d]escribe how to individualize an exercise program on the basis of information obtained through health
screening, progress made in class, or fitness evaluation; for example, by
raising or lowering exercise intensity, placing someone into a beginner
or advanced program, or modifying specific exercises." '4 7 However,
while this section requires an instructor to demonstrate how to individualize a program, it contains no description of the type of exercises that
should be included in the program or what the duration of the program
should be, based on any new information that may be obtained from the
participant. Indeed, from a legal viewpoint, the Guidelines offer little guidance in judging an exercise professional's conduct.
In addition to the Guidelines, IDEA has published the Aerobic DanceExercise InstructorManual ("Manual"). The Manual provides all the basic
knowledge needed to fulfill the behavioral objectives outlined in the
44. Angsten, An Overview of the Standards of Practicefor Dance Exercise and Aerobics, Part
Two: The Use of Expert Witnesses and Standards of Practice in Court, 1 EXERCISE STANDARDS AND
MALPRACTICE REP. LAW. ED. 37 (1987).
45. Id.
46.

IDEA FOUNDATION, GUIDELINES FOR TRAINING OF DANCE-EXERCISE INSTRUCTORS 1

(1986).
47. Id. at 3.
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Guidelines, as well as information needed to pass the certification exam. 48
D. AFAA Guidelines
The Aerobics and Fitness Association of America ("AFAA") was
formed in 1983 to provide a foundation upon which standards for the
teaching of aerobic exercise could be built. In 1983 AFAA published
Basic Exercise Standards and Guidelines ("Standards and Guidelines").4 9 The
stated purpose of the Standards and Guidelines is "to provide the professional instructor with up-to-date information presented in an easy-tofollow format on how to teach a class that is both safe and effective while
still allowing for the individual creativity inherent in this exercise
form."

50

The Standards and Guidelines are divided into twelve sections and describe methods by which an instructor should instruct a class. Some of
the more important sections provide information on medical clearance,
class format, warm-up exercises, cool-down exercises, and methods of
51
checking one's heart rate.
The Standards and Guidelines provide specific standards with respect
to the type of exercise that should be performed as well as duration. For
example, as part of a warm-up prior to exercise, the Standards and Guidelines state that "[c]lass should begin with 7-10 minutes of a balanced
combination of static stretches and smoothly performed, rhythmic
limbering exercises." '5 2 Hence, the Standards and Guidelines, unlike the
IDEA standards, appear to be directed more at the practical aspects of
class formatting and not the subjective knowledge of the instructor. In
addition to the Standards and Guidelines, AFAA has published a complete
textbook on aerobic fitness that provides a detailed analysis of all phases
53
of aerobic fitness.
E.

YMCA Guidelines

The YMCA has been actively involved in developing physical fitness
programs in the United States for more than a century. The YMCA invented basketball and volleyball, and it also developed long distance
running clubs long before jogging became a popular sport. 54 In 1972,
48.
49.

IDEA FOUNDATION, Certification Exam (1989).
Standards and Guidelines have been revised twice since they were introduced in the

fall of 1983. The Standards and Guidelines were first revised in 1985 when they were included
in the AFAA text book AEROBICS THEORY AND PRACTICE (P. COOPER ED. 1988), and then
once again in 1987.
50. West, Introduction to Basic Exercise Standards and Guidelines of the Aerobics and Fitness
Association of America, in AEROBICS, THEORY AND PRACTICE (P. Cooper ed. 1988).
. 51. The Aerobics and Fitness Association of America, Basic Exercise Standards and Guidelines, in
AEROBICS THEORY AND PRACTICE XV (P. Cooper ed. 1988).
S52. BASIC EXERCISE STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES section IV. B. in AEROBICS THEORY
AND PRACTICE (P. Cooper ed. 1988).
53. THE AEROBICS AND FITNESS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, AEROBICS THEORY AND
PRACTICE (P. Cooper ed. 1988)
54. Golding, An Examination of the Standards of Practiceof the Young Men's ChristianAssociation (YMCA), 1 EXERCISE STANDARDS AND MALPRACTICE REP. LAw. ED. 29 (1987).
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the YMCA published The Y's Way to Physical Fitness5 5 which contained a
comprehensive set of principles and guidelines for use by all the YMCAs' in the United States. The YMCA's guidelines are very rigorous
and founded upon solid professional expertise. 56 These guidelines appear to be similar to the AFAA's standards in that they state specific
exercise types as well as duration. 5 7 In addition, the YMCA's guidelines
provide for a specific exercise format, as well as examples of acceptable
58
exercises that may be selected based on the instructor's personal taste.
For example, chapter five of Exercise Principles and Guidelines states: "[ain
exercise session should consist of four basic parts-warm-up, muscular
strength and endurance exercises, cardiorespiratory work, and cooldown. Everyone should exercise a minimum of 40 to 60 minutes three
to four times per week.', 59 In addition, the exercise principles and
guidelines contain extensive tables and charts to properly gauge
60
workout intensity and duration.
F. Application of Standards to Aerobic Fitness Programs
At first, application of these standards to a particular exercise program may appear troublesome. Indeed, taken together they are difficult
to reconcile. Some are stated in terms of an instructor's subjective
knowledge, 6 1 while others are stated in terms of specific standards of
practice.

62

Prospectively, the behavioral objectives may be used by a fitness
program director to ensure that an instructor has the minimum knowledge of exercise science needed to format a safe and effective class. On
the other hand, specific standards of practice may be used to ensure that
a pre-planned class format complies with the industry's notion of acceptable practices. By taking care to see that a fitness program complies
with the accepted industry standards of practice, a fitness director may
63
avoid legal liability and, more importantly, serious participant injury.
In the unfortunate event of an injury or accident, a program that
followed the industry standards will be able to assert that its conduct was
within the scope of accepted industry standards. In addition, a welltrained staff will be better able to respond. to problems when they do
55. L. GOLDING, Y's WAY TO PHYSICAL FITNESS (3d ed. 1989).
56. Herbert, A Trial Lawyer's Guide to the Legal Implications of Recreational, Preventive and

Rehabilitative Exercise Program Standardsof Care, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433, 447 (1988).
57. See L. GOLDING, supra note 55, at 145.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 149.
60. Id. at 145-157.
61. Supra note 31 and accompanying text.
62. Supra note 33 and accompanying text.
63. Once the fitness instructor meets the accepted standard of practice in the industry
and the fitness class participant has consented to take part in the fitness program with
knowledge of the attendant risk of any physical exercise program, the instructor should be
able to avoid liability should an accident occur. See Simons,Assumption of Risk and Consent in
the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U.L. REV. 213, 215 (1987); see also PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 68 (5th ed. 1984).
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arise. 6 4 In summary, when accidents occur, as they inevitably will in the
fitness center setting, the industry standards may be used to judge the
appropriateness of facility/personnel policies and procedures in place at
the time of the accident. 6 5 The goal of the industry must be to establish
a cohesive set of nationally recognized standards of practice directed at
both the subjective knowledge of the instructor and, perhaps more importantly, specific instructor performance.
III.

CERTIFICATION OF INSTRUCTORS

In the mid-1980's more than 50 certification programs existed, and
it was very difficult for consumers to gauge the quality of instructors in
the fitness center setting in terms of instructor certification. 66 Often
many fitness centers developed in-house testing procedures that led to
certification of staff members, who had varying levels of training and
experience as fitness instructors. 67 Many of these programs failed to
provide even the minimum training and knowledge needed to properly
68
instruct a fitness class.
Often when an injury occurs, and is followed by litigation, the instructor's qualifications and training will be at issue. 69 This may be the
case even when the instructor's conduct leading to the injury was within
70
the industry's recognized standard of practice.
As early as 1984, at least two national organizations recognized the
need for national certification. 7 1 It became obvious that the excess of
certification programs, in particular the mail order programs, were not
sufficient to assure the consumer that their instructor had achieved an
72
acceptable level of training.
Today, The American College of Sports Medicine, The International Dance-Exercise Association and The Aerobics and Fitness Association of America have all assumed major roles as certifying
organizations in the United States. 73 The certification process, within a
given organization, is often closely related to the organization's stan64. All of the standards discussed above contain sections on emergency procedures.
See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SPORTS MEDICINE, GUIDELINES FOR EXERCISE TESTING AND PRESCRIPTION 24 (1986);
LINES FOR TRAINING
FITNESS ASSOCIATION
PHYSICAL FITNESS 27

INTERNATIONAL DANCE-EXERCISE ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION, GUIDEOF DANCE-EXERCISE INSTRUCTORS 5 (1986); THE AEROBICS AND
OF AMERICA, AEROBICS THEORY & PRACTICE 293 (1988); Y's WAY TO

(L. Golding 3d ed. 1989).
65. Herbert, supra note 35, at 449.
66. Cinque, Aerobic Instructor Certification:Standards at Last?, 14 PHYSICIAN SPORTSMED.

171 (1986).
67.

Rabinoff, An Examination of Four Recent Cases Against Fitness Instructors, 2 EXERCISE

43 (1988).
68. The basic knowledge needed includes studies in physical education, physiology,
sports medicine, kinesiology and adult fitness. Id.
69. Rabinoff, supra note 67.
STANDARDS MALPRACTICE REP.

70. Id.
71. See Fenly, Dance-Exercise Guidelines Planned, 12 PHYSICIAN SPORTSMED. 31 (1984).
72. Golding, Standards of Competency for Dance Exercise Instructors, I EXERCISE STANDARDS
MALPRACTICE REP. 37, 41 (1987).

73.

The YMCA also has an extensive certification process, however, its use is limited

to instructors within the YMCA system.
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dards of practice. 74 To completely understand the relationship of the
certification process to the industry standards of practice, it is important
to briefly discuss the various certification processes, their effect on fitness programs, and on the program's concomitant legal liability.
A.

ACSM Certification

The ACSM was initially involved in the certification of rehabilitative
exercise program leaders. However, in 1982, in response to a perceived
need for certification of preventive exercise programs the ACSM developed the Health Fitness Instructor program. 75 The rapid growth of the
aerobic fitness industry during the latter half of the 1980's led the ACSM
to develop an additional certification program for aerobic fitness leaders. 7 6 This certification program stresses basic exercise physiology, ki77
nesiology, exercise principles, emergency care and floor leadership.
B.

IDEA Certification

The IDEA certification exam is administered by an independent
testing service and will be offered three times during 1990.78 The test
covers a wide range of subject matter 79 and certification must be renewed every two years. 80 The IDEA certification examination program
contains no practical component. This didactic and non-practical orientation of the IDEA exam is a serious shortcoming of the IDEA certification process, a shortcoming that is also reflected in the non-practical
orientation of the IDEA guidelines.
74. See supra section II.

75. In order to be certified as a Health Fitness Instructor a candidate was required to
have a bachelors degree in an allied health field. The program consisted of a four-day

workshop followed by an examination. See Golding, Standards of Competencyfor Dance Exercise
Instructors, I EXERCISE STANDARDS MALPRACTICE REP. 37, 40 (1987); see also AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SPORTS MEDICINE, GUIDELINES FOR EXERCISE TESTING AND PRESCRIPTION 113 (3d

ed. 1986).
76. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SPORTS MEDICINE, supra note 38, at 113.
77. The ACSM certification process entails a three-day workshop as well as a one-day
examination. The examination contains, in addition to the written component, a foursection practical exam covering practical leadership, exercise specificity, contraindicated
exercise and exercise for special populations. Candidates for ACSM certification must possess certification from IDEA, AFAA or other equivalent organizations before they will be
allowed to sit for the examination. Golding, Standards of Competency for Dance Exercise Instructors, 1 EXERCISE STANDARDS MALPRACTICE REP. 37, 41 (1987).
78. Two additional tests will be offered in 1990 in conjunction with IDEA conferences. See IDEA FOUNDATION, CERTIFICATION EXAM: 1990 TEST DATES AND SITES.
79. The IDEA certification exam consists of three main components: 1) Core Knowledge: exercise physiology, basic anatomy and kinesiology, and exercise programing skills;
2) Operational and Administrative Skills: emergency training, health screening and legal
issues; and 3) Nutrition and Weight Control: basic nutrition, nutrition and exercise, and
weight loss and weight control. In addition, it is suggested that the applicant have completed at least 25 hours of supervised course work in related fields. IDEA FOUNDATION,
CERTIFICATION EXAM, INFORMATION AND APPLICATION 4 (1989).

80.

Recertification requires at least 15 hours of continuing education over a two year

period. Id.
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C. AFAA Certification

The AFAA certification exam 8 1 , unlike the IDEA exam, contains a
written as well as a practical component. The practical emphasis of the
AFAA exam appears to be a reflection of the practical orientation of
AFAA's Standards and Guidelines.82 The written portion of the examination tests the candidate's understanding of the Standards and Guidelines at
a Junior College comprehension level. 8 3 At present, the exam is offered
several times a month throughout the United States and abroad.
D. Certification of Instructors: Conclusions
The voluminous number of certification programs that had dotted
the fitness landscape only a few years ago appears to have diminished.
The void has been filled by fewer, albeit more respected, national certification programs, several of which were discussed above. Some commentators question the effectiveness of even these programs, given their
relatively short workshop and training periods. 84 While not completely
disagreeing with that argument, it is important to note that the almost
explosive consumer demand in recent years makes it a practical impossibility to demand college training of all aerobic fitness leaders. However,
it appears clear from the standpoint of legal liability that there can be no
exception from full national certification of all aerobic fitness leaders.
Certification programs provide, at least, presumptive evidence of the
competency of the instructor. 8 5 The consumer has the right to demand
that his or her instructor has the basic level of knowledge necessary to
instruct safely. 86 Indeed, certification programs will undoubtedly become the standard of practice for consumer fitness programs in the
87
years to come.
IV.

LEGISLATION

Although there have been many threats by state legislatures to pass
81. The criteria for AFAA certification are as follows:
1) Individuals must demonstrate knowledge of:
a. Anatomy and exercise physiology;
b. Cardiovascular/medical considerations of aerobic exercise;
c. Injury prevention;
d. Correct exercise execution and instruction;
e. Appropriate class format and instruction technique;
f. Sports nutrition; and
2) Hold current CPR Certification
West, Certification, in AEROBICS THEORY & PRACTICE (P. Cooper ed. 1988).

82. See supra notes 52, 53 and accompanying text.
83. Angsten, An Overview of the Standards of Practicefor Dance Exercise and Aerobics, Part
Two: The Use of Expert Witnesses and Standardsof Practicein Court, 1 EXERCISE STANDARDS MALPRACTICE REP. LAW. ED. 36, 37 (1987).
84. Rabinoff, An Examination of Four Recent Cases Against Fitness Instructors, 2 EXERCISE
STANDARDS MALPRACTICE REP. 43, 44 (1988).
85. Golding, Standards of Competency for Dance Exercise Instructors, I EXERCISE STANDARDS
MALPRACTICE REP. 37, 41 (1987).

86. Id.
87.

Id.
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laws that would regulate the licensing of exercise professionals, 88 there
have been few89 actual legislative proposals, 90 and only one to date has
been passed into law. 9 1
In 1986 Senate Bill No. 64 was introduced in the California Senate
by Senator Arthur Torres.9 2 Senate Bill No. 64 was not well received by
the fitness community. The American College of Sports Medicine felt
that the bill would have a "negative impact on the competence of individuals teaching fitness."' 93 The California proposal never became law.
In

1987 Senate Bill 290 was introduced into the Wisconsin Senate

by Senator Lee and others. 9 4

Later that year the Wisconsin legislature

enacted the law 9 5 which went into effect on May 3, 1988.96 The new

law 9 7 requires that only one employee of a fitness center have satisfactorily completed courses in basic first aid and basic cardiopulmonary
88. Cinque, Aerobic Instructor Certification: Standards at Last?, 14 PHYSICIAN SPORTSMED.

171 (1986).
89. Three other states: Pennsylvania, Minnesota and New York introduced bills similar to the Wisconsin legislation in the later part of 1989. As of the writing of this article,
none of these proposals had been passed into law.
90. See generally Legislative Proposalsfor Licensing Exercise Professionals, I EXERCISE STANDARDS AND MALPRACTICE REP. 91 (1987).
91. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 134.705 (West 1989).
92. The'law, as it was proposed, would have required fitness instructors to be certified
and would not allow those who were not certified to use the title "fitness instructor." The
proposed law would require course instruction and certification testing in the following
subject areas:
I. Basic exercise physiology;
2. Basic anatomy;
3. Basic kinesiology;
4. Dance exercise teaching and leadership skills;
5. Dance exercise injuries and prevention techniques;
6. Professional and legal responsibilities;
7. First aid;
8. Instruction in basic cardiopulmonary resuscitation; and
9. Basic nutrition.
Legislative Proposalsfor Licensing Exercise Professionals, I EXERCISE STANDARDS AND MALPRACTICE REP. 91 (1987).

93. Id. at 91 (citing a letter to California State Senators Arthur Torres and Joseph
Montoya fromJohn R. Sutton, M.D., President, Peter B. Raven, Ph.D., President Elect, and
John A. Miller, Executive Director, ACSM).
94. Legislative Proposalsfor Regulating Exercise Professionals, 2 EXERCISE STANDARDS AND
MALPRACTICE REP. 9 (1988).

95. 1987 Act 385.
96. New Legislation: Legislative Proposalfor Regulating Exercise Professional Becomes Law, 3
EXERCISE STANDARDS MALPRACTICE REP. 13 (1989).

97. Section 134.705 Fitness center staff requirements:
(2) A fitness center shall do any of the following:
(a) At all times during which the fitness center is open and its facilities
and services are available for use, have at least one employe [sic] present on
the premises of the fitness center who has satisfactorily completed a course
or courses in basic first aid and basic cardiopulmonary resuscitation taught
by an individual; organization or institution of higher education approved by
the department.
(b) Ensure that each of its employes, [sic] within 90 days after hire, satisfactorily completes at least one course in basic first aid and basic cardiopulmonary resuscitation taught by an individual, organization or institution
of higher education approved by this department.
(4) A fitness center shall post a notice or notices on its premises stating the
requirements of sub. (2) and the penalty for the violation of sub. (2) under s.
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resuscitation.9 8
The law, as it was passed, is a somewhat diluted version of the legislation originally proposed. In its original form, the law required at least
one employee to successfully complete a minimum of three hours of college level instruction in exercise physiology. 99 In its present form, the
law contains no provision regulating the level of fitness training that an
00
instructor must have.1
Some commentators have noted that this new law "may represent a
and
first step towards state regulation of fitness center employees"''
that state regulation of the industry is desirable. 10 2 However, it appears
and indeed may hamper
clear that this law falls short of being effective
03
efforts to improve instructor competence.'
The new law is clearly insufficient to provide the assurance that a
fitness instructor will have the qualifications necessary to properly instruct an aerobic fitness class. 10 4 The only substantive requirement of
the law with respect to an instructor's qualifications is that "at least one
employee present ...

has satisfactorily completed a course or courses in

basic first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation." 105 Hence, the law
of
contains no requirement that the instructor have any understanding
06
exercise physiology, kinesiology, nutrition or weight control.1
134.70(15)(a). The notice shall comply with the rules promulgated by the department under sub. (5)(d).
(5) The department shall promulgate rules establishing all of the following:
(a) The minimum standards for the qualifications and training of an individual, including an individual associated with an organization or institution of higher education, who teaches basic first aid or basic cardiopulmonary
resuscitation to fitness center employes [sic] under sub. (2).
(b) The minimum hours of instruction and general content of the basic
first aid and basic cardiopulmonary resuscitation courses taught to fitness
center employees under sub. (2).
(c) Procedures governing the department's approval of individuals, organizations and institutions meeting the standards established under paras.
(a) and (b).
(d) Specifications for the notice required under sub. (4) including:
1. Dimensions.
2. Print size or type.
3. The location or locations where the notice must be posted on the
fitness center premises.
(7) A violation of sub, (2) or (4) is subject to s. 134.70(15)(a). This subsection or s. 134.70(15)(a) does not preclude a person injured as a result of a violation of this section from pursuing and other available equitable or legal relief.
98. WIs. STAT. § 134.705 (2)(a) (1987).
99. Supra note 96, at 14.
100. See supra note 97.
101. Legislative Proposal For Regulating Exercise Professionals Becomes Law, 3 EXERCISE STANDARDS MALPRACTICE REP. 13, 14 (1989).
102. Id.
103. Interview with Marc. A. Rabinoff, Ed.D., Chairman & Professor, Physical Education & Recreation Department, Metropolitan State College, Denver, Colorado, in Denver
(Dec. 12, 1989).
104. Id.
105. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 134.705 (2)(a) (1987).
106. These subjects are treated in detail in L. GOLDING, Y'S WAY TO PHYSICAL FITNESS
ch. 3 (1989); AEROBICS THEORY AND PRACTICE part A (Cooper ed. 1988); AEROBIC DANCEEXERCISE INSTRUCTORS MANUAL part I (Gelder ed. 1987); GUIDELINES FOR EXERCISE TESTING AND PRESCRIPTION ch. 9 (3d ed. 1986).
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In the event injuries occur at a fitness center that does not comply
with the provisions of the statute, it may be claimed, depending on the
jurisdiction, that the acts or omissions of the center are negligence per
se.10 7 However, the statute does nothing to address the more serious
concern of the fitness industry, that of instructor qualifications.
Indeed, the real fear of such legislation is that a fitness center may
follow the law to the letter, providing one employee who is CPR trained,
but have fitness classes taught by untrained and inexperienced personnel. When an injury occurs, the fitness center may attempt to raise the
defense that it followed the statute and should not be held accountable
to any industry standard.
In reality, such fear may not be so well founded. While it is true
that compliance with the statute may be evidence of due care, it may not
necessarily preclude a finding that the fitness center was not negligent in
failing to also meet the industry standard.10 8 Whether such a defense
will be a successful bar to legal claims, at least in Wisconsin, will depend
for the most part upon future judicial interpretation of section 134.705
by the Wisconsin courts.10 9

It appears clear that even with a statute similar to Wisconsin's, the
courts will look to the accepted industry standard of practice when assessing an instructor's conduct or a program format. Hence, efforts to
assure better instructor qualifications as well as a safer, more effective
fitness experience should come from a cohesive effort on the part of the
industry, and not from legislative intervention.
V.

CONCLUSION

A little more than five years ago, the aerobic fitness industry had
little in the way of industry standards or guidelines. Today, a few organizations have emerged as leaders in the promulgation of industry standards and continue the thrust towards comprehensive standards of
practice. These organizations also offer comprehensive certification
programs for aerobic fitness instructors through workshops and examinations nationwide.
At present, there have been no published appellate court decisions
defining to what standard aerobic fitness instructors will be held.
Hence, the fitness professional as well as the trial lawyer needs to be
aware of the standards promulgated by the industry and understand
their application. Therefore, in light of the various standards of practice
in the aerobic fitness industry, it will be interesting to see what standard
107. See New Legislation, Legislative ProposalforRegulating Exercise Professionals Becomes Law,
I EXERCISE STANDARDS MALPRACTICE REP. 13, 14 (1989); see also Martin v Herzog, 126
N.E. 814 (1920); PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 229 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (1977).
108. See Stone v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 490 N.Y.S.2d 468 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1985); PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS 233 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C
(1977).
109. As of the writing of this article there have been no published opinions by the
Wisconsin courts construing the provisions of § 134.705.

1990]

AEROBIC FITNESS

courts will apply when faced with litigation. These standards and guidelines provide at least a basic description of what the industry views as
acceptable practice. In the event of injury to a participant in an aerobic
fitness program, these standards serve as a guideline by which courts
may judge the conduct of the instructor as well as the content of the
program.
However, these standards, as they exist today, are only one step in
an evolving process. In the future, the industry must move towards a
single cohesive standard of practice, recognized on a national level, if
the public is to be assured of a uniform quality level of training for all
instructors. In addition, the industry standards must define specific instructor performance and not simply state required minimum levels of
subjective knowledge.
Today, it is essential that all aerobic fitness instructors possess certification from a nationally recognized organization. However, the current certification process needs to be geared more towards a practical
application of skills in an hands-on environment if the unknowing, exercising public is to be assured of safe and effective exercise programs.
State legislation regulating fitness center personnel has been proposed in a few states and enacted into law in one. While such regulation
of the aerobic fitness industry is the product of genuine concern for the
health and safety of fitness program participants, it is not the most effective way to address the problem. In the rapidly evolving aerobic fitness
industry, effective regulation can only come from the adoption of national uniform standards of practice by the industry.

